Radar control of airspace. The principle of creating a continuous radar field. To detect air and space targets

B.C./ NW 2015 № 2 (27): 13 . 2

AIRSPACE CONTROL THROUGH SPACE

Klimov F.N., Kochev M.Yu., Garkin E.V., Lunkov A.P.

High-precision air attack weapons, such as cruise missiles and unmanned attack aircraft, have evolved to have long ranges ranging from 1,500 to 5,000 kilometers. The stealth of such targets during flight requires their detection and identification along the acceleration trajectory. It is possible to detect such a target at a great distance either with over-the-horizon radar stations (ZG radars), or with the help of satellite-based location or optical systems.

Attack unmanned aircraft and cruise missiles most often fly at speeds close to the speeds of passenger aircraft, therefore, an attack by such means can be disguised as normal air traffic. This challenges control systems airspace the task of identifying and identifying such attack weapons from the moment of launch and at the maximum distance from the lines of effective destruction of them by airborne forces. To solve this problem, it is necessary to use all existing and developed airspace control and surveillance systems, including over-the-horizon radars and satellite constellations.

The launch of a cruise missile or attack unmanned aircraft can be carried out from the torpedo tube of a patrol boat, from the external sling of an aircraft, or from a launcher disguised as a standard sea container located on a civilian cargo ship, car trailer, or railway platform. Missile attack warning system satellites already today record and track the coordinates of launches of unmanned aircraft or cruise missiles in the mountains and in the ocean using the engine plume in the acceleration area. Consequently, missile attack warning system satellites need to track not only the territory of a potential enemy, but also the waters of the oceans and continents globally.

The deployment of radar systems on satellites to control aerospace is today associated with technological and financial difficulties. But in modern conditions, such a new technology as broadcast automatic dependent surveillance (ADS-B) can be used to control airspace via satellites. Information from commercial aircraft using the ADS-B system can be collected using satellites by placing on board receivers operating at ADS-B frequencies and relays of the received information to ground-based airspace control centers. Thus, it is possible to create a global field of electronic surveillance of the planet’s airspace. Satellite constellations can become sources of flight information about aircraft over fairly large areas.

Information about airspace coming from ADS-B system receivers located on satellites makes it possible to control aircraft over oceans and in terrain folds mountain ranges continents. This information will allow us to select air attack weapons from the flow of commercial aircraft and subsequently identify them.

ADS-B identification information about commercial aircraft received via satellites will create the opportunity to reduce the risks of terrorist attacks and sabotage in our time. In addition, such information will make it possible to detect emergency aircraft and aircraft accident sites in the ocean far from the coast.

Let's evaluate the possibility of using various satellite systems to receive flight information from aircraft using the ADS-B system and relay this information to ground-based airspace control systems. Modern aircraft transmit flight information via the ADS-B system using on-board transponders with a power of 20 W at a frequency of 1090 MHz.

The ADS-B system operates at frequencies that freely penetrate the Earth's ionosphere. ADS-B system transmitters located on board aircraft have limited power, therefore, receivers located on board satellites must have sufficient sensitivity.

Using the energy calculation of the Airplane-Satellite satellite communication link, we can estimate the maximum range at which the satellite can receive information from aircraft. The peculiarity of the satellite line used is the restrictions on the weight, overall dimensions and energy consumption of both the aircraft’s on-board transponder and the satellite’s on-board transponder.

To determine the maximum range at which the ADS-B satellite can receive messages, we use the well-known equation for the line of satellite communication systems in the earth-satellite section:

Where

– effective signal power at the transmitter output;

– effective signal power at the receiver input;

– gain of the transmitting antenna;

– slant range from the spacecraft to the receiving station;

– wavelength on the “DOWN” line

waves on the “Down” line;

– effective aperture area of ​​the transmitting antenna;

– transmission coefficient of the waveguide path between the transmitter and the spacecraft antenna;

– efficiency of the waveguide path between the receiver and the ES antenna;

Transforming the formula, we find the slant range at which the satellite can receive flight information:

d = .

We substitute into the formula the parameters corresponding to the standard onboard transponder and the receiving trunk of the satellite. As calculations show, the maximum transmission range on the aircraft-satellite line is 2256 km. Such an inclined transmission range on the aircraft-satellite link is only possible when working through low-orbit satellite constellations. At the same time, we use standard aircraft avionics without complicating the requirements for commercial aircraft.

The ground station for receiving information has significantly fewer restrictions on weight and dimensions than the on-board equipment of satellites and aircraft. Such a station can be equipped with more sensitive receiving devices and high-gain antennas. Consequently, the communication range on the satellite-to-ground link depends only on the conditions of line of sight of the satellite.

Using data from the orbits of satellite constellations, we can estimate the maximum slant range of communication between a satellite and a ground receiving station using the formula:

,

where H is the height of the satellite’s orbit;

– radius of the Earth’s surface.

The results of calculations of the maximum slant range for points at various geographical latitudes are presented in Table 1.

		Orbcom	Iridium	Messenger	Globalstar	Signal
Orbit altitude, km				1400	1414	1500
Radius of the Earth north pole, km	6356,86	2994,51	3244,24	4445,13	4469,52	4617,42
Radius of the Earth Arctic Circle, km	6365,53	2996,45	3246,33	4447,86	4472,26	4620,24
Radius of the Earth 80°, km	6360,56	2995,34	3245,13	4446,30	4470,69	4618,62
Radius of the Earth 70°, km	6364,15	2996,14	3245,99	4447,43	4471,82	4619,79
Radius of the Earth 60°, km	6367,53	2996,90	3246,81	4448,49	4472,89	4620,89
Radius of the Earth 50°, km	6370,57	2997,58	3247,54	4449,45	4473,85	4621,87
Radius of the Earth 40°, km	6383,87	3000,55	3250,73	4453,63	4478,06	4626,19
Radius of the Earth 30°, km	6375,34	2998,64	3248,68	4450,95	4475,36	4623,42
Radius of the Earth 20°, km	6376,91	2998,99	3249,06	4451,44	4475,86	4623,93
Radius of the Earth 10°, km	6377,87	2999,21	3249,29	4451,75	4476,16	4624,24
Radius of the Earth equator, km	6378,2	2999,28	3249,37	4451,85	4476,26	4624,35

The maximum transmission range on the aircraft-satellite link is less than the maximum slant range on the satellite-to-ground link for the Orbcom, Iridium and Gonets satellite systems. The maximum slant range of the data is closest to the calculated maximum data transmission range of the Orbcom satellite system.

Calculations show that it is possible to create an airspace surveillance system using satellite relay of ADS-B messages from aircraft to ground-based centers for summarizing flight information. Such a surveillance system will allow increasing the range of controlled space from a ground point to 4,500 kilometers without the use of inter-satellite communications, which will ensure an increase in the airspace control area. By using inter-satellite communication channels, we will be able to control the airspace globally.

