Abu Bakr al Baghdadi group. The leader of the Iraqi terrorist group "Islamic State" Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. From lawyer to extremist

Photo: Ropi / Zuma / Globallookpress.com

The future caliph Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim al-Badri was born in the Iraqi city of Samarra, north of Baghdad, in 1971. Power in the country then belonged to the pan-Arab secularist left-wing Baath party.

Ibrahim's father, Awwad, was actively involved in the religious life of the community and taught at the local mosque. It was there that his son took his first steps as a theologian: he gathered the neighborhood boys, and they read the Koran together.

The Baathists did not actively encourage the spread of religion, but they did not fight it either. Some of Ibrahim's relatives even joined the ranks of the ruling party. Two of the future caliph's uncles worked in President Saddam Hussein's intelligence services; one of his brothers was an officer in Saddam's army, and another brother died in the Iraq-Iran war. Ibrahim himself was too young at the beginning of the conflict to take part in it.

Since 1993, the Iraqi leader began a “return to faith campaign”: nightclubs were closed in the country, public consumption of alcohol was prohibited, and Sharia rules were introduced to a limited extent (for example, hands were cut off for theft).

When it's time to decide higher education, Ibrahim al-Badri tried to enter the University of Baghdad to study law, but his poor knowledge of English and unimportant grades let him down. As a result, he went to the Faculty of Theology, and then entered the University of Islamic Sciences, where he received a master's degree in qiraats (schools for public recitation of the Koran).

While studying for a master's degree, at the insistence of his uncle, Ibrahim joined the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood. This supranational Islamist organization advocated the creation of religious Islamic states, but in most countries its followers chose cautious tactics and did not support armed struggle with the authorities. Al-Badri such ideas seemed too soft - he called their followers people of words, not deeds, and the future caliph quickly joined the most radical members of the organization.

After receiving his master's degree in 2000, al-Badri settled in a small apartment in a poor area of ​​Baghdad, next to a mosque. In four years, he managed to change two wives and become the father of six children.

In 2004, al-Badri was arrested by the Americans - he went to visit a friend who was wanted. The future caliph ended up in the Camp Bucca filtration camp, where the occupation administration kept suspicious Iraqis. They were not prohibited from performing religious rituals, and the future caliph skillfully took advantage of this: he gave lectures on religion, conducted Friday prayers and gave instructions to the captives in accordance with his interpretation of Islam.

Prisoners said that Camp Bucca had become a veritable academy for jihadism. “Teach him, instill an ideology and show him the further path, so that at the time of liberation he becomes a blazing flame,” - this is how one of the former prisoners described the strategy of Islamic theologians inside the filtration camp in relation to each new arrival.

After his release, al-Badri contacted al-Qaeda in Iraq, who advised him to move to Damascus. In the Syrian capital, he had the opportunity, in addition to working for terrorists, to complete his dissertation. Then a conflict began in the ranks of the jihadists, which led to the transformation of the Iraqi branch of al-Qaeda into the brutal Islamic State of Iraq. Al-Badri was appointed head of the religious direction in the Iraqi “provinces” of the organization. The caliphate did not have any territory at that time, so Ibrahim was mainly involved in developing a propaganda strategy and making sure that the militants strictly followed religious instructions.

In March 2007, he returned to Baghdad, where he defended his dissertation and became a doctor of Koranic studies. His scientific success attracted the attention of the then leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, who made al-Badri head of the Sharia Committee - that is, responsible for all religious work of the terrorist organization.

In 2013, the group began participating in hostilities in Syria and changed its name to the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIS), and after the blitzkrieg of the summer of 2014, it shortened it to “Islamic State.” At the same time, Awwad Ibrahim al-Badri declared himself caliph, finally turning into Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

The American authorities are promising $10 million for the head of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: on the State Department website rewardsforjustice he is called by the pseudonym Abu Dua. Despite the fact that al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri is valued at almost twice as much in monetary terms, after the death of Osama bin Laden, it is the self-proclaimed caliph and leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr, who is considered today “terrorist number one.”

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Real name: Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri al-Husseini al-Samarrai, also known as Abu Dua.

Born in 1971 in the Iraqi city of Samarra (120 km north of Baghdad). He graduated from the University of Baghdad with a doctorate in history and Islamic law.

Until 2003, he was a preacher and teacher of Islamic law in the Diyala province in central Iraq.

Soon after the Western coalition invaded Iraq in 2003, al-Baghdadi joined the ranks of the rebels who began armed resistance against the foreign presence.

Later he joined the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda and by the fall of 2005 had gained fame as one of the most prominent leaders of this group. He, in particular, was involved in transporting volunteers from Syria and Saudi Arabia to participate in the war against the Western coalition in Iraq.

