German jets in battles against Stalin's falcons. The last year of the war: a comparison of the losses of the Third Reich in the east and in the west. aviation Airplanes 1944

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AIRCRAFT

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Reformatted the topic into a group of sections for each of the main participating countries and cleaned up duplicates, similar information and information that raised open doubts.

Tsarist Russian Air Force:
- during WW1, 120-150 captured German and Austrian aircraft were captured. Most - two-seat reconnaissance aircraft, fighters and twin-engine aircraft were rare (Note 28*)
- at the end of 1917, the Russian army had 91 air squadrons consisting of 1,109 aircraft, of which:
available at the front - 579 (428 serviceable, 137 faulty, 14 obsolete), 237 equipped for the front and 293 in schools. This number did not include up to 35 aircraft of the Airship Squadron, 150 aircraft of naval aviation, aircraft of logistics agencies, 400 aircraft of air fleets and in reserve. The total number of aircraft was estimated at 2200-2500 military aircraft (Note 28*)

USSR Air Force:
- in 1937 there were 18 aviation schools in the Red Army, in 1939 - 32, as of 05/01/1941 - already 100
(Note 32*)
- order No. 080 of 03.1941: training period for flight personnel - 9 months in peacetime and 6 months in wartime, flight hours for cadets on training and combat aircraft - 20 hours for fighters and 24 hours for bombers (a Japanese suicide bomber in 1944 had to have 30 hours of flight time) (Note 12*)
- in 1939, the Red Army had 8139 combat aircraft, of which 2225 were fighters (Note 41*)
- 09/01/1939 the USSR had 12,677 combat aircraft at the beginning of WW2 (Note 31*)
- in the summer of 1940 there were 38 air divisions in the Red Army, and by 01/01/1941 there should have been and there were 50
(Note 9*)
- only in the period from 01/01/1939 to 06/22/1941, the Red Army received 17,745 combat aircraft, of which 3,719 were new types, not inferior in basic parameters to the best Luftwaffe aircraft (Note 43*). According to other sources, at the beginning of the war there were 2,739 aircraft of the latest types Yak-1, MIG-3, LAGG-3, PE-2, half of which were in the western military districts (Note 11*)
- as of January 1, 1940, there were 12,540 combat aircraft in the western military districts, excluding long-range bomber aircraft. By the end of 1940, these numbers were almost doubled to 24 thousand combat aircraft. The number of training aircraft alone was increased to 6800 (Note 12*)
- as of January 1, 1941, the Red Army Air Force numbered 26,392 aircraft, of which 14,628 were combat aircraft and 11,438 were training aircraft. Moreover, 10565 (8392 combat) were built in 1940 (Note 32*)
- at the beginning of the Second World War, 79 air divisions and 5 air brigades were formed, of which the Western Military District included 32 air divisions, 119 air regiments and 36 corps squadrons. Long-range bomber aviation in the western direction was represented by 4 air corps and 1 separate air division in the amount of 1,546 aircraft. The number of air regiments by June 1941 increased by 80% compared to the beginning of 1939 (Note 11*)
- The Second World War was met by 5 heavy bomber corps, 3 separate air divisions and one separate regiment of Soviet long-range bomber aviation - about 1000 aircraft, of which 2\\3 were lost during the six months of the war. By the summer of 1943, long-range bomber aviation consisted of 8 air corps and numbered more than 1,000 aircraft and crews. (Note 2*)
- 1528 DB-3 long-range bombers were built in 1941 (Note 44*)
- 818 TB-3 heavy bombers were launched at the beginning of the Second World War (Note 41*)
- by the beginning of the war there were 2,739 aircraft of the latest types Yak-1, MIG-3, LAGG-3, PE-2, half of which were in the western military districts (Note 11*). On 06/22/41, 917 Mig-3 (486 pilots retrained), 142 Yak-1 (156 pilots retrained), 29 Lagg (90 pilots retrained) (Note 4*) entered the Air Force
- in the Red Army Air Force units of the border military districts at the beginning of the war there were 7139 combat aircraft, 1339 long-range bomber aircraft, 1445 in naval aviation, which totaled 9917 aircraft
- on the eve of the war, in the European part of the USSR alone there were 20 thousand aircraft, of which 17 thousand were combat aircraft (Note 12*)
- by the spring of 1942, the USSR reached the pre-war level of aircraft production - at least 1000 combat aircraft per month. From June 1941 to December 1944, the USSR produced 97 thousand aircraft
- from the second half of 1942, Soviet industry reached the production line of 2500 aircraft per month with a total monthly loss of 1000 aircraft (Note 9*)
- as of June 22, 1942, 85% of all Soviet long-range bomber aviation consisted of 1,789 DB-3 aircraft (from the DB-3f modification it was called IL-4), the remaining 15% were SB-3. These planes did not fall under the first attacks of German aircraft, since they were based relatively far from the border (Note 3*)
- during the years of production (1936-40), 6831 Soviet SB bombers were built (Note 41*)
- 10,292 I-16 biplanes and its modifications were produced from 1934 to 1942
- as of June 22, 1941, 412 Yak-1s were produced (Note 39)
- 16 thousand Yak-9s were produced during the war
- IL-2 was the most popular attack aircraft of the Second World War. From 1941 to 1945, 36 thousand of them were produced (Note 41 * and 37 *) The losses of attack aircraft during the war years amounted to about 23 thousand.
- 11 thousand Soviet attack pilots died during the Second World War (Note 25*)
- in 1944, units had two aircraft for each Soviet attack pilot (Note 17*)
- the life of an attack aircraft lasted on average 10-15 sorties, and 25% of the pilots were shot down on the first sortie, while at least 10 sorties were required to destroy one German tank (Note 9*)
- the USSR received 18.7 thousand aircraft from the USA under Lend-Lease (Note 34*), of which: 2243 P-40 "Curtiss", 2771 A-20 "Douglas Boston", 842 B-25 "Mitchell" bombers " from the USA, and 1338 "Supermarine Spitfire" and 2932 "Hurricane" - (Note 26 *) from England.
- by the beginning of 1944, the USSR had 11,000 combat aircraft, the Germans - no more than 2,000. During the 4 years of the war, the USSR built 137,271 aircraft and received 18,865 aircraft of all types, of which 638 aircraft were lost during transportation. According to other sources, at the beginning of 1944 there were 6 times more Soviet combat aircraft than all German aircraft (Note 8*)
- on the “heavenly slow-moving vehicle” - U-2vs about 50 air regiments fought during the Second World War (Note 33*)
- from the monograph “1941 - lessons and conclusions”: “... out of 250 thousand sorties carried out
Soviet aviation in the first three months of the war, against tank and motorized columns of the enemy..." The record month for the Luftwaffe was June 1942, when (according to Soviet VNOS posts) 83,949 sorties of combat aircraft of all types were carried out. In other words, "the defeated and "destroyed on the ground" Soviet aviation flew in the summer of 1941 with an intensity that the Germans were able to achieve in only one month during the entire war (Note 13*)
- Average survivability of Soviet pilots during the Patriotic War:
fighter pilot - 64 combat missions
attack aircraft pilot - 11 combat missions
Bomber pilot - 48 combat missions
torpedo bomber pilot - 3.8 combat missions (Note 45*)
- the accident rate in the Red Army Air Force on the eve of the Second World War was enormous - on average, 2-3 planes crashed per day. This situation largely continued during the war. It is no coincidence that during the war, non-combat aircraft losses were over 50% (Note 9*)
- “unaccounted loss” - 5240 Soviet aircraft remaining at airfields after their capture by the Germans in 1941
- the average monthly losses of the Red Army Air Force from 1942 to May 1945 were 1000 aircraft, of which non-combat losses were over 50%, and in 1941 combat losses were 1700 aircraft, and total losses were 3500 per month (Note 9*)
- non-combat losses of Soviet military aviation in the Second World War amounted to 60,300 aircraft (56.7%) (Note 32*)
- in 1944, the losses of Soviet combat aviation amounted to 24,800 aircraft, of which 9,700 were combat losses, and 15,100 were non-combat losses (Note 18*)
- from 19 to 22 thousand Soviet fighters were lost in the Second World War (Note 23*)
- in accordance with Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 632-230ss dated March 22, 1946 “On the rearmament of the Air Force, Air Defense Fighter Aviation and Naval Aviation with modern domestically produced aircraft”: “...to be removed from service in 1946 and written off: foreign fighter aircraft types, including Airacobra - 2216 aircraft, Thunderbolt - 186 aircraft, Kingcobra - 2344 aircraft, Kittyhawk - 1986 aircraft, Spitfire - 1139 aircraft, Hurricane - 421 aircraft Total: 7392 aircraft. and 11937 obsolete domestic aircraft (Note 1*)

German Air Force:
- during the German offensive of 1917, up to 500 Russian aircraft became German trophies (Note 28*)
- according to the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had to scrap 14 thousand of its aircraft after the end of WW1 (Note 32*)
- serial production of the first combat aircraft in Nazi Germany began only in 1935-1936 (Note 13*). So in 1934, the German government adopted a plan to build 4,000 aircraft by September 30, 1935. Among them there was nothing but old stuff (Note 52*)
- 03/01/1935 - official recognition of the Luftwaffe. There were 2 regiments of Ju-52 and Do-23 (Note 52*)
- 771 German fighters were produced in 1939 (Note 50*)
- in 1939, Germany produced 23 combat aircraft daily, in 1940 - 27, and in 1941 - 30 aircraft (Note 32*) By the spring of 1942, Germany was producing up to 160 aircraft per month
- 09/01/1939 Germany began WW2 with 4093 aircraft (of which 1502 were bombers) (Note 31*)
- on the eve of the Second World War, Germany had 6,852 aircraft, of which 3,909 aircraft of all types were allocated to attack the USSR. This number included 313 transport personnel and 326 communications aircraft. Of the remaining 3,270 combat aircraft: 965 fighters (almost equally - Bf-109e and BF-109f), 102 fighter-bombers (Bf-110), 952 bombers, 456 attack aircraft and 786 reconnaissance aircraft (Note 32 *). According to other sources, on June 22, 1941 the Germans concentrated against the USSR; 1037 (of which 400 are combat-ready) Bf-109 fighters; 179 Bf-110 as reconnaissance aircraft and light bombers, 893 bombers (281 He-111, 510 Ju-88, 102 Do-17), attack aircraft - 340 Ju-87, reconnaissance aircraft - 120. Total - 2534 (of which about 2000 combat-ready ). As well as 1000 aircraft of the German allies
- after the transfer in December 1941 of 250-300 aircraft of the 2nd Air Corps from the USSR for operations in the area of ​​Malta and North Africa, the total number of Luftwaffe on the Soviet front decreased from 2465 aircraft on 12/01/1941 to 1700 aircraft on 12/31/1941. In January 1942, the number of German aircraft decreased further after the transfer of aircraft of the 5th Air Corps to Belgium (Note 29*)
- in 1942, Germany produced 8.4 thousand combat aircraft. According to other sources, the Germans produced only up to 160 aircraft monthly
- in 1943, Germany produced 849 fighters on average per month (Note 49*)
- 84,320 aircraft of all types were produced in Germany in 1941-45. (Note 24*) - in total, 57 thousand German aircraft of all types were destroyed during WW2
- 1190 seaplanes were produced by the German aircraft industry during WW2 (Note 38): of which 541 Arado 196a
- 2500 Storch communications aircraft were built in total. According to other sources, 2871 Fi-156 "Storch" ("Stork") were produced, and in the summer of 1941 the Germans captured the plant producing its Soviet counterfeit copy of the OKA-38 "Stork" (Note 37*)
- the German Ju-88 bomber was produced with a total of 15,100 aircraft (Note 38*)
- 1433 Me-262 jets were produced in Germany during WW2 (Note 21*)
- a total of 5709 Ju-87 Stuka (Note 40*) and 14676 Ju-88 (Note 40* and 37*) were produced
- in 1939-45, 20,087 FW-190 fighters were produced, while production reached its peak at the beginning of 1944, when 22 aircraft of this type were produced daily (Note 37 * and 38 *)
- during WW2, 35 thousand German Bf-109 fighters were produced (Note 14* and 37*)
- having produced 3225 transport Ju-52 ("Auntie Yu") since 1939, the German aircraft industry was forced to stop its production in 1944 (Note 40*)
- during the war years, Czech airlines produced 846 “frames” - FB-189 fire spotters - for the Luftwaffe. In the USSR this type of aircraft was not produced at all.
- a total of 780 reconnaissance spotters Hs-126 (“Crutch”) were produced (Note 32*)
- German failed aircraft adopted by the Wehrmacht: 871 Hs-129 attack aircraft (1940), 6500 Bf-110 (6170 - Note 37*), 1500 Me-210 and Me-410 (Note 15*). The Germans retrained the failed Ju-86 fighter as a strategic reconnaissance aircraft (Note 32*). The Do-217 never became a successful night fighter (364 were produced, including 200 in 1943) (Note 46*). Produced in quantities of more than 1000 units (according to other sources, only 200 aircraft were produced, another 370 were in various stages of readiness, and parts and components were produced for another 800 aircraft - Note 38*) the German heavy bomber He-177 due to numerous accidents, often simply burned up in the air (Note 41*). The He-129 attack aircraft turned out to be extremely unsuccessful due to difficult controls, weak engine armor, and weak stern weapons (Note 47*)
- in 1945, the share of fighters out of all military aircraft produced in Germany was 65.5%, in 1944 - 62.3% (Note 41*)
- during WW2, the Germans produced 198 not entirely successful, heavy six-engine military transport aircraft Me-323 from converted "Giant" gliders, which at one time were intended for landing (they could transport 200 paratroopers or a certain number of tanks and 88mm anti-aircraft guns) to the territory England (Note 41* and 38*)
- in 1941, the losses of Ju-52 transports for the first time exceeded their production - more than 500 aircraft were lost, and only 471 were produced (Note 40 *)
- 273 Ju-87s operated against the USSR, while Poland was attacked by 348 Ju-87s (Note 38*)
- in 8 months (08/01/40 - 03/31/41) due to accidents and disasters, the Luftwaffe lost 575
aircraft and killed 1368 people (Note 32*)
- the most active Allied pilots flew 250-400 sorties in WW2, while similar figures for German pilots fluctuated between 1000 - 2000 sorties
- by the beginning of WW2, 25% of German pilots had mastered the skill of blind piloting (Note 32*)
- in 1941, a German fighter pilot, leaving flight school, had more than 400 hours of total experience
flight time, of which at least 80 hours - on a combat vehicle. After graduating from the reserve air group
added another 200 hours (Note 32*)
- during the Second World War there were 36 German pilots, each of whom shot down more than 150 Soviet aircraft and about 10 Soviet pilots, each of whom shot down 50 or more German aircraft (Note 9*)
- the ammunition of the Bf-109F fighter is enough for 50 seconds of continuous firing from machine guns and 11 seconds from the MG-151 cannon (Note 13*)
- the V-2 rocket consisted of 45 thousand parts; Germany was able to produce up to 400 rockets of this type maximum monthly
- of the 4,300 V-2 missiles, more than 2,000 exploded on the ground or in the air during launch or came out of
building during the flight. Only 50% of the missiles hit a circle with a diameter of 10 km (Note 27*). In total, 2,419 V-missile attacks were recorded on London, and 2,448 on Antwerp. Of those fired at targets, 25% of the missiles reached their target. A total of 30 thousand V-1 missiles were manufactured. In 1945, the speed of V-1 missiles reached about 800 km/h. (Note 9*)
- 06/14/1944 the first V-2 fell on London. Of the 10,492 V-2s fired at London, 2,419 reached the target. Another 1,115 rockets exploded in Southern England (Note 35*)
- by the end of 1944, 8696, 4141 and 151 V-2s were launched from the He-111 (N-22) carrier aircraft in Antwerp, London and Brussels, respectively (Note 35*)

US Air Force:
- after WW1, in November 1918, the United States had 1,172 “flying boats” in service (Note 41*)
- 09/01/1939 the United States had 1576 combat aircraft at the beginning of WW2 (Note 31*)
- during WW2, the US aviation industry produced over 13 thousand Warhawks, 20 thousand Wildcats and Hellcats, 15 thousand Thunderbolts and 12 thousand Mustangs (Note 42*)
- 13 thousand American B-17 bombers were produced in WW2 (Note 41*)

Royal Air Force:
- the most popular English bomber, MV 2 Wellington, was produced in the amount of 11,461 aircraft (Note 51*)
- 09/01/1939 England began WW2, having 1992 combat aircraft (Note 31*)
- already in August 1940 England was producing twice as many fighters every day as
Germany. Their total number subsequently exceeded the number of pilots so much that
soon made it possible to transfer some of the aircraft to conservation or transfer them to other countries under Lend-Lease (Note 31*)
- from 1937 to the end of WW2, more than 20 thousand British Spitfire fighters were produced (Note 41*)