Fig. 1 “Airspace control using satellites”

Fig. 2 “Airspace control with inter-satellite communications”

The proposed method of airspace control allows:

Expand the coverage area of ​​the airspace control system, including to the oceans and mountain ranges up to 4,500 km from the receiving ground station;

When using an intersatellite communication system, it is possible to control the Earth's airspace globally;

Receive flight information from aircraft regardless of foreign airspace surveillance systems;

Select air objects tracked by 3D radar based on the degree of their danger at long-range detection lines.

Literature:

1. Fedosov E.A. "Half a century in aviation." M: Bustard, 2004.

2. “Satellite communications and broadcasting. Directory. Edited by L.Ya. Kantor.” M: Radio and communication, 1988.

3. Andreev V.I. "Order of the Federal Service air transport RF dated October 14, 1999 No. 80 “On the creation and implementation of a broadcasting automatic dependent surveillance system in civil aviation Russia."

4. Traskovsky A. “Moscow’s aviation mission: the basic principle of safe management.” "Air panorama". 2008. No. 4.

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1 Scientific and technical problems in the development of the federal reconnaissance and airspace control system Russian Federation and ways to solve them Major General A.Ya. KOBAN, Candidate of Technical Sciences Colonel D.N. SAMOTONIN, Candidate of Technical Sciences ABSTRACT. The main scientific and technical problems and directions of development of the Federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation and the country's air navigation system in the context of the creation of aerospace defense of Russia are identified. KEY WORDS: federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation, air navigation system of Russia, radio technical troops, radar support, unified automated radar system. SUMMARY. Rey scientific and technical problems and areas for developing the RF Federal system of air space reconnaissance and control and Air navigation system of the country in terms of creation of the Aerospace Defense of Russia. KEYWORDS: RF Federal system of air space reconnaissance and control, Air navigation system of Russia, Radio Technical Troops, radar support, unified automated radar system. The FEDERAL system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (FSR and KVP RF) was created on the basis of Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of January 14, 1994 146, is an interdepartmental dual-use system and is intended to provide radar information about the air situation of points and control centers (CP, Central Command) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces) in the interests of solving air defense (air defense) tasks, including tasks of protecting the state border and suppressing terrorist acts and other illegal actions in the airspace of the Russian Federation, ensuring flights of state, experimental and civil aviation, as well as for radar support of organization centers air traffic air navigation system of the Russian Federation (ANS of Russia) through the integrated use of radar systems and equipment available in the RF Armed Forces and ANS of Russia. The information and technical basis of the FSR and KVP of the Russian Federation is the unified automated radar system (URLS). To solve the tasks assigned to the FSR and KVP, the EARLS involves the forces and means of radio technical units and subunits of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, as well as dual-use radar positions (RLP DN) Federal agency air transport (Rosaviation). In order to develop the EARLS, in the period from 2007 to 2015, the federal target program “Improving the federal system

2 SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT OF FSR AND STOL OF THE RF AND WAYS FOR THEIR SOLUTION 15 reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as the Program (), approved by Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of June 2, 2006 345. Analysis of the results of the implementation of the Program ( ) shows that the goals stated in it to increase the efficiency of airspace control, reduce the overall costs of maintaining radio engineering units of the Russian Ministry of Defense and increase aviation safety have been largely achieved. At the same time, the absence of conceptual and regulatory legal documents regulating the issues of functioning, ensuring activities and development of the FSR and STOL, changes in the conditions and factors influencing the construction and application of a unified radar system and control system for the use of the airspace of the Russian Federation, determined a number of scientific and technical problems in the development of the FSR and STOL for the period until 2025: insufficient level of automation of information and technical interaction Air Defense Control Center (PU, CP) with the operational bodies of the Unified Air Traffic Management System (US ATM) to implement effective joint processing of radar, flight and planning information about the air situation when solving problems of monitoring the use of Russian airspace; non-compliance of the principles of construction and operation of the EARLS with the requirements for its integration with the EU ATM, the formation and maintenance of a unified information space about the state of the air situation in the context of the creation of the Aerospace Defense System of the Russian Federation and the Russian ATS; discrepancy between the principles of development, operation and application in the control system of the Aerospace Forces (VKS) of automation equipment for monitoring the use of the airspace of the Russian Federation with the requirements placed on them in modern conditions; discrepancy between the performance characteristics of outdated radar equipment and the modern information needs of the Russian Ministry of Defense when solving the tasks assigned to them, taking into account the increasing threats to the security of the Russian Federation in the airspace. The formulated scientific and technical problems made it possible to substantiate the following main directions for the development of FSR and KVP in the context of the creation of the aerospace defense system of the Russian Federation and the ANS of Russia. First direction. Development of new and modernization of existing airspace reconnaissance (surveillance) means. Analysis of the predicted target and interference environment for the period up to 2025 necessitates a significant increase in the requirements for the radar equipment used in terms of their spatial and information capabilities. Considering that all manned aircraft, as well as many unmanned enemy aircraft, are equipped with jamming transmitters to make it easier to overcome the air defense system, the requirements for noise immunity of radio technical troops (RTV) groups are significantly increasing. In the context of a shortening time interval between the detection of targets and the delivery of a strike on them by enemy air attack means, the main way to preserve the RTV group will be maneuver by forces and means of radar reconnaissance. Consequently, the requirements for the mobility of promising radars are increasing. Considering that air defense combat duty tasks are carried out continuously (in peacetime and wartime), and the operating conditions of radar equipment in peacetime and wartime are different, then

3 16 A.Ya. KOBAN, D.N. SAMOTONIN requirements for standby radar equipment in peacetime and wartime will be different. To solve peacetime problems, relatively inexpensive radars with integrated secondary radar equipment and additional automatic dependent surveillance (ADS-V) equipment are needed. In order to reduce cost, these radar equipment can be stationary (transportable), but at the same time they must have high reliability (assigned service life of more than one hundred thousand hours, mean time between failures of thousands of hours), maintainability (block-modular design principle, built-in diagnostic and troubleshooting equipment , technical condition forecasting), low operating costs (automatic radar modules without calculations). Taking into account the need to use information about the air situation in the interests of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport of Russia when solving ATM problems, these radar equipment must be certified in accordance with the established procedure. One of the main directions in the development of standby radar equipment performing tasks in Peaceful time, they must be brought to the level of automatic radars. This requirement is also due to the need to recreate the radar field in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation. Based on the conditions of use in wartime, the following requirements are additionally imposed on standby radar equipment: automatic reconnaissance of types of interference and adaptation to the air and electronic environment, including the ability to concentrate energy on interference-hazardous and other important areas; high secrecy of operation ensured by the development of passive (semi-active) radar equipment; high mobility, ensured by a reduction in the time of folding (deployment), switching on and monitoring the functioning of the radar; automatic topographic reference and orientation. At the same time, standby radars intended for air defense combat duty in wartime must be multi-band, providing, at low energy costs, the required characteristics in terms of detection range and accuracy in determining the coordinates of enemy air defense systems. Taking into account the analysis of potential threats to the Russian Federation in the aerospace sphere, the relevance of detecting airborne attack systems operating at low and extremely low altitudes is increasing. Differences in the conditions and tasks of using low-altitude radars predetermine their division into duty and combat mode radars. The main requirements for promising low-altitude standby radars are: the ability to detect and track low-flying, small-sized and low-speed air targets (KR, UAVs, hang gliders, etc.) against the background of intense reflections from the ground, local objects, hydrometeorological formations, intentional passive and non-synchronous impulse noise; the presence in the radar complexes (RLC) of remote radar modules located outside the RTV units and operating in automatic mode; the possibility of placing antenna systems on high-altitude supports (in some cases on tethered balloons). Low-altitude radars in combat mode are primarily required to have high maneuverability, sufficient energy