In October 2005, an American plane struck a terrorist base near the Iraqi city of Al-Qaim on the border with Syria, where al-Baghdadi was allegedly hiding. However, his body was not found after the airstrike.

According to some sources, in 2005 he was captured during an operation by American troops in the rebel Sunni cities of Fallujah, Ramadi and Samarra, and was held in an American camp for especially dangerous extremists, Camp Bocca in southern Iraq. According to some media reports, during his imprisonment, a meeting was organized between al-Baghdadi and American General David Petraeus (February 2007 - September 2008 - Commander of the Multinational Forces in Iraq; 2010-2012 Director of the CIA). In 2009, al-Baghdadi was released along with other prisoners of the camp, which was closed under an agreement between the US administration of George W. Bush and the Iraqi government of al-Maliki. As some sources write, saying goodbye to the commander of the Camp Bocca security unit, American Colonel Kenneth King, al-Baghdadi said goodbye to him: “See you in New York, guys!”

According to other media citing the US Department of Defense, al-Baghdadi was placed in the camp as a “civilian internee” and was there from February to December 2004. The US Department of Defense does not provide any other information about his detention.

On May 16, 2010, he headed the terrorist organization "Islamic State of Iraq" (ISI) after the assassination of its leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (April 2010).

In 2011, with the outbreak of armed confrontation in Syria, al-Baghdadi sent there his assistant Adnan al-Haj Ali (better known as Abu Muhammad al-Jaulani), who formed and led the anti-government jihadist terrorist group Jabhat al-Nusra there.

In October 2011, the US State Department announced a $10 million reward for any information leading to the capture and execution of al-Baghdadi. He was officially added to the US list of particularly dangerous terrorists.

Since April 9, 2013, he has been the leader of the terrorist jihadist group “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL), which united the Syrian “Jabhat al-Nusra” and the Iraqi “Islamic State of Iraq”.

In November 2013, a split occurred between the Iraqi and Syrian factions. Jabhat al-Nusra separated from ISIS and began to act independently again. Al-Baghdadi remained the leader of the ISIS group, with a total number of up to 15 thousand people, fighting both in Iraq and Syria.

In January 2014, under the leadership of al-Baghdadi, the Sunni cities of Fallujah and Ramadi were captured.

Since the beginning of June 2014, ISIS has been conducting an active offensive in Iraq with the goal of creating an Islamic caliphate in the Sunni provinces. ISIS managed to capture the bordering Iraqi Kurdistan the cities of Mosul and Tikrit and take control of most of the provinces of Ninewa, Salah al-Din and Diyala. Currently, ISIS militants continue to advance from north to south towards Baghdad.

On June 29, 2014, ISIS decided to establish a quasi-state - the “Islamic Caliphate” and appoint Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as caliph (head of the caliphate). ISIS also decided to rename ISIS the “Islamic State” (a group banned in the Russian Federation - TASS note). The decisions were made on the first day of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. In a special statement, the group called on Muslims around the world to recognize the creation of the caliphate, as well as to “swear allegiance to it (the “Islamic Caliphate”) and support it... The legitimacy of all emirates, groups, states and organizations is lost with the expansion of the powers of the caliph and the arrival of his troops on their territory."

The media call al-Baghdadi "the true heir of Osama bin Laden", he is known for his radicalism and cruelty. As a result of the terrorist activities of the group he led in Iraq, several thousand civilians were killed. More than 1,200 people have already died since June 10, 2014 alone. Al-Baghdadi is believed to be very cautious, covering his face even in the presence of his entourage. Al-Baghdadi proclaims himself the direct heir of the Prophet Muhammad.

Born Ibrahim ibn Awwad ibn Ibrahim ibn Ali ibn Muhammad al Badri as Samara'i, presumably in the city of Samarra (northern Iraq) in 1971.

START

In 2003 he joined the Resistance Movement, which broke out in Iraq after the American invasion. By that time, he was a cleric in the Samarra mosque of Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbali.

Religious education the future leader of ISIS received his education at the University of Islamic Sciences in Azamiya, on the outskirts of Baghdad, in the late 1990s.

In 2003, he participated in the founding of the military group Jamaat Jaysh Aghl Sunna wal Jamaa, in which he headed the Sharia Committee.

According to the US Department of Defense, al Baghdadi was arrested by US troops in Iraq and spent 9 months in Camp Buka prison (from February to December 2004). The Special Review Board, which decides on the release of prisoners, recommended al-Baghdadi for “unconditional release” because it did not consider him a high-level threat. No further archival information about his arrests has been found.

Although there is information that al-Baghdadi once served a sentence in one of the Syrian prisons, where he made contacts with the Syrians (either with the opposition or with the regime). The latter gives Baghdadi’s opponents a reason to accuse him of secret collaboration with the Assad regime. However, there is no documentary evidence of his stay in a Syrian prison or his recruitment by the regime.

