Hidden "Frontier" of air control. New solutions to old low-altitude problems. The principle of creating a continuous radar field Radar control of airspace

This problem can be solved using affordable, cost-effective and sanitary-safe means. Such means are built on the principles of semi-active radar (SAL) using accompanying illumination of transmitters communication and broadcasting networks. Today, almost all well-known developers of radar equipment are working on the problem.

The task of creating and maintaining a continuous round-the-clock duty field for airspace control at extremely low altitudes (AL) is complex and costly. The reasons for this lie in the need to consolidate the orders of radar stations (radars), the creation of an extensive communication network, the saturation of the ground space with sources of radio emissions and passive reflections, the complexity of the ornithological and meteorological situation, dense population, high intensity of use and inconsistency of regulations relating to this area.

In addition, the boundaries of responsibility of various ministries and departments when monitoring surface space are separated. All this significantly complicates the possibility of organizing radar monitoring of airspace in the WWII.

Why do we need a continuous field of surface airspace monitoring?

For what purposes is it necessary to create continuous field monitoring of surface airspace during WWI Peaceful time? Who will be the main consumer of the information received?

Experience of working in this direction with various departments indicates that no one is against the creation of such a field, but each interested department needs (for various reasons) its own functional unit, limited in goals, objectives and spatial characteristics.

The Ministry of Defense needs to control the airspace during WWI around defended objects or in certain directions. Border Service - above the state border, and no higher than 10 meters from the ground. Unified air traffic management system - over airfields. Ministry of Internal Affairs - only aircraft preparing for takeoff or landing outside the permitted flight areas. FSB - the space around sensitive objects.

Ministry of Emergency Situations - areas of man-made or natural disasters. FSO - areas of residence of protected persons.

This situation indicates the absence of a unified approach to solving the problems and threats that await us in the low-altitude surface environment.

In 2010, the problem of controlling the use of airspace during WWII was transferred from the responsibility of the state to the responsibility of the aircraft operators themselves.

In accordance with the current Federal rules for the use of airspace, a notification procedure for the use of airspace has been established for flights in class G airspace (small aviation). From now on, flights in this class of airspace can be carried out without obtaining air traffic control clearance.

If we look at this problem through the prism of the appearance of unmanned aircraft in the air aircraft, and in the near future, passenger “flying motorcycles”, then a whole complex of problems arises related to ensuring the safety of using airspace at extremely low altitudes above settlements, industrially hazardous areas.

Who will control traffic in low-altitude airspace?

Companies in many countries around the world are developing such affordable low-altitude vehicles. For example, the Russian company Aviaton plans to create its own passenger quadcopter for flights (attention!) outside airfields by 2020. That is, where it is not prohibited.

The reaction to this problem has already manifested itself in the form of the adoption by the State Duma of the law “On Amendments to the Air Code Russian Federation regarding the use of unmanned aircraft." In accordance with this law, all unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) weighing more than 250 g are subject to registration.

In order to register a UAV, you must submit an application to the Federal Air Transport Agency in any form indicating the details of the drone and its owner. However, judging by the way things are going with the registration of manned light and ultra-light aircraft, it seems that the problems with unmanned aircraft will be the same. Now two different organizations are responsible for registering light (ultra-light) manned and unmanned aircraft, and no one is able to organize control over the rules for their use in class G airspace over the entire territory of the country. This situation contributes to an uncontrolled increase in cases of violations of the rules for the use of low-altitude airspace and, as a consequence, an increase in the threat of man-made disasters and terrorist attacks.

On the other hand, the creation and maintenance of a wide monitoring field in the PMV in peacetime by traditional means of low-altitude radar is hampered by restrictions on sanitary requirements for the electromagnetic load on the population and the compatibility of radio electronic systems. Existing legislation strictly regulates the radiation regimes of radio electronic devices, especially in populated areas. This is strictly taken into account when designing new distribution networks.

So, what's the bottom line? The need for monitoring of surface airspace at PMV objectively remains and will only increase.

However, the possibility of its implementation is limited by the high cost of creating and maintaining a field in WWI, the inconsistency of the legal framework, the absence of a single responsible body interested in a large-scale round-the-clock field, as well as restrictions imposed by supervisory organizations.

There is an urgent need to begin developing preventive measures of an organizational, legal and technical nature aimed at creating a system for continuous monitoring of WWI airspace.

The maximum height of the boundary of Class G airspace varies up to 300 meters in Rostov region and up to 4.5 thousand meters in areas Eastern Siberia. IN last years V civil aviation Russia is experiencing an intensive growth in the number of registered general aviation vehicles and operators. As of 2015, over 7 thousand aircraft were registered in the State Register of Civil Aircraft of the Russian Federation. It should be noted that in Russia as a whole, no more than 20-30% of the total number of aircraft (AC) are registered by legal entities, public associations and private owners of aircraft using aircraft. The remaining 70-80% fly without an operator's license or without registering aircraft at all.

According to GLONASS NP estimates, in Russia annually sales of small unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) increase by 5-10%, and by 2025, 2.5 million of them will be purchased in the Russian Federation. It is expected that the Russian market in terms of consumer and commercial small Civilian UAS could account for about 3-5% of the global total.

Monitoring: economical, affordable, environmentally friendly

If we approach with an open mind the means of creating continuous monitoring of PMV in peacetime, then this problem can be solved by accessible, cost-effective and sanitary-safe means. Such means are built on the principles of semi-active radar (SAL) using accompanying illumination of transmitters of communication and broadcasting networks.

Today, almost all well-known developers of radar equipment are working on the problem. SNS Research has published a report, Military & Civil Aviation Passive Radar Market: 2013-2023, and expects that by 2023, both sectors will see more than 100,000 investments in the development of such radar technology. 10 billion US dollars, with annual growth in the period 2013-2023. will be almost 36%.

The simplest version of a semi-active multi-position radar is a two-position (bistatic) radar, in which the illumination transmitter and radar receiver are separated by a distance exceeding the range measurement error. A bistatic radar consists of a companion illumination transmitter and a radar receiver, spaced apart from the base.

Emissions from transmitters of communication and broadcasting stations, both ground-based and space-based, can be used as accompanying illumination. The illumination transmitter generates an omnidirectional low-altitude electromagnetic field, in which targets

With a certain effective scattering surface (ESR), they reflect electromagnetic energy, including in the direction of the radar receiver. The receiver antenna system receives a direct signal from the illumination source and a delayed echo signal from the target relative to it.

If there is a directional reception antenna, the angular coordinates of the target and the total range relative to the radar receiver are measured.

The basis for the existence of PAL is the vast coverage areas of broadcasting and communication signals. Thus, the zones of different cellular operators almost completely overlap, complementing each other. In addition to the cellular communications illumination zones, the country's territory is covered by overlapping radiation fields from terrestrial TV broadcast transmitters, VHF FM and FM satellite TV broadcasting stations, and so on.

To create a multi-position radar monitoring network in the PMV, an extensive communication network is required. Dedicated secure APN channels for transmitting packet information based on M2M telematics technology have such capabilities. Typical throughput characteristics of such channels at peak load are no worse than 20 Kb/sec, but according to application experience, they are almost always much higher.

JSC NPP KANT is conducting work to study the possibility of detecting targets in the illumination field of cellular networks. During the research, it was found that the widest coverage of the territory of the Russian Federation is provided by the communication signal of the GSM 900 standard. This communication standard provides not only sufficient energy for the illumination field, but also the technology of packet data transmission GPRS wireless communication at speeds of up to 170 Kb/sec between elements of a multi-position radar , separated by regional distances.

The work carried out within the framework of R&D showed that typical suburban territorial frequency planning of a cellular communication network provides the ability to build a low-altitude multi-position active-passive system for detecting and tracking ground and air (up to 500 meters) targets with an effective reflective surface of less than 1 square meter. m.

The high height of the suspension of base stations on antenna towers (from 70 to 100 meters) and the network configuration of cellular communication systems make it possible to solve the problem of detecting low-altitude targets made using stealthy STEALTH technology using spaced location methods.

As part of R&D for the detection of air, ground and surface targets in the field of cellular communication networks, a passive receiving module (RPM) detector of a semi-active radar station was developed and tested.

As a result of field testing of a PPM model within the boundaries of a cellular communication network of the GSM 900 standard with a distance between base stations of 4-5 km and a radiation power of 30-40 W, the possibility of detecting at the designed flight range a Yak-52 type aircraft, a UAV - a DJI Phantom 2 type quadcopter, was achieved , moving road and river transport, as well as people.