Air forces of other countries:
- 09/01/1939 France began WW2 with 3335 aircraft (Note 31*): 1200 fighters, 1300 bombers, 800 reconnaissance aircraft, 110,000 personnel
- in 1942 Japan 3.2 thousand combat aircraft
- in total, the Polish Air Force had 1900 aircraft at the beginning of the war (Note 8*)
- Romanian Air Force as of June 22, 1941: 276 combat aircraft, of which 121 fighters, 34 medium and 21 light bombers, 18 seaplanes and 82 reconnaissance aircraft. Another 400 aircraft were in flight schools. It makes no sense to specify types of aircraft due to moral and physical obsolescence. Romanian 250 (205 combat-ready) aircraft allocated against the USSR were opposed by about 1,900 Soviet aircraft. On the eve of the war, the Germans retrained 1,500 Romanian aviation specialists and agreed to supply modern Bf-109u and He-110e to Romania. On the eve of the war, 3 squadrons were re-equipped with the new Romanian fighter IAR-80 (Note 7*)

OTHER:
- in the “Battle of England” the Germans lost 1,733 aircraft (Note 30*). According to other sources, losses amounted to 1,792 aircraft, of which 610 were Bf-109s. British losses amounted to 1,172 aircraft: 403 Spitfires, 631 Hurricanes, 115 Blenheims and 23 Defiants (Note 37*)
- more than 200 US P-36 fighters were manufactured for France before WW2 (Note 41*)
- in September 1944 there was a peak in the number of allied bombers in Europe - more than 6 thousand (Note 36 *)
- 250 million aircraft cartridges received under Lend-Lease were melted down (Note 9*)
- during the Second World War, the Finns (Air Force-PVO) claim 2,787, the Romanians - about 1,500, the Hungarians - about 1,000, the Italians - 150-200, the Slovaks - 10 downed Soviet aircraft. Another 638 shot down Soviet aircraft are listed in the combat accounts of the Slovak, Croatian and Spanish fighter squadrons. According to other sources, the German allies together shot down no more than 2,400 Soviet aircraft (Note 23*)
- about 3240 German fighters were destroyed on the Soviet-German front, of which 40 were accounted for by the allies of the USSR (VVS-Air Defense of the Poles, Bulgarians and Romanians since 1944, the French from Normandy-Niemen) (Note 23*)
- on 01/01/1943, 395 German daytime fighters operated against 12,300 Soviet aircraft, on 01/01/1944 - 13,400 and 473, respectively (Note 23*)
- after 1943, from 2\\3 to 3\\4 of all German aviation countered the aviation of the anti-Hitler coalition in Western Europe (Note 23*) The 14 Soviet air armies formed at the end of 1943 put an end to the dominance of German aviation in the skies of the USSR (Note 9* )
- Soviet aviation losses in the first days of the war: 1142 (800 were destroyed on the ground), of which: Western District - 738, Kiev - 301, Baltic - 56, Odessa - 47. Luftwaffe losses in 3 days - 244 (of which 51 in first day of the war) (Note 20*)
- on June 22, 1941, the Germans allocated 3 bombers to attack each Soviet military airfield. The strike was carried out with 2-kilogram SD-2 fragmentation bombs. The radius of destruction of the bomb is 12 meters with 50-200 fragments. A direct hit from such a bomb was equivalent to a medium-power anti-aircraft shell (Note 22*) The Stuka attack aircraft carried 360 SD-2 bombs (Note 19*)
- in 1940, 21,447 aircraft engines were produced in the USSR, of which less than 20% were domestic developments. In 1940, the standard repair life of Soviet aircraft engines was 100-150 hours, in reality - 50-70 hours, while this figure in France and Germany was 200-400 hours, in the USA - up to 600 hours (Note 16*)
- at the beginning of the war in the European part of the USSR, the Soviet Air Force had 269 reconnaissance aircraft out of a total number of 8000 aircraft against German 219 long-range and 562 short-range reconnaissance aircraft out of a total number of 3000 aircraft (Note 10*)
- the Allied Air Force in the Mediterranean theater after the fall of Tunisia, estimated at 5,000 aircraft, was opposed by no more than 1,250 Axis aircraft, of which roughly half were German and half were Italian. Of the German aircraft, only 320 were suitable for action, and among them were 130 Messerschmitt fighters of all modifications (Note 8*)
- aviation of the Northern Fleet of the USSR in 1944: 456 combat-ready aircraft, of which 80 were flying boats. German aviation in Norway consisted of 205 aircraft in 1944 (Note 6*)
- the German Air Force in France lost 1401 aircraft, the French only lost fighters - 508 (257 fighter pilots died) (Note 5*)

A unique document from the category “For official use” describing the design and operation of the YuMO-004B jet engine of the last and most advanced military aircraft of Nazi Germany at that time in the world, the Messerschmitt-262. In the last months of the war, it was with this aircraft that Hitler and Goering’s hopes for a turning point in the “air war” were tied, during which the Reich suffered one defeat after another. However, testing and serial production of the Me-262 began too late due to the shortsightedness of the Luftwaffe leadership, led by Ernst Udett and Goering's deputy Erhard Milch. The document was developed by a team of the so-called “Bureau of New Technology” of the USSR Ministry of Aviation Industry in 1946. Each copy of this document had its own registration number - in our case No. 233. A similar document issued by the same bureau was devoted to the fuselage and aerodynamic qualities of the aircraft (not in our collection). Original, condition consistent with age. The full version of the document is in .

The German Me-262 fighter is considered by many experts to be one of the best military aircraft that took part in the Second World War. If the leaders of the Third Reich had timely assessed its capabilities and combat potential, victory in Europe would have gone to the Allies at a much higher price. However, Hitler’s short-sightedness, the lack of professionalism of Luftwaffe commander Hermann Goering, and bureaucratic delays turned this first jet fighter in the history of air warfare into a kind of “pariah” in the squadron of combat aircraft. But no matter how unsuccessful and short the fate of the Me-262 turned out to be, so amazing was the post-war history of the ideas of jet aviation embedded in it.

THE FURER'S LAST HOPE

This plane had its own mission from the very beginning. Along with the “weapon of retaliation” (atomic bomb) being hastily developed by German scientists, the Messerschmitt-262 was considered as a “weapon of salvation” of the Third Reich from total defeat by the Allies. Under the influence of the Imperial Minister of Propaganda J. Goebbels, whose opinion was shared by many generals of the German High Command, Germany owed its defeats on the fronts primarily to the unprofessionalism of the commander of the air force, Hermann Goering, who was unable to protect the skies and cities of the Reich from the destructive raids of allied aviation. Many believed that if the German Luftwaffe had managed to become master of the situation in the air, a decisive turning point could have occurred in the course of the war. And the main hope in this matter rested on the new jet Messerschmitt.

In the notes of Joseph Goebbels, which he kept punctually throughout the war, the theme of the Me-262 jet comes up constantly, and in the last weeks of the war it sounds like a spell: “In accordance with the availability of gasoline, all but five types of aircraft will be withdrawn from our weapons program. The main attention, according to the Fuhrer’s decision, will be given to the production of ME-262.”<…>“Direct hits from the ME-262 simply tear apart the Mosquito.” It takes four hits to shoot down such a bomber. In a month of such battles, the Anglo-American enemy must suffer such significant losses that he will have to limit his activity in the air.”<…>“Now the Fuhrer has great hopes for jet fighters. He even calls them “machines of German destiny.” He believes that thanks to jet aircraft it will be possible - at least through defensive actions - to undermine the enemy's superiority in the air."<…>“The Fuehrer now places his greatest hopes in new jet aircraft. This month 500 of them will be produced, and next month - 1000. Airfields for them can be built with great difficulty.”<…>“The Fuehrer pins all his hopes on the use of these new jets. The enemy will not be able to oppose anything significant to them in the air.”

All these are records dated March and April 1945, when the outcome of the Second World War was no longer in doubt. Already in the last days of the war, when Soviet troops stood at the walls of Berlin, six commissioners were appointed at Hitler's headquarters to implement the program for accelerated production of the Me-262. Management of the program was entrusted to two trusted combat generals - Joseph Kammhuber, who was responsible for the production of night fighters, and Dietrich Peltz, who was responsible for the production of day fighters. The Third Reich was dying, but an order was sent to flight schools to recruit 20 thousand cadets who were to take to the air on the planes of the “German hope.”

The German jet fighter "Messerschmitt-262" also had another name - Schwalbe, which means "Swallow". Its flight advantages were demonstrated already in the first battle - on July 25, 1944, in the skies over Munich, the new Messerschmitt was almost torn to pieces by the English high-speed Mosquito bomber. However, the Third Reich did not have enough time to produce a sufficient number of “miracle aircraft”. And although from 1944 to 1945, 1,433 Me-262 jet fighters were assembled at German aircraft factories and transferred to the front, which also became the most popular jet aircraft of World War II, it failed to fulfill its original mission. Perhaps due to the fact that the new plane’s path to the sky turned out to be surprisingly difficult.

LONG ROAD TO SKY

The idea of ​​​​creating a jet fighter aircraft in Germany was born almost simultaneously with the beginning of the development of a turbojet engine (TRE). It should be noted that in the 1930s, the labor intensity of creating a turbojet engine, as one of the most knowledge-intensive finished aircraft products, was considered the greatest. In addition, the very idea of ​​​​transonic aircraft was perceived with some skepticism, since the wind tunnels that existed at that time did not make it possible to determine the characteristics of such high-speed aircraft. The development of a pursuit aircraft under the designation P-1065 first began in October 1938. It was planned to install two P3302 jet engines with a thrust of 600 kgf each. It was expected that a fighter with these turbojet engines would be able to reach speeds of up to 900 km/h. The appearance of the aircraft did not take shape immediately, and its evolution is in many ways similar to the development of flora and fauna: from simple to complex. In addition, the new aircraft could fly “in the slop,” as aircraft designers joked—that is, it did not require special highly purified aviation gasoline. At the end of the war, when Germany lost access to oil, this turned out to be an important argument in his favor.
Based on the dimensions of the turbojet engine, which was manufactured at the BMW plant, German aircraft designer Willy Messerschmitt approved the first version of the future Me-262. The unusual combination of fuselage contours and load-bearing surface (the Me-262 was equipped with a so-called “swept” wing) was a step towards an integral aircraft layout, which, as is known, became widespread during the creation of fourth-generation combat aircraft. The design of the aircraft was developed in such a way that each part was easy to manufacture and could be manufactured at various enterprises. A large shortage of aluminum alloys forced designers, to the detriment of the weight of the airframe, to widely use steel and wood in the airframe construction.

The first flight of a jet fighter, piloted by one of Germany's best pilots, Wendel, took place on March 25, 1942 and almost ended in disaster. The plane slowly gained an altitude of 50 meters, and when the pilot began to retract the landing gear, the left turbojet engine failed, and a little later the right one. The pilot managed to turn the car around and successfully land it at the airfield. This was a result of the low reliability of early turbojet engines. However, in the meantime, the Heinkel plant completed testing of the Junkers Jumo 004 A engine, which developed a thrust of 840 kgf. These engines were installed on the Me-262 and tests continued.

A total of three prototypes were produced, and its testing did not go very smoothly. On April 18, 1942, an experienced Me-262 crashed, killing the pilot. All this threatened that the idea of ​​​​a jet fighter could be abandoned altogether, but the situation was saved by one of the best test pilots in Germany, Adolf Galland. He thoroughly tested the aircraft in the air and on the ground and a few days later reported to Reichsmarschall Goering that “this machine is a real smile of Fortune! It gives us an advantage while our opponents use piston engine aircraft. This aircraft opens a new page in combat use.” Galland proposed some technical improvements to the design of the fighter, in particular, from now on all Me-262s were equipped - for the first time in the history of fighter aviation - with ejection seats for emergency evacuation of pilots in case of damage to the vehicle. By the way, until the end of the war, this saved the lives of 70 Luftwaffe pilots whose high-speed fighters were shot down or damaged.

Goering himself became infected with the enthusiasm of the pilots. The Luftwaffe was rapidly losing air supremacy, and the appearance of a new “indestructible” aircraft was supposed to correct the reputation of Goering himself. However, he did not immediately manage to convince Hitler that the Me-262 should become that “miracle weapon”. Hitler even then treated Goering and the entire Luftwaffe with such great distrust that he personally wanted to verify the effectiveness of the new technology. He demanded from engineers, designers and specialists obligations and guarantees that they could not give. When the designer Messerschmitt himself arrived at headquarters with a report on the new aircraft, Hitler attacked him with reproaches, not allowing him to say a word. He ordered to continue testing on a few prototypes, and because of this whim of the Fuhrer, preparations for mass production of one of the best aircraft of the Second World War were delayed for almost a year!

Not only the choleric temperament of the German Fuhrer played a role, but also his attitude to issues of strategy. Defense in Hitler's eyes was a secondary matter. Where the Luftwaffe was concerned, he listened only to what related to offensive actions; he was deaf to the needs of air defense. When, at the end of August 1944, Speer and Galland personally brought to his attention the vital need to concentrate German fighter power in defense of the Reich, Hitler simply threw them out the door shouting that they must obey his orders. In turn, Goering never objected to Hitler, but only passed down the destructive orders of the Fuhrer. In relation to honored pilots, he sometimes behaved completely insultingly. At one of the meetings, Goering began to argue that German fighter pilots had received too many awards that they did not deserve. Galland, who was present at the meeting, upon hearing this, turned pale, tore off the Knight's Cross and noisily threw it on the Reich Minister's table. An icy silence reigned, but Goering left it without consequences. At the very end of the war, Galland, who was, in fact, one of the creators of combat jet fighter aircraft, was sent to Italy with tacit instructions not to return to Germany until the end of the war. He survived, and in 1953 he wrote memoirs in which he spoke in detail, among other things, about the history of the creation of the Me-262.

BATTLE OF THE DOOMED

Meanwhile, the situation at the fronts was rapidly deteriorating, and already in November 1943, Nazi leaders again remembered the “miracle plane.” Its construction was hastily included in the weapons program and given emergency powers to organize rapid production. Goering personally visited the Messerschmitt factories to get acquainted with the progress of work on the Me-262. However, now another hitch arose: Hitler proposed converting the Me-262 into a jet bomber, which would require a complete change in design, attaching bomber sights and suspensions for aerial bombs. This could have slowed down the production of the aircraft for a long time, since the jet fighter, due to its flight characteristics and visibility from the cockpit, was not at all suitable for targeted bombing.

And a few weeks later, a large-scale disaster overtook the German aviation industry: in February 1944, Allied aircraft carried out targeted mass raids on German aircraft factories (the so-called Operation Big Week). As a result, more than 100 Me-262 aircraft were destroyed at the factories in Augsburg and Regensburg, and many technicians and workers were killed. The production of jet aircraft was urgently moved deep into Germany, to Leipheim, but even there, on April 24, the final assembly shops were destroyed by a powerful daytime raid by American bombers...

Jet Messers began to enter service with the troops only in the fall of 1944. The first squadron of jet fighters was assigned to form one of the best German aces, Walter Nowotny, who had 250 downed aircraft and was one of the most successful fighter pilots in the Reich. The creation of the first jet fighter unit, called the 7th Fighter Squadron (JG-7), began in the air town of Achmer near Osnabrück. Novotny personally selected the pilots for his squadron and equipped it with the best fighter aces that the Luftwaffe had at that time. The “bomber hunters” had to take their “baptism of fire” on the Western Front, which especially suffered from Allied air raids. The pilots noted that the Me-262 was much easier to control than the main Luftwaffe fighter Messerschmitt-109 (Gustav). True, the Me-262 accelerated worse, but in a dive it could easily exceed the speed limits. In addition, the jet fighter flew quite well on one engine, and its speed reached 450-500 km/h. The duration of its flight at an altitude of 7000 meters reached 2.25 hours. The fighter's armament consisted of four 30-mm MK 108A-3 cannons with 100 rounds of ammunition for the upper guns and 80 for the lower ones. The choice of such guns indicated that the aircraft was intended to fight enemy bombers, and there was no talk of any maneuverable combat with fighters. According to the German historian K. Becker, “with these weapons, the pilots of the JG-7 squadron destroyed 45 four-engine bombers and 15 accompanying fighters in the last week of February 1945.” For example, on March 17, several Me-262s from Group III took off to intercept B-17s bombing Ruland, Bohlen and Cottbus. In that battle, non-commissioned officer Koster shot down two Flying Fortresses, and Oberleutnant Wegmann and Oberfeldwebel Gobel - one each.

Mostly the Me-262 fought in the West, but there were also clashes with Soviet pilots. The first battles between Soviet aircraft and the Me-262 showed the vulnerability of Soviet aircraft to German jets. At the end of February 1945, Soviet pilots even received a special order - to open fire on the Me-262 without waiting for approach, from a distance of 600 meters. However, some Soviet aces - for example, the famous Ivan Kozhedub and Yevgeny Savitsky - managed to shoot down a Messerschmitt-262. Alexander Pokryshkin also encountered the Me-262, but was unable to shoot it down. It also happened that a Soviet pilot managed to shoot down an Me-262, but the command did not believe him. This happened to fighter pilot Major Okolelov, who shot down a Messerschmitt-262 in the last days of April 1945 in the area of ​​the Breslau-Berlin highway. The downed plane fell in a hard-to-reach area, and the command simply did not believe the Soviet pilot. Only many years later did he manage to prove that he was right - and only thanks to the memoirs of an English pilot who witnessed this battle and wrote about it in his memoirs. The Soviet command believed the Englishman.