American troops in Iraq in October 2005 mentioned "Abu Dua" among those killed during a bombing on the Iraqi-Syrian border.

At the beginning of 2006, Al Qaeda in Iraq was renamed Majlis Shura al Mujahideen (Mujahideen Council in Iraq), at which time Al Baghdadi and his group joined it. A few months later, this organization became known as ISI (Islamic State of Iraq), and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi received the post of head of the Sharia Committee and joined the Supreme Advisory Council.

While working for the ISI, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was known for the severity of decisions made by the religious court.

Another important area of ​​his activity is the transfer of foreign fighters to Iraq.

CHAPTER "IGI"

In May 2010, he became the head of ISIS, taking the place of Abu Omar al Baghdadi, who was killed by American occupation forces.

In January, ISIS began to push them out of the provincial center of Raqqa, and armed fighting broke out in the eastern province of Deir ez-Zor.

In February, Al Qaeda formally renounced ISIS.

In January 2014, taking advantage of the growing confrontation in Iraq between the Shiite government of Maliki and the Sunnis, ISIS took the city of Fallujah (western Iraqi province of Anbar). They also took possession for the most part Ramadi, are present in a number of areas on the Syrian and Turkish borders.

CHAPTER "IS"

In June 2014, al-Baghdadi proclaimed the creation of the Caliphate (Islamic State), accordingly becoming Caliph Ibrahim. Most Islamic theologians criticized this claim and rendered verdicts that such a solution was untenable.

Al Baghdadi, meanwhile, said that IS would establish its rule in the Middle East and Europe, calling on all Muslims to emigrate to its Caliphate.

July 2014 for IS was marked by successes in Iraq, as well as a new round of confrontation in Syria, caused by the influx of captured weapons from Iraq.

Moreover, the chances of success of such an uprising are much higher than those of the revolution against Assad - and the secret here is not popularity (only Iranian and Russian media continue to believe in Assad’s popularity among Syrians).
The secret is that Al Baghdadi’s regime (military facilities-special services-agent network) has not yet been established as well as Assad’s.

// Satatya was prepared based on materials from open sources, as well as

Islamist terrorist groups Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab, Boko-Haram, Taliban - their names are legion. But ISIS remains the most brutal and most dangerous today.

The Islamic State does not enter into negotiations even with the same terrorists hiding behind the banner of the prophet. And it does not participate in competitions for the title of the richest organization in the world - no one knows how much money ISIS has. But experts assure that the treasures of ISIS are countless - these include donations from Islamists from all over the world, and oil smuggling, and trafficking in weapons and people.

The cruelty of jihadists is not even the stuff of legends - everything is in the news. Every week their reports about mass executions of dissenters, insufficient believers and dissidents appear online. Journalists looked at the map of ISIS operations and tried to figure out how this group managed to short term to gather so many Islamists from all over the world under its banner, and who is its official leader, who calls himself after the medieval caliph, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi.

Unlike the past personification of evil, Bin Laden, his current incarnation, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, is not yet so widely known. And although the whole world is discussing his recent marriage to a German woman, to this day only one video of him is available on the Internet. He, unlike Bin Laden, does not come from the richest Saudi family, his relatives are not seen in business ties with the White HOUSE administration, he did not destroy the “twin towers”, and is not hiding in inaccessible caves in the mountains with the fascinating name Tora Bora . But he is alive. Meanwhile, while the popularity of Abu Bakr himself is only gaining momentum, the evil that he personifies is already quite real and very popular.

"This Al-Baghdadi appeared as if out of nowhere, and it is not clear whether the United States is hunting for him or not. Look at what weapons are still falling into the hands of Al-Baghdadi's people in Iraq to this day. He has British, Israeli weapons, and no one is attacking. To understand who is behind them, you need to understand who benefits from the virtual destruction of nation states - Syria and Iraq," says former US National Security Agency employee Wayne Madson.

The story of how a relatively small militant group of Iraqi Islamists fighting in Syria against Assad under the banner of al-Qaeda, within two years, turned into a powerful structure with ambitions of a new Arab caliphate is vague. The person of the Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi raises no less questions. It turned out that eleven years ago he was held in an American prison in Iraq, but then was allegedly released. According to Pentagon officials, he was kept behind bars for no more than a year. However, the former head of this prison claims that Baghdadi spent five years there and was only released in 2009.

“Some believe that this is sufficient evidence that the Americans worked with him, recruited him, and so on. Based on my observations and analysis of what is happening, I can say that, depending on the Americans and on Saudi Arabia, this is all a myth. This myth is spreading mainly the propaganda machine of Iran, which, so to speak, benefits from presenting its opponents as simply hirelings of American imperialism, Israel, Saudi Arabia and so on, but this contradicts the known facts,” believes Heydar Dzhemal, Chairman of the Islamic Committee of Russia.