During the tests, the spatial-energy detection characteristics and the capabilities of the GSM signal to resolve targets were assessed. The possibility of transmitting packet detection information and remote mapping information from the test area to a remote surveillance indicator has been demonstrated.

Thus, to create a continuous round-the-clock multi-frequency overlapping location field in the surface space on the PMV, it is necessary and possible to build a multi-position active-passive location system with the integration of information flows obtained using illumination sources of various wavelengths: from meter (analog TV, VHF FM and FM broadcasting) to short UHF (LTE, Wi-Fi). This requires the efforts of all organizations working in this direction. The necessary infrastructure and encouraging experimental data for this are available. We can safely say that the developed information base, technologies and the very principle of hidden PAL will find their rightful place in wartime.

In the figure: “Scheme of a bistatic radar.” As an example, the current coverage area of ​​the borders of the Southern federal district signal from the mobile operator "Beeline"

To assess the scale of placement of backlight transmitters, let’s take the average Tver region as an example. It has an area of ​​84 thousand square meters. km with a population of 1 million 471 thousand people there are 43 radio broadcast transmitters broadcasting sound programs of VHF FM and FM stations with radiation power from 0.1 to 4 kW; 92 analogue transmitters of television stations with radiation power from 0.1 to 20 kW; 40 digital transmitters for television stations with power from 0.25 to 5 kW; 1,500 transmitting radio communication facilities of various types (mainly cellular base stations) with radiation power ranging from a few mW in an urban area to several hundred W in a suburban area. The height of the backlight transmitter suspension varies from 50 to 270 meters.

MILITARY THOUGHT No. 3(5-6)/1997

On some problems of monitoring compliance with the rules for using airspace

Colonel GeneralV.F.MIGUNOV,

candidate of military sciences

Colonel A.A.GORYACHEV

THE STATE has full and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory and territorial waters. The use of the airspace of the Russian Federation is regulated by laws consistent with international standards, as well as regulatory documents of the Government and individual departments within their competence.

To organize the rational use of the country's airspace, air traffic control, ensure flight safety, and monitor compliance with the procedure for its use, the Unified Air Traffic Control System (US ATC) was created. Formations and units of the Air Defense Forces, as users of airspace, are part of the control objects of this system and in their activities are guided by the same regulatory documents for all. At the same time, readiness to repel a surprise enemy air attack is ensured not only by the continuous study by the crews of the command posts of the Air Defense Forces of the developing situation, but also by monitoring the use of airspace. A legitimate question is: is there any duplication of functions here?

Historically, in our country, the radar systems of the EU ATC and Air Defense Forces arose and developed to a large extent independently of one another. Some of the reasons for this include differences in the needs of defense and the national economy, the volume of their financing, the significant size of the territory, and departmental disunity.

Data about the air situation in the ATC system is used to develop commands transmitted to aircraft and ensure their safe flight along a pre-planned route. In the air defense system, they serve to identify aircraft that have violated the state border, control troops (forces) intended to destroy an air enemy, aim weapons and electronic warfare at air targets.

Therefore, the principles of constructing these systems, and therefore their capabilities, differ significantly. It is significant that the positions of the ES ATC radar facilities are located along air routes and in the areas of airfields, creating a control field with a lower boundary height of about 3000 m. Air defense radio units are located primarily along the state border, and the lower edge of the radar field they create does not exceed the minimum height flight of potential enemy aircraft.

The system of control of the Air Defense Forces over the use of airspace was developed in the 60s. Its base is made up of radio-technical air defense troops, intelligence and information centers (RIC) of command posts of formations, associations and the Central Command Post of the Air Defense Forces. In the process of control, the following tasks are solved: providing command posts of air defense units, formations and formations with data on the air situation in their areas of responsibility; timely detection of aircraft whose identity has not been established, as well as foreign aircraft violating the state border; identification of aircraft violating the rules of use of airspace; ensuring the safety of air defense aviation flights; assistance to EU ATC authorities in providing assistance to aircraft caught in force majeure circumstances, as well as search and rescue services.

Monitoring the use of airspace is carried out on the basis of radar and dispatch control: radar consists of escorting aircraft, establishing their nationality and other characteristics using radar equipment; dispatcher - in determining the estimated location of aircraft based on the plan (flight requests, traffic schedules) and reports on actual flights. arriving at the command posts of the Air Defense Forces from the EU ATC bodies and departmental control posts in accordance with the requirements of the Regulations on the procedure for using airspace.

If radar and air traffic control data are available for the aircraft, they are identified, i.e. an unambiguous connection is established between the information obtained instrumentally (coordinates, movement parameters, radar identification data) and the information contained in the flight notification of the given object (flight or application number, tail number, initial, intermediate and final points of the route, etc.) . If it is not possible to identify the radar information with the planning and dispatch information, then the detected aircraft is classified as a violator of the rules for using airspace, data about it is immediately transmitted to the interacting ATC unit and measures adequate to the situation are taken. In the absence of communication with the intruder or when the aircraft commander does not comply with the dispatcher's orders, air defense fighters intercept him and escort him to the designated airfield.

Among the problems that have the strongest impact on the quality of functioning of the control system, one should first of all mention the insufficient development of the regulatory framework regulating the use of airspace. Thus, the process of determining the status of Russia’s border with Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in the airspace and the procedure for controlling its crossing has been unjustifiably delayed. As a result of the uncertainty that has arisen, determining the ownership of an aircraft flying from the indicated states ends when it is already deep in Russian territory. At the same time, in accordance with the current instructions, part of the air defense forces on duty is put on alert No. 1, additional forces and means are included in the work, i.e. material resources are wasted unjustifiably and excessive psychological tension is created among combat crews, which is fraught with the most serious consequences. This problem is partially solved by organizing joint combat duty with the air defense forces of Belarus and Kazakhstan. However, its complete solution is possible only by replacing the current Regulations on the procedure for using airspace with a new one that takes into account the current situation.

Since the beginning of the 90s, the conditions for fulfilling the task of monitoring the use of airspace have been steadily deteriorating. This is due to a reduction in the number of radio technical troops and, as a consequence, the number of units, and first of all, those of them whose maintenance and provision of combat duty required large material costs were disbanded. But it was precisely these units, located on the sea coast, on islands, hills and in the mountains, that had the greatest tactical significance. In addition, the insufficient level of material support has led to the fact that the remaining units, much more often than before, lose combat effectiveness due to a lack of fuel, spare parts, etc. As a result, the RTV’s ability to carry out radar control at low altitudes along the Russian borders has significantly decreased.

In recent years, the number of airfields (landing sites) that have a direct connection with the nearest command posts of the Air Defense Forces has noticeably decreased. Therefore, messages about actual flights arrive via bypass communication channels with long delays or do not arrive at all, which sharply reduces the reliability of dispatch control, complicates the identification of radar and planning dispatch information, and does not allow the effective use of automation tools.

Additional problems arose in connection with the formation of numerous aviation enterprises and the emergence of aviation equipment in the private ownership of individuals. There are known facts when flights are carried out not only without notifying the Air Defense Forces, but also without permission from air traffic control authorities. At the regional level, there is disunity between enterprises regarding the use of airspace. The commercialization of airlines' activities even affects their presentation of aircraft schedules. A typical situation has become when they demand payment, but the troops do not have the funds for these purposes. The problem is solved by producing unofficial statements that are not updated in a timely manner. Naturally, the quality of control over compliance with the established procedure for using airspace is reduced.

Changes in the structure of air traffic had a certain impact on the quality of functioning of the control system. Currently, there is a tendency to increase international flights and unscheduled flights, and consequently, the congestion of the corresponding communication lines. If we take into account that the main terminal device of communication channels at the air defense control post are outdated telegraph devices, it becomes obvious why the number of errors has sharply increased when receiving notices of planned flights, messages about departures, etc.

It is assumed that the listed problems will be partially resolved as the Federal System of Reconnaissance and Airspace Control develops, and especially during the transition to the Unified Automated Radar System (EARLS). As a result of the unification of departmental radar systems, for the first time it will be possible to use a common information model of air traffic by all bodies connected to the EARLS as consumers of air situation data, including command posts of the Air Defense Forces, Air Defense Forces Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, EU ATC centers, and other departmental air traffic control centers.