The enormous advantage that jet fighters had over piston-engined machines was best demonstrated on April 7, 1945. On this day, the Luftwaffe, acting according to the “Wehrwolf” (werewolf) plan, aimed its attacks not as usual against the bombers, but against the escort of fighters accompanying them. Without suffering any significant losses, JG-7 reported twenty-eight enemy fighters shot down. On the other hand, on the same day, American P-51 Mustang fighters staged a deadly hunt for the German Messerschmitt-109 and Focke Wulf-190. The war diary of the US I Air Corps records the loss of at least 133 German aircraft and the death of seventy-seven pilots.

This was the last great air battle in the skies over Europe. A few days later, the Me-262 pilots had to relocate to an airfield in Prague, which was very far away for active participation in hostilities. And the courage and resilience of individual pilots could no longer prevent the military defeat of Nazi Germany. Thus ended the combat history of the Me-262. Developed before the war, ignored for years and almost even banned by Germany's top military leaders, the German fighter jet remains a shining symbol of German ingenuity even in times of crisis, although its influence on the outcome of the war was negligible. A significant portion of the Me-262s built were lost during Anglo-American air raids; many of them never managed to take to the skies.

FALCONS VS SWALLOWS

Of course, the Kremlin knew that the Germans had a jet fighter, and were waiting for an opportunity to get at least one copy of this miracle of German engineering. In general, the USSR was just as jealous of the German achievements in military aircraft construction as Germany was of the characteristics of Soviet tanks. The rivalry between Russian and German pilots began during the First World War (see note) and continued during the Spanish confrontation (see note). Perhaps it was in Spain that the most sensitive blow was dealt to the pride of the Soviet military aircraft industry. Despite the incredible efforts of the USSR, German aviation reigned supreme in the Spanish skies, completely wiping out the Spanish city of Guernica as a demonstration of its power. And this despite the fact that the USSR did not skimp on expenses, trying to bring its aviation closer to the battle sites in Spain. These days, few people know that the Canelobre caves, which have become a tourist attraction in the city of Alicante, were used in 1936 as a hangar for the assembly and shelter of Soviet Polikarpov aircraft - the U-2 multi-purpose biplanes (known in the West as Po-2). The work on equipping this natural cave, pouring concrete, making a giant tunnel (which still serves as the entrance to the cave), as well as laying almost three kilometers of mountain road took Soviet military specialists less than a year.

Today, only specialists know about this episode of the war in Spain. On the Canelobre cave itself there is not a single indicator of what happened here during the Civil War. And in the USSR itself, they tried not to remember the war in Spain once again. Only occasionally - and even then due to oversight - did the Soviet press publish materials on this topic, such as the one shown in the illustration below - which depicts Polikarpov’s planes in the skies of Spain.

However, the Soviet pilots also had one more tooth against the German aces. The fact is that many of them, in the 20s and 30s, bypassing the terms of the Versailles Treaty, studied in the USSR and were even graduates of higher military educational institutions: the future Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Field Marshal Walter Model, Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, General Manstein, Kruse, Horn, Feige, Hitler's adjutant from the Air Force, Colonel Nicholas von Below and many others. And the future developer of Luftwaffe military aviation, aircraft designer Hugo Junkers, also lived in Moscow in the late 20s, where he trained at the design bureau of Andrei Tupolev. And although many of them did not share the idea of ​​war with the USSR in their hearts, they all used their experience gained during their studies in the USSR in the war. Thus, in the memoirs of Nicholas von Below there is an interesting dialogue that took place between him and Hitler back in 1939, when the Fuhrer asked his adjutant what experience he had learned from his training in the USSR. In response, von Below said that one day, when German pilots were conducting training bombing in the Lipetsk area (where they studied at the local secret aviation school), one of the bombs exploded in a field where local boys were grazing horses. Both children and horses died, but the Soviet authorities billed the German command only for the horses. Not a word was said about the dead children. From this incident, von Below drew a conclusion, which he shared with Hitler: “In war, the Russians will not count people...”

Of course, such treachery did not add to the love of the German pilots among the Soviet military. It is known that in many units German pilots were not even captured alive. The technical superiority of German aircraft, which had developed at the beginning of the war, was leveled off by its middle. New Soviet fighters, as well as Soviet tanks, were not inferior to, and in many respects even superior to, the enemy. And then, out of nowhere, the Me-262, practically inaccessible to Soviet aircraft. It was urgent to study a new machine - but for this it was necessary to get it somewhere. Such an opportunity presented itself only in April 1945. Then Chief Sergeant Major Helmut Lennartz from the same 7th Fighter Squadron was forced to make an emergency landing on territory occupied by Soviet troops. At the same time, the engines of his plane received additional damage from the earth that fell into them. After that, the car ended up in the hands of the Soviet troops, it was taken to the Air Force Research Institute and, under the leadership of the chief engineer, I. G. Rabkin, it was repaired. It was then repainted in Soviet military aviation colors, the swastika on the tail was replaced with a red star, and the vehicle was handed over for flight testing.

A little later, units of the 16th Air Army captured more than 20 Me-262 jet fighters at airfields in Oranienburg, Dalgov, and later in Tempelhof in Berlin. General Savitsky came to test the captured jet machine. He took off in a two-seat fighter and was assisted in the flight by a German captured pilot. The aircraft were transported to the Air Force Research Institute, where Soviet specialists became familiar with their design. Our pilots knew that jet Messers were repeatedly pulled into a dive at high speed and German pilots crashed along with their vehicles, so the candidate for testing was selected especially carefully. The first Soviet pilot to fly the Me-262 was Andrei Kochetkov. On September 15, 1945, he launched a test flight on the repaired Schwalbe. Until November 1945, he completed 17 more flights, for which he received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. During the tests, the same unpleasant features were revealed when flying at high speeds that German specialists had previously encountered. While attempting to reach a maximum speed of 870 km/h, the plane entered an uncontrolled dive. Luckily for the pilot, this happened at an altitude of 11,000 m and Kochetkov, with great difficulty, managed to save the car. Until the end of the summer of 1945, the Air Force Research Institute was able to test the gas turbine Jumo 004 using domestic low-octane gasoline, and another turbojet engine, the BMW 003, using tractor kerosene. For the first time, it was possible to determine the thrust, fuel consumption, and optimal speed of the most advanced German engines.

Meanwhile, in the occupied regions of Germany, Soviet and American specialists were on a real hunt for military-technical documentation and all kinds of “know-how” of German industry. In April 1945, army counterintelligence officers arrested the chief technical adviser on jet aircraft, engineer E. Purucker, in Berlin. Within a few days, the head of the GRU, General F. Kuznetsov, informed the USSR Minister of Aviation Industry A. Shakhurin: “The prisoner E. Puruker is of great interest to you, as he is widely aware of the production of jet engines for aircraft in Germany. The prisoner is in Moscow and can be presented for special interrogation by your representative.” It was from Purucker that it became known where exactly the technical documentation for the Me-262 and other experimental Luftwaffe aircraft was kept. Special teams were sent to retrieve the drawings and thoroughly searched the design offices in Ceske Budejovice, Wiener Neustadt and Bergkristall east of Linz. A high-ranking engineer also reported on a secret airfield in the vicinity of Prague, where about 60 aircraft were based. Purucker turned out to be a very valuable informant, because it was he who spoke about the technical difficulties that the Germans encountered in the process of “bringing to mind” their jet Swallows. He also clarified that the German aircraft industry reached its largest production of Me-262s in March 1945, having received 237 aircraft from assembly lines.

Numerous reports from German pilots, engineers, and high-ranking aviation officials increased interest in the Messerschmitt jet in the Soviet Union. The captured aircraft were sent to aircraft factories in Syzran and to the experimental sites of the Air Force Research Institute, where specialists carefully studied each component. At the conclusion of the act based on the results of flight tests, it was noted, in particular, that the Me-262 is a mature jet aircraft and has a great advantage in maximum horizontal speed over modern domestic and foreign fighters with piston engines. Deputy People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry P.V. Dementyev, having received the first results of flight tests of a captured fighter, sent a letter to Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars G.M. Malenkov with a proposal to immediately begin serial production of Soviet jet aircraft based on the Me-262. Production of the aircraft was planned to be organized at factories No. 381 in Moscow and No. 292 in Saratov. The study of the design of the aircraft, the production of drawings and adaptations of the aircraft for Soviet equipment and weapons were entrusted to the chief designer of the department, Myasishchev, and the development of engines was entrusted to the designer Klimov. Vladimir Mikhailovich Myasishchev, having carefully studied the design of the Me-262, also noted in his report: “I must note that this aircraft, according to the review of the Air Force Scientific Research Institute, has a number of operationally proven designs, such as a three-wheeled landing gear, cabin pressurization, etc., and has good controllability characteristics , allows for the possibility of installing very powerful weapons and using them as an attack aircraft, has a proven two-seat training version and the ability to further increase the maximum flight speed (up to 900-960 km/h) and range (up to 1200 km). At the same time, equipping the Air Force with jet aircraft (in single-seat and two-seat training versions) can begin in mid-1946.”

However, the famous aircraft designer Alexander Yakovlev turned out to be a fierce opponent of this idea. In his book “The Purpose of Life” he wrote: “At one of Stalin’s meetings, when discussing issues of the aviation industry, the proposal of People’s Commissar Alexei Shakhurin was considered for the serial production of the captured Messerschmitt-262 jet fighter captured by our troops. During the discussion, Stalin asked if I was familiar with this plane and what was my opinion. I replied that I know the Me-262 aircraft, but I object to its launch in our series because it is a bad aircraft, difficult to fly and unstable in flight, which suffered a number of accidents in Germany. If it enters our service, it will scare our pilots away from jet aviation. They will quickly see from their own experience that this plane is dangerous and also has poor takeoff and landing properties. I also noticed that if we copy the Messerschmitt, then all attention and resources will be mobilized on this machine, and we will cause great damage to the work on domestic jet aircraft...” After subsequent discussion, the proposal to copy the Me-262 was rejected. Although the Soviet history of the German jet Messerschmitt did not end there. In preparation for the November 1946 parade over Red Square, the Air Force proposed using the Me-262 to train pilots selected to fly the first MiG-9 and Yak-15 jets at a rate of 5-6 flights each. To train pilots, it was planned to transport 20 Me-262 aircraft to the airfield of the 16th Air Army in Chkalovskaya. However, this proposal did not pass: the first Soviet jet fighters, the famous MIG-9, were designed for one pilot, and our pilots would have to retrain from German twins.

Life itself put the final stop on the issue of copying German jet aircraft. On September 17, 1946, during a test flight at the Chkalovsky airfield near the village of Kishkino in the Moscow region, one of the German Messerschmitt-262 crashed, burying test pilot F.F. Demid under its rubble. From that moment on, the final decision was made - not to copy the “Germans”, but to develop our own. Nevertheless, the Me-262 left a deep mark on Soviet aviation. It's not common to just talk about it.

TROPHY AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

In fact, this is one of the carefully hushed up topics of post-war Soviet history - how exactly Soviet science, the military-industrial complex and industry disposed of the engineering “legacy of the enemy” that we inherited as a result of the war. During the fighting on German territory, the zone of Soviet occupation included areas in which many aviation enterprises were concentrated - mainly large aircraft manufacturing concerns such as Junkers, Arado, Heinkel, Focke-Wulf, Dornier. Most of the factories were heavily damaged by aerial bombardment, many turned into ruins. Aircraft designers and developers of new military equipment - Prandtl, Betz, Busemann, Georgi, Heinkel, Lippisch and others - went to the West (it is believed, not without the help of Western intelligence services). However, what the winners got could have been enough for many years with thoughtful and serious study. Therefore, almost simultaneously with the beginning of the fighting on the territory of the Third Reich, a special scientific and technical council (NTS) was created in Moscow, which immediately after the war was transformed into the Bureau of New Technology - it was it that issued the document presented in our collection. Professors, academicians, and leading scientists were mobilized to work in the STS, whose task was to “determine scientific and technical policy for the further development of the army and navy,” or, simply put, to make the most of the captured military-technical and scientific potential of Germany for needs of Soviet industry. Thousands of pages of drawings and texts, product samples, descriptions of experiments, and scientific literature were delivered to Moscow in a continuous stream. Hundreds of German translators were recalled from the front and retrained as specialists in scientific and technical translation. At the same time, in Germany itself, everything that was of even the slightest value was being dismantled. By mid-1946, 123 thousand machine tools and other industrial equipment were exported from Germany to the USSR. This made it possible to create nine new aircraft factories in the Soviet Union, including two aircraft and three engine factories.

Naturally, special attention was paid to the latest types of weapons - jet aircraft, rocket technology, nuclear projects... Although Stalin, Voroshilov, Budyonny before the war did not believe in the power of new developments in the field of weapons and spoke contemptuously about missiles, the experience of the war taught them a lot. In March 1945, when the war was still raging, but Germany’s fate had already been decided, the State Defense Committee issued a decree on the removal of radar documentation and equipment from German factories for their production in the USSR. Soon the State Defense Committee issued a decision “On sending a commission to remove equipment and study the work of the German Rocket Institute in Peenemünde.” We are talking about the enterprise where the German “miracle weapons” - V-1 and V-2 - were created. Academician Georgy Byushgens wrote: “After the end of the war in 1945, TsAGI scientists and other aviation specialists had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with captured aviation research materials from the German DVL Institute in the city of Adlershof. These materials contained, in addition to the results of tests in the wind tunnels of the institute, models of specific aircraft, and general data.”
Captured materials from TsAGI scientists - Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute named after N.E. Zhukovsky was not immediately appreciated. However, many specialists at the institute quickly realized the promise of this area. Further theoretical and experimental research was entrusted to a team of the most authoritative scientists of the institute. In addition to technical documentation, Soviet specialists discovered unfinished samples of Me-162 single-engine jet fighters and three damaged He-280 twin-engine jet fighters. Soviet doctrines studied enemy developments. Here is a quote from one of the reports: “The development of jet technology in Germany has taken on a large scale in recent years. Captured samples of German jet technology available in the USSR - jet aircraft (fighters, attack aircraft, bombers), aviation jet gas turbine engines, liquid jet engines, radio-controlled and unguided missiles (long-range and for combating anti-aircraft targets), projectile aircraft and jet glide bombs controlled by radio from aircraft show that the introduction of jet technology in aviation, navy and artillery was carried out in Germany on a large scale, and the Germans had serious success in this area.”

To study enemy achievements and the possibility of using them in the USSR, by government decision in the summer of 1945, an interdepartmental Commission on Jet Technology was created under the State Defense Committee. In August 1945, bench tests of German jet engines were carried out. At pilot plant No. 51, production of “10X” projectile aircraft began, similar to the German V-1 cruise missile. Also in 1945, the idea arose to use German specialists to develop jet aviation in the USSR. People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry Shakhurin addressed the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks with a secret letter. It said, in particular: “A large number of German specialists and scientists in the field of aviation are now in our hands. These scientists and specialists have enormous reserves of knowledge accumulated during their work in research and experimental organizations in Germany... From our point of view, it would be advisable to have a special type of organization with a special regime on the territory of the USSR or in the zone of Germany occupied by us (under the supervision of the NKVD ), where German scientists could conduct research work - according to our instructions...".
This was immediately reported to Stalin, and the go-ahead was given to use the “enemy’s legacy” for the development of the domestic military industry. The search for and attraction of German specialists to cooperation occurred in various ways. Some, for example, the former head of pilot production at Junkers, Dr. B. Baade, voluntarily expressed a desire to cooperate in order to continue working in aviation. The leading aerodynamics specialist at Heinkel, Z. Gunter, also contacted the Soviet authorities. Many were motivated by mercantile considerations - money and food rations. Some scientists, having heard about the cruelties of the NKVD, were simply afraid to refuse.
In total, over a thousand German scientists were involved in the work. They were collected in Berlin, Dessau, Leipzig, Halle, Strasfurt and Rostock. Everyone wrote a report on the past activities of the scientific institution and spoke about their work. Having become acquainted with these materials, Soviet specialists gave their resumes and set new tasks for the “trophy” scientists. The completed work was sent to the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry, to research institutes and enterprises for more complete study for application in their future work.
At the end of August 1946, the most valuable and promising German specialists were transported to the USSR. There were about seven thousand of them. Aircraft builders were assembled at pilot plant No. 1 in the village of Podberezye, Kimry district, on the shores of the Moscow Sea. Specialists in turbojet engines and instruments were sent to pilot plant No. 2, located near Kuibyshev. Scientists working on engines took their jobs at enterprises near Moscow - plant No. 500 in Tushino and No. 456 in Khimki. It is still unknown exactly what contribution German teaching made to the development of Soviet aircraft construction and how many ideas they suggested to their colleagues from the USSR. However, one can guess that the contribution of 7 thousand of the best minds of the German aviation industry to the development of Soviet military-technical thought turned out to be very significant. Perhaps it was these and similar developments that became the main military trophy of Russia. A trophy that allowed a dilapidated country to turn into a world superpower in a matter of years - with the best aviation and weapons in the world...

Recently, interest in the jet aircraft of the Third Reich has been especially great. After all, it can be considered the progenitor of modern aircraft.