The rapid transformation of the inconspicuous Islamic activist Ibrahim Al-Badri, released from an American prison, into the leader of the most brutal Islamist military group was accompanied by another process - the emergence of former senior officers of Saddam Hussein's army in the leadership of the organization.

“The fact is that when Saddam’s officers came to power in the ISIS group, they purged the previous leadership. It’s a difficult question who purged whom, either the Americans, or these Saddam guys themselves, but, in general, the former leadership of ISIS was destroyed. And the person who, in fact, is behind the creation of the ISIS group was a former officer of Saddam, who is known as Haji Bakr, he died in January 2014. But, nevertheless, he managed to create this group, he managed to create ISIS, and he found this Al Baghdadi, he pulled him out of there, elevated him and brought him into the shura, into the council of commanders, that is, the main management link of the entire group,” says political scientist, expert on the Middle East Anatoly Nesmiyan.

A photograph taken in Syria when the current caliph was still little known. He's in the second row, to the left of Senator McCain. At that time, some unanimity still reigned among the fighters against the regime of Bashar al-Assad. All of them were generously financed by Washington, their armed forces, recognized by the Americans as moderate, trained at military bases in Jordan and Turkey. It is noteworthy that the future caliph of the bloodthirsty “Islamic State,” who had not yet grown a beard, was considered quite a handshake then some three years ago. Analysts who are inclined to believe that Americans are behind the actions of ISIS to this day are convinced: the sharply increased importance of ISIS, the conflict with al-Qaeda, represented in Syria by the Al-Nusra Front, the replacement of the struggle against Assad with the struggle for influence within the ranks of the opposition and, ultimately, ISIS's summer invasion of Iraq are all the result of serious divisions within the White House and on Capitol Hill.

"The United States has several political goals in this region. One of the most significant is a reshuffle of forces in the Middle East. This is carried out through massacres, not by US forces, but in this case, by the forces of the non-governmental army of the Islamic caliph ISIS. But there is another one political line of a certain group led by Senator McCain. This group seeks, first of all, the overthrow of the Assad regime. Senator McCain is not only an American senator and head of the opposition, but also a functionary high level in the US government. Therefore, it is very difficult to reliably establish who is subordinate to whom in this matter. The conflict between these two directions is not a conflict of interests, but a conflict of priorities. Either first rebuild the entire Middle East, or finally overthrow Assad. The existence of these two political strategies is obvious,” says French political scientist and orientalist Thierry Meyssan.

It must be admitted that there are indeed many strange things associated with ISIS. Saudi Arabia, whose representatives at one time provided covert support to this formation, is now forced to strengthen its border in this direction, not without reason fearing an imminent attack. It is known that relations between Riyadh and Washington have recently been far from ideal. In addition, since the triumphant entry of Caliph Al Baghdadi’s troops into Iraq, the United States and Iran, at least in this direction, unexpectedly turned from bitter enemies into allies, bringing Obama closer to the desired solution to the problem of the Iranian nuclear project. Iraq itself, without the direct participation of the Americans, was de facto divided into three parts. So, filming the terrible atrocities committed by Islamic State militants is clearly not enough to conclude that American policy in the Middle East has failed.

Compilation by Najib Ben Abdel Kader@abounour2006

Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi is a real person, however, this is just a nickname or pseudonym. The same applies to everyone around him. There is not a single member of the Al-Baghdadi Council whose last name or first name is real.

And Al-Baghdadi is 100% Iraqi. No other nationality is accepted because... he doesn't trust anyone.

The number of members of Al-Baghdadi's Military Council increases and decreases, ranging from 8 to 13 people.

Al-Baghdadi's Military Council is headed by three former members of Saddam's army, former Ba'athists. The main one is Colonel General Haji Bakr, an officer in Saddam’s Ba’athist army.

Who is Haji Bakr? What is his relationship with al-Baghdadi and when did it begin?

Tweets from 12/14/2013

As already mentioned, the Al-Baghdadi Military Council is headed by three people, the main one of whom is a former Baathist officer, a General Staff colonel named Haji Bakr. Colonel Haji Bakr joined the State of Iraq at a time when the State of Iraq was headed by Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi. Haji Bakr was at that time a simple member of a military organization who offered his services in the military field, his experience of serving in the Baathist army to the Al-Baghdadi organization. Colonel Haji was known for his loyalty to the Baath Party. He was the highest-ranking military leader in the inner circle of Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi, with whom he was not previously acquainted. However, through intermediaries associated with Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi and Abu Hafs Al-Muhajer, he was accepted into the inner circle, with the condition that he would connect the organization with the army leadership and provide valuable information about it.