In the process of theoretical study of options for using EARLS, the question arose about the advisability of further entrusting the Air Defense Forces with the task of monitoring the use of airspace. After all, the EC ATC authorities will have the same information about the air situation as the crews of the command posts of the Air Defense Forces, and at first glance, it is sufficient to carry out control only by the EC ATC centers, which, having direct communication with aircraft, are able to quickly understand the situation. In this case, there is no need to transmit a large volume of planning and dispatch information to the command posts of the Air Defense Forces and further identify them with radar information and calculated data on the location of aircraft.

However, the Air Defense Forces, while guarding the air borders of the state, cannot rely solely on the ES ATC in identifying aircraft violating the state border. The parallel solution of this task at the command posts of the Air Defense Forces and at the EU ATC centers minimizes the likelihood of error and ensures the stability of the control system during the transition from a peaceful situation to a military one.

There is another argument in favor of maintaining the existing order for the long term: the disciplining influence of the Air Defense Forces control system on the EU ATC bodies. The fact is that the daily flight plan is monitored not only by the zonal center of the EU ATC, but also by the control group crew of the corresponding command post of the Air Defense Forces. This also applies to many other issues related to aircraft flights. Such an organization facilitates the prompt identification of violations of the rules for the use of airspace and their timely elimination. It is difficult to quantify the impact of the Air Defense Forces control system on flight safety, but practice shows a direct connection between the reliability of control and the level of safety.

In the process of reforming the Armed Forces, there is objectively a danger of destruction of previously created and sufficiently well-functioning systems. The problems discussed in the article are very specific, but they are closely related to such major government tasks as border security and air traffic management, which will be relevant in the foreseeable future. Therefore, maintaining the combat effectiveness of the radio technical troops, which form the basis of the Federal reconnaissance and airspace control system, should be a problem not only for the Air Defense Forces, but also for other interested departments.

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Improving the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control: history, reality, prospects

At the end of the 20th century, the issue of creating a unified radar field for the country was quite acute. Multi-departmental radar systems and equipment, often duplicating each other and consuming colossal budget funds, did not meet the requirements of the country's leadership and the Armed Forces. The need to expand work in this area was obvious.

Work on the creation of a federal system for reconnaissance and control of airspace began with the decree of the President of the Russian Federation in 1993 “On the organization of air defense in the Russian Federation,” in which the now familiar name was first heard - the federal system of reconnaissance and control of airspace of the Russian Federation (FSR and KVP).

The Military Scientific Committee and the Directorate of Radio Technical Troops (RTV) of the High Command of the Air Defense Forces prepared draft reports and regulatory legal documents that formed the basis for the 1994 decrees of the President of the Russian Federation “On the creation of a federal system for reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation” and “ On approval of the Regulations on the Central Interdepartmental Commission of the Federal System of Intelligence and Airspace Control of the Russian Federation.”

The FSR and KVP were assigned the following tasks:

• radar reconnaissance and radar control of the airspace of the Russian Federation;
• operational control of forces and means of radar reconnaissance and radar control of airspace;
• organization of interaction between control bodies of the branches of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces) and air traffic control bodies;
• information support for military command and control systems and air traffic control bodies;
• placement of radio-electronic equipment on the territory of the Russian Federation on the basis of a unified technical policy.

The information basis of the FSR and KVP was made up of units of RTV air defense, communications troops and radio technical support of the Air Force, radar surveillance of the Navy, and radar positions of the Unified Air Traffic Management System (US ATM). Radar reconnaissance units of the Air Defense Forces of the Ground Forces could be used by special order.

Thus, the unified radar system of the federal system was supposed to consist of the forces and means of radar reconnaissance of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, as well as a control system, collection and processing of radar information, the basis of which was the command posts (CP) of radio technical units and formations , reconnaissance and information centers of command posts of formations and formations (districts and zones) of air defense.

In their development, the FSR and KVP, as its ideologists imagined, had to go through a number of stages of development, while it was necessary to make maximum use of the potential of the radar system of the RF Armed Forces:

1st stage. Preparatory (1993).

2nd stage. Priority work on the creation of the FSR and KVP (January - September 1994).

3rd stage. Deployment of the main elements of the FSR and KVP in air defense zones (October - December 1994).

4th stage. Deployment of dual-use information elements and testing of technical means of a unified automated radar system - EA radar (1995–2001).

5th stage. Complete transition to EA radar (2001–2005).

The FSR and KVP have been formed for two decades. Practical activities to create a federal system began in October 1994, when, on behalf of the President of Russia, the central interdepartmental commission of the FSR and KVP (TsMVK) began to function under the leadership of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces, Colonel General of Aviation V. A. Prudnikov. At the origins of the creation of the federal system were professionals in their field, military and civilian leaders and specialists in the field of air defense and air traffic control: V. A. Prudnikov, V. G. Shelkovnikov, V. P. Sinitsyn, V. F. Migunov, G. K. Dubrov, A. I. Aleshin, A. R. Balychev, Ya. V. Bezel, V. I. Mazov, A. S. Sumin, V. P. Zhila, V. K. Demedyuk, V. I. Ivasenko, V. I. Kozlov, S. N. Karas, V. M. Korenkov, A. E. Kislukha, B. V. Mikhailov, B. I. Kushneruk, N. F. Zobov, A. A. Koptsev, R. L. Danelov, N. N. Titarenko, A. I. Travnikov, A. I. Popov, B. V. Vasiliev, V. I. Zakharyin and others.

During the first four stages, coordinating bodies of the federal system were created and began to work: TsMVK FSR and KVP, six zonal interdepartmental commissions (for air defense zones), two interdepartmental commissions with zonal rights (in two air defense regions in the west and east of the country).

Regulatory legal documents were developed and approved regulating the creation of dual-use information elements of the FSR and KVP in air defense zones and regions: “Regulations on dual-use units of the Russian Ministry of Defense”, “Regulations on dual-use positions of the Russian Ministry of Transport”, General Agreement between the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport of Russia “On the creation, operation and operation of dual-use units and positions.”

Rice. 1. Assessment of reduction in resource consumption of radio-electronic equipment RTV Air Force
Graphics by Yulia GORELOVA

As a result of this work, agreements were reached between the authorized structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport on the creation of 30 positions and 10 dual-use units.

The first practical steps to create dual-use information elements of the federal system were made thanks to the persistence and enthusiasm of specialists from the Radio Engineering Troops (RTV), who performed the functions of the CMVC apparatus, as well as EU ATM enterprises and enterprises of the military-industrial complex (DIC).

The experience of information interaction between military and civilian authorities has shown that the use of dual-purpose RTV units in the village. Chalna, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Kyzyl, Kosh-Agach made it possible to reduce the economic costs of enterprises in the interests of solving EU ATM problems by at least 25–30 percent. RTV radars of types 5N87, 1L117 and P-37 were used as sources of radar information.

In turn, the use of TRLK-10 and P-37 radar at dual-purpose positions of the North Caucasus Air Traffic Control Center, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Perm, Kolpashevo ATM centers made it possible to maintain the quality of control over the use of airspace within the boundaries of responsibility for air defense in the context of a reduction in personnel and number of RTV Air Force.

However, the subject of FSR and KVP, despite the very high level of documents in accordance with which it was necessary to carry out work, was financed within the framework of the state defense order on a residual basis. And R&D on FSR and KVP in these years was financed at the level of 15 percent of the need.

Radio altimeter PRV-13 at one of the sites of the Kapustin Yar training ground. Intended to work as a means of measuring altitude as part of the 5N87 radar complex together with other rangefinders (P-37, P-35M, 5N84, 5N84A)
Photo: Leonid YAKUTIN

As of July 1, 1997, it was not possible to conclude a single agreement (local agreement) on the creation of dual-use information elements due to the lack of real opportunities for mutual settlements between military and civilian users of radar information.

There is an urgent need to have priority funding when creating a federal system. Therefore, in December 1998, a special working group was formed from representatives of the apparatus of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Federal aviation service(FAS) of Russia, which prepared an analytical note on the FSR and KVP for a report to the country’s top leadership.

The note noted that the situation with the creation of the FSR and KVP represents not only serious threat national security of Russia, but is also the reason for lost profits from possible receipts of funds into the federal budget through the FAS of Russia from foreign and domestic airlines using Russian airspace.

It was stated that the FSR and KVP are the national treasure of Russia, one of the most important fragments of the country’s unified information space. She needed immediate and comprehensive government support.

Rice. 2. Indicators of increasing the area of ​​controlled airspace
Graphics by Yulia GORELOVA

The issue was resolved at the level of the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation E.M. Primakov. To the utmost as soon as possible The materials of the analytical note were reviewed at all levels and instructions were given for further actions. The Russian Ministry of Defense, together with interested departments, prepared and agreed on projects necessary documents and in August 1999, a decree of the President of the Russian Federation “On priority measures of state support for the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation” was issued.