Soviet pilots, as well as the pilots of their allies, were very lucky that the leadership of Nazi Germany, who hoped for a blitzkrieg, realized somewhat late the logical conclusion from the “Battle of Britain” - the war was dragging on, and the Luftwaffe needed aircraft with higher flight characteristics to achieve in quality what could not be achieved in numbers. When this fact was finally realized, the German aircraft industry had already taken an impressive step in the field of research and development of fundamentally new aircraft, but these efforts were nullified by the lack of coordination of work and hesitations of senior management and could no longer influence the outcome of the war.

This was most clearly manifested in the creation of turbojet fighters - a sad story marked by political struggle, petty envy and back and forth. Until his suicide, Colonel General Ernst Udet stubbornly held the view that jet fighters did not meet the requirements of the Luftwaffe. These views were shared by General Field Marshal Erhard Milch, who raised the question of stopping work altogether. As a result, although the first He-280 jet fighter successfully flew on April 2, 1941 and demonstrated its complete advantage in a number of aspects over conventional fighters, the complete apathy of senior officials and the personal hostility of some of the ranks of the Technical Department of the RLM towards Ernst Heinkel negated the success of creating the most the leading combat aircraft of the time. Real support for jet aviation was provided only in 1944.

Ernst Heinkel showed his interest in a gas turbine suitable for installation on an aircraft in the spring of 1936, when former assistant professor at the University of Göttingen Pohl, Hans-Joachim Pabst von Ohain, began creating gas turbines of his own design. Its first engine, the HeS-2A, was successfully demonstrated in September 1937. His deadlift was 80 kg. It was followed by the HeS-2B with a thrust of 130 kg and work began on the HeS-3A. At the same time, a suitable aircraft was selected for its testing. "HeS-ZA" developed a thrust of 450 kg and was tested in the spring of 1939 in flight under the fuselage of the He-118 V2. The second HeS-3B engine developed a thrust of 500 kg. It was installed on the experimental He-178 V1. The first flight of the vehicle took place on August 24, 1939, and the circling flight took place on August 27 in Marien under the control of Erich Warsitz. This was the first flight of an airplane powered by a turbojet engine.

When designing the He-178, the designers “squeezed” the car as much as possible. Its length is 7.48 meters, its wingspan is 7.2 meters, its area is 9.1 square meters. meters, while the specific load on the wing was 219 kg/sq.m. Empty weight of the aircraft is 1620 kg, take-off weight is 1998 kg. During testing, a maximum speed of 700 km/h was achieved.

By this time, work was already underway on the turbojet HeS-8A with a centrifugal compressor, which had a smaller diameter and greater thrust, and Heinkel technical director Robert Lusser in the spring of 1939 carried out development work on a twin-engine, single-seat fighter for this engine. All work was then carried out on a proactive basis. The technical department was not even notified. The He-178 V1 was demonstrated to Udet and Milch on November 1, 1939 in Marien, but both were very skeptical about the use of a turbojet engine as the main propulsion system of the aircraft.

Later, work on jet and rocket aircraft will be carried out on a wider scale. Each design bureau will present its developments to experts. The results achieved by the Germans during this period, as will become clear after processing all the captured documents and samples, will allow us to conclude that Germany in the second half of the 1930s and early 1940s was the undoubted leader in this field.

But the leadership of the Third Reich was in no hurry to actively finance the jet project. Germany, which had the most combat-ready army in 1939, developed the theory of “Blitzkrieg,” in which there was no place for jet aircraft.

Despite the lack of understanding in Milch's department, work progressed on both the fighter and the engine. In March 1940, Messerschmitt received a contract for 3 prototype aircraft under the “Project 1065”, the development of which was carried out independently of Heinkel. In the end, Ernst Heinkel Flygtsoigwerke also received official support for its fighter, called the He-280.

By September 1940, the airframe of the first He-280 V1 (DL+AS) aircraft was ready. Work was underway on two more aircraft. In addition to the Pabst von Ohain turbojet engines, the He-280 had a number of non-standard, if not revolutionary, ideas. A compressed air ejection seat was installed in the cockpit - the first development of its kind in the world.

The cabin itself had to be sealed. The fighter had a retractable nose wheel, which allowed the aircraft to taxi horizontally on the ground, thereby avoiding the problems encountered on the first Me-262, which had engines pointed directly at the ground. The design was all-metal with working skin, with a monocoque fuselage of oval cross-section and a two-tail tail. The engines were mounted under the main wing spar, immediately behind the landing gear hinge, which was retracted to the line of symmetry using hydraulics. There were flaps on both sides of the engine nacelle.

To evaluate the aerodynamic qualities of the He-280 V1 before the first motor flight, fairings with ballast were installed instead of engine nacelles to simulate the weight of the engine and fuel. On September 11, 1940, the aircraft was lifted into the air in tow behind the He-111H. The glider tests were carried out by Bader, a pilot from Rechlin. A total of 41 glider flights were made until March 17, 1941, after which the He-280 V1 was returned to the hangar for the installation of two HeS-8A turbojet engines with a thrust of 585 kg each.

The fuselage tank could be filled with up to 1000 liters of fuel, but on the first flight on April 2, 1941, the tank was only half filled - quite enough for takeoff and one pass over the airfield at moderate speed. Fritz Schafer lifted the He-280 V1 into the air. Turning around over the mouth of Varnov, he circled to the airfield and began landing when the fuel was almost running out. During the first flight, the engines were without cowlings, as tests on the ground showed that fuel had accumulated at the bottom of the engine nacelles, threatening a fire. The landing gear was not retractable, and the flight altitude did not exceed 300 meters.

Three days later, on April 5, the plane was lifted into the air with the engines cowled up by Bader - the He-280 V1 was demonstrated in front of Udet, the head of the Luftwaffe engineering department Lucht and the head of L.C.3 (propulsion systems department) Eissenlohr. They showed some interest in the aircraft, although it was short-lived. Udet doubted the need for such an unusual fighter until the end of his tenure, an opinion shared by Milch, who replaced him.

With a total weight of 4285 kg, the He-280 V1 reached a speed of 775 km/h at an altitude of 6000 meters, however, it was expected that the HeS-8A engines would produce up to 720 kg of thrust and the speed would be up to 925 km/h - very optimistic estimates. The second experimental He-280 V2 (GJ+CA) was ready in May 1941. In July we completed the He-280 V3 (GJ+CB). 6 more cars were ordered.

Meanwhile, serious difficulties were encountered in fine-tuning the HeS-8A engine, also known as Heinkel-Hirt 001 (Heinkel acquired the former Hirth plant in Zuffenhausen on April 9, 1941). The engines mounted on the He-280 V1 produced 600 kg of thrust, which made it possible to reach a speed of 800 km/h, but in one of the first flights of this aircraft, under the control of Fritz Schafer, one of the turbine blades came off. The engine shook and flames burst out of it. The best man successfully landed the plane on its belly, the damage was minor and the plane flew after repairs within 3 days.

In January 1942, the He-280 V1 was transferred to the test center in Rechlin, where the HeS-8A were replaced by 4 Argus As 014 pulse engines - they were tested under the Fi-103 program. With these engines, the He-280 V1 could not even get off the ground.

Despite the problems with the HeS-8A, by the spring of 1942 Ernst Heinkel already believed that the He-280 was ready for adoption, at a time when its competitor Me-262 had not even flown on jet propulsion. But the Ministry of Aviation ignored his proposal. To force the decision, Heinkel organized a training battle between the FW-190A, which took off from the Arado airfield near Warnemünden, and the He-280. The fighter jet easily won the battle against its opponent.

After several major defeats, in 1942 Germany finally stepped up its rocket program. As a result, RLM agreed to produce 13 pre-production He-280A-0.

At the beginning of the summer of 1942, tests of the He-280 aircraft were transferred from Mariene to Schwechat. By this time, the Technical Department agreed that the Jumo 004 turbojet engine had noticeable advantages over the Heinkel-Hirt 001, which never produced the planned thrust. As a result, in June 1942, the He-280 V2 was re-equipped with the "Jumo 004A" with a thrust of 840 kg.

The take-off weight of the vehicle increased to 5200 kg, and the speed reached 785 km/h. Flight testing resumed in July. At the same time, armament of three 20-mm MG 151 cannons was installed for the first time in the forward fuselage.

In the meantime, the He-280 V4 (GJ+CC) and V5 (CJ+CD) were completed. The latter retained the Heinkel-Hirt 001 engines, while the former had a BMW 003A-0 with a thrust of 750 kg. The He-280 V5 was proposed by Heinkel as a prototype of the serial He-280A-1, which had an empty weight of 3060 kg and a takeoff weight of 4300 kg. It was stated that the maximum speed reached 815 km/h (however, this is doubtful), the flight range at this speed and an altitude of 6000 meters was 650 km, and at an altitude of 10,000 meters - 950 km, rate of climb - 19 m/s, ceiling - 11,500 meters . The landing speed was 140 km/h.

The Non-280 V6 (NU+EA) aircraft received weapons and “Jumo 004” engines from the very beginning. It was tested in Rechlin at the beginning of 1943. Heinkel offered the Technical Department a fighter-bomber He-280B-1 with two “Jumo 004B” 900 kg thrust. The maximum speed was estimated at 875 km/h. It was planned to double the armament of the Non-280A by installing up to 6 x 20-mm MG 151 cannons, and replace the two-fin empennage with a single-fin one. RLM and the Milch department, only 3 months ago, having concluded that preparations for mass production of the Me-262 were premature and that, given the heavy workload of Heinkel with other work, the production of the He-280 was not realistic, they suddenly made a “turn around”, ordering 300 vehicles Non-280V-1. Since Heinkel did not have the necessary capacity, it was decided to transfer the contract to Siebel.

However, by that time, tests of the Me-262 V2 showed that the Messerschmitt fighter had superior performance characteristics over the He-280 with the same propulsion system, especially in terms of flight range - the main disadvantage of the Heinkel fighter. As a result, on March 27, 1943, the Technical Department ordered Ernst Heinkel to stop all work on the He-280. Only 9 prototype aircraft were allowed to be completed...

* * *

In 1944, training centers for jet aviation pilots and the first combat units were formed. Jet aircraft took an active part in combat operations almost until the very end of the war.

The main target of the Luftwaffe's jets was Allied bombers, which constantly attacked cities and industrial sites in Germany. Soviet Air Force aircraft encountered the latest German developments only at the very end of the war, when the front was already on German territory.

And the war was coming to an end, the “raw” and unfinished Luftwaffe jets could not compete with the perfect ones: La-7, Yak-9 and so on. And the training of German pilots left much to be desired... The lack of permanently operating jet aircraft on the Eastern Front is explained by the fact that all the jet aces were in the western direction and protected the skies of Germany from constant bombing attacks inflicted by the Allies.

The first to meet jet aircraft on the Eastern Front were the pilots of the 176th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment.

This meeting took place on February 14, 1945. A. S. Kumanichkin, together with regiment commander P. F. Chupikov, met an unusual aircraft in the air. The guardsmen tried to attack the enemy, but the German plane unexpectedly quickly broke away from their pursuers. After developing the film from the photo-machine gun, it became clear that the pilots of the 176th GIAP met with the latest Me-262 jet fighter. This was the first, but not the last meeting of the pilots of the 176th GIAP with German jet technology.

The first jet was credited to the famous ace Hero of the Soviet Union Ivan Nikitovich Kozhedub.

Kozhedub Ivan Nikitovich. Born on June 8, 1920 in the village of Obrazhievka, now Shostkinsky district, Sumy region, in a peasant family. Graduated from the Chemical and Technological College. Since 1940 in the Red Army. In 1941 he graduated from the Chuguev Military Aviation Pilot School. On the fronts of the Great Patriotic War since March 1943. In 1949 he graduated from the Air Force Academy, in 1956 - from the Military Academy of the General Staff. Since 1971 in the Central Office of the Air Force, since 1978 - in the General Inspection Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Air Marshal. Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 2nd - 5th convocations. Member of the Presidium of the DOSAAF Central Committee.

Awarded the Order of Lenin (twice), the Red Banner (seven), Alexander Nevsky, Patriotic War 1st degree, Red Star (twice), "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" 3rd degree, medals, as well as foreign orders and medals . Honorary citizen of the cities of Balti, Chuguev, Kaluga, Kupyansk, Sumy and others. A bronze bust was installed in the village of Obrazhievka.

This event occurred on February 19, 1945 in the sky over the Oder and, according to the description of I. Kozhedub himself, it happened like this:

“It was like this. We were conducting an aerial hunt not far from the front line. I carefully monitor the air. From the south, from the direction of Frankfurt, at an altitude of 3500 meters, a plane suddenly appears. It flies along the Oder at a speed limiting for our Lavochkins. Yes, this It’s a jet plane! I quickly turn around. I give the engine full throttle, chasing the enemy. The pilot, obviously, did not look back, relying on the high speed, “squeezing” the maximum speed out of the car, trying to close the distance and approach with a slight decrease under the enemy’s “belly.” the plane. I would like to take a closer look at it; if I manage to open fire and shoot it down. I approach from the tail at a distance of 500 meters. Successful maneuver, speed of action allowed me to approach the jet plane. But what is it? It’s clear - my partner. Still, I was in a hurry! I mercilessly scold the “Old Man” to myself, I am sure that my plan of action was irreparably violated. But his routes unexpectedly - unexpectedly - helped me: the German plane began to turn to the left, in my direction. The distance decreased sharply, and I got closer to the enemy. With involuntary excitement I open fire. And the jet plane, falling apart, falls."

In this air battle, I.N. Kozhedub shot down an Me-262. German sources confirm the loss, even identifying the aircraft number as WNr.900284.

Many, and often everyone, believe that I.N. Kozhedub shot down non-commissioned officer Kurt Lange from I./KG(j)54. But this is unlikely, since I/KG(j)54 at that time (02/22/1945 - 03/28/1945) was based at the airfield in Giebelstatt near Wurzburg. And Ivan Nikitovich’s battle with a jet plane took place north of Frankfurt-on-Oder. If any of the readers do not have the opportunity to look at the map of Germany, then I will allow myself to remind you that Wurzburg is Bavaria, which means the southern part of Germany. Frankfurt an der Oder - northern. And the distance between them is quite decent. About 600 km (the practical flight range of the Me-262 is 1040 km). One wonders why KG(j)54 would send a plane across Germany on a “hunt” when the more experienced (in terms of pilots) JV44 periodically operates there (the fact is that near the Oder there was a so-called “training zone” for this unit, there did young pilots undergo flight training)? But wait, JV44 was officially formed on February 24, 1945, and the jet fighter battle took place on February 19, 1945. Well, JV44 is not suitable. Let's look at the following parts.

Maybe JG7. Let's consider this option. In February, this unit was engaged in repelling attacks from Allied aircraft from the western direction, but there were frequent cases of JG7 flying near the Eastern Front. Fortunately, the location allowed: Bradenburg - Brist.

This means that the plane from JG7 most likely met with Ivan Nikitovich. It is known that the camouflage of this fighter consisted of random spots and with a number behind the cockpit: the number “9” in red. Let's remember the designations in the Luftwaffe. The red number denotes membership in the 2nd Squadron in each group. This means that Ivan Nikitich most likely shot down the Me-262 from the 2nd squadron of JG7. But skeptics also have reason to doubt, for example: why Ivan Nikitich did not declare victory immediately upon landing at the airfield. Or, where is the FKP film that captured the Me-262? Why is there not a word about a jet aircraft in the regiment’s documents, at least in the monthly report. And one more argument: in the typewritten list of victories, the victory over Me-262 is written in pen in the margins, which raises doubts about the authenticity of this document.

Well, this issue is very complex and requires separate consideration. And I just tried to slightly lift the veil of this secret.

But other pilots also had encounters with the Me-262; some shot down this “miracle weapon of retribution,” and others died at its “hands.”

Merkviladze Garry Alexandrovich. Born on February 17, 1923 in the city of Batumi (Adjarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic). Graduated from 9th grade. Since 1941 in the Red Army. In the same year he graduated from Tbilisi, and in 1942 from Armavir Military Aviation Pilot School. Since March 1943 on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War.

Deputy squadron commander of the 152nd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment (12th Guards Fighter Aviation Division, 1st Guards Attack Aviation Corps, 2nd Air Army, 1st Ukrainian Front) Guard Senior Lieutenant G. A. Merkviladze by May 1945 made 386 combat missions, in 87 air battles he personally shot down 13 and 2 enemy aircraft in a group.

Title of Hero of the Owls. The Union was assigned on June 27, 1945.

In 1952 he graduated from the Air Force Academy, in 1961 - from the Military Academy of the General Staff. Since 1970, General - Aviation Major G. A. Merkviladze has been in reserve. Lived in the city of Tbilisi. Awarded the Order of Lenin, the Red Banner (three times), Alexander Nevsky, the Order of the Patriotic War 1st degree, the Red Star (three times), and medals. Died on April 2, 1971.

Pilot of the 152nd GvIAP Garry Aleksandrovich Merkviladze also has a downed Me-262 to his credit. The battle took place as follows: Harry Alexandrovich, while flying, noticed a new enemy aircraft, according to the description, matching the Me-262. The German pilot also noticed the Soviet fighter and prepared to attack. Merkviladze realized that without cunning this plane could not be brought down “from heaven to earth.”