4 SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT OF FSR AND KVP RF AND WAYS TO SOLUTION 17 technical potential with the possibility of its concentration in a given direction (sector), increased accuracy of coordinate measurement and the ability to detect targets with a small effective scattering surface (ESR). One of the main requirements for promising radars is the need to interface them with existing and future automation systems, as well as the possibility of integration into a single information space about the state of the air situation. This includes, among other things, the use of unified protocols for exchanging information about the state of the air situation, combining radar information from various sources about air objects, and exchanging this information at higher speeds using the means of the digital telecommunications network being created by the Russian Ministry of Defense. Second direction. Full-scale deployment of EARLS FSR and STOL and its comprehensive modernization in the interests of increasing the efficiency of using radar, flight and planning information received from EU ATM units to solve air defense problems. Full-scale deployment of EARLS and its comprehensive modernization include: equipping (re-equipping) radio engineering units with modern and advanced radars (RLK); modernization of dual-use route radar positions of the Federal Air Transport Agency by deploying new airborne radar systems on them, as well as reconstruction of EU ATM centers, including in the interests of improving interdepartmental information and technical interaction; creation and deployment of unified automatic modules of software and hardware (MPTS), providing automatic exchange of planned, radar and additional information using unified protocols for information and technical interaction of dual-use route radar positions and EC ATM centers with the control center (PU, CP) of the RF Armed Forces. To ensure information and technical interaction through digital channels and using unified protocols, Russian Ministry of Defense facilities provide for the purchase of advanced automation systems (CAS), which together will increase the efficiency of joint processing of radar, flight and planning information at command posts of radio engineering regiments. Third direction. Phased creation of an integrated radar system of the FSR and STOL in the interests of creating a unified information space about the state of the air situation using the resources of the deployed EARLS. The implementation of this direction is organized by equipping radio engineering regiments with complexes of automatic means developed within the framework of the development work (R&D) “Observer FSR and KVP”, and integrating on their basis all sources of radar information of the Russian Ministry of Defense and Rosaviation, stationed within the boundaries of the position area of ​​the radio engineering regiment. Fourth direction. Organization of a unified system for automated control of the use of Russian airspace (ESKIVP) in the videoconferencing control system. The implementation of this direction is planned to be carried out within the framework of the state armament program, which provides for the development and adoption of unified MPTS for automation of solving the problem of monitoring the use

5 18 A.Ya. KOBAN, D.N. SAMOTONIN airspace of the Russian Federation. MPTS are intended for joint use with the control center control system (PU, CP) of aerospace forces associations, air defense formations, military units of the RTV in the interests of improving the quality of solving the problem of monitoring the use of airspace based on the implementation of modern system-technical principles for the exchange and processing of information coming from the EU ATM centers and PU radio technical troops. MPTS is being developed in various configurations with an open interface for information and technical interfacing for use at all levels of management in the automated solution of the problem of monitoring the use of airspace in conjunction with existing and future automation systems. Thus, in solving the main scientific and technical problems in the period until 2025, two stages can be distinguished: comprehensive modernization of EARLS in all regions of the Russian Federation, creation of the head site for the joint use of the integrated radar system (IRLS) FSR and KVP and ESKIVP years full-scale deployment of IRLS and ESKIVP in all regions of the country. Successful implementation of the stages of development of the SDF and CVP is possible with the unconditional implementation of GPV activities and the timely development (clarification) of conceptual and regulatory legal documents regulating the issues of construction, operation, support of the activities and development of the SDF and CVP.

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Improving the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control: history, reality, prospects

At the end of the 20th century, the issue of creating a unified radar field for the country was quite acute. Multi-departmental radar systems and equipment, often duplicating each other and consuming colossal budget funds, did not meet the requirements of the country's leadership and the Armed Forces. The need to expand work in this area was obvious.

Work on the creation of a federal system for reconnaissance and control of airspace began with the decree of the President of the Russian Federation in 1993 “On the organization of air defense in the Russian Federation,” in which the now familiar name was first heard - the federal system of reconnaissance and control of airspace of the Russian Federation (FSR and KVP).

The Military Scientific Committee and the Directorate of Radio Technical Troops (RTV) of the High Command of the Air Defense Forces prepared draft reports and regulatory legal documents that formed the basis for the 1994 decrees of the President of the Russian Federation “On the creation of a federal system for reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation” and “ On approval of the Regulations on the Central Interdepartmental Commission of the Federal System of Intelligence and Airspace Control of the Russian Federation.”

The FSR and KVP were assigned the following tasks:

• radar reconnaissance and radar control of the airspace of the Russian Federation;
• operational control of forces and means of radar reconnaissance and radar control of airspace;
• organization of interaction between control bodies of the branches of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces) and air traffic control bodies;
• information support for military command and control systems and air traffic control bodies;
• placement of radio-electronic equipment on the territory of the Russian Federation on the basis of a unified technical policy.

The information basis of the FSR and KVP was made up of units of RTV air defense, communications troops and radio technical support of the Air Force, radar surveillance of the Navy, and radar positions of the Unified Air Traffic Management System (US ATM). Radar reconnaissance units of the Air Defense Forces of the Ground Forces could be used by special order.

Thus, the unified radar system of the federal system was supposed to consist of the forces and means of radar reconnaissance of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, as well as a control system, collection and processing of radar information, the basis of which was the command posts (CP) of radio technical units and formations , reconnaissance and information centers of command posts of formations and formations (districts and zones) of air defense.

In their development, the FSR and KVP, as its ideologists imagined, had to go through a number of stages of development, while it was necessary to make maximum use of the potential of the radar system of the RF Armed Forces:

1st stage. Preparatory (1993).

2nd stage. Priority work on the creation of the FSR and KVP (January - September 1994).

3rd stage. Deployment of the main elements of the FSR and KVP in air defense zones (October - December 1994).

4th stage. Deployment of dual-use information elements and testing of technical means of a unified automated radar system - EA radar (1995–2001).

5th stage. Complete transition to EA radar (2001–2005).