Colonel General Staff was close to the leadership of the state of Iraq as a military adviser to Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi and Abu Hafs Al-Muhajer. Colonel General Haji Bakr provided the leadership with information and plans of a military nature and, through communications, connected him with the former military leadership of the Baath Party. The leadership of the state of Iraq brought Colonel Haji closer and closer to them, and in just a few weeks they recognized in him a significant storehouse of military and managerial experience. The strange thing is that the current leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, was not yet a member of the organization's leadership, such as Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi. Until the death of the latter, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi was a member of the organization not included in its leadership. He lived in the west of Iraq, and more specifically in the province of Al-Anbar, and even more precisely in Fellujah.

Haji Bakr remained in the leadership as an adviser to Al-Baghdadi and Al-Muhajer for about 50 days, when a disaster struck the state of Iraq - both Al-Baghdadi and Al-Muhajer were killed by a shell. Colonel Haji Bakr was not injured. At one moment, both leaders, who were the largest and most prominent leaders of the state of Iraq, died. The leadership positions were vacant. Then Haji was appreciated by everyone. Haji Bakr had a friend - a colonel named Mazin Nahir. Haji Bakr often visited Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi, accompanied by him, either presenting Mazin as an unofficial member collaborating with the organization, or as a trusted agent, introduced into the ranks of supporters of the regime, who would not like to be exposed either as part of the organization’s leadership or on its meetings after the murder of two leaders. Colonel Haji Bakr informed his associates and the leadership of the organization that he had sworn allegiance to the new emir of the state of Iraq, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. This news came as a surprise to everyone.

Application: Abu Hamza Al-Muhajer, who accompanied Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi, is an Egyptian named Abdel Munim Azzeddin Badauwi, whose last two nicknames, before joining Al-Baghdadi, (Abu Omar) were: 1) Abu Ayyub; 2) Abu Hafs.

Tweets from 12/15/2013

When, during a special meeting, one hour after the death of the leader of Al-Baghdadi (the First) and Al-Muhajer, Colonel Abu Bakr invited Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi to become emir and Abu Bakr expressed his concerns to him, Colonel Haji Bakr reassured him by promising help and support from the rear, which pleased both Al-Baghdadi himself and those from his circle who had been with him from the very beginning of his leadership activities.

A new stage in the history of the state of Iraq has begun, called the period of dual leadership - one leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi - in plain sight, and a shadow leader - Colonel General Haji Bakr. The activities of the state of Iraq began to proceed in an atmosphere of fear of the presence in the state (organization) of a person endowed with extraordinary powers - Haji Bakr, very close to the emir. The image of a beardless colonel, always at the right hand of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, caused misunderstanding among members of the state (organization), which both leaders, Al-Baghdadi and the colonel, felt.

From the first weeks, the colonel began to grow a beard and change his image and manner of communication. None of the members of the organization had any questions for the leadership, since a question is a doubt, and doubt is a split in the ranks, which one way or another can lead to bloodshed and the liquidation of the organization. None of the members of the organization knew the colonel before Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi came to its leadership. After about two months, Colonel Haji Bakr began to hold special meetings with Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi in order to prepare the structure of the new state. Their first agreement was the creation of two apparatuses: an apparatus to prevent a split in the state and protect it from within by creating security units that eliminate everyone who poses a danger to the existence of the organization, and an apparatus to ensure the flow of material resources to the state.

First: security apparatus.

The first steps to ensure security were that Colonel of the General Staff Haji Bakr recommended that the parade leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi avoid personal meetings with the heads of regional units in order not to be subject to their influence or instructions, but to convey to them the orders of the emir through the leadership formed by the colonel Advisory Council. Subsequently, Colonel Haji Bakr became a necessary person for Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, with whom he never parted; he became, as it were, his personal minister, a real shadow leader of the organization.

The second step in creating a security agency was the formation of disparate units engaged in liquidation and secret killings, formed by the colonel initially with 20 people, and then, over the course of several months, increased to a hundred people.

Orders for these units came only directly from senior management. They were not subordinate to any of the regional emirs. The selection of personnel in them took place on the basis of the colonel’s personal acquaintances from among his especially trusted colleagues from his former activities during the collapsed Iraqi Baathist regime. The task of these units was the secret liquidation of those suspected of secessionist activities or opposition to the State of Iraq, including the liquidation of warlords and Sharia judges.

At the same time, orders for their liquidation did not pass through the organizational structures of state leaders, bypassing them. At the head of these units, the colonel put his former colleague, a former officer named Abu Sawfan Rifai. Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi felt safe and was inflamed with a feeling of gratitude towards Colonel Haji Bakr. He began to consider him the person he needed. Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi even felt that he could not remain head of the organization without Colonel Haji Bakr, who, thanks to his experience in the army, serves as the acting minister of defense and head of the security services.