The decree identified the state customers and the main contractor for the work to improve the unified radar system of the FSR and KVP. The Government of the Russian Federation was instructed to ensure the development and approval in 1999 of the Federal Target Program (FTP) for improving the FSR and CVP for 2000–2010, providing for the financing of this program from the federal budget.

Over the course of several years, the draft Federal Target Program was reviewed, adjusted, clarified, reduced, supplemented, but was not submitted to the government for consideration. In 2001, the Main Control Directorate of the President of the Russian Federation became interested in how the decisions taken on the creation of the FSR and KVP were implemented, and conducted an inspection of the state of affairs.

The audit showed that the government and a number of ministries (the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia, the Russian Ministry of Economic Development, the Russian Ministry of Finance) did not take proper measures to implement the adopted regulatory legal acts. The state of affairs in creating the FSR and KVP was considered unsatisfactory and did not meet national security requirements. It was recommended to take urgent measures to correct the current situation. However, even such a harsh assessment did not change the situation for the better.

At the same time, life did not stand still. Troops and enterprises involved in the use of airspace and air traffic control needed to be given some kind of tool to equip dual-use information elements with dual-use track radar systems (TRLC DN).

Specialists from interested structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Russian Ministry of Transport and the Russian Ministry of Economic Development prepared a draft decision on shared financing of equipping dual-use radar positions (TRLP DN), which was submitted to the commanders-in-chief of the Air Force for approval by the heads of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation.

PRV-13 were also used as part of the automated radio engineering units of the ACS facilities 5N55M (Mezha-M), 5N53-N (Nizina-N), 5N53-U (Nizina-U) of the Luch-2(3) system. ,86Zh6 (“Field”), 5N60 (“Base”) of the Luch-4 system. PRV-13 interfaced with the objects of the automated control system "Vozdukh-1M", "Vozdukh-1P" (with ASPD data acquisition and transmission equipment and "Kaskad-M" instrument guidance equipment), with the air defense control system ASURK-1MA, ASURK-1P and cabin K -9 S-200 air defense systems
Photo: Leonid YAKUTIN

The decision was approved in November 2003. Starting from 2004, it was planned to finance the equipping of the TRLP DN on the principles of shared participation within the framework of the state defense order and the subprogram “Unified Air Traffic Management System” of the Federal Target Program “Modernization of the Transport System of Russia (2002–2010)” .

The equipment for equipping the DN TRLP was identified as the DN TRLC "Lira-T" produced by JSC "Lianozovsky Electromechanical Plant". In accordance with this decision, given the absence of a federal target program for the FSR and KVP, work was carried out over several years. The main technical solutions for equipping the Lira-T DN TRLC were tested during state tests at the Velikiye Luki DN TRLC. For the period 2004–2006 more than a dozen DN TRLPs were equipped: in 2004 – Omolon, Markovo, Keperveem, Pevek, Shmidta metro station; in 2005 – Okhotsk, Okha, Nakhodka, Arkhara; in 2006 – metro stations Kamenny, Polyarny, Dalnerechensk, Ulan-Ude.

The work done made it possible to have 45 dual-use information elements by the end of 2006 (33 percent of the approved lists). This result was achieved to a large extent thanks to the active position of the Central Military Commission, which different years were headed by the current commanders-in-chief of the Air Defense Forces, and since 1998 - by the Air Force.

The main burden of organizational and technical support for the creation of the FSR and KVP fell on the TsMVK apparatus, the functions of which were performed by the RTV Directorate. In 2003, the center of this very important work became the specially created 136th Coordination and Regulatory Department (KNO) of the FSR and Air Force KVP.

The management of the department was entrusted to A.E. Kislukha, who since 1994 had been the executive secretary of the Central Military Commission and led the functional direction of work on creating elements of the federal system in the RTV Directorate of the main command of the Air Defense Forces, and later the Air Force.

The formation of the KNO, of course, eliminated a number of problems of coordinating the work of various departments, but the department did not solve the main task of testing technical equipment. Due to this and a number of other reasons, it was not possible to solve the main task of technical re-equipment with dual-use equipment and the transition to EA radar by 2005. The determining factor was the lack of targeted funding for research, development and serial supply of dual-use technical equipment to improve the FSR and KVP.

Only in January 2006, by decree of the government of the Russian Federation, the concept of the federal target program “Improving the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation for the period until 2010” was approved, and then in June of the same year, decree of the government of the Russian Federation No. 345 “On the federal target program “Improving the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (2007–2010).”

Three-coordinate combat mode radar (centimeter wave range) ST-68UM
Photo: Leonid YAKUTIN

A lot of work on the preparation of draft documents was carried out by the leaders and specialists of the Air Force High Command: A. V. Boyarintsev, A. I. Aleshin, G. I. Nimira, A. V. Pankov, S. V. Grinko, specialists from the production and technological policy department and civil products (PTP PGN) OJSC "Concern Air Defense "Almaz-Antey": G. P. Bendersky, A. I. Ponomarenko, E. G. Yakovlev, V. V. Khramov, O. O. Gapotchenko, managers and specialists of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation: A. V. Shramchenko, D. V. Savitsky, E. A. Voitovsky, N. N. Titarenko, N. I. Torba, A. Lomakin, as well as managers and specialists of the FSUE State ATM Corporation ": V. R. Gulchenko, V. M. Libov, K. K. Kaplya, V. V. Zakharov, K. V. Elistratov.

The concept for the development of the FSR and STOL of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2015 and further prospects determined the main directions of organizational, military-technical and economic policy for the development of the FSR and STOL in the interests of solving the problems of aerospace defense, organizing air traffic and suppressing terrorist acts and other illegal actions in airspace of the Russian Federation.

The concept reflects the agreed positions of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, as well as other stakeholders federal bodies executive power in the main areas of development and application of the FSR and KVP in peacetime.

Ideologically, a new stage in the development of the FSR and KVP was recognized. In its development, the FSR and KVP must go through five main stages:

• Stage I – 1994–2005;
• Stage II – 2006–2010;
• Stage III – short-term perspective (2011–2015);
• Stage IV – medium term (2016–2020);
• Stage V – long-term perspective (after 2020).

At stage I from the moment of the creation of the FSR and KVP, the basis for building a federal system in accordance with the regulatory legal documents in force at that time was the principle of the coordinated use of radar equipment of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport in joint basing areas. The implementation of this principle was achieved by centralized (unified) planning of the use of radar equipment in air defense zones (districts).

At the same time, the exchange of information about the air situation between the dual-use radio technical units (RTP DN) of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the regional centers of the EU ATM, as well as between the dual-purpose radar positions (RLP DN) of the Russian Ministry of Transport and the radio technical units of the Air Force and Navy was carried out mainly in a non-automated way.

The source of financing for work related to the creation and use of dual-use units and positions were funds received by the Russian Ministry of Transport through air navigation fees, as well as funds allocated by the Russian Ministry of Defense for the construction and maintenance of the Russian Armed Forces.

The lack of a mechanism for targeted financing of activities for the creation of FSR and KVP did not allow organizing the use of information about the air situation from the EU ATM radar station located in areas where the air defense forces of the Russian Ministry of Defense do not create a radar field. This factor, as well as the lack of information and technical interaction (interface) automated systems EU ATM and air defense bodies did not lead to a significant increase in the efficiency of the functioning of the FSR and STOL.

At stage II creation and development of the FSR and KVP, after many years of effort, guaranteed state support for the deployment of the FSR and KVP was finally achieved within the framework of the Federal Target Program “Improving the FSR and KVP of the Russian Federation (2007–2010).”

Three main areas of activity were planned:

1. Comprehensive work to improve the FSR and KVP, including:

• development of design documentation for information interaction between EU ATM centers and air defense control bodies;
• development of documentation for the reconstruction of EU ATM centers;
• development of design documentation for the reconstruction of dual-use route radar positions of the EU ATM.

2. Reconstruction of dual-use route radar positions of the EU ATM.

3. Reconstruction of EU ATM centers in terms of equipping air traffic control systems with air defense control units.

The main objective of the Federal Target Program is to create the material and technical base of the FSR and KVP in the Central, North-Western and Eastern regions of the Russian Federation by equipping the EU ATM TC with information and technical interaction systems (ITI) with air defense control bodies, as well as modernizing the RLP of the Ministry of Transport of Russia for their implementation dual-use functions.