The FSR and KVP have been formed for two decades. Practical activities to create a federal system began in October 1994, when, on behalf of the President of Russia, the central interdepartmental commission of the FSR and KVP (TsMVK) began to function under the leadership of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces, Colonel General of Aviation V. A. Prudnikov. At the origins of the creation of the federal system were professionals in their field, military and civilian leaders and specialists in the field of air defense and air traffic control: V. A. Prudnikov, V. G. Shelkovnikov, V. P. Sinitsyn, V. F. Migunov, G. K. Dubrov, A. I. Aleshin, A. R. Balychev, Ya. V. Bezel, V. I. Mazov, A. S. Sumin, V. P. Zhila, V. K. Demedyuk, V. I. Ivasenko, V. I. Kozlov, S. N. Karas, V. M. Korenkov, A. E. Kislukha, B. V. Mikhailov, B. I. Kushneruk, N. F. Zobov, A. A. Koptsev, R. L. Danelov, N. N. Titarenko, A. I. Travnikov, A. I. Popov, B. V. Vasiliev, V. I. Zakharyin and others.

During the first four stages, coordinating bodies of the federal system were created and began to work: TsMVK FSR and KVP, six zonal interdepartmental commissions (for air defense zones), two interdepartmental commissions with zonal rights (in two air defense regions in the west and east of the country).

Regulatory legal documents were developed and approved regulating the creation of dual-use information elements of the FSR and KVP in air defense zones and regions: “Regulations on dual-use units of the Russian Ministry of Defense”, “Regulations on dual-use positions of the Russian Ministry of Transport”, General Agreement between the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport of Russia “On the creation, operation and operation of dual-use units and positions.”

Rice. 1. Assessment of reduction in resource consumption of radio-electronic equipment RTV Air Force
Graphics by Yulia GORELOVA

As a result of this work, agreements were reached between the authorized structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport on the creation of 30 positions and 10 dual-use units.

The first practical steps to create dual-use information elements of the federal system were made thanks to the persistence and enthusiasm of specialists from the Radio Engineering Troops (RTV), who performed the functions of the CMVC apparatus, as well as EU ATM enterprises and enterprises of the military-industrial complex (DIC).

The experience of information interaction between military and civilian authorities has shown that the use of dual-purpose RTV units in the village. Chalna, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Kyzyl, Kosh-Agach made it possible to reduce the economic costs of enterprises in the interests of solving EU ATM problems by at least 25–30 percent. RTV radars of types 5N87, 1L117 and P-37 were used as sources of radar information.

In turn, the use of TRLK-10 and P-37 radar at dual-purpose positions of the North Caucasus Air Traffic Control Center, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Perm, Kolpashevo ATM centers made it possible to maintain the quality of control over the use of airspace within the boundaries of responsibility for air defense in the context of a reduction in personnel and number of RTV Air Force.

However, the topics of FSR and KVP, despite very high level documents, in accordance with which it was necessary to carry out work, was financed within the framework of the state defense order on a residual basis. And R&D on FSR and KVP in these years was financed at the level of 15 percent of the need.

Radio altimeter PRV-13 at one of the sites of the Kapustin Yar training ground. Intended to work as a means of measuring altitude as part of the 5N87 radar complex together with other rangefinders (P-37, P-35M, 5N84, 5N84A)
Photo: Leonid YAKUTIN

As of July 1, 1997, it was not possible to conclude a single agreement (local agreement) on the creation of dual-use information elements due to the lack of real opportunities for mutual settlements between military and civilian users of radar information.

There is an urgent need to have priority funding when creating a federal system. Therefore, in December 1998, a special working group was formed from representatives of the apparatus of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Federal aviation service(FAS) of Russia, which prepared an analytical note on the FSR and KVP for a report to the country’s top leadership.

The note noted that the situation with the creation of the FSR and KVP poses not only a serious threat to the national security of Russia, but also causes lost profits from possible revenues Money to the federal budget through the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia from foreign and domestic airlines using Russian airspace.

It was stated that the FSR and KVP are the national treasure of Russia, one of the most important fragments of the country’s unified information space. She needed immediate and comprehensive government support.

Rice. 2. Indicators of increasing the area of ​​controlled airspace
Graphics by Yulia GORELOVA

The issue was resolved at the level of the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation E.M. Primakov. To the utmost as soon as possible The materials of the analytical note were reviewed at all levels and instructions were given for further actions. The Russian Ministry of Defense, together with interested departments, prepared and agreed on projects necessary documents and in August 1999, a decree of the President of the Russian Federation “On priority measures of state support for the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation” was issued.

The decree identified the state customers and the main contractor for the work to improve the unified radar system of the FSR and KVP. The Government of the Russian Federation was instructed to ensure the development and approval in 1999 of the Federal Target Program (FTP) for improving the FSR and CVP for 2000–2010, providing for the financing of this program from the federal budget.

Over the course of several years, the draft Federal Target Program was reviewed, adjusted, clarified, reduced, supplemented, but was not submitted to the government for consideration. In 2001, the Main Control Directorate of the President of the Russian Federation became interested in how the decisions taken on the creation of the FSR and KVP were implemented, and conducted an inspection of the state of affairs.

The audit showed that the government and a number of ministries (the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia, the Russian Ministry of Economic Development, the Russian Ministry of Finance) did not take proper measures to implement the adopted regulatory legal acts. The state of affairs in creating the FSR and KVP was considered unsatisfactory and did not meet national security requirements. It was recommended to take urgent measures to correct the current situation. However, even such a harsh assessment did not change the situation for the better.

At the same time, life did not stand still. Troops and enterprises involved in the use of airspace and air traffic control needed to be given some kind of tool to equip dual-use information elements with dual-use track radar systems (TRLC DN).

Specialists from interested structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Russian Ministry of Transport and the Russian Ministry of Economic Development prepared a draft decision on shared financing of equipping dual-use radar positions (TRLP DN), which was submitted to the commanders-in-chief of the Air Force for approval by the heads of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation.

PRV-13 were also used as part of the automated radio engineering units of the ACS facilities 5N55M (Mezha-M), 5N53-N (Nizina-N), 5N53-U (Nizina-U) of the Luch-2(3) system. ,86Zh6 (“Field”), 5N60 (“Base”) of the Luch-4 system. PRV-13 interfaced with the objects of the automated control system "Vozdukh-1M", "Vozdukh-1P" (with ASPD data acquisition and transmission equipment and "Kaskad-M" instrument guidance equipment), with the air defense control system ASURK-1MA, ASURK-1P and cabin K -9 S-200 air defense systems
Photo: Leonid YAKUTIN

The decision was approved in November 2003. Starting from 2004, it was planned to finance the equipping of the TRLP DN on the principles of shared participation within the framework of the state defense order and the subprogram “Unified Air Traffic Management System” of the Federal Target Program “Modernization of the Transport System of Russia (2002–2010)” .