Second:

The State of Iraq, under the leadership of its former leader Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi, has taken serious steps to attract large financial resources based on:

1) Confiscation of the financial resources of all Shiites, Christian minorities, Druze, as well as all those collaborating with the Assad regime, even Sunnis;

2) Appropriation of state oil fields, state energy and fuel facilities, enterprises and any financial resources;

3) All companies that have contracts with the ruling regime, be it maintenance companies, housing and communal services companies, gas stations, communications companies. All of them were considered partners of the ruling regime. The owners of those that were not completely under their control received threats of murder and bombing of company facilities or stores they owned if they refused to pay the monthly tax. And they paid it, fearing for their property.

4) Roadblocks were placed along long highways, charging heavy vehicle drivers fees that sometimes amounted to $200.

The state of Iraq, under the leadership of Abu Bakr and the colonel, concentrated very significant financial resources, due to which the amount of wages and payments for participation in hostilities was increased. With increasing financial opportunities among Iraqis, the attractiveness of joining and commitment to the State has increased significantly. The financial apparatus of the state of Iraq was created. It is surprising that Colonel Haji Bakr himself became its leader, combining the duties of the military leader of the state. Five managers were assigned to him. During this period, the colonel established a group of consultants, the composition of which was appointed by the Advisory Council of the State of Iraq from seven to thirteen people, of which not a single one was non-Iraqi.

Now I would like to receive answers from the State of Iraq to the following questions:

– How did the idea of ​​forming the state of Iraq and the Levante come about? Who put forward the idea of ​​al-Baghdadi's redeployment to Syria three weeks before it was officially announced and where did he live all this time?

– Why did he rush to announce his redeployment and why did he choose the Turkish border as his place of residence before the announcement of the redeployment? Why did he choose mobile iron trailers near refugee camps as his place of residence?

– What threat did he make against Abu Muhajir Al-Jolani before the announcement of the creation of the state and what, at his request, should Al-Jolani or Jabhat al-Nusra do or not do on the issue of its dissolution?

There is a photograph of al-Baghdadi with his advisers, taken on the border with Turkey a week before the announcement of the creation of the state of Iraq and the Levant and the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra.

Tweets from 12/17/2013

With the outbreak of the Syrian revolution, the eyes of the state of Iraq and the Levant turned to Syria, especially the eyes of members of the organization of non-Iraqi origin, and especially those from Syria. Colonel Haji Bakr was frightened by the possibility of infiltration by members of the State of Iraq and its leadership, who, being its members, were looking for ways to create division in its ranks, and could choose Syria as a loophole to escape from the state.

Colonel Haji Bakr advised Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi to leaders at all levels to abandon all thoughts of moving to Syria. Anyone who goes to Syria will be considered a schismatic and a renegade. Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi made such an appeal, which contained threats. The reason for this was clear - the situation was unclear and it was necessary to abstain. Ferment began within the ranks of the members of the state of Iraq, which could lead to splits, vacillations and uncontrolled flight of its members, especially non-Iraqis, to Syria. The colonel proposed forming a group of non-Iraqis that would be sent to Syria under the command of a Syrian, with a ban on any non-Iraqi leader being part of the group. In this he saw an opportunity to save the state of Iraq from splitting.

The new leadership in Syria will attract non-Iraqi as well as foreign supporters. The Jabhet al-Nusra organization was formed, which began to develop under the leadership of Abu Muhajir Al-Jolani. The name of the organization and its authority began to gain strength. The name of Abu Muhajir Al-Jolani has acquired international resonance. Many mujahideen from the Persian Gulf region, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, Algeria, Europe and Yemen began to join Jabhat al-Nusra at an alarming rate and in large numbers. This strengthening of Jabhat al-Nusra began to cause fear among the colonel and Al-Baghdadi, since in the ranks of Jabhat al-Nusra there is no loyalty either to the state of Iraq or to Al-Baghdadi personally. Colonel Haji Bakr was frightened by the strengthening of Jabhat al-Nusra and Al-Jolani, which threatened Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi and the state of Iraq with losing their role in the process as a whole. Therefore, Haji Bakr called on Al-Baghdadi to order Al-Jolani to announce on the radio that Jabhat al-Nusra was officially a subdivision of the State of Iraq under the leadership of Al-Baghdadi. Al-Jolyani promised to think about it, however, he delayed his answer in every possible way.

Days passed, but there was still no statement. Al-Baghdadi sent Al-Jolani a reminder containing reprimands and reproaches, to which he responded with further promises to consult with his circle of Mujahideen and scientists. Al-Jolani sent a letter to Al-Baghdadi, in which, to the great disappointment of the colonel, he noted that such a statement, in the opinion of all members of the Advisory Council, would not be in the interests of the revolution. Al-Baghdadi was also angry. They, under the guise of Mujahideen and advisers to Al-Baghdadi's wing, sent spies in order to, being among Al-Jolani's associates, monitor his movements, so that he did not give orders and enter into an alliance with anyone.