General coordination of the activities of the FSR and the KVP at the second stage of its development was entrusted to the Interdepartmental Commission for the Use and Control of the Airspace of the Russian Federation, formed by decree of the President of the Russian Federation in 2006.

A significant assistance in the work was the release in 2008 of the decree of the President of the Russian Federation “On measures to improve the management of the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation.”

The Decree legally consolidated the organizational and technical changes in the field of FSR and KVP, which actually occurred after the emergence of a new coordinating body represented by the Interdepartmental Commission for the Use and Control of the Airspace of the Russian Federation (IVC IVP and KVP), and also established that the only supplier (lead contractor) when placing orders for the supply of goods, performance of work, provision of services for state needs in the interests of the defense of the country and the economy of the state in the field of use, reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation, OJSC is the Almaz-Antey Air Defense Concern.

During the implementation of the Federal Target Program, much attention was paid to the issue of creating SITV, to achieve the effectiveness of which a standard structural diagram of SITV centers of the EU ATM centers with control bodies and air defense command posts was developed. The scheme provides for the implementation of two methods of issuing information about the air situation from dual-use information elements: centralized and decentralized.

To organize direct interaction between the EU ATM center and air defense authorities, an interaction dispatcher is appointed from the combat crew of the duty shift of the command post of the air defense formation. The dispatcher's workstation for interaction with air defense authorities is installed in the ES ATM center and includes technical means for displaying radar and planning dispatch information and means for communication with officials of the ES ATM center and the command post of the air defense connection.

This decision has stood the test of time (1999–2005). The so-called ulnar interaction between air defense control command officers and dispatchers was carried out directly at the EU ATM centers in air defense zones. The proposed technical solutions within the framework of the Federal Targeted Program significantly increase the possibilities of interaction.

The technical solution to the problem of information and technical interaction is based on a set of software and hardware tools (CPTS), which makes it possible to receive radar and planning information from automated air traffic control systems (ATC) of EC ATM centers, as well as receiving, processing and combining radar information from TRLP DN, which are part of the EU ATM center, for subsequent transfer to the air defense command post automation equipment complexes.

The technical means of SITV also include remote sets of subscriber equipment (VKAO), complexes of communication means and transmission of air situation data (CSPD). The methodological apparatus for designing and assessing indicators and indicators of the Federal Target Program, which was used in the design of Federal Target Program measures, was developed at the 2nd Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the State Research Institute "Air Navigation" and the Scientific and Technical Center "Promtekhaero".

To carry out the complex of works provided for by the Federal Target Program, a cooperation of co-executors was created at OJSC Air Defense Concern Almaz-Antey, which included more than 10 enterprises and organizations. A large amount of work in the main areas of activity was carried out by the Department of PTP PGN, MNIIPA, VNIIRA, the company NITA, NPO Lianozovo Electromechanical Plant, STC Promtekhaero, LOTES-TM, Radiophysics, State Research Institute Aeronavigation, 24th NEIU and the 2nd Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

In order to reconstruct the DN TRLC based on the requirements of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport, JSC NPO Lianozovo Electromechanical Plant specially developed and successfully passed state tests of the Sopka-2 TRLC DN.

TRLK DN "Sopka-2" is designed to equip dual-purpose radar positions of the Ministry of Transport of Russia and provide radar information to the PU of the Russian Armed Forces, involved in air defense combat duty in peacetime, to solve problems of detection, measurement of three coordinates, assessment of movement parameters, determination of nationality air objects, as well as receiving additional (flight) information and receiving “Alarm” (“Distress”) signals from aircraft located in its coverage area, and issuing generalized information about the air situation to display equipment or to the ATC system of the EU ATM and to CP (PU) of the RF Armed Forces.

The work carried out during the II stage on the deployment of SITV in nine EU ATM centers (Moscow, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Magadan, Yakutsk, Rostov, St. Petersburg, Murmansk) and the modernization of 46 air traffic control radars made it possible to create in the Central, Eastern and Northern -In the Western regions of the country, fragments of a unified radar system of the FSR and KVP, built on the principle of information and technical interaction of departmental radar systems of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport.

At the same time, the exchange of information about the air situation between the EU ATM centers equipped with SITV and the command posts of the aerospace defense brigades is carried out in an automated mode, and at most modernized positions, DN TRLCs are deployed, which include equipment for state identification of the EU GLO and measuring the flight altitude of the observed aircraft. The work carried out at stage II to improve the FSR and CVP made it possible to increase the area of ​​airspace controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defense (at an altitude of 1000 meters) by more than 1.7 million square meters. km, reduce the resource consumption of radio-electronic equipment of the Russian Ministry of Defense by almost 1.4 million hours and ensure the required level of air traffic safety by reducing the risk of accidents from 13x10 -7 to 4x10 -7.

The ending follows.

Alexander KISLUKHA

The inventions relate to the field of radar and can be used in monitoring space irradiated by external sources of radio emission. The technical result of the proposed technical solutions is to reduce the operating time of the radar in active mode by increasing its operating time in passive mode. The essence of the invention is that control of the airspace irradiated by external radiation sources is carried out by viewing the space with the active channel of the radar station only in those directions of the viewing area in which the ratio of the energy of the external radio-electronic equipment reflected by the object to the noise is greater than the threshold value, for this purpose the reflected object the energy of an external radio-electronic device, the waiting time for irradiation of the inspected direction is the shortest and does not exceed the permissible value. 2 n. and 5 salary f-ly, 2 ill.

The inventions relate to the field of radar and can be used in monitoring space irradiated by external sources of radio emission.

There is a known method for active radar location of objects, which consists in emitting sounding signals, receiving reflected signals, measuring the delay time of signals and angular coordinates of objects, calculating the range to objects (Theoretical foundations of radar, edited by Ya.D. Shirman, M., "Soviet Radio ", 1970, pp. 9-11).

A known radar station (RLS) implements a known method, containing an antenna, an antenna switch, a transmitter, a receiver, an indicator device, a synchronizer, and the signal input/output of the antenna is connected to an antenna switch, the input of which is connected to the output of the transmitter, and the output to the input receiver, the output of the receiver, in turn, is connected to the input of the indicator device, two outputs of the synchronizer are connected to the input of the transmitter and the second input of the indicator device, respectively, the coordinate output of the antenna is connected to the third input of the indicator device (Theoretical Fundamentals of Radar, edited by Ya.D. Shirman, M., "Soviet Radio", 1970, p.221).

The disadvantage of the known method and the device that implements it is that the radiation of radar signals is carried out in each direction of the controlled area. This method makes the radar extremely vulnerable to anti-radar weapons, since with continuous operation of the radar there is a high probability of detecting its signals, determining the direction to the radar and being damaged by anti-radar weapons. In addition, the ability to concentrate energy in any areas of the controlled area to ensure the detection of subtle targets or to detect targets under the influence of active interference is very limited. It can only be carried out by reducing the energy emitted to other directions in the zone.

It is known that sources that are not part of the radar can be used as radiation sources. Such radiation sources are usually called “external” (Gladkov V.E., Knyazev I.N. Detection of air targets in the electromagnetic field of external radiation sources. “Radio Engineering”, issue 69, pp. 70-77). External sources of radio emission can be radars of neighboring states and other radio-electronic equipment (RES).

The closest way to control the space irradiated by external sources of radiation includes surveying the space using radar, additionally receiving the energy of the external RES reflected by the object, determining the boundaries of the zone in which the ratio of the reflected energy of the RES to the noise Q is greater than the threshold value Q pores, and emitting energy only in those directions of the zone in which the reflected energy of the RES was detected (RF Patent No. 2215303, 09.28.2001).

The device closest to the claimed one is a radar station (Fig. 1), containing passive and active channels, a coordinate calculation unit, wherein the passive channel includes a series-connected receiving antenna and receiver, the active channel includes a series-connected antenna, antenna switch, receiver and a range calculation device, as well as a synchronizer and a transmitter, the output of which is connected to the input of the antenna switch, with the first and second outputs of the synchronizer connected, respectively, to the input of the transmitter and the second input of the range calculation device (RF Patent No. 2226701, 03/13/2001).

The essence of the known method is as follows.