The equipment for equipping the DN TRLP was identified as the DN TRLC "Lira-T" produced by JSC "Lianozovsky Electromechanical Plant". In accordance with this decision, given the absence of a federal target program for the FSR and KVP, work was carried out over several years. The main technical solutions for equipping the Lira-T DN TRLC were tested during state tests at the Velikiye Luki DN TRLC. For the period 2004–2006 more than a dozen DN TRLPs were equipped: in 2004 – Omolon, Markovo, Keperveem, Pevek, Shmidta metro station; in 2005 – Okhotsk, Okha, Nakhodka, Arkhara; in 2006 – metro stations Kamenny, Polyarny, Dalnerechensk, Ulan-Ude.

The work done made it possible to have 45 dual-use information elements by the end of 2006 (33 percent of the approved lists). This result was achieved to a large extent thanks to the active position of the Central Military Command, which in different years was headed by the current commanders-in-chief of the Air Defense Forces, and since 1998 - by the Air Force.

The main burden of organizational and technical support for the creation of the FSR and KVP fell on the TsMVK apparatus, the functions of which were performed by the RTV Directorate. In 2003, the center of this very important work became the specially created 136th Coordination and Regulatory Department (KNO) of the FSR and Air Force KVP.

The management of the department was entrusted to A.E. Kislukha, who since 1994 had been the executive secretary of the Central Military Commission and led the functional direction of work on creating elements of the federal system in the RTV Directorate of the main command of the Air Defense Forces, and later the Air Force.

The formation of the KNO, of course, eliminated a number of problems of coordinating the work of various departments, but the department did not solve the main task of testing technical equipment. Due to this and a number of other reasons, it was not possible to solve the main task of technical re-equipment with dual-use equipment and the transition to EA radar by 2005. The determining factor was the lack of targeted funding for research, development and serial supply of dual-use technical equipment to improve the FSR and KVP.

Only in January 2006, by decree of the government of the Russian Federation, the concept of the federal target program “Improving the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation for the period until 2010” was approved, and then in June of the same year, decree of the government of the Russian Federation No. 345 “On the federal target program “Improving the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (2007–2010).”

Three-coordinate combat mode radar (centimeter wave range) ST-68UM
Photo: Leonid YAKUTIN

A lot of work on the preparation of draft documents was carried out by the leaders and specialists of the Air Force High Command: A. V. Boyarintsev, A. I. Aleshin, G. I. Nimira, A. V. Pankov, S. V. Grinko, specialists from the production and technological policy department and civil products (PTP PGN) OJSC "Concern Air Defense "Almaz-Antey": G. P. Bendersky, A. I. Ponomarenko, E. G. Yakovlev, V. V. Khramov, O. O. Gapotchenko, managers and specialists of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation: A. V. Shramchenko, D. V. Savitsky, E. A. Voitovsky, N. N. Titarenko, N. I. Torba, A. Lomakin, as well as managers and specialists of the FSUE State ATM Corporation ": V. R. Gulchenko, V. M. Libov, K. K. Kaplya, V. V. Zakharov, K. V. Elistratov.

The concept for the development of the FSR and STOL of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2015 and further prospects determined the main directions of organizational, military-technical and economic policy for the development of the FSR and STOL in the interests of solving the problems of aerospace defense, organizing air traffic and suppressing terrorist acts and other illegal actions in airspace of the Russian Federation.

The concept reflects the agreed positions of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, as well as other interested federal bodies executive power in the main areas of development and application of FSR and KVP in peacetime.

Ideologically, a new stage in the development of the FSR and KVP was recognized. In its development, the FSR and KVP must go through five main stages:

• Stage I – 1994–2005;
• Stage II – 2006–2010;
• Stage III – short-term perspective (2011–2015);
• Stage IV – medium term (2016–2020);
• Stage V – long-term perspective (after 2020).

At stage I from the moment of the creation of the FSR and KVP, the basis for building a federal system in accordance with the regulatory legal documents in force at that time was the principle of the coordinated use of radar equipment of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport in joint basing areas. The implementation of this principle was achieved by centralized (unified) planning of the use of radar equipment in air defense zones (districts).

At the same time, the exchange of information about the air situation between the dual-use radio technical units (RTP DN) of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the regional centers of the EU ATM, as well as between the dual-purpose radar positions (RLP DN) of the Russian Ministry of Transport and the radio technical units of the Air Force and Navy was carried out mainly in a non-automated way.

The source of financing for work related to the creation and use of dual-use units and positions were funds received by the Russian Ministry of Transport through air navigation fees, as well as funds allocated by the Russian Ministry of Defense for the construction and maintenance of the Russian Armed Forces.

The lack of a mechanism for targeted financing of activities for the creation of FSR and KVP did not allow organizing the use of information about the air situation from the EU ATM radar station located in areas where the air defense forces of the Russian Ministry of Defense do not create a radar field. This factor, as well as the lack of information and technical interaction (interface) of automated systems of EU ATM and air defense units, did not lead to a significant increase in the efficiency of the functioning of the FSR and STOL.

At stage II creation and development of the FSR and KVP, after many years of effort, guaranteed state support for the deployment of the FSR and KVP was finally achieved within the framework of the Federal Target Program “Improving the FSR and KVP of the Russian Federation (2007–2010).”

Three main areas of activity were planned:

1. Comprehensive work to improve the FSR and KVP, including:

• development of design documentation for information interaction between EU ATM centers and air defense control bodies;
• development of documentation for the reconstruction of EU ATM centers;
• development of design documentation for the reconstruction of dual-use route radar positions of the EU ATM.

2. Reconstruction of dual-use route radar positions of the EU ATM.

3. Reconstruction of EU ATM centers in terms of equipping air traffic control systems with air defense control units.

The main objective of the Federal Target Program is to create the material and technical base of the FSR and KVP in the Central, North-Western and Eastern regions of the Russian Federation by equipping the EU ATM TC with information and technical interaction systems (ITI) with air defense control bodies, as well as modernizing the RLP of the Ministry of Transport of Russia for their implementation dual-use functions.

General coordination of the activities of the FSR and the KVP at the second stage of its development was entrusted to the Interdepartmental Commission for the Use and Control of the Airspace of the Russian Federation, formed by decree of the President of the Russian Federation in 2006.

A significant assistance in the work was the release in 2008 of the decree of the President of the Russian Federation “On measures to improve the management of the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation.”

The Decree legally consolidated the organizational and technical changes in the field of FSR and KVP, which actually occurred after the emergence of a new coordinating body represented by the Interdepartmental Commission for the Use and Control of the Airspace of the Russian Federation (IVC IVP and KVP), and also established that the only supplier (lead contractor) when placing orders for the supply of goods, performance of work, provision of services for state needs in the interests of the defense of the country and the economy of the state in the field of use, reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation, OJSC is the Almaz-Antey Air Defense Concern.

During the implementation of the Federal Target Program, much attention was paid to the issue of creating SITV, to achieve the effectiveness of which a standard structural diagram of SITV centers of the EU ATM centers with control bodies and air defense command posts was developed. The scheme provides for the implementation of two methods of issuing information about the air situation from dual-use information elements: centralized and decentralized.