This fact greatly worried Al-Jolani, as it limited his freedom of movement and action. He began to speak to his entourage with restrained compliments to the state of Iraq and Al-Baghdadi, which only further increased suspicions against him. He felt that he would be eliminated. His feelings of anxiety and fear for his life increased significantly when the US called for Jabhat al-Nusra to be included in the list terrorist organizations, and Al-Jolani himself to the list of most wanted persons.

Al-Jolani had a chance to hide from the people sent by Al-Baghdadi to spy on him, isolating himself among a limited closed circle of people he personally selected. The US designation of Jabhat al-Nusra as a terrorist organization, and of Al-Jolani himself as one of Syria's most wanted men, has heightened Colonel Haji Bakr's and al-Baghdadi's fears and concerns about Jabhat al-Nusra's competition with the state.

Abu Muhajer Al-Jolani was a smart politician who tried to maintain moderation and instill peace in Al-Baghdadi's soul. However, the fears of the colonel and Al-Baghdadi exceeded all the reassurances coming from Al-Jolani, which forced the colonel to think about further steps to join Jabhat al-Nusra to the state of Iraq. Colonel Haji Bakr advised Al-Baghdadi to send Al-Jolani an order to carry out a military action against the leadership of the Free Army during a meeting in Turkey in order to inflict maximum damage on the leadership of the Free Army.

Al-Baghdadi sent a letter to Al-Jolani with instructions to carry out two explosions, the first in Turkey and the second in Syria, the targets of which would be the places of greatest concentration of Free Army leaders. Such actions were justified by the need to prevent future contacts and rapprochement with the United States and to eliminate them before the situation in Syria worsens, preventing their popularity from growing among the people. The names of the leaders of the Free Army who were subject to liquidation were identified (we have a list of these names). These orders were communicated to the senior leaders of Jabhat al-Nusra and their units. A meeting of Jabhat al-Nusra took place.

The giant's order was unanimously rejected. A detailed response was sent to Al-Baghdadi, stating that Jabhat al-Nusra and its Advisory Council reject this order because they are Muslims, and also do not consider it possible to hold such events in Turkey, which is a significant state that provides significant support for the revolution . Carrying out the action will disrupt the development of the jihadist movement and that Jabhat al-Nusra knows better, since it is closest to these processes. This caused even greater anger between General Staff Colonel Haji Bakr and Al-Baghdadi, who considered this fact a blatant disobedience.

The colonel and al-Baghdadi sent a harsh letter to al-Jolani, in which he was given a choice: either carry out the order or dissolve Jabhat al-Nusra and form a new organization. Al-Jolani delayed his answer. The colonel and al-Baghdadi were waiting for an answer, which was always delayed. Al-Jolani expressed deliberate disregard for the instructions since the ultimatum had expired. Al-Baghdadi sent his envoy to meet with Al-Jolani to listen to his explanations. Al-Jolani tried to avoid this meeting, citing certain circumstances.

The wait for the meeting dragged on, and Al-Baghdadi's envoy returned empty-handed. Al-Baghdadi felt real danger. He felt that Jabhat al-Nusra considered itself more large force than the state of Iraq and got out of its control. The colonel proposed the following to Al-Baghdadi: he would send the heads of Iraqi units with the task of holding meetings with the regional leaders of Jabhat al-Nusra for the purpose of espionage and testing their moods, giving them the idea of ​​​​dissolving Jabhat al-Nusra and looking at their reaction, and at the same time finding out the degree of popularity of Al -Baghdadi in their midst. This was actually accomplished.

The Colonel and Al-Baghdadi sent ten Iraqis to Jabhat al-Nusra, who spent ten days among the Mujahideen. During this time, they held meetings with the Mujahideen and some influential figures in Jabhat al-Nusra, especially with people from Saudi Arabia. The results of these meetings were mixed. Reaction ranged from support for the idea to rejection. There was a large layer that supported common Islamic aspirations and dreams of creating a state from Iraq to Syria under a single leadership, most of whose representatives were represented by newly joined Jabhat al-Nusra, who had previously encountered the leadership of Jabhat al-Nusra, which prohibited and punished any manifestations apostasy.

There were also those who met their demise at the hands of Jabhat al-Nusra for inciting apostasy, or were severely punished for it. Any entity strives to provide its members with maximum freedom, and Jabhat al-Nusra has imprisoned, persecuted and disarmed some of its members for spreading ideas of apostasy. Among those imprisoned by the verdict of Jabhat al-Nusra were: Tunisians Abu Ritaj Al-Susi, Abu Omar Al-Ibadi, Moroccans Abu Damdam Al-Husni, Abu Hajjaj Al-Nawari, Saudi Arabian Abu Bakr Omar Al-Qahtani.