For the used RES, the value of the ratio of the energy reflected by the object to the noise (i.e., the signal-to-noise ratio) at the reception point is calculated using the formula (Blyakhman A.B., Runova I.A. Bistatic effective area of ​​scattering and detection of objects during transmission radar. "Radio Engineering and Electronics", 2001. Volume 46, No. 4, formula (1) on p. 425):

where Q=P c /P w - signal-to-noise ratio;

P T - average power of the transmitting device;

G T , G R are the gains of the RES transmitting antenna and the radar receiving antenna, respectively;

λ - wavelength;

η - generalized losses;

σ(α B ,α Г) - EPR of the object for a two-position system as a function of the vertical and horizontal diffraction angles α B and α Г, respectively; the diffraction angle is understood as the angle between the direction of irradiation and the line connecting the object and the observation point;

F T (β,θ), F R (β,θ) - radiation patterns of the RES transmitting antenna and the radar receiving antenna, respectively;

R sh - average noise power in the receiving device band;

R T, R R - distance, respectively, from the RES and the receiving device to the object.

The angular boundaries of the zone are calculated vertically and horizontally, in which the values ​​of the signal-to-noise ratio Q are not less than the threshold Q POR. The threshold value Q POR is selected based on the required reliability of detection of the RES energy reflected by the object.

Within the boundaries calculated in this way, the zone is inspected in passive mode (within the frequency range of the selected RES). The active mode is not used. If in a certain direction of the inspected part of the zone the measured RES energy has a level not less than the threshold, then this direction is inspected in the active mode. In this case, a probing signal is emitted, an object is detected and its coordinates are measured. After which the inspection continues in passive mode.

Thus, the number of zone directions inspected in active mode is reduced. Due to this, the concentration of emitted radar energy can be increased in some directions of the zone, which increases the reliability of object detection.

The disadvantage of the known technical solutions is as follows.

As is known, external sources of radiation, for example radars located on the territory of neighboring states, are characterized for an external observer by the randomness of emissions in time. Therefore, the use of such sources that irradiate the inspected area of ​​the zone with a sufficient level of power, as a rule, requires a long waiting time for irradiation.

It can be shown that when using an external radar as an external 1st source, including one located on the territory of a neighboring state, the waiting time for irradiation t i of the inspected direction will be determined by the expression:

where Δα i, Δβ i is the angular size of the set of parts of the bottom i-th external Radars, the radiation level of which provides Q≥Q POR;

ΔAi; ΔB i - angular size of the external radar viewing area;

T i - review period space i external radar.

For the case when the fulfillment of the condition Q≥Q ERP is ensured only by the main beam DNA i-th external radar (which is the case in the prototype), i.e. Δα i Δβ i =Δα i0 Δβ i0 , where Δα i0 Δβ i0 are the angular dimensions of the main beam of the bottom of the i-th external radar, taking into account the fact that the angular dimensions of the external radar viewing area (ΔA i ,ΔB i) are significant, it is true:

and t i →T i .

It follows that since for modern surveillance radars the review period is T i = 5÷15 s and is strictly limited, their use as external radars with a single-channel survey method is practically excluded, since the survey of a space consisting of tens of thousands of directions, at a cost for inspection of each direction 5÷15 s is unacceptable.

In addition, modern radars operate in a wide frequency range and have a large number of signal types, the parameters of which, although known, require a larger number of channels for reception.

Modern radars are required to provide coverage of space sequentially in time without additional stopping of the beam, i.e. "on the way". Due to the fact that the moments of irradiation of the zone by the main beam of the external radar and the moments of reception of radiation by the radar station in the same directions rarely coincide, the achieved operating time of the radar in the passive mode as a whole over the viewing area turns out to be small. Accordingly, the time of its operation in active mode is significant. In the closest technical solutions, when external radars are used as radiation sources, the vast majority of the time the radar operates on radiation in almost the entire viewing area, which, as noted, increases its vulnerability to enemy anti-radar weapons and limits the ability to concentrate energy. This is a disadvantage of the closest technical solutions.

Thus, the solved problem (technical result) of the proposed technical solutions is to reduce the operating time of the radar in active mode by increasing its operating time in passive mode.

The problem is solved by the fact that in the method of monitoring the airspace irradiated by external sources of radiation, which consists in viewing the space by a radar station (radar), in additionally receiving the energy reflected by the object from an external radio-electronic device (RES), in determining the boundaries of the zone within which the ratio of the reflected object RES energy to noise is greater than the threshold value, and in the emission of radar signals only in those directions of the zone in which reflected RES energy is detected, according to the invention, the energy of that external RES is received, the waiting time for irradiation of the inspected direction is the smallest and does not exceed the permissible value.

The problem is also solved by:

Ground-based radars, including radars of neighboring states, are selected as external electronic zones, their parameters and coordinates are determined;

To view a section of the zone, select those external radars for which, other things being equal, the ratio is greatest, where D MAKCi is the maximum range actions i external radar, D FACTi - distance from the i-th external radar to the viewed section of the zone;

To view a section of the zone, select those external radars for which, other things being equal, the diffraction angles are the smallest;

To view a section of the zone, select external radars with a wide bottom in the elevation plane;

Based on the stored angular coordinates β i, ε i, and the range D FACTi for i=1,...,n external radars calculate the values ​​and angles of diffraction and draw up a map of the correspondence of sections of the controlled area to the parameters of external radar stations to be used when monitoring these sections .

The problem is also solved by the fact that in a radar station containing a passive channel, including a series-connected receiving antenna and a receiver, and an active channel, including a series-connected antenna, an antenna switch, a receiver and a range calculation device, as well as a synchronizer and a transmitter, the output of which is connected with the input of the antenna switch, and the first and second outputs of the synchronizer are connected, respectively, to the input of the transmitter and the second input of the range calculation device, according to the invention, a second input of the receiver, a synchronizer input and a channel control unit containing a memory are introduced, and a calculator connected to its output, the output of which is connected with the second input of the receiver, and its second input is connected to the third output of the synchronizer, as well as a second computer, the input and output of which are connected, respectively, to the output of the receiver and the input of the synchronizer.

The essence of the proposed technical solutions is as follows.

To solve this problem, information is required about the parameters of external radio electronics irradiating the radar coverage area, which comes from electronic reconnaissance equipment, is stored and regularly updated, i.e. a map of the distribution zone is compiled and maintained. Such information contains data on the location of the RES, time intervals of operation of the RES for radiation, wavelengths of emitted signals, radiation power and its change depending on the angles at which the analyzed sections of the viewing area are irradiated.

The available a priori information about all (n) RES irradiating the zone is analyzed before inspecting in passive mode each direction of the radar viewing area and the selection of the external RES best suited for use at the current step of the radar operation is made.

An external RES is selected (k-e from i=1,...,n), having:

The shortest waiting time for irradiation of the analyzed area of ​​the zone, not exceeding the permissible t DOP, which is determined based on the permissible time for increasing the review period:

The largest value of the ratio of the maximum range of the RES to the distance of the RES to the viewed section of the zone:

Smallest diffraction angles:

The widest beam (Δθi) in the elevation plane:

In this case, criterion (3) is the most important and therefore mandatory. To carry it out, it is necessary to bring the moment of inspection of the radar direction in passive mode as close as possible to the moment of irradiation of this direction by an external RES, i.e. reduce the waiting time for irradiation by external RES of the direction being inspected by the radar. To reduce this waiting time to the greatest extent, the claimed invention uses a phased array antenna (PAR). Phased array makes it possible to change the position of the beam in the electronic scanning sector in any order. This phased array ability allows, at each moment of time, from a variety of directions in the electronic scanning sector, to select for inspection in passive mode the direction whose waiting time for irradiation by any external RES is the shortest. The use of an arbitrary order for selecting a direction for inspection in passive mode instead of sequential transition from direction to direction can significantly reduce the waiting time for direction irradiation. Obviously, the best effect is achieved when using a two-dimensional phased array.

The receiving position, which is a passive radar with phased array, has frequency-tunable equipment for receiving and processing signals from external electronic zones, in particular external active radars, including those located on the territory of neighboring states. Based on the results of selecting an external RES, the receiving channel equipment is configured.

After selecting the RES, the signal is received via a passive channel. If, during the permissible waiting time, a reflected signal from an external RES is detected, i.e. conditions are met:

then this means that there is an object in this direction. To detect an object and measure its coordinates, a signal is emitted in this direction by the active channel.

If, during the permissible waiting time by the passive channel, the level of received radiation from the RES does not exceed the threshold value, i.e. (7) is not satisfied, this means that there is no object in this direction. The probing signal is not emitted in this direction. The passive channel antenna beam moves to the next, not previously inspected, direction of the monitored area, and the process is repeated.