On February 27, 1945, a conference was held in the 16th Air Army on the topic: “The fight of piston fighters of the Red Army Air Force against the enemy’s new jet technology.” The conference was attended by pilots who had already met the Me-262 in the sky, everyone shared their impressions of the new creation of the Luftwaffe. By the way, Ivan Nikitich Kozhedub also spoke there, but did not say anything about the downed Me-262, he only described how it was possible to shoot it down.

The conference was opened by the commander of the 16th Air Army, General - Aviation Commander S.I. Rudenko with the following words:

“We have gathered to talk about some of the features of the fight against high-speed German aircraft, including Messerschmitt-262, which have jet engines. Some of the comrades present here have already met such aircraft in the air. I would like these pilots shared their impressions of air battles, told us what the new enemy aircraft looked like in flight, what tactics were needed to better hit and shoot them down. This is required by the interests of the final victory over Nazi Germany."

Novikov Alexey Ivanovich. Born on November 7, 1916 in Moscow in a working-class family. He graduated from 7 classes, the FZU school, the flying club, and in 1936 - the Ulyanovsk School of Pilot Instructors. Since 1939 in the Red Army, in the same year he graduated from the Borisoglebsk Military Aviation Pilot School. On the fronts of the Great Patriotic War from the first day. By August 1942, the squadron commander of the 17th Fighter Aviation Regiment (205th Fighter Aviation Division, 2nd Air Army, Voronezh Front), Captain A.I. Novikov, flew 242 combat missions and shot down 11 enemy aircraft in 34 air battles. On February 4, 1943, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In total, during the war he made about 500 combat missions, shot down 22 enemy aircraft personally and 5 in a group.

After the war he continued to serve in the Air Force. In 1960 he graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff. Since 1970, General - Aviation Major A.I. Novikov - retired. Lived and worked in Moscow. Awarded the Order of Lenin, the Red Banner (three times), the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree (twice), the Red Star (four times), and medals. Died on October 23, 1986.

“The plane had a long, thin tail and an elongated nose with a low suspension of two gondola installations under the wings. The meeting took place on intersecting courses. The enemy quickly slipped past me and disappeared from view. During the search, I met him again and approached him. German pilot, probably noticed me and broke away again and left. For the third time I met the enemy on the same course as the first time.

Turning around, I picked up a speed of 570 km per hour and began to approach. However, the jet plane got away from me again. General E. Ya. Savitsky tried to attack him. But this attempt remained equally ineffective: the speed of the German car reached 800 km per hour. Traces of the operation of its jet engines were not visible due to the heavy haze."

Summing up his speech, Alexey Ivanovich gave some advice on techniques for combating new aircraft. Firstly, attack only using the method of surprise, preferably from the direction of the sun. Secondly, when conducting a battle it is necessary to use the maneuver of your aircraft so as not to allow targeted fire from the enemy. During an attack by the enemy, it is necessary to make a turn, and when the attacker rushes forward, only then open cannon fire.

Alexey Ivanovich also noted the rather poor maneuverability of this aircraft due to its very high speed. Oddly enough, one of the weak features of this fighter was its speed. According to Novikov, the sight installed on Soviet aircraft was suitable for firing at new enemy aircraft only from short distances. There was no point in firing at long distances. But still, there is no point in modifying the sight specifically for a new enemy aircraft. The scope of the confrontation between the Me-262 and the Soviet Air Force was so small and ineffective that the Messer jet could no longer influence the course of the war.

Makarov Valentin Nikolaevich. Born on August 30, 1919 in Sevastopol in a working-class family. Participant of the Great Patriotic War since June 1941. Squadron commander of the 511th Fighter Aviation Regiment (220th Fighter Aviation Division, 16th Air Army, Don Front) Captain V.N. Makarov by January 1943 had flown 462 combat missions, in 118 air battles he shot down 15 personally and in a group 7 enemy aircraft. On January 28, 1943, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In total, he performed 635 combat missions, conducted 150 air battles, shot down 30 aircraft personally and 9 in a group.

In 1947 he graduated from the Higher Officer Flight Tactical Courses, and in 1956 from the Military Academy of the General Staff. Since 1975, General - Aviation Major V.N. Makarov has been in reserve. He was awarded the Order of Lenin (twice), the Red Banner (three times), Alexander Nevsky, the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree, the Red Star (twice), “For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces,” 3rd degree, and medals. Died on May 20, 1978.

“While covering ground troops on the northern bridgehead of the Oder River, I also met an unfamiliar plane. At first I recognized it as a Rama, but when I turned around and went on the attack, I was convinced that it was not a Focke-Wulf. Gondolas were suspended under the planes of the aircraft. installations. They probably contained jet engines, since white smoke streamed from the gondolas. The unknown plane quickly moved away from me, and I lost sight of it."

Valentin Nikolaevich agreed with Novikov: in order to shoot down such a plane it is necessary to use the factor of surprise using the sun and clouds. According to Makarov, one of the weak features of the new car was poor visibility of the pilot, and especially the lower hemisphere. The opinions of the speakers also agreed that there is no need to change the sight, but to fire only from small angles.

Also, Makarov made a proposal that pairs or fours should be sent on missions to destroy the Me-262, since they are easier to control than large groups. And that the battle formation when escorting attack aircraft and bombers must be built in such a way as to prevent the enemy from launching a surprise attack. The groups should be strengthened and pulled back. Kobyletsky Ivan Ivanovich. Participant of the Great Patriotic War since June 1941. Deputy squadron commander of the 43rd Fighter Aviation Regiment (220th Fighter Aviation Division, 8th Air Army, South-Eastern Front) Senior Lieutenant I. I. Kobyletsky in an air battle on 08/16/1942 over his airfield near Stalingrad on a Yak plane -1 rammed an enemy fighter. Landed at the airport. He fought on the Southwestern, Don, Central, and Belorussian fronts. Deputy commander of the 53rd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment (1st Guards Fighter Aviation Division, 16th Air Army, 1st Belorussian Front) of the Guard, Major I. I. Kobyletsky, by February 1945, had carried out 451 combat missions, in 94 air battles personally shot down 15 and as part of a group 9 enemy aircraft. On May 15, 1946 he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Since September 1948, Lieutenant Colonel I.I. Kobyletsky has been retired due to illness. Lived in Kyiv. He worked as a fitter-patterner, senior inspection foreman, and engineer. Awarded the Order of Lenin (twice), the Red Banner (twice), Alexander Nevsky, the Order of the Patriotic War 1st degree, the Red Star, and medals. Died July 25, 1986.

From the 53rd Guards IAP, Major Ivan Ivanovich Kobyletsky and Captain Gennady Sergeevich Dubenok took part in the conference.

I. I. Kobyletsky came up with an interesting idea. He proposed setting up something like an “ambush”, or rather, studying the enemy’s routes and organizing an ambush, thereby taking the enemy by surprise and, taking the initiative in the air battle into his own hands, shooting down or forcing the enemy’s plane to land.

Captain G.S. Dubenok, on the contrary, developed the idea of ​​Lieutenant Colonel V.N. Makarov that in order to successfully fight the enemy it is necessary to use all the advantages of building a formation of attack aircraft and fighters.

Summing up the results of the conference, the commander of the 16th Air Army, General - Colonel of Aviation S.I. Rudenko, recommended that the command of the units continue the process of training in tactics to combat Luftwaffe jet aircraft. He also expressed the hope that battles with jet aircraft will be fought at short distances (from 20 to 600 meters).

At the conclusion of his speech, the General called on everyone to preserve their proud name - the falcons of the country of the Soviets.

The conference ended and the victorious spring of 1945 was dawning. But the resistance of Hitler’s army continued, and there were frequent clashes in the sky with enemy aircraft. New encounters with Luftwaffe jet technology were no exception.

Dubenok Gennady Sergeevich. Born on January 1, 1920 in the village of Kraskovo, Pustoshkinsky district, Tver region. After graduating from the Chuguev Military Aviation School in 1939, he was sent to the position of fighter pilot on the Southwestern Front. Participant in the Battle of Stalingrad. He was an aviation flight commander and then deputy squadron commander of the 512th Fighter Aviation Regiment, deputy squadron commander of the 55th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment of the 16th Air Army. He fought on the Don, Central and 1st Belorussian fronts. In total he made 372 combat missions. Having conducted more than 100 air battles, he shot down 12 enemy aircraft personally and 11 in a group. On August 24, 1943 he was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. After the war, he completed his postgraduate studies at the Red Banner Air Force Academy. He served as a teacher and senior lecturer at the academy.

He was awarded the Order of Lenin, the Red Banner (twice), the Order of the Patriotic War 1st and 2nd degree, the Red Star, "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" 3rd degree, the medal "For the Defense of Stalingrad" and many others.

So on March 22, 1945, in a battle with a pair of Me-262s, pilot Lev Ivanovich Sivko (photo provided by A.V. Stankov) shot down a “jet”. I would like to dwell on this episode a little.

When the enemy plane began to turn around, Lev Ivanovich, with a burst from 100 meters, damaged the right plane of the Me-262 wing, between the engine and the console. The enemy fighter overturned and crashed to the ground 5 km west of Tsekhin.

According to some sources, L. I. Sivko himself soon died:

“But L. Sivko’s car was also damaged, the pilot could not leave it and died a hero’s death. Now the fighting friends in the skies of Berlin avenged the death of the brave Komsomol member.”

On March 22, the US Air Force raided targets in Germany. On this day, the Germans announced 3 German fighters shot down. Perhaps these were planes from JG7 from the Bradenbug - Brist airfield.

So, on this day, 3 aircraft of the Luftwaffe jet fleet were lost. The first aircraft from 11./JG7 was lost during a bomber attack (pilot August Lübking, WNr. 111541), the second between Cottbus and Bautzen in the Alt-Döbern area (pilot Heinz Eichner, WNr. 500462). What about the third one, you ask? I will answer, there is very little data on this loss, only the serial number of the Me-262 is known. WNr. 900192. And the fact that this plane was lost in the Tsekhin area on March 22, 1945. Coincidence? It’s unlikely, considering that this is the territory where Soviet pilots “hunted.” So Lev Sivko most likely shot down this particular Me-262. Another argument for the truth of this victory is confirmation of the battle from the ground.

And where did the second Me-262 from the pair of attackers go? If he returned to the airfield, then why didn’t he report that his partner had been shot down by a Soviet fighter? Although he may have notified him, it is already March 1945, less than 2 months before the end of the war. Perhaps the message from the pilot of the second fighter was simply lost in the shuffle of German military documents. It's the end of the war after all...

There was less than a month left before the end of the war, but the resistance of the Luftwaffe pilots did not cease to weaken (we must pay tribute to the German pilots, they continued to resist the enemy, as they say, until the last “drop of blood”).

In the spring of 1945, Soviet pilots were lucky enough to shoot down several more Me-262s. One of these lucky ones turned out to be Egorovich Vladimir Alekseevich. In April 1945, in the sky of Berlin, he took down a Me-262 with a burst from his Yak-9T.

Born on May 19, 1919 in the village of Sutiski, now a village in the Tyvrovsky district of the Vinnitsa region, in a peasant family. Studied at a construction technical school. Since April 1943 on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. Squadron commander of the 402nd Fighter Aviation Regiment (265th Fighter Aviation Division, 3rd Fighter Aviation Corps, 16th Air Army, 1st Belorussian Front) Captain V. A. Egorovich completed 248 combat missions by February 1945, in 71 air battles he shot down 22 enemy aircraft.

On May 15, 1946 he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

After the war he continued to serve in the Air Force. Since 1949, he was the head of the flight unit of the DOSAAF flying club in the Zaporozhye region. He was awarded the Order of Lenin, the Red Banner (three times), Alexander Nevsky, the Order of the Patriotic War, 2nd degree, and medals. Tragically died on April 27, 1953.

Another "April lucky guy" Kuznetsov Ivan Aleksandrovich.

The battle took place as follows: the Me-262 group wanted to attack the Il-2 attack aircraft when the covering fighters took off into the air. The Messers began to try to get out of the battle. And then the regiment commander gave the order: “Shot down the jet plane!” I. A. Kuznetsov aimed his Yak across the jet and fired a long burst at the German plane. Messer's right engine began to smoke. But the Messer jet was still trying to get out of the battle, picking up speed. But 3 more fighters took off to help their commander. They simultaneously opened fire on the Me-262. The German pilot could not escape such an attack; his plane tilted and crashed to the ground.

This victory was chalked up to Ivan Kuznetsov’s personal account, although it was a group victory. This event took place on April 30, 1945 near Berlin. On the fronts of the Great Patriotic War since December 1942. The squadron commander of the 107th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment (11th Guards Fighter Aviation Division, 2nd Air Army, 1st Ukrainian Front) of the Guard, Senior Lieutenant I. A. Kuznetsov, by May 1945, had completed 219 combat missions. In 59 air battles he shot down 10 enemy aircraft and destroyed a lot of enemy manpower and military equipment with assault strikes. On June 27, 1945 he was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

After the war he continued to serve in the Air Force. In 1953 he graduated from the Higher Officer Flight and Tactical Courses, served in the country's Air Defense Forces, and commanded a formation. Since 1972, General - Aviation Major I. A. Kuznetsov has been in reserve. Living in Astrakhan, he was chairman of the regional DOSAAF committee. Awarded the Order of Lenin, the Red Banner (four times), Alexander Nevsky, the Order of the Patriotic War 1st and 2nd degree, the Red Star (twice), Soviet and foreign medals.

“It was much more difficult for us, attack aircraft, to fight the Me-262. Jet planes flew over our formation, lying in wait for the Ilyas during turns when approaching a target or when exiting an attack. They also attacked damaged aircraft landing.

One pair got used to intercepting the Ilyushins in such a way that at least they didn’t return from the mission alone. The corps commander ordered to stop these brazen attacks by hunters. We came up with a simple plan: I and my partner decided to use me as bait, to deceive the enemy with the appearance of easy prey.

One morning, at about 8 o'clock, I lifted my Il into the air. Full ammunition, but no bombs. Three pairs of "Yaks" climbed to 5000 meters. I began to walk at speed over the airfield. Suddenly, 2 silvery dots began to grow from the front line. The leading Me-262 went on the attack. Maneuvering, I fired a cannon burst at him. Then our fighters arrived from above.

The Messer that attacked me quickly went up, but our guys still covered the second one. The fascist had no choice but to eject. Drachenko Ivan Grigorievich. Senior pilot of the 140th Guards Assault Aviation Regiment (8th Guards Assault Aviation Division, 1st Guards Assault Aviation Corps, 2nd Air Army, 1st Ukrainian Front) Guard junior lieutenant I. G. Drachenko by August 1944 made 100 combat missions for reconnaissance and destruction of enemy manpower and equipment. Participated in 14 air battles. On August 14, 1944, while performing a combat mission, he was seriously wounded and captured. Managed to escape. After recovery he returned to the front. On October 26, 1944 he was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. After the war, Senior Lieutenant I.G. Drachenko retired. In 1953 he graduated from the Faculty of Law of Kyiv University, worked as the director of an evening high school, and as deputy director of the Palace of Culture "Ukraine" in Kyiv. Awarded the Order of Lenin, the Red Banner, the Patriotic War 1st degree, the Red Star, Glory (all three degrees), and medals. Author of the books: “For the sake of life on earth”, “On the wings of courage”.

But why didn't his parachute open? When we approached the place where the Nesetsky pilot fell, we immediately noticed that the parachute was locked. This means that the pilot was doomed to death in advance..."

But perhaps the most interesting clash occurred with Major A.V. Vorozheikin.

Arseny Vasilyevich is the only Soviet Air Force pilot who shot down a German Arado Ar-234 jet bomber. In addition, Vorozheikin is also a wonderful writer: such wonderful works as “Soldiers of the Sky”, “Private Aviation”, “Berlin Beneath Us” came from his pen. It is in his book “Soldiers of the Sky” that Arseniy Vasilyevich describes how he shot down the Arada jet. I bring to the reader's attention the same passage:

“Below us, some kind of plane is gliding unusually quickly. My eyes cling tightly to it. Under the wings I see 4 twin engines. Jet. I’ve heard of such a plane. “Arada”, a fighter-bomber. It has 4 30-mm cannons and can be rockets.

The speed of this car is about 900 km/h. This is the latest innovation in German military equipment. Although we flew on the best Yaks - the Yak-3, they are piston-powered and are 200 kilometers slower than the new German jets. You won’t be able to defeat this fascist with old techniques. Experience suggested how best to attack him.

Vorozheikin Arseniy Vasilievich Born on October 28, 1912 in the village of Prokofievo, now Gorodets district of the Gorky region, in a peasant family. Since 1931 in the Red Army. In 1937 he graduated from the Kharkov Military Aviation Pilot School. Participated in the battles on the Khalkhin-Gol River in 1939. Conducted 30 air battles, shot down 6 Japanese aircraft personally and 12 in a group. During the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940 he was a military commissar of an aviation squadron. In 1942 he graduated from the Air Force Academy. On the fronts of the Great Patriotic War since 1942. Squadron commander of the 728th Fighter Aviation Regiment (256th Fighter Aviation Division, 5th Fighter Aviation Corps, 2nd Air Army, 1st Ukrainian Front) for 78 combat missions and participation in 32 air battles, in which he personally destroyed 19 enemy aircraft, 02/04/1944 awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The second Gold Star medal was awarded to Captain A.V. Vorozheikin on August 19, 1944 for 28 combat missions, 14 air battles and 11 downed aircraft.