To organize direct interaction between the EU ATM center and air defense authorities, an interaction dispatcher is appointed from the combat crew of the duty shift of the command post of the air defense formation. The dispatcher's workstation for interaction with air defense authorities is installed in the ES ATM center and includes technical means for displaying radar and planning dispatch information and means for communication with officials of the ES ATM center and the command post of the air defense connection.

This decision has stood the test of time (1999–2005). The so-called ulnar interaction between air defense control command officers and dispatchers was carried out directly at the EU ATM centers in air defense zones. The proposed technical solutions within the framework of the Federal Targeted Program significantly increase the possibilities of interaction.

The technical solution to the problem of information and technical interaction is based on a set of software and hardware tools (CPTS), which makes it possible to receive radar and planning information from automated air traffic control systems (ATC) of EC ATM centers, as well as receiving, processing and combining radar information from TRLP DN, which are part of the EU ATM center, for subsequent transfer to the air defense command post automation equipment complexes.

The technical means of SITV also include remote sets of subscriber equipment (VKAO), complexes of communication means and transmission of air situation data (CSPD). The methodological apparatus for designing and assessing the indicators and indicators of the Federal Target Program, which was used in the design of the Federal Target Program measures, was developed at the 2nd Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the State Scientific Research Institute "Aeronavigation" and the Scientific and Technical Center "Promtekhaero".

To carry out the complex of works provided for by the Federal Target Program, a cooperation of co-executors was created at OJSC Air Defense Concern Almaz-Antey, which included more than 10 enterprises and organizations. A large amount of work in the main areas of activity was carried out by the Department of PTP PGN, MNIIPA, VNIIRA, the company "NITA", NPO "Lianozovsky Electromechanical Plant", STC "Promtekhaero", LOTES-TM, "Radiophysics", State Research Institute "Aeronavigation", 24th NEIU and the 2nd Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

In order to reconstruct the DN TRLC based on the requirements of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport, JSC NPO Lianozovo Electromechanical Plant specially developed and successfully passed state tests of the Sopka-2 TRLC DN.

TRLK DN "Sopka-2" is designed to equip dual-purpose radar positions of the Ministry of Transport of Russia and provide radar information to the PU of the Russian Armed Forces, involved in air defense combat duty in peacetime, to solve problems of detection, measurement of three coordinates, assessment of movement parameters, determination of nationality air objects, as well as receiving additional (flight) information and receiving “Alarm” (“Distress”) signals from aircraft located in its coverage area, and issuing generalized information about the air situation to display equipment or to the ATC system of the EU ATM and to CP (PU) of the RF Armed Forces.

The work carried out during the II stage on the deployment of SITV in nine EU ATM centers (Moscow, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Magadan, Yakutsk, Rostov, St. Petersburg, Murmansk) and the modernization of 46 air traffic control radars made it possible to create in the Central, Eastern and Northern -In the Western regions of the country, fragments of a unified radar system of the FSR and KVP, built on the principle of information and technical interaction of departmental radar systems of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport.

At the same time, the exchange of information about the air situation between the EU ATM centers equipped with SITV and the command posts of the aerospace defense brigades is carried out in an automated mode, and at most modernized positions, DN TRLCs are deployed, which include equipment for state identification of the EU GLO and measuring the flight altitude of the observed aircraft. The work carried out at stage II to improve the FSR and CVP made it possible to increase the area of ​​airspace controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defense (at an altitude of 1000 meters) by more than 1.7 million square meters. km, reduce the resource consumption of radio-electronic equipment of the Russian Ministry of Defense by almost 1.4 million hours and ensure the required level of air traffic safety by reducing the risk of accidents from 13x10 -7 to 4x10 -7.

The ending follows.

Alexander KISLUKHA

This problem can be solved using affordable, cost-effective and sanitary-safe means. Such means are built on the principles of semi-active radar (SAL) using accompanying illumination of transmitters communication and broadcasting networks. Today, almost all well-known developers of radar equipment are working on the problem.

The task of creating and maintaining a continuous round-the-clock duty field for airspace control at extremely low altitudes (AL) is complex and costly. The reasons for this lie in the need to consolidate the orders of radar stations (radars), the creation of an extensive communication network, the saturation of the ground space with sources of radio emissions and passive reflections, the complexity of the ornithological and meteorological situation, dense population, high intensity of use and inconsistency of regulations relating to this area.

In addition, the boundaries of responsibility of various ministries and departments when monitoring surface space are separated. All this significantly complicates the possibility of organizing radar monitoring of airspace in the WWII.

Why do we need a continuous field of surface airspace monitoring?

For what purposes is it necessary to create a continuous field of monitoring of surface airspace on WWII in peacetime? Who will be the main consumer of the information received?

Experience of working in this direction with various departments indicates that no one is against the creation of such a field, but each interested department needs (for various reasons) its own functional unit, limited in goals, objectives and spatial characteristics.

The Ministry of Defense needs to control the airspace during WWI around defended objects or in certain directions. Border Service - above the state border, and no higher than 10 meters from the ground. Unified air traffic management system - over airfields. Ministry of Internal Affairs - only aircraft preparing for takeoff or landing outside the permitted flight areas. FSB - the space around sensitive objects.

Ministry of Emergency Situations - areas of man-made or natural disasters. FSO - areas of residence of protected persons.

This situation indicates the absence of a unified approach to solving the problems and threats that await us in the low-altitude surface environment.

In 2010, the problem of controlling the use of airspace during WWII was transferred from the responsibility of the state to the responsibility of the aircraft operators themselves.

In accordance with the current Federal rules for the use of airspace, a notification procedure for the use of airspace has been established for flights in class G airspace (small aviation). From now on, flights in this class of airspace can be carried out without obtaining air traffic control clearance.

If we consider this problem through the prism of the appearance of unmanned aerial vehicles in the air, and in the near future, passenger “flying motorcycles”, then a whole complex of problems arises related to ensuring the safety of the use of airspace at extremely low altitudes above settlements, industrially hazardous areas.

Who will control traffic in low-altitude airspace?

Companies in many countries around the world are developing such affordable low-altitude vehicles. For example, the Russian company Aviaton plans to create its own passenger quadcopter for flights (attention!) outside airfields by 2020. That is, where it is not prohibited.

The reaction to this problem has already manifested itself in the form of the adoption by the State Duma of the law “On Amendments to the Air Code of the Russian Federation regarding the use of unmanned aircraft.” In accordance with this law, all unmanned vehicles are subject to registration. aircrafts(UAV) weighing more than 250 g.

In order to register a UAV, you must submit an application to the Federal Air Transport Agency in any form indicating the details of the drone and its owner. However, judging by the way things are going with the registration of manned light and ultra-light aircraft, it seems that the problems with unmanned aircraft will be the same. Now two different organizations are responsible for registering light (ultra-light) manned and unmanned aircraft, and no one is able to organize control over the rules for their use in class G airspace over the entire territory of the country. This situation contributes to an uncontrolled increase in cases of violations of the rules for the use of low-altitude airspace and, as a consequence, an increase in the threat of man-made disasters and terrorist attacks.