For the case of using active radars as external RES, including those located on the territory of neighboring states, the criterion for selecting an external radar is the total angular size of the main beam and side lobes, at which the level of received radiation has a signal-to-noise ratio Q not less than the threshold Q POR. Such radars include, first of all, radars whose distance from the area being viewed (D FACT) is significantly less than the maximum range of the radar (D MAX).

So, for example, if the relation , then the energy level of the external radar incident on the inspected area of ​​the zone will be sufficient to detect an object not only in the area of ​​the main lobe, but also in the side lobes (the level of which in this case is -13 dB with a uniform amplitude distribution of the field across the antenna surface), and when further increase in this ratio - and in the background region, i.e. wherein and t i →0.

The specified criterion will also be satisfied for those used as external airfield and route radars, the density of which, as a rule, is quite high and therefore there is a high probability of fulfilling the condition . In addition, modern airfield radars have wide directional patterns in the elevation plane, which ensures that they simultaneously illuminate a large area of ​​the zone.

Favorable conditions for external radars are also achieved when the external radar irradiates the analyzed area of ​​the zone with small diffraction angles. So, with diffraction angles of no more than ±10°, the EPR of an object increases tens and hundreds of times (Blyakhman A.B., Runova I.A. Bistatic effective area of ​​scattering and detection of objects during transmission radar. "Radio Engineering and Electronics", 2001, Volume 46, No. 4, pp. 424-432), which leads to a decrease in the irradiation waiting time t i , since detection of an object becomes possible when it is irradiated by the side lobes and background of the radar bottom.

The choice of external radar is made on the basis of a priori, regularly updated data on the parameters and location of the radar. These data make it possible to draw up a digital map of the correspondence of areas of the controlled space to radar stations to be used as external ones when monitoring these areas. This map makes it possible to automatically adjust the parameters of the receiving channel to view sections of the zone in passive mode.

Thus, a reduction in the waiting time for irradiation by an external RES of the inspected direction in the viewing area is achieved and the solution to the problem is provided - increasing the operating time of the radar in passive mode.

The inventions are illustrated by the following drawings.

Figure 1 is a block diagram of the closest radar;

Figure 2 is a block diagram of the proposed radar.

The inventive radar station (Fig. 2) contains a passive channel 1, an active channel 2 and a channel control unit 3, while the passive channel 1 includes a series-connected receiving antenna 4 and a receiver 5, the active channel 2 includes a series-connected antenna 6, an antenna switch 7, receiver 8 and range calculation device 9, as well as synchronizer 10 and transmitter 11, the output of which is connected to the input of antenna switch 7, and the first and second outputs of synchronizer 10 are connected, respectively, to the input of transmitter 11 and the second input of range calculation device 9, channel control unit 3 includes a memory 12 and a computer 13 connected to its output, the output of which is connected to the second input of the receiver 5, and its second input is connected to the third output of the synchronizer 10, as well as a computer 14, the input and output of which are connected, respectively, to the output of the receiver 5 and the input of the synchronizer 10 .

The inventive radar station can be made using the following functional elements.

Receiving antenna 4 and antenna 6 - phased array with electronic scanning in azimuth and elevation and with circular mechanical rotation in azimuth (Handbook of radar, edited by M. Skolnik, vol. 2, M., "Sov. Radio", 1977, pp.132-138).

Receivers 5 and 8 are of the superheterodyne type (Handbook on the fundamentals of radar technology. M., 1967, pp. 343-344).

Antenna switch 7 - a balanced antenna switch based on a circulator (A.M. Pedak et al. Handbook on the fundamentals of radar technology. Edited by V.V. Druzhinin. Military publishing house, 1967, pp. 166-168).

Range calculation device 9 is a digital computer that calculates the range to an object based on the delay of the reflected signal (Theoretical foundations of radar. /Ed. Ya.D.Shirman, M., "Soviet Radio", 1970, p.221).

Synchronizer 10 - Radar devices (theory and principles of construction). Ed. V.V.Grigorina-Ryabov, pp.602-603.

Transmitter 11 is a multistage pulse transmitter on a klystron (A.M. Pedak et al. Handbook on the fundamentals of radar technology. Edited by V.V. Druzhinin. Military publishing house, 1967, pp. 277-278).

Memory 12 - storage device (Integrated circuits. Handbook edited by T.V. Tarabrin, - M.: "Radio and Communications", 1984).

Computer 13 is a digital computer that implements the selection of RES in accordance with criteria (3)-(6).

Computer 14 is a digital computer that implements control of the active channel in accordance with criteria (7).

The inventive radar operates as follows.

Data on the location of RES, time intervals of RES operation for radiation, wavelengths of emitted RES signals, radiation power and its change depending on the angles at which sections of the viewing area are irradiated are received from electronic reconnaissance means and recorded in memory 12, where they are stored and regularly are updated.

During the operation of the radar, the directions of the viewing area are analyzed in order to determine the need to emit a probing signal from the active channel to measure the coordinates of the object. For each direction of the viewing area, the RES best suited for use is determined. The choice of RES is carried out in computer 13 by checking criteria (3)-(6) for all external RES, the parameters of which are recorded in memory 12.

After the RES is selected, the receiver 5 is configured to receive signals from this RES. To do this, the signal parameters of the selected RES are supplied from the output of the computer 13 to the receiver 5. Then, using the receiving antenna 4 and receiver 5, the signal of the selected RES is received.

If, upon reception in the analyzed direction, a reflected signal from an external RES is detected that satisfies conditions (7), then in order to detect an object and measure its coordinates, a control signal is supplied from the output of the computer 14 to the input of the synchronizer 10, according to which the transmitter 11 generates a high-frequency probing signal. From the output of transmitter 11, the high-frequency signal is fed to antenna 6 through an antenna switch and radiated. The signal reflected from the object is received by the antenna 6 and, through the antenna switch 7, is fed to the receiver 8, where it is converted to an intermediate frequency, filtered, amplified and fed to the range calculation device 9. In the range calculation device 9, the range to the object R is calculated from the delay time of the reflected signal 0 . The azimuth and elevation angle of the object (ε 0 and β 0, respectively) are determined by the position of the antenna beam 6.

If, during the permissible waiting time by passive channel 1, the level of received radiation from the RES does not exceed the threshold value, i.e. conditions (7) are not met, then the signal of active channel 2 is not emitted in this direction. The beam of the receiving antenna 4 of the passive channel 1 moves to the next, not previously examined, direction of the controlled zone, and the process is repeated.

1. A method for monitoring airspace irradiated by external sources of radiation, which consists of surveying the space with a radar station (radar) in passive mode, receiving the energy of an external radio-electronic device (RES) reflected by the object, and determining the boundaries of the zone within which the ratio of the energy of the RES reflected by the object to noise is greater than the threshold value, and in the emission of radar signals in the active mode only in those directions of the zone in which the reflected energy of the RES is detected, characterized in that the energy of that external RES is received, the waiting time for irradiation of the inspected direction is the smallest and does not exceed the permissible, determined based on the permissible time for increasing the radar coverage period, while the information used about the time intervals of operation of the radar for radiation from electronic reconnaissance equipment is stored and regularly updated for each direction of the radar coverage area.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that ground-based radars, including radars of neighboring states, are selected as external electronic zones, and their parameters are determined on the basis of a priori information from electronic reconnaissance means.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that to view a section of the zone, those external radars are selected for which, other things being equal, the ratio is the greatest, where D maxi is the maximum range of the i-th external radar, D facti is the distance from i- th external radar to the area being viewed.

4. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that to view a section of the zone, those external radars are selected for which, other things being equal, the diffraction angles are the smallest.

5. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that to view a section of the zone, external radars with a wide bottom in the elevation plane are selected.

6. The method according to claim 2, or 3, or 4, or 5, characterized in that, on the basis of stored and updated information from electronic reconnaissance means about the location of the RES, time intervals of operation of the RES for radiation, wavelengths of emitted signals, radiation power and its changes depending on the angles at which the analyzed sections of the viewing area are irradiated make up a map of the correspondence of sections of the controlled area to the parameters of external radar stations to be used when monitoring these sections.