Since 1944, senior instructor - pilot of the combat training department of front-line aviation.

After the war, he commanded an aviation regiment and division, and was the first deputy commander of the air defense of the Black Sea Fleet. In 1952 he graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff. Since 1957, General - Aviation Major A.V. Vorozheikin has been in reserve.

The plane is still flying low and will soon overtake me. This is where I have to catch him. And I turn the car again. The “Yak” obeys with difficulty, as if complaining: “Stop testing me,” and is eager to get out of the dive. I hold it tightly as I continue to lose altitude. The speed gauge needle is already vibrating at the round and dangerous number “700”. And my “Yak”, as if having renounced life, has lost its agility and no longer rushes upward into the sky, but with cold doom goes towards the ground.

The car is not designed for such high speed: it may fall apart. And if you have enough strength, it won’t come out of the dive: it will get sucked in.

With full muscle tension I begin to withdraw. It's hard to hear, but it's easy to hear. True, my eyes get dark from overload, but I know from experience that this will pass if you just ease the pressure on the handle. Just a little more effort. If only the Yak could withstand it! Must! That's how I want it. And I'm pulling. Although it’s night in my eyes, I feel everything is fine.

Well done "Yak", he survived! My eyes become clearer, I see the horizon, the sky, the earth. There must be an "Arada" here somewhere. Here she is! Near. I calculated it well. And then something happened that I no longer feared. There was an explosion and a blow to the head. I choked on something thick and cold. My vision darkened again. Consciousness clearly noted: this is the last attack. A shell exploded in the cabin... But why did it feel cold and not hot and I don’t feel any pain or scorching fire? Did the plane fall apart?.. However, in front of me again was the sky, the earth, the horizon and the Arada. My Yak is intact. And the explosion, the impact?.. That's it - the canopy was torn off the cabin, and the cold air whipped into the face. I'm taking aim at the Arada!

That's bad luck. It’s already far away, I might not get there. I'm shooting. Fabulous! Cords of tracer shells and bullets caught up with the enemy and dug into his body. Sparks and fire sprayed out of the Arada, thick smoke poured out, and the plane disappeared into the Berlin fire..."

It is very difficult to trace this loss from German sources. But in fact it is impossible, because it is not even known whether this plane was shot down, since its remains were not found. And there are no witnesses to be found either. One can only guess what happened to that Arada jet. Of course, the probability that the Ar-234 landed is almost zero, since landing in a city is not very convenient, especially on a bomber. But if no plane wreckage was found and there are no witnesses to the victory, then the victory will not be counted. They did the same with Arseny Vasilyevich. This victory was simply not counted.

The Soviet pilots undoubtedly had experience in fighting enemy jet technology (which came in handy a little later in the war with the United States in North Korea), but what about the Germans themselves? Do they have any mention of similar incidents in the history of front-line jet aviation? Let's try to figure it out.

Of course, it is hardly possible to find out who shot down the first Soviet fighter. We will try to consider all the episodes of encounters with Soviet aircraft on the Eastern Front.

So let's start, and we'll start with such an eminent pilot as Johannes Steinhof.

In his memoirs, “At the Last Hour,” Oberst Steinhof describes encounters with Soviet pilots in the skies over the Oder in February 1945:

“We are flying an eastern course in the direction of the highway that led to Frankfurt an der Oder. Suddenly a Russian fighter appears in front of me, and I did not have time to coordinate the position of the Me-262 and fix the target in the sight in a few seconds. Only a few meters separated me from the Russian fighter, when I passed by and went up. Looking back, I saw the flashes of his weapon. He continuously pulled his fighter up.

There were many fighters maneuvering around me, it was tempting to take out one of their cannons, but as soon as I approached them, they began to maneuver even more vigorously, which made the attack extremely difficult. And I was forced to hide from their sight."

“Flying west at an altitude of 1000 meters, I crossed the Oder. Now I must gain altitude again to be among the Russian fighters. When I put the Me-262 on the wing and moved the throttle levers to turn around, I saw a group of Il- 2, there were 7 or 8 of them, despite the camouflage, their silhouettes were clearly visible. They fired from cannons and dropped bombs on the highway, trucks walking along this highway turned to the side of the road, and the soldiers scattered in different directions. I caught one of the attack aircraft in my sights. , pressed the cannon button, the burst was short, and immediately pulled the control stick towards himself so as not to hit the treetops.

A few hundred meters before the edge of the forest, he touched the snow with his propeller, a huge snow cloud rose, completely hiding the Il-2, and when a gust of wind blew the snow to the side, I saw a distinct silhouette of an attack aircraft in the snow, and at that moment a small black figure of a pilot climbed out of the plane , which first jumped onto the wing, and then ran through the deep snow towards the forest."

30-mm cannon mounted on the Me-262.

This meeting took place on February 25, 1945. Steinhof took off from the Bradenburg-Brist airfield. In March he also mentions meetings with pilots of the Red Army Air Force. Here is another quote from his memoirs:

“One of the March days, I wanted to teach one of the newcomers how to fly in pairs. After takeoff, we headed for the “training zone” near the Oder. We flew over the river and on the other side we saw a group of Russian fighters. I wanted to attack, but the lead angle when firing let me down again, the fact is that the jet Me-262 has a different design than the Me-109. I flew through the formation several times unsuccessfully. Then something appeared in front of me, which turned out to be a Russian fighter. Instinctively, I fired from four 30-. mm guns. Like lightning, the remains of the Russian fighter flew around my cabin. It literally disintegrated in the air!

Looking back, I saw the rest of the Russian fighters going home at full throttle. I turn around, descend and see below me a lone fighter with red stars flying to the west. I catch him in my sights and shoot. Its pilot twitched, tried to get away at low level, but crashed into the top of the hill."

As we can see from the above quotes, Steinhof claims two Russian planes were shot down.

However, Steinhof was not the only one who claimed to have shot down Soviet fighters; there were other Luftwaffe pilots flying the Me-262 who also laid claim to victories won on the Eastern Front.

So, in the last days of April, Lieutenant Herbert Schlüter shot down one Yak-9 near the city of Breslau, and Chief Fenrich Gunther Wittbold destroyed 2 Soviet Il-2 attack aircraft in the vicinity of Baerwalde. He later recalled:

“Everything happened very quickly and at low altitude. I was very surprised to meet the Russians there. The gunner of the first Il-2 didn’t even have time to open fire. I started a 360-degree turn when the second Il-2 was in my way. I didn’t I saw him until the tracer bullets from his guns flew past my ears. Having received several hits, the IL-2 fell apart into many small parts."

During the last weeks of the war, JG7 pilots destroyed about 20 Soviet aircraft.

But the most interesting thing is that the last victory in World War II, which was won by Luftwaffe pilots, was on a jet plane, and besides, a Soviet fighter was shot down. Presumably, this is a pilot from the 129th GvIAP G. G. Stepanov. This victory was won on May 8 at 15:20.

In conclusion, I would like to say that the Luftwaffe jet aircraft did not bring the desired result to Hitler. Too late, he gave the go-ahead for mass production of aircraft with jet and rocket engines. Nothing could save Germany.

Pilots died not so much because they were shot down by enemy planes, but because they became victims of man-made disasters.

On the Eastern Front, jet aircraft did not bring any success and their use there was comparable to the death convulsions of a dying person. In this case, the dying role was the Third Reich and its war machine.

Nevertheless, experience, courage and loyalty to the Motherland did not even psychologically break the pilots of the Red Army Air Force in front of the “jet monster” of the Luftwaffe; the Russian pilots drove this beast away and put an end to the ambitions of the Luftwaffe.

The Me-262 aircraft was not the only Luftwaffe serial jet fighter to take part in the battles of World War II. And although another aircraft of the same company, we are talking about the missile Me-163 “Kometa”, was not encountered in air battles with Soviet pilots, it is worth telling a little about it.

This aircraft is known in the history of world aviation as the Messerschmitt-163. However, its creator was not Willy Messerschmitt, whose name he began to bear, but Alexander Lippisch, a very talented scientist in the field of aviation. This machine was conceived and designed by Lippisch, but built at the Messerschmitt factories. Lippisch's idea, embodied in metal, began to bear the designation Me-163. There are countless children in this world who bear the names not of their parents, but of those who took care of them. The main thing in this matter is the essence, not the name.

Everyone who flew on this jet miracle felt “heat in the chest and cold in the back.” This plane could lift a person to great heights or throw him into the underworld in a short time. It was for this spirit that people loved him. This is what test pilot Mano Ziegler writes in his memoirs:

“Almost not a single flight day passed without the loss of one of us. But strangely enough, we all loved this rocket monster, like a flighty woman who could deceive you and abandon you at any moment, but nevertheless we remained faithful to him ".

The German interceptor fighter Me-163, which entered service with the German Air Force in May 1944, was one of the most unusual, but at the same time the most promising fighters in the world. In the subsequent decades of aviation development, not a single production aircraft was created that could be directly compared with this fighter.

The prototype aircraft was designated DFS-194. More precisely, it was a DFS-33 glider, developed by the German Research Institute of Glider Technology, equipped with a rocket engine. At the same time, the design of the aircraft had to be thoroughly redesigned, after which it received the designation DFS-194. While it was being built in Darmstadt, Alexander Lippisch and several of his employees were supposed to move to Ausburg to the Willy Messerschmitt company (since the institute was mainly a research institution, it was decided to launch serial production of the aircraft on the basis of the Messerschmitt company - the leading developer and manufacturer of German fighters). The aircraft was given the corporate designation Me-163. Work on this aircraft began on January 2, 1939. A team of 6 people began working on it. Heini Dittmar agreed to become a test pilot.

Meanwhile, the Darmstadt-built DFS-194 began to undergo towing tests. Then a rocket engine was installed on it, running on “T-fuel” (hydrogen peroxide) and “Z-fuel” (potassium permanganate). Test flights with such a power plant were carried out at the Peenemünde missile base. Despite the great difficulties that accompanied the tests, encouraging results were obtained. Using the DFS-194 rocket glider, Heini Dittmar reached a speed of 550 km/h.

Tests of the first experimental Me-163 V1 aircraft in gliding flight began in the spring of 1941. Flight tests of the aircraft were initially carried out in tow. A twin-engine Me-110 aircraft was chosen as a towing vehicle. The first towing flights showed that the Me-163's glide angle was too small. There was not enough landing strip on the first landing, and Dittmar was forced to slip between two hangars located at the end of the airfield. Everyone who saw this landing had their hair stand on end. A number of modifications to the aircraft design followed, and again towing tests for gliding.

Until that time, no aircraft that did not have a tail had flown at speeds above 350 km/h. At speeds exceeding this, dangerous flutter occurred on the rudder. When this was dealt with, it turned out that at a speed exceeding 520 km/h, he appeared on the elevator. It took more than 15 towing flights until these problems were corrected. In general, in terms of aerodynamic properties, the Me-163 aircraft turned out to be unusually good and reliable. In gentle flight, it easily reached speeds of about 900 km/h.

One day, Ernst Udet, who was responsible for new equipment at the Ministry of Aviation, came to test the aircraft. At this time, Dittmar, at an altitude of 5000 meters, was carrying out another program on the Me-163, which had been towed there. Lippisch, seeing Udet arrive, pointed his finger up at him.

What's that there, Lippisch? - asked Udet.

Our experienced Me-163...

At that moment, Dittmar directed the car down and at enormous speed, approximately 800 km/h, leveling it, flew over the airfield, and then went up like a candle.

What engine is on this car? - asked Udet.

“This plane doesn’t have an engine yet,” Lippisch answered.

No engine? - Udet asked. - Do you, Lippisch, take me for a fool?

During this test flight, Dittmar made several dive flights and climbed upward.

This cannot be,” Udet said every time the plane ascended, “You are lying to me, Lippisch!”

When Dittmar landed, Udet approached the plane and began to carefully examine it. Finally, making sure that he was not being deceived, he said:

Indeed, there is no engine...

The motorless flight Udet saw made a strong impression on him. From that time on, he began to vigorously promote further work on it and did not lose sight of it until his death.

The rocket engine Walter created for the Me-163 had a thrust of 750 kg. The first flights with such an engine were carried out at the Peenemünde rocket base. The machine showed an unprecedented rate of climb. But, since the jettisonable takeoff aircraft did not have shock-absorbing devices, the pilot was subjected to large vibration overloads during takeoff. The same thing happened during landing. There was an urgent need to create a seat for the pilot that could withstand such overloads. Test flights were temporarily stopped.

Despite the fact that a sufficiently reliable pilot seat was not made, test flights were resumed. Already on the 4th flight, Dittmar managed to reach a speed of 800 km/h. But this was not the limit yet. When the plane reached a speed of 920 km/h, as a result of flutter, the rudder flew off. Landing the plane was out of the question. Dittmar had to leave him and bail out.

On the next experimental aircraft, the Me-163 V4, Heini Dittmar made a record flight and reached a speed of over 1000 km/h. If the flights had not been carried out in the greatest secrecy, they could have become a world achievement. Dittmar himself spoke about these flights as follows:

"It was not easy to achieve record speeds. The engine turned off every time, it was barely possible to reach a speed of about 500 km/h. When I managed to figure out its whim, I decided to conduct high-speed flights at an altitude of 4000 meters. A special measuring distance was made. Flying above it, I carefully I monitored the speed indicator. The pressure gauge indicated normal pressure. At this altitude, the engine did not let me down. In one of the flights over the measured distance, the needle began to creep up: 950 - 960 - 970... I looked at the pressure gauge, the engine was fine. As soon as I turned my eyes to the speed indicator, the needle was already beyond the 1000 km/h mark. The plane began to vibrate strongly. I immediately turned off the engine and waited for the plane to crash. I felt that the plane began to obey the controls. Then I finally realized that I had entered the sound barrier zone. Upon landing, I learned that on the measuring line the plane showed a speed of 1004 km/h.”

Thus, already in 1941, an aircraft with a person on board exceeded the 1000 km mark. After achieving this success, Heini Dittmar was awarded the Lilienthal Prize for research in the field of aviation. This was a well-deserved reward for his flight tests, during which he was on the verge of death more than once.

This aircraft was also the first aircraft in the history of aviation to encounter problems with the compressibility of air flow at high speeds in horizontal flight. Therefore, when developing the car, a number of new aerodynamic problems had to be solved. The design chosen for the Comet - a tailless design with a swept wing - made their decision easier. Since that time, the use of swept wings has become one of the traditional solutions to the problems of high-speed flight.

The modification of the Me-163 aircraft, designated "B", had a jet thrust almost 2 times greater than the first. The speed has increased, and with it the danger. Knowing full well that every flight could end in death, Dittmar turned to Udet with a request to give him a partner whom he could teach to pilot a rocket plane. Goes ensured that Dittmar's friend, Rudolf Opitz, was transferred from the front to the Messerschmitt company as a test pilot.

The designers still faced the problem of cushioning the pilot's seat. At the end of the rocket plane tests, Heini Dittmar had an accident that confined him to a hospital bed for 2 years. During landing, the shock absorber on the landing ski failed. The plane remained unharmed, but Dittmar broke his spine. Opitz continued testing the aircraft. Soon he was joined by the famous pilot ace Wolfgang Spate, recalled from the front. When the tests were completed, “Test Detachment No. 16” was formed in the summer of 1943 in Bad Zwischenahn for training in flying a rocket aircraft.

We can say that the participants in the anti-Hitler coalition were lucky in that the technical difficulties that arose during the development of the aircraft (associated mainly with the creation of a liquid-fuel rocket engine), as well as the political difficulties of that time, made it difficult for the Comet to enter service with the Nazi Air Force .

According to its design, the Me-163 was a rather conservative “tailless” aircraft with a swept wing, which was designed by Alexander Lippisch, who had gained considerable experience by this time. Single-section elevons were installed on the wing (wooden structure), and a vertical tail with a rudder was installed on the tail of the short all-metal (aluminum alloy) fuselage. The designers solved the problem of the retractable landing gear by abandoning it altogether. The plane took off from a detachable two-wheeled trolley, and landing was carried out on a single ski, similar to the landing devices of gliders. The plane did not have ski- or wheel-type wing supports, so almost every landing ended with the plane turning around, and often in a coup.

All available volumes of the fuselage were given over to tanks that housed liquid-propellant rocket engine fuel. The fuel components of the Me-163 fighter were a mixture of methyl alcohol, hydrazine and water (fuel) and hydrogen peroxide (oxidizer). Several Me-163 accidents occurred due to contact of rocket fuel components outside the engine combustion chamber (Walter HW 509 C-1, 20 kN thrust). Sometimes the engine exploded even just from a rough landing.

Despite the significant fuel reserve (2000 kg), the engine's efficiency was very low, so that it could only operate for 12 minutes; this means that the interceptor had to be based directly under the air corridors along which the enemy bombers followed. By the time the Me-163 reached an altitude of 9,760 meters, it only had fuel left for 6.5 minutes of flight. In some cases, fully fueled Comets were towed to a height behind heavy German aircraft, after which the engine was started in the air and the interceptor fighter began attacking the bomber.