On the other hand, the creation and maintenance of a wide monitoring field in the PMV in peacetime by traditional means of low-altitude radar is hampered by restrictions on sanitary requirements for the electromagnetic load on the population and the compatibility of radio electronic systems. Existing legislation strictly regulates the radiation regimes of radio electronic devices, especially in populated areas. This is strictly taken into account when designing new distribution networks.

So, what's the bottom line? The need for monitoring of surface airspace at PMV objectively remains and will only increase.

However, the possibility of its implementation is limited by the high cost of creating and maintaining a field in WWI, the inconsistency of the legal framework, the absence of a single responsible body interested in a large-scale round-the-clock field, as well as restrictions imposed by supervisory organizations.

There is an urgent need to begin developing preventive measures of an organizational, legal and technical nature aimed at creating a system for continuous monitoring of WWI airspace.

The maximum height of the border of class G airspace varies up to 300 meters in the Rostov region and up to 4.5 thousand meters in areas of Eastern Siberia. IN last years In Russian civil aviation, there is an intensive growth in the number of registered general aviation facilities and operators. As of 2015, over 7 thousand aircraft were registered in the State Register of Civil Aircraft of the Russian Federation. It should be noted that in Russia as a whole, no more than 20-30% of the total number of aircraft (AC) are registered by legal entities, public associations and private owners of aircraft using aircraft. The remaining 70-80% fly without an operator's license or without registering aircraft at all.

According to GLONASS NP estimates, in Russia annually sales of small unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) increase by 5-10%, and by 2025, 2.5 million of them will be purchased in the Russian Federation. It is expected that the Russian market in terms of consumer and commercial small Civilian UAS could account for about 3-5% of the global total.

Monitoring: economical, affordable, environmentally friendly

If we approach with an open mind the means of creating continuous monitoring of PMV in peacetime, then this problem can be solved by accessible, cost-effective and sanitary-safe means. Such means are built on the principles of semi-active radar (SAL) using accompanying illumination of transmitters of communication and broadcasting networks.

Today, almost all well-known developers of radar equipment are working on the problem. SNS Research has published a report, Military & Civil Aviation Passive Radar Market: 2013-2023, and expects that by 2023, both sectors will see more than 100,000 investments in the development of such radar technology. 10 billion US dollars, with annual growth in the period 2013-2023. will be almost 36%.

The simplest version of a semi-active multi-position radar is a two-position (bistatic) radar, in which the illumination transmitter and radar receiver are separated by a distance exceeding the range measurement error. A bistatic radar consists of a companion illumination transmitter and a radar receiver, spaced apart from the base.

Emissions from transmitters of communication and broadcasting stations, both ground-based and space-based, can be used as accompanying illumination. The illumination transmitter generates an omnidirectional low-altitude electromagnetic field, in which targets

With a certain effective scattering surface (ESR), they reflect electromagnetic energy, including in the direction of the radar receiver. The receiver antenna system receives a direct signal from the illumination source and a delayed echo signal from the target relative to it.

If there is a directional reception antenna, the angular coordinates of the target and the total range relative to the radar receiver are measured.

The basis for the existence of PAL is the vast coverage areas of broadcasting and communication signals. Thus, the zones of various operators cellular communication almost completely overlap, mutually complementing each other. In addition to the cellular communications illumination zones, the country's territory is covered by overlapping radiation fields from terrestrial TV broadcast transmitters, VHF FM and FM satellite TV broadcasting stations, and so on.

To create a multi-position radar monitoring network in the PMV, an extensive communication network is required. Dedicated secure APN channels for transmitting packet information based on M2M telematics technology have such capabilities. Typical throughput characteristics of such channels at peak load are no worse than 20 Kb/sec, but according to application experience, they are almost always much higher.

JSC NPP KANT is conducting work to study the possibility of detecting targets in the illumination field of cellular networks. During the research, it was found that the widest coverage of the territory of the Russian Federation is provided by the communication signal of the GSM 900 standard. This communication standard provides not only sufficient energy for the illumination field, but also the technology of packet data transmission GPRS wireless communication at speeds of up to 170 Kb/sec between elements of a multi-position radar , separated by regional distances.

The work carried out within the framework of R&D showed that typical suburban territorial frequency planning of a cellular communication network provides the ability to build a low-altitude multi-position active-passive system for detecting and tracking ground and air (up to 500 meters) targets with an effective reflective surface of less than 1 square meter. m.

The high height of the suspension of base stations on antenna towers (from 70 to 100 meters) and the network configuration of cellular communication systems make it possible to solve the problem of detecting low-altitude targets made using stealthy STEALTH technology using spaced location methods.

As part of R&D for the detection of air, ground and surface targets in the field of cellular communication networks, a passive receiving module (RPM) detector of a semi-active radar station was developed and tested.

As a result of field testing of a PPM model within the boundaries of a cellular communication network of the GSM 900 standard with a distance between base stations of 4-5 km and a radiation power of 30-40 W, the ability to detect, at the designed flight range, an aircraft of the Yak-52 type, a UAV - a quadcopter of the DJI Phantom 2 type, was achieved. , moving road and river transport, as well as people.

During the tests, the spatial-energy detection characteristics and the capabilities of the GSM signal to resolve targets were assessed. The possibility of transmitting packet detection information and remote mapping information from the test area to a remote surveillance indicator has been demonstrated.

Thus, to create a continuous round-the-clock multi-frequency overlapping location field in the surface space on the PMV, it is necessary and possible to build a multi-position active-passive location system with the integration of information flows obtained using illumination sources of various wavelengths: from meter (analog TV, VHF FM and FM broadcasting) to short UHF (LTE, Wi-Fi). This requires the efforts of all organizations working in this direction. The necessary infrastructure and encouraging experimental data for this are available. We can safely say that the developed information base, technologies and the very principle of hidden PAL will find their rightful place in wartime.

In the figure: “Scheme of a bistatic radar.” As an example, the current coverage area of ​​the borders of the Southern federal district signal from the mobile operator "Beeline"

To assess the scale of placement of backlight transmitters, let’s take the average Tver region as an example. It has an area of ​​84 thousand square meters. km with a population of 1 million 471 thousand people there are 43 radio broadcast transmitters broadcasting sound programs of VHF FM and FM stations with radiation power from 0.1 to 4 kW; 92 analogue transmitters of television stations with radiation power from 0.1 to 20 kW; 40 digital transmitters for television stations with power from 0.25 to 5 kW; 1,500 transmitting radio communication facilities of various types (mainly cellular base stations) with radiation power ranging from a few mW in an urban area to several hundred W in a suburban area. The height of the backlight transmitter suspension varies from 50 to 270 meters.

Radar field is a region of space with a given height and lower boundary, within which the radar grouping ensures reliable detection, determination of the coordinates of air targets and their continuous tracking.