The Saudi Abu Bakr Omar Al-Qahtani, who was punished by Jabhat al-Nusra, had his weapons confiscated and was punished three times for spreading inflammatory apostate ideas. He was on the side of the violators of the foundations of Jabhat al-Nusra. He sided with a group of individuals punished by Jabhat al-Nusra on suspicion of supporting al-Baghdadi, which resonated with Jabhat al-Nusra. This Saudi subsequently became the chairman of the Sharia court of the state of Al-Baghdadi and the first renegade.

Two weeks after al-Baghdadi announced the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra, ten of al-Baghdadi's spies returned to Iraq with a vague picture of the level of support among Jabhat al-Nusra members for its dissolution and re-subordination to a single state. Colonel Haji Bakr invited Al-Baghdadi not to make any decision regarding the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra, but to go with him in order to personally understand the situation on the spot, since the announcement of the creation of the state of Iraq and Syria during the absence of Al-Baghdadi in Syria was not capable of inspiring and leading the masses.

People would like to see Al-Baghdadi, and his physical presence would be an effective factor. Al-Baghdadi agreed with the colonel's opinion and sent people to prepare a secretive and safe place. After these people got in touch, a safe place was determined on the Turkish border, his redeployment was prepared, accompanied by his personal envoy and colleague in the leadership of the organization, Colonel General Staff Haji Bakr and only three other people. What did Al-Baghdadi do when he arrived in Turkey and where exactly did he live? How many days did he spend there before announcing the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra?

Part 2

Tweets from 12/18/2013

When did al-Baghdadi appear in Syria? How was the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra announced? What does the Saudi officer Bender Al-Shaalian have to do with the formation of Al-Baghdadi’s new state?

Al-Baghdadi, the colonel and their entourage arrived in Syria three weeks before the announcement of the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra, after which they immediately went to a secret location on the Turkish border. The following was prepared for Al-Baghdadi: iron mobile trailers near the Syrian refugee camp - the safest place for him and the farthest from prying eyes. Al-Baghdadi and his companions lived in these trailers, where Al-Baghdadi met with regional leaders of Jabhat al-Nusra, urging them to recognize their leadership.

Al-Baghdadi decided not to reveal to them the disagreements and conflicts taking place between him and Al-Jolani, explaining to them that the essence of the idea is common leadership in the name of common interests and to everyone’s satisfaction, and that everyone, both the leadership and the Sharia to advisers, this choice in favor of bringing Jabhat al-Nusra under the wing of the state seems correct. It's just a matter of returning one of the branches of the organization to its basics. This is a purely organizational issue.

Al-Baghdadi's meetings with influential members of Jabhat al-Nusra took place in two versions, the first of which was when a prominent Jabhat al-Nusra figure met and talked with him in private, being personally acquainted with him, and the second, when a low-ranking leader did not have a personal one-on-one meeting with him, but met with him in the presence of about ten people, one of whom said that Al-Baghdadi was present among these ten and heard your answers.

They call for unity of ranks and the creation of a single organization. It will happen very soon. They gave advice on how to achieve cohesion and unity, talked about how dangerous the enemies and vacillations in the ranks were, that Al-Jolani was silent, that there were no disagreements or differences between him and Al-Baghdadi. Upon learning of Al-Baghdadi's arrival in Syria and his meetings with influential people from the leadership of Jabhat al-Nusra, Al-Jolani was extremely angry.

Jabhat al-Nusra's leadership was concerned, foreshadowing al-Baghdadi's next steps. Al-Baghdadi extended an invitation to Al-Jolani for an urgent meeting. Al-Jolani refused the meeting. He became aware of Al-Baghdadi's anger and the possibility of his assassination. He refrained from the meeting, surrounding himself with heavy security. Al-Baghdadi was unable to establish the exact location of Al-Jolani, and he sent a message to Al-Jolani, informing him of the imminent dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra, demanding that he make a personal statement in the interests of maintaining unity. Al-Jolani responded with an even more sincere and frank letter, pointing out that the annexation of Jabhat al-Nusra into the state of Al-Baghdadi would be a fatal mistake and would lead to the tearing to shreds of the popularity and authority gained by Jabhat al-Nusra among the Syrian jihadists , and that the people of Syria categorically reject such a decision, advising Al-Baghdadi to return to Iraq, leaving Jabhat al-Nusra alone.

Colonel Haji Bakr advised Al-Baghdadi to issue a statement on the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra on his own behalf, but not to issue a statement about the resignation of Al-Jolani, since he may yet return after the end of the crisis in relations. The colonel asked to delay the statement until a combat battalion could be formed in Syria from among defectors from Jabhat al-Nusra, capable of becoming the core of Al-Baghdadi’s security after his statement.

Colonel Haji Bakr summoned the leaders of Jabhat al-Nusra loyal to him and agreed with them that they, from among their subordinates, would form a guard battalion that would guarantee the success of the statement, spreading the news about it among supporters of