The aircraft's armament consisted of 2 20 mm cannons mounted in the wing. The Me-163 was one of the smallest fighters of World War II. The aircraft's wing span was 9.81 m, the aircraft's wing area was 20.37 sq.m, the take-off weight was 5299.8 kg, and the load per unit wing area was 260.9 kg/sq.m. The maximum speed of the serial Me-163C was 858 km/h, the aircraft was capable of gaining an altitude of 12,100 meters in 3 minutes 20 seconds; the rate of climb at the ground was 60 m/sec.

364 aircraft were produced in serial production. Subsequently, a number of aircraft with liquid propellant engines were created, but none of them ever became a serial Air Force combat aircraft.

The Me-163 aircraft was in service with only one fighter squadron - JG400 [commander - famous German pilot ace Wolfrang Spate; He finished the war flying the Me-262 and had 99 air victories to his credit] and was used exclusively to combat enemy heavy bombers on the Western Front. By the end of 1944, the combat activity of JG400 sharply decreased due to the constant bombing of airfields, poor pilot training, and the critical situation with fuel delivery. In reality, only the 1st group was in combat, which managed to achieve 9 victories with the loss of 14 aircraft. The 2nd group, due to lack of fuel, ended the war without flying a single combat mission...

The Me-163 rocket plane was not covered in the glory of victories. Many cars were lost due to engine failure. Quite a few of them died in air battles. The remaining ones were captured by the Allies and tested for some time in the research institutes of the air forces of the victorious countries. This indicated that his flight technical data was of interest.

In our country, test flights of a two-seat training version of the machine, the Me-163S, were carried out.

In the years when a speed of 700 - 750 km/h was considered very good for serial fighters, in Germany the designers already knew what would happen to the aircraft when it reached twice the speed, four times the speed, how the car would behave in the speed of sound zone and far away. for her. All the years of the war, the Germans, it turns out, persistently carried out relevant research, and not only theoretical, but already in laboratories and testing grounds, “blowing” in the wind tunnels of Göttingen, Hamburg, Folkenrode, Detmold, Travemünde, Pienemünde, in the giant Otzale tube in the Alps, they shot detailed films about the flights of cruise missiles, about the fall of experimental bombs from a great height (so that, while falling, they had time to accelerate to the required speed). We learned to reliably, with an error of no more than 1%, determine the parameters of a supersonic air flow at any point of the profile flowing around it, take into account the influence of various physical and geometric factors on such a flow, and much more - and as a result, in 1944, at least 8 prototype jet aircraft, at least 7 were in the design stage.

In 1944 - 1945, our Western allies discovered in Germany a ready-made purge aerodynamic model of the Yeger R-13 fighter (chief designer Alexander Lippisch) and an experimental glider DM-1 - a simplified “analog” of this fighter, a narrow tailless triangle.

The Americans have already flown the DM-1. The speed of the R-13 would be, according to some sources, 1650, according to others - 1955, according to others - 2410 km/h. In the powerful wind tunnel of Göttingen, the Germans blew the R-13 model in a flow more than 2.5 times the speed of sound.

The DM-1 airframe designed by Alexander Lippisch had a wing sweep of 60° along the leading edge and 15° at the rear. The glider was created at the end of the Second World War as a full-scale gliding model of a designed fighter aircraft with a ramjet engine. DM-1 was developed with the aim of testing the possibility of ensuring acceptable flight characteristics of an aircraft of this design at low flight speeds. In the absence of a prototype aircraft equipped with a sufficiently powerful power plant, it was planned to obtain high-speed aerodynamic data in a wind tunnel. Aerodynamic data in the intermediate speed range were obtained from flight tests in which the DM-1 was towed to a high altitude (approximately 7600 meters or more), after which the aircraft separated and flew freely. The DM-1 was supposed to accelerate to the speed required by the test program during a prolonged dive. The relatively low mass of this glider did not allow it to develop a very high speed in a dive. The maximum dive speed was approximately 558.7 km/h.

When creating the DM-1 glider, Lippisch was helped by two groups of engineers - aviation enthusiasts from Darmstadt and Munich universities (the glider got its name from the initial letters of these cities).

If you do not take into account the lack of an engine, the DM-1 was a fully completed aircraft, equipped, among other things, with a three-wheel retractable landing gear. To ensure a minimum weight of the structure, the aircraft was made of wood, and thin aircraft plywood was used as skin. In addition to the innovative wing shape, a unique design feature was that the cabin was the root part of the leading edge of the vertical tail of a large relative thickness.

The DM-1 fell into the hands of American occupation forces and was then used in the United States for testing in 1945. The results obtained were so encouraging that the Convair company received a contract to develop and build a jet modification of this airframe. The DM-1 is currently housed at the US Air Force Museum near Dayton, Ohio.

Immediately after the war, the United States brought 86 German military designers and scientists from Germany. An incomplete list of them (only the “leading ones” are listed) was given in December 1946 by the Aviation News magazine. Named among them was Wernher von Braun, the chief designer of the V-2 rocket, later the head of the development of the American Saturn launch vehicles and Apollo spacecraft, and the first was Dr. Alexander Lippisch...

In conclusion of our story, I would like to return again to the developments in the field of jet technology by designer Ernst Heinkel, or more precisely, to the Heinkel He-162 “Salamander” aircraft.

The history of this car is very interesting. In the last year of the war, when the inevitability of Germany’s defeat was already obvious, Hitler was possessed by two “great ideas” - the creation of a total weapon of retaliation and the total mobilization of the entire country. During this period, one after another, “extremely simple” and at the same time, seemingly very effective means of combating the enemy were born. One of them was the “total” fighter He-162. One of the leaders of the Ministry of Armaments had the idea to create a small jet fighter, later called “people’s”, intended for “defense of the fatherland.” It needed to be easy to operate. After a short training, it was supposed to be flown mainly by boys from the Hitler Youth gliding schools.

The development task and tactical and technical requirements for such an aircraft were issued simultaneously to five companies: Blom and Voss, Heinkel, Junkers, Arado and Focke-Wulf. According to the requirements, the aircraft's speed had to be 750 km/h, armament - 2 guns, flight time 20 minutes, weight 2000 kg, power plant - one BMW 003 turbojet engine with a thrust of 810 kg.

Heinkel employees received the order to design the aircraft on September 8, 1944. Even before starting to assemble it, they already knew that it would not be advisable to place a single engine in the fuselage. Having experience in building a single-engine He-178 aircraft, they understood how many different connections would be required with such an engine placement. It was easier to install the engine above the fuselage, as was already done by the designers of the Fisler company on the Fi-103 projectile aircraft. For ease of production, it was decided to make the wing and tail surfaces wooden. Even the fuel tank was made of veneer. It was decided to make the landing gear with a nose wheel, which was supposed to ensure good takeoff and landing qualities of the vehicle.

Design work on the Non-162 aircraft began on September 24, 1944, and already on December 6, that is, just 2 months later, the first prototype of the aircraft was flown into the air by pilot Peters, who had an engineering education. During its testing, a maximum flight speed of 840 km/h was obtained at an altitude of 6000 meters. Unfortunately, this talented pilot later died during testing of the second experimental He-162 aircraft due to destruction of the wing in flight. However, Hitler hurried Heinkel and therefore, after slightly strengthening the wing structure, even without additional flight tests, the aircraft was put into production simultaneously at several Heinkel and Junkers factories.

On July 17, 1945, an aviation parade took place at the English airfield in Farnborough, in which captured German-made aircraft also took part. Among others, 8 Non-162 aircraft were shown. According to the report of an English pilot who tested the serial He-162, the speed of the vehicle did not exceed 750 km/h, which was explained by the haste to launch the aircraft into mass production. He expressed himself in just two words about the flight and aerobatic properties of this fighter: “The best in the world!”

The original article by Andrey Lyubushkin is located on the website "Aviators of World War II". I took the liberty of inserting into it additional information about the He-178, He-280, He-162, Me-163 aircraft, the experimental developments of A. Lippisch, and supplemented it with some interesting drawings and photographs.

For those who are interested in the history of the creation of jet aircraft in the design bureau of Ernst Heinkel, I suggest reading one of the chapters of his book “In my fast-paced life...” -

Assessing the decisive role of aviation as the main striking force in the struggle for the spread of Bolshevism and the defense of the state, in the first five-year plan the leadership of the USSR set a course for creating its own large and autonomous air force from other countries.

In the 20s, and even in the early 30s, USSR aviation had a fleet of aircraft, mostly foreign-made (only Tupolev aircraft appeared - ANT-2, ANT-9 and its subsequent modifications, which becamesubsequently the legendary U-2, etc.). The aircraft that were in service with the Red Army were of many brands, had outdated designs and poor technical condition. In the 20s, the USSR purchased a small number of German aircraft of the Junkers type and a number of other types for service air routes of the North / research of the Northern Sea Route / and the performance of government special flights. It should be noted that civil aviationin the pre-war period it practically did not develop, with the exception of the opening of a number of unique “demonstration” airlines or occasional flights of ambulance and service aviation.

During the same period, the era of airships ended, and the USSR builtin the early 30s, successful designs of “soft” (frameless) airships of the “B” type. Digression, it should be noted about the development of this type V aeronautics abroad.

In Germany, the famous rigid airshipdesign "Count Zeppepelin" explored the North, was equipped with cabins for passengers, had a significant flight range and quitehigh cruising speed / up to 130 km/h or more, providedseveral motors designed by Maybach. There were even several dog sleds on board the airship as part of the expedition to the North. The American airship "Akron" is the largest in the world, with a volume of 184 thousand cubic meters. m carried 5-7 aircraft on board and transported up to 200 passengers, not counting several tons of cargo over a distance of up to 17 thousand km. without landing. These airships were already safe, because... were filled with the inert gas helium, and not hydrogen as at the beginning of the century. Low speed, low maneuverability, high cost, complexity of storage and maintenance predetermined the end of the era of airships. Experiments with balloons also came to an end, which proved the latter’s unsuitability for active combat operations. A new generation of aviation with new technical and combat performance was needed.

In 1930, our Moscow Aviation Institute was created - after all, the replenishment of factories, institutes and design bureaus of the aviation industry with experienced personnel was of decisive importance. The old cadres of pre-revolutionary education and experience were clearly not enough; they were thoroughly eliminated and were in exile or in camps.

Already by the Second Five-Year Plan (1933-37), aviation workers had a significant production base, the basis for the further development of the air force fleet.

In the thirties, by order of Stalin, demonstration, but in fact test, flights of bombers “camouflaged” as civilian aircraft were carried out. The aviators Slepnev, Levanevsky, Kokkinaki, Molokov, Vodopyanov, Grizodubova and many others distinguished themselves.

In 1937, Soviet fighter aircraft underwent combat tests in Spain and demonstrated technical inferiority. AircraftPolikarpov (type I-15,16) were defeated by the latest German machines. The race for survival began again. Stalin gave the designersindividual assignments for new aircraft models, widely and generouslyThere were bonuses and benefits - the designers worked tirelessly and demonstrated a high level of talent and preparedness.

At the March 1939 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilovnoted that, compared to 1934, the Air Force has grown in its personalis 138 percent...The aircraft fleet as a whole has grown by 130 percent.

Heavy bomber aircraft, which were assigned the main role in the upcoming war with the West, doubled in 4 years, while other types of bomber aircraft, on the contrary, decreased by half. Fighter aircraft increased two and a half times. Altitudeaircraft already amounted to 14-15 thousand m. The technology for the production of aircraft and engines was put on stream, stamping and casting were widely introduced. The shape of the fuselage changed, the aircraft acquired a streamlined shape.

The use of radios on board aircraft began.

Before the war, great changes took place in the field of aviation materials science. In the pre-war period there was a parallel development of heavy aircraft of all-metal construction with duralumin skinand light maneuverable aircraft of mixed structures: wood, steel,canvas. As the raw material base expanded and the aluminum industry developed in the USSR, aluminum alloys found increasing use in aircraft construction. There was progress in engine construction. The M-25 air-cooled engines with a power of 715 hp and the M-100 water-cooled engines with a power of 750 hp were created.

At the beginning of 1939, the USSR government convened a meeting in the Kremlin.

It was attended by leading designers V.Ya. Klimov, A.A. Mikulin,A.D. Shvetsov, S.V. Ilyushin, N.N. Polikarpov, A.A. Arkhangelsky, A.S. Yakovlev, head of TsAGI and many others. The People's Commissar of the aviation industry at that time was M.M. Kaganovich. Possessing a good memory, Stalin was quite well aware of the design features of aircraft; all important issues regarding aviation were resolved by Stalin. The meeting outlined measures for the further accelerated development of aviation in the USSR. Until now, history has not conclusively refuted the hypothesis of Stalin’s preparation for an attack on Germany in July 1941. It was on the basis of this assumption about the planning of Stalin’s attack on Germany (and further for the “liberation” of Western countries), adopted at the “historic” plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in August 1939 and this fact, incredible for that (or any other) time, of the sale of advanced German equipment and technology to the USSR seems explainable. A large delegation of Sovietaviation workers, who traveled to Germany twice shortly before the war, got their hands on fighters, bombers, guidance systems, and much more, which made it possible to sharply advance the level of domestic aircraft production. A decision was made to increase the combat power of aviation, since it was from August 1939 The USSR began covert mobilization and prepared strikes against Germany and Romania.

Mutual exchange of information on the state of the armed forces of the three states (England, France and the USSR), represented in Moscow in August1939, i.e. before the start of the partition of Poland, showed that the numberThere are 2 thousand first-line aircraft in France. Of these, twothirds were completely modern aircraft. By 1940, it was planned to increase the number of aircraft in France to 3000 units. Englishaviation, according to Marshal Burnet, had about 3,000 units, and the potential production was 700 aircraft per month.German industry underwent mobilization only at the beginning1942, after which the number of weapons began to increase sharply.

Of all the domestic fighter aircraft ordered by Stalin, the most successful variants were the LAGG, MiG and YAK.The IL-2 attack aircraft delivered a lot to its designer Ilyushinneniya. Manufactured initially with rear hemisphere protection (double)he, on the eve of the attack on Germany, did not suit the customers of hiswastefulness.” S. Ilyushin, who did not know all of Stalin’s plans, was forced to change the design to a single-seat version, i.e., bring the design closer to the “clear sky” plane. Hitler violated Stalin’s plans and at the beginning of the war the plane urgently had to be returned to its original design.

On February 25, 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "Onreorganization of the aviation forces of the Red Army." The resolution provided for additional measures to re-equip air units. In accordance with the plans for a future war, the task was set to urgently form new air regiments, and, at the same time, equip them, as a rule, with new machines. The formation of several airborne corps began.

The doctrine of war on “foreign territory” and “little bloodshed” causedthe emergence of a “clear sky” aircraft intended for the unpunishedraids on bridges, airfields, cities, factories. Before the war, hundreds of thousands

young men were preparing to transfer to a new one, developed by the post-Stalincompetition, the SU-2 aircraft, of which it was planned to produce 100-150 thousand units before the war. This required accelerated training of the corresponding number of pilots and technicians. SU-2 is essentially a Soviet Yu-87, and in Russia it did not stand the test of time, because There was never a “clear sky” for either country during the war.

Air defense zones with fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery were formed. An unprecedented recruitment into aviation began, voluntarily andforcibly. Almost all of the small civil aviationwas mobilized into the Air Force. Dozens of aviation schools were opened, incl. ultra-accelerated (3-4 months) training, traditionally, the officers at the helm or control handle of the aircraft were replaced by sergeants - an unusual fact and evidence of haste in preparing for war. Airfields were urgently moved to the borders (about 66 airfields), supplies of fuel, bombs, and shells were imported. Carefully and raids on German airfields and the Ploieşti oil fields were detailed in special secrecy...

On June 13, 1940, the Flight Test Institute was formed(LII), during the same period other design bureaus and research institutes were formed.In the war with the Soviet Union, the Nazis assigned a special role to theiraviation, which by this time had already gained complete dominance inair in the West. Basically a plan for the use of aviation in the Eastplanned the same as the war in the West: first to conquer the dominantin the air, and then transfer forces to support the ground army.

Outlining the timing of the attack on the Soviet Union, Hitler's commandThe operation set the following tasks for the Luftwaffe:

1.Destroy Soviet airfields with a surprise attackSoviet aviation.

2.Achieve complete air supremacy.

3. After solving the first two tasks, switch aviation to support ground forces directly on the battlefield.

4. Disrupt the work of Soviet transport, complicate the transfertroops both in the front line and in the rear.

5. Bombard large industrial centers - Moscow, Gorky, Rybinsk, Yaroslavl, Kharkov, Tula.

Germany dealt a crushing blow to our airfields. Only for 8Hours of the war, 1,200 aircraft were lost and mass casualties occurred.flight personnel, storage facilities and all supplies were destroyed. Historians noted the strange “crowding” of our aviation at the airfields the day beforewar and complained about the “mistakes” and “miscalculations” of the command (i.e. Stalin)and assessment of events. In fact, “crowding” foreshadows plansa super-massive strike on targets and confidence in impunity, which did not happen. The Air Force flight personnel, especially the bomber ones, suffered heavy losses due to the lack of support fighters; the tragedy of the death of perhaps the most advanced and powerful air fleet inhistory of mankind, which had to be revived again under the blows enemy.