7. A radar station containing a passive channel, including a series-connected receiving antenna and a receiver, and an active channel, including a series-connected antenna, an antenna switch, a receiver and a range calculation device, as well as a synchronizer and a transmitter, the output of which is connected to the input of the antenna switch, and the first and second outputs of the synchronizer are connected, respectively, to the input of the transmitter and the second input of the range calculation device, characterized in that a channel control unit is introduced into the passive channel, containing a memory and a computer connected to its output, which implements the selection of a radar facility (RES), and a computer is also introduced , which implements control of the active channel, while the output of the computer that implements the choice of RES is connected to the second input of the receiver of the passive channel, and the second input of the computer that implements the choice of RES is connected to the third output of the active channel synchronizer, the input of the computer that implements control of the active channel is connected to the output of the passive channel receiver, and the output is connected to the input of the active channel synchronizer.

The invention relates to geodetic measurements using satellite radio navigation systems, mainly when working under conditions of strong influence of reflected signals, in particular when working in forested areas, as well as in cramped urban conditions

A method for monitoring airspace irradiated by external radiation sources, and a radar station for its implementation

B.C./ NW 2015 № 2 (27): 13 . 2

AIRSPACE CONTROL THROUGH SPACE

Klimov F.N., Kochev M.Yu., Garkin E.V., Lunkov A.P.

High-precision air attack weapons, such as cruise missiles and unmanned attack aircraft, have evolved to have long ranges ranging from 1,500 to 5,000 kilometers. The stealth of such targets during flight requires their detection and identification along the acceleration trajectory. It is possible to detect such a target at a great distance either with over-the-horizon radar stations (ZG radars), or with the help of satellite-based location or optical systems.

Attack unmanned aircraft and cruise missiles most often fly at speeds close to the speeds of passenger aircraft, therefore, an attack by such means can be disguised as a normal one air traffic. This confronts airspace control systems with the task of detecting and identifying such attack weapons from the moment of launch and at the maximum distance from the lines of effective destruction of them by airborne forces. To solve this problem, it is necessary to use all existing and developed airspace control and surveillance systems, including over-the-horizon radars and satellite constellations.

The launch of a cruise missile or attack unmanned aircraft can be carried out from the torpedo tube of a patrol boat, from the external sling of an aircraft, or from a launcher disguised as a standard sea container located on a civilian cargo ship, car trailer, or railway platform. Missile attack warning system satellites already today record and track the coordinates of launches of unmanned aircraft or cruise missiles in the mountains and in the ocean using the engine plume in the acceleration area. Consequently, missile attack warning system satellites need to track not only the territory of a potential enemy, but also the waters of oceans and continents globally.

The deployment of radar systems on satellites to control aerospace is today associated with technological and financial difficulties. But in modern conditions New technology such as broadcast automatic dependent surveillance (ADS-B) can be used to monitor airspace via satellites. Information from commercial aircraft using the ADS-B system can be collected using satellites by placing on board receivers operating at ADS-B frequencies and relays of the received information to ground-based airspace control centers. Thus, it is possible to create a global field of electronic surveillance of the planet’s airspace. Satellite constellations can become sources of flight information about aircraft over fairly large areas.

Information about airspace coming from ADS-B system receivers located on satellites makes it possible to control aircraft over oceans and in terrain folds mountain ranges continents. This information will allow us to select air attack weapons from the flow of commercial aircraft and subsequently identify them.

ADS-B identification information about commercial aircraft received via satellites will create the opportunity to reduce the risks of terrorist attacks and sabotage in our time. In addition, such information will make it possible to detect emergency aircraft and aircraft accident sites in the ocean far from the coast.

Let's evaluate the possibility of using various satellite systems to receive flight information from aircraft using the ADS-B system and relay this information to ground-based airspace control systems. Modern aircraft transmit flight information via the ADS-B system using on-board transponders with a power of 20 W at a frequency of 1090 MHz.

The ADS-B system operates at frequencies that freely penetrate the Earth's ionosphere. ADS-B system transmitters located on board aircraft have limited power, therefore, receivers located on board satellites must have sufficient sensitivity.

Using the energy calculation of the Airplane-Satellite satellite communication link, we can estimate the maximum range at which the satellite can receive information from aircraft. The peculiarity of the satellite line used is the restrictions on the weight, overall dimensions and energy consumption of both the aircraft’s on-board transponder and the satellite’s on-board transponder.

To determine the maximum range at which the ADS-B satellite can receive messages, we use the well-known equation for the line of satellite communication systems in the earth-satellite section:

Where

– effective signal power at the transmitter output;

– effective signal power at the receiver input;

– gain of the transmitting antenna;

– slant range from the spacecraft to the receiving station;

– wavelength on the “DOWN” line

waves on the “Down” line;

– effective aperture area of ​​the transmitting antenna;

– transmission coefficient of the waveguide path between the transmitter and the spacecraft antenna;

– efficiency of the waveguide path between the receiver and the ES antenna;

Transforming the formula, we find the slant range at which the satellite can receive flight information:

d = .

We substitute into the formula the parameters corresponding to the standard onboard transponder and the receiving trunk of the satellite. As calculations show, the maximum transmission range on the aircraft-satellite line is 2256 km. Such an inclined transmission range on the aircraft-satellite link is only possible when working through low-orbit satellite constellations. At the same time, we use standard aircraft avionics without complicating the requirements for commercial aircraft.

The ground station for receiving information has significantly fewer restrictions on weight and dimensions than the on-board equipment of satellites and aircraft. Such a station can be equipped with more sensitive receiving devices and high-gain antennas. Consequently, the communication range on the satellite-to-ground link depends only on the conditions of line of sight of the satellite.

Using data from the orbits of satellite constellations, we can estimate the maximum slant range of communication between a satellite and a ground receiving station using the formula:

,

where H is the height of the satellite’s orbit;

– radius of the Earth’s surface.

The results of calculations of the maximum slant range for points at various geographical latitudes are presented in Table 1.

		Orbcom	Iridium	Messenger	Globalstar	Signal
Orbit altitude, km				1400	1414	1500
Radius of the Earth north pole, km	6356,86	2994,51	3244,24	4445,13	4469,52	4617,42
Radius of the Earth Arctic Circle, km	6365,53	2996,45	3246,33	4447,86	4472,26	4620,24
Radius of the Earth 80°, km	6360,56	2995,34	3245,13	4446,30	4470,69	4618,62
Radius of the Earth 70°, km	6364,15	2996,14	3245,99	4447,43	4471,82	4619,79
Radius of the Earth 60°, km	6367,53	2996,90	3246,81	4448,49	4472,89	4620,89
Radius of the Earth 50°, km	6370,57	2997,58	3247,54	4449,45	4473,85	4621,87
Radius of the Earth 40°, km	6383,87	3000,55	3250,73	4453,63	4478,06	4626,19
Radius of the Earth 30°, km	6375,34	2998,64	3248,68	4450,95	4475,36	4623,42
Radius of the Earth 20°, km	6376,91	2998,99	3249,06	4451,44	4475,86	4623,93
Radius of the Earth 10°, km	6377,87	2999,21	3249,29	4451,75	4476,16	4624,24
Radius of the Earth equator, km	6378,2	2999,28	3249,37	4451,85	4476,26	4624,35

The maximum transmission range on the aircraft-satellite link is less than the maximum slant range on the satellite-to-ground link for the Orbcom, Iridium and Gonets satellite systems. The maximum slant range of the data is closest to the calculated maximum data transmission range of the Orbcom satellite system.

Calculations show that it is possible to create an airspace surveillance system using satellite relay of ADS-B messages from aircraft to ground-based centers for summarizing flight information. Such a surveillance system will allow increasing the range of controlled space from a ground point to 4,500 kilometers without the use of inter-satellite communications, which will ensure an increase in the airspace control area. By using inter-satellite communication channels, we will be able to control the airspace globally.

Fig. 1 “Airspace control using satellites”

Fig. 2 “Airspace control with inter-satellite communications”

The proposed method of airspace control allows:

Expand the coverage area of ​​the airspace control system, including to the oceans and mountain ranges up to 4,500 km from the receiving ground station;

When using an intersatellite communication system, it is possible to control the Earth's airspace globally;

Receive flight information from aircraft regardless of foreign airspace surveillance systems;

Select air objects tracked by 3D radar based on the degree of their danger at long-range detection lines.

Literature:

1. Fedosov E.A. "Half a century in aviation." M: Bustard, 2004.

2. “Satellite communications and broadcasting. Directory. Edited by L.Ya. Kantor.” M: Radio and communication, 1988.

3. Andreev V.I. "Order of the Federal Service air transport RF dated October 14, 1999 No. 80 “On the creation and implementation of a broadcasting automatic dependent surveillance system in Russian civil aviation.”

4. Traskovsky A. “Moscow’s aviation mission: the basic principle of safe management.” "Air panorama". 2008. No. 4.