The radar field is formed from the radar visibility zones.

Visibility area(detection) is the area of ​​space around the radar within which the station can detect and track air targets with a given probability.

Each type of radar has its own visibility zone, it is determined by the design of the radar antenna and its tactical and technical characteristics (wavelength, transmitter power and other parameters).

The following important features of radar detection zones are noted, which must be taken into account when creating a grouping of reconnaissance units:

The boundaries of radar visibility zones show the target detection range depending on the target's flight altitude.

The formation of the radar direction diagram, especially in the meter and decimeter range, is significantly influenced by the earth's surface.

Consequently, the terrain will have a significant impact on the radar's visibility ranges. Moreover, the influence of the terrain in different directions from the radar station point is different. Consequently, the detection ranges of the same type of air targets at the same altitude in different directions may be different.

Detection radars are used to conduct reconnaissance of enemy air in a circular search mode. The width of the radiation pattern of such a radar in the vertical plane is limited and is usually 20-30°. This causes the presence of so-called “dead craters” in the radar visibility range, where observation of air targets is impossible.

The possibility of continuous tracking of air targets in the radar visibility zone is also influenced by reflections from local objects, as a result of which an illuminated area appears near the center of the indicator screen. Tracking targets in the area of ​​local objects is difficult. Even if the radar is deployed at a position that meets the requirements for it, in moderately rugged terrain the radius of the zone of local objects reaches 15-20 km relative to the center of the position. Turning on the passive interference protection equipment (moving target selection system) does not completely “remove” marks from local objects from the radar screens, and with a high intensity of reflections from local objects, observation of targets in this area is difficult. In addition, when the radar operates with the SDC equipment turned on, the detection range of air targets is reduced by 10-15%.

The section of the radar visibility zone in the horizontal plane at a given height can be conditionally taken as a ring with the center at the point where the radar is located. The outer radius of the ring is determined by the maximum detection range of an air target of a given type at a given altitude. The inner radius of the ring is determined by the radius of the “dead crater” of the radar.

When creating a radar grouping in the reconnaissance system, the following requirements must be met:

The maximum possible range of confident detection in the most likely direction of enemy air raids (in front of the front edge).

A continuous radar field must cover the space above the entire territory of the operational formation of troops, at all possible flight altitudes of the enemy air force.

The probability of detecting targets at any point in a continuous field should be no lower than 0.75.

The radar field must be highly stable.

Maximum savings in radar reconnaissance resources (number of radars).

You should focus on choosing the optimal height of the lower boundary of the continuous radar field, since this is one of the most important conditions for meeting the listed requirements.

Two neighboring stations provide a continuous radar field only starting from a certain minimum height (H min), and the smaller the distance between the radars, the lower the lower boundary of the continuous field.

That is, the smaller the height of the lower boundary of the field is set, the closer the radar is required to be located, the more radar is required to create the field (which contradicts the above requirements).

In addition, the lower the height of the lower boundary of the field, the smaller the offset of the zone of confident detection at this height in front of the leading edge.

The state and trends in the development of airborne systems already at the present time require the creation of a radar field in the height range of several tens of meters (50-60 m).

However, to create a field with such a height of the lower border, you will need great amount radar equipment. Calculations show that when the height of the lower boundary of the field decreases from 500 m to 300 m, the need for the number of radars increases by 2.2 times, and when decreased from 500 m to 100 m, by 7 times.

In addition, there is no urgent need for a single continuous radar field with such a low altitude.

Currently, it is considered rational to create a continuous field in the front (army) operating zone using ground-based radars with a lower boundary height of 300-500 meters in front of the front edge and in tactical depth.

The height of the upper boundary of the radar field, as a rule, is not specified and is determined by the capabilities of the radars in service with the RTP.

To develop a general methodology for calculating the values ​​of intervals and distances between radar reconnaissance units and radar reconnaissance units in their unified grouping, we will accept the following assumptions:

1. The entire unit is armed with the same type of radar, each unit has one radar;

2. The nature of the terrain does not significantly affect the radar visibility range;

Condition: Let it be necessary to create a continuous radar field with a lower boundary height of “H min”. The radius of the visibility zone (detection range) of the radar at “H min” is known and equal to “D”.

The problem can be solved by positioning the radar in two ways:

At the tops of the squares;

At the vertices of equilateral triangles (in a checkerboard pattern).

In this case, the radar field at “Н min” will look like (Appendix 4 and 5)

The distance between the radars will be equal to:

With the first method d=D =1.41 D;

With the second d=D =1.73 D;

From a comparison of these figures, we can conclude that creating a radar field by placing radars at the vertices of equilateral triangles (in a checkerboard pattern) is more economically profitable since it requires fewer stations.

We will call a grouping of reconnaissance assets located at the corners of an equilateral triangle a grouping of type “A”.

Although beneficial from a cost-saving point of view, type A grouping does not provide other essential requirements. For example, the failure of any of the radars leads to the formation of large gaps in the radar field. Loss of air targets during tracking will be observed even if all radars are working properly, since the “dead craters” in the radar visibility areas are not blocked.

Grouping type “A” has unsatisfactory field characteristics in front of the leading edge. In areas that occupy a total of more than 20% of the width of the front strip, the extension of the reconnaissance zone in front of the front edge is 30-60% less than possible. If we also take into account the distortion of radar visibility zones due to the influence of the nature of the terrain around the positions, then in general we can conclude that a type “A” grouping can only be used in exceptional cases with an acute lack of funds and in secondary directions in the depths of the operational formation of front troops, but not along front lines

The appendix presents a grouping of radars, which we will conditionally call a grouping of type “B”. Here the radars are also located in arshins of equilateral triangles, but with sides equal to the detection range “D” at the height of the lower boundary of the field in several lines. Intervals between radars in lines d=D, and distance between lines

C= D = 0.87 D.

At any point in the field created by a type “B” grouping, the space is viewed simultaneously by three radars, and in some areas even seven. Thanks to this, high stability of the radar field and reliability of tracking air targets is achieved with a detection probability close to unity. This grouping ensures the overlap of radar “dead craters” and areas of local objects (which can only be achieved with d=D), and also eliminates possible gaps in the field due to distortion of radar visibility zones due to the influence of the terrain around the position.

To ensure the continuity of the radar field over time, each radar involved in creating the field must operate around the clock. In practice this is not feasible. Therefore, at each point, not one, but two or more radars must be deployed, which form the radar station.

Typically, each RLP is deployed by one RLR from the ortb.

To create a continuous radar field, it is advisable to place the radar field in several lines in a checkerboard pattern (at the vertices of equilateral triangles),

The intervals between posts must be selected based on the given height of the lower boundary of the radar field (H min).

It is advisable to choose the intervals between radars equal to the detection range of air targets “D” at the height “H min”, the lower boundary of the field in this area (d=D)

The distance between the radar lines should be within 0.8-0.9 of the detection range at the height of the lower boundaries of the “H min” field.