It must be admitted that the Nazis managed to largely implement their plans for an air war in 1941 and the first half of 1942. Almost all available forces were thrown against the Soviet Union G Hitler's aviation, including units removed from the Western Front. Atit was assumed that after the first successful operations, some of the bombsarmored and fighter formations will be returned to the Westfor the war with England. At the beginning of the war, the Nazis had not only quantitative superiority. Their advantage was also the fact that the pilotsthe personnel who took part in the air attack have already been seriouslynew fighting school with French, Polish and English pilots. Onthey also had a fair amount of experience interacting with their troops,acquired in the war against Western European countries.Old types of fighters and bombers, such as the I-15,I-16, SB, TB-3 could not compete with the latest Messerschmitts and"Junkers". Nevertheless, in the unfolding air battles, even on the lipsnew types of aircraft, Russian pilots caused damage to the Germans. From 22June to July 19, Germany lost 1,300 aircraft only battles

Here is what the German General Staffist Greffath writes about this:

" Behind period from June 22 to July 5, 1941 German air forcelost 807 aircraft of all types, and during the period from July 6 to July 19 - 477.

These losses indicate that despite the surprise achieved by the Germans, the Russians were able to find the time and strength to provide decisive resistance ".

On the very first day of the war, fighter pilot Kokorev distinguished himself by ramming an enemy fighter, the crew’s feat is known to the whole worldGastello (the latest research into this fact suggests that the ramming crew was not Gastello’s crew, but the crew of Maslov, who flew with Gastello’s crew to attack enemy columns), who threw his burning car onto a cluster of German equipment.Despite the losses, the Germans in all directions brought everything into battlenew and new fighters and bombers. They abandoned the front4940 aircraft, including 3940 German, 500 Finnish, 500 Romanianand achieved complete air supremacy.

By October 1941, the Wehrmacht armies approached Moscow and were busycities supplying components for aircraft factories, the time has come to evacuate the factories and design bureaus of Sukhoi, Yakovlev and others in Moscow, Ilyushin inVoronezh, all factories in the European part of the USSR demanded the evacuation.

Aircraft production in November 1941 decreased by more than three and a half times. Already on July 5, 1941, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decided to evacuate from the central regions of the country part of the equipment of some aircraft equipment factories to duplicate their production in Western Siberia, and after some time it was necessary to make a decision on the evacuation of the entire aircraft industry.

On November 9, 1941, the State Defense Committee approved schedules for the restoration and relaunch of evacuated factories and production plans.

The task was not only to restore aircraft production,but also to significantly increase their quantity and quality. In December 1941The aircraft production plan was completed in less than 40 years.percent, and motors - only 24 percent.In the most difficult conditions, under bombs, in the cold, cold of Siberian wintersbackup factories were launched one after another. They were refined and simplified.technologies, new types of materials were used (without compromising quality), women and teenagers took over the machines.

Supplies under Lend-Lease were also of no small importance for the front. Throughout the Second World War, aircraft supplied 4-5 percent of the total production of aircraft and other weapons produced in the USA. However, a number of materials and equipment supplied by the USA and England were unique and indispensable for Russia (varnishes, paints, other chemicals substances, devices, tools, equipment, medicines, etc.) that cannot be characterized as “insignificant” or secondary.

The turning point in the work of domestic aircraft factories came around March 1942. At the same time, the combat experience of our pilots grew.

Between November 19 and December 31, 1942 alone, the Luftwaffe lost 3,000 combat aircraft in the battles for Stalingrad. Our aviation becameact more actively and showed all its combat power in the NorthCaucasus. Heroes of the Soviet Union appeared. This title was awardedboth for downed aircraft and for the number of combat sorties.

In the USSR, the Normandie-Niemen squadron was formed, staffed by French volunteers. The pilots fought on Yak aircraft.

Average monthly production of aircraft rose from 2.1 thousand in 1942 to 2.9 thousand in 1943. Total industry in 1943produced 35 thousand aircraft, 37 percent more than in 1942.In 1943, factories produced 49 thousand engines, almost 11 thousand more than in 1942.

Back in 1942, the USSR surpassed Germany in the production of aircraft - the heroic efforts of our specialists and workers and the “complacency” or unpreparedness of Germany, which did not mobilize industry in advance for war conditions, had an impact.

In the Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943, Germany used significant quantities of aircraft, but the power of the Air Force for the first time ensured air supremacy. For example, in just one hour on one day of the operation, a force of 411 aircraft was struck, and so on in three waves during the day.

By 1944, the front received about 100 aircraft daily, incl. 40 fighters.The main combat vehicles were modernized. Aircraft withimproved combat qualities of the YAK-3, PE-2, YAK 9T, D, LA-5, IL-10.German designers also modernized the aircraft."Me-109F,G,G2", etc.

By the end of the war, the problem of increasing the range of fighter aircraft arose; airfields could not keep up with the front. Designers proposed installing additional gas tanks on airplanes, and jet weapons began to be used. Radio communications developed, and radar was used in air defense. Bomb strikes became increasingly intense. Thus, on April 17, 1945, bombers of the 18th Air Army in the area of ​​Königsbergaz carried out 516 sorties for 45 minutes and dropped 3,743 bombs with a total weight of 550 tons.

In the air battle for Berlin, the enemy took part in 1,500 combat aircraft based at 40 airfields near Berlin. This is the most intense air battle in history, and the highest level of combat training on both sides should be taken into account.The Luftwaffe was fought by aces who shot down 100,150 or more aircraft (record300 combat aircraft shot down).

At the end of the war, the Germans used jet aircraft, which were significantly faster than propeller-driven aircraft in speed - (Me-262, etc.). However, this did not help. Our pilots in Berlin flew 17.5 thousand combat sorties and completely destroyed the German air fleet.

Analyzing military experience, we can conclude that our aircraft, developed in the period 1939-1940. had constructive reserves for subsequent modernization. Along the way, it should be noted that in the USSR not all types of aircraft were accepted for service. For example, in October 1941, production of MiG-3 fighters was stopped, and in 1943, IL-4 bombers.

The USSR aviation industry produced 15,735 aircraft in 1941. In the difficult year of 1942, during the evacuation of aviation enterprises, 25,436 aircraft were produced, in 1943 - 34,900 aircraft, in 1944 - 40,300 aircraft, in the first half of 1945, 20,900 aircraft were produced. Already in the spring of 1942, all factories evacuated from the central regions of the USSR beyond the Urals and to Siberia, they fully mastered the production of aviation equipment and weapons. Most of these factories in new locations in 1943 and 1944 produced products several times more than before the evacuation.

The successes of the rear made it possible to strengthen the country's air force. By early 1944, the Air Force And grounded 8818 combat aircraft, and German - 3073. In terms of the number of aircraft, the USSR exceeded Germany by 2.7 times. By June 1944, the German Air Forcehad only 2,776 aircraft at the front, and our Air Force - 14,787. By the beginning of January 1945, our Air Force had 15,815 combat aircraft. The design of our aircraft was much simpler than that of American, German or British aircraft. This partly explains such a clear advantage in the number of aircraft. Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare the reliability, durability and strength of our and German aircraft, as well as to analyze the tactical and strategic use of aviation in the war of 1941-1945. Apparently, these comparisons would not be in our favor and would conditionally reduce such a striking difference in numbers. However, perhaps, simplifying the design was the only way out in the absence of qualified specialists, materials, equipment and other components for the production of reliable and high-quality equipment in the USSR, especially since, unfortunately, in the Russian army they traditionally hire by “numbers”, not by skill .

Aircraft weapons were also improved. in 1942, a large-caliber 37 mm aircraft gun was developed, later it appearedand a 45 mm cannon.

By 1942, V.Ya. Klimov developed the M-107 engine to replace the M-105P, adopted for installation on water-cooled fighters.

Greffoat writes: “Relying on the fact that the war with Russia, like the war in the West, would be lightning fast, Hitler intended, after achieving the first successes in the East, to transfer bomber units, as well asthe required number of aircraft back to the West. In the East they mustair connections intended for directsupport for German troops, as well as military transport units and a number of fighter squadrons..."

German aircraft created in 1935-1936 at the beginning of the war no longer had the possibility of radical modernization. According to the German General Butler "The Russians had the advantage that in the production of weapons and ammunition they took into account all the featuresconducting the war in Russia and ensuring maximum simplicity of technology. As a result of this, Russian factories produced a huge amount of weapons, which were distinguished by their great simplicity of design. Learning to wield such a weapon was relatively easy... "

The Second World War fully confirmed the maturity of domestic scientific and technical thought (this ultimately ensured the further acceleration of the introduction of jet aviation).

Nevertheless, each country followed its own path in designing airplanes.

The aviation industry of the USSR produced 15,735 aircraft in 1941. In the difficult year of 1942, during the evacuation of aviation enterprises, 25,436 aircraft were produced, in 1943 - 34,900 aircraft, for1944 - 40,300 aircraft, 20,900 aircraft were produced in the first half of 1945. Already in the spring of 1942, all factories evacuated from the central regions of the USSR to the Urals and Siberia had fully mastered the production of aviation equipment and weapons. Most of these factories moved to new locations in 1943 and 1944 years they produced several times more production than before the evacuation.

Germany had, in addition to its own resources, the resources of the conquered countries. In 1944, German factories produced 27.6 thousand aircraft, and our factories produced 33.2 thousand aircraft in the same period. In 1944, aircraft production was 3.8 times higher than the 1941 figures.

In the first months of 1945, the aircraft industry prepared equipment for the final battles. Thus, the Siberian Aviation Plant N 153, which produced 15 thousand fighters during the war, transferred 1.5 thousand modernized fighters to the front in January-March 1945.

The successes of the rear made it possible to strengthen the country's air force. By the beginning of 1944, the Air Force had 8,818 combat aircraft, and the German - 3,073. In terms of the number of aircraft, the USSR exceeded Germany by 2.7 times. By June 1944, the German Air Forcehad only 2,776 aircraft at the front, and our Air Force - 14,787. By the beginning of January 1945, our Air Force had 15,815 combat aircraft. The design of our aircraft was much simpler than the American and Germanor English cars. This partly explains such a clear advantage in the number of aircraft. Unfortunately, it is not possible to make a comparison of the reliability, durability and strength of our and German aircraft, andalso analyze the tactical and strategic use of aviation in the war of 1941-1945. Apparently these comparisons would not be inour benefit and would conditionally reduce such a striking difference in numbers. However, perhaps, simplifying the design was the only way out in the absence of qualified specialists, materials, equipment and other components for the production of reliable and high-quality equipment in the USSR, especially since, unfortunately, in the Russian army they traditionally hire by “numbers”, not by skill .

Aircraft weapons were also improved. In 1942, a large-caliber 37 mm aircraft gun was developed, and later a 45 mm caliber gun appeared. By 1942, V.Ya. Klimov developed the M-107 engine to replace the M-105P, adopted for installation on water-cooled fighters.

The fundamental improvement of the aircraft is its conversionchanging from a propeller to a jet. To increase flight speeda more powerful engine is installed. However, at speeds above 700 km/hspeed increase from engine power cannot be achieved. Outputhouse from the position is the use of jet traction. Appliesturbojet/turbojet/ or liquid jet/LPRE/ engine.the second half of the 30s in the USSR, England, Germany, Italy, later - inThe United States was intensively creating a jet aircraft. In 1938, jets appearedhighest in the world, German jet engines BMW, Junkers. In 1940the first Campini-Capro jet aircraft made test flightsneither", created in Italy, later the German Me-262, Me-163 appearedXE-162. In 1941, the Gloucester aircraft with a jet was tested in Englandengine, and in 1942 they tested a jet aircraft in the USA - "Irokometh". In England, the twin-engine jet aircraft "Me" was soon createdtheor", who took part in the war. In 1945, on the Me planeTheor-4" set a world speed record of 969.6 km/h.

In the USSR, in the initial period, practical work on the creation of reactionstive engines was carried out in the direction of the liquid rocket engine. Under the guidanceS.P.Koroleva, A.F.Tsander, designers A.M.Isaev, L.S.DushkindevelopedThe first domestic jet engines were built. Pioneer turbojeakA.M.Lyulka became the first ative engine.At the beginning of 1942, G. Bakhchivandzhi made the first flight on a jettive domestic aircraft. Soon this pilot diedduring aircraft testing.Work on the creation of a jet aircraft for practical useresumed after the war with the creation of the Yak-15, MiG-9 using non-German YuMO jet engines.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the Soviet Union entered the war with numerous, but technically backward fighter aircraft. This backwardness was, in essence, an inevitable phenomenon for a country that had only recently embarked on the path of industrialization that Western European states and the United States had followed in the 19th century. By the mid-20s of the 20th century, the USSR was an agricultural country with a half-illiterate, mostly rural population and a tiny percentage of engineering, technical and scientific personnel. Aircraft manufacturing, engine manufacturing and non-ferrous metallurgy were in their infancy. Suffice it to say that in Tsarist Russia they did not produce ball bearings and carburetors for aircraft engines, aircraft electrical equipment, control and aeronautical instruments at all. Aluminum, wheel tires and even copper wire had to be purchased abroad.

Over the next 15 years, the aviation industry, along with related and raw materials industries, was created practically from scratch, and simultaneously with the construction of the largest air force in the world at that time.

Of course, with such a fantastic pace of development, serious costs and forced compromises were inevitable, because it was necessary to rely on the available material, technological and personnel base.

The most complex knowledge-intensive industries—engine building, instrument making, and radio electronics—were in the most difficult situation. It must be admitted that the Soviet Union was unable to overcome the gap from the West in these areas during the pre-war and war years. The difference in the “starting conditions” turned out to be too great and the time allotted by history was too short. Until the end of the war, we produced engines created on the basis of foreign models purchased back in the 30s - Hispano-Suiza, BMW and Wright-Cyclone. Their repeated forcing led to overstressing of the structure and a steady decrease in reliability, and, as a rule, it was not possible to bring our own promising developments to mass production. The exception was the M-82 and its further development, the M-82FN, which gave birth to perhaps the best Soviet fighter of the war, the La-7.

During the war years, the Soviet Union was unable to establish serial production of turbochargers and two-stage superchargers, multifunctional propulsion automation devices similar to the German “Kommandoherat”, powerful 18-cylinder air-cooled engines, thanks to which the Americans crossed the milestone of 2000, and then at 2500 hp. Well, by and large, no one in our country was seriously involved in work on water-methanol boosting of engines. All this greatly limited aircraft designers in creating fighters with higher performance characteristics than the enemy.

No less serious restrictions were imposed by the need to use wood, plywood and steel pipes instead of scarce aluminum and magnesium alloys. The irresistible weight of the wooden and mixed construction forced us to weaken the weapons, limit the ammunition load, reduce the fuel supply and save on armor protection. But there was simply no other way out, because otherwise it would not have been possible to even bring the flight data of Soviet aircraft closer to the characteristics of German fighters.

For a long time, our aircraft industry compensated for the lag in quality through quantity. Already in 1942, despite the evacuation of 3/4 of the aircraft industry's production capacity, the USSR produced 40% more combat aircraft than Germany. In 1943, Germany made significant efforts to increase the production of combat aircraft, but nevertheless the Soviet Union built 29% more of them. Only in 1944, the Third Reich, through the total mobilization of the resources of the country and occupied Europe, caught up with the USSR in the production of combat aircraft, but during this period the Germans had to use up to 2/3 of their aviation in the West, against the Anglo-American allies.

By the way, we note that for each combat aircraft produced in the USSR there were 8 times fewer machine tools, 4.3 times less electricity and 20% fewer workers than in Germany! Moreover, more than 40% of workers in the Soviet aviation industry in 1944 were women, and over 10% were teenagers under 18 years of age.

The given figures indicate that Soviet aircraft were simpler, cheaper and more technologically advanced than German ones. Nevertheless, by the middle of 1944, their best models, such as the Yak-3 and La-7 fighters, surpassed German aircraft of the same type and contemporary ones in a number of flight parameters. The combination of fairly powerful engines with high aerodynamic and weight efficiency made it possible to achieve this, despite the use of archaic materials and technologies designed for simple production conditions, outdated equipment and low-skilled workers.

It can be argued that the named types in 1944 accounted for only 24.8% of the total production of fighter aircraft in the USSR, and the remaining 75.2% were older types of aircraft with worse flight characteristics. We can also recall that in 1944 the Germans were already actively developing jet aviation, having achieved considerable success in this. The first samples of jet fighters were put into mass production and began to arrive in combat units.

Nevertheless, the progress of the Soviet aircraft industry during the difficult war years is undeniable. And his main achievement is that our fighters managed to recapture from the enemy low and medium altitudes, at which attack aircraft and short-range bombers operated - the main striking force of aviation on the front line. This ensured the successful combat work of the Ilovs and Pe-2s against German defensive positions, force concentration centers and transport communications, which, in turn, contributed to the victorious offensive of the Soviet troops at the final stage of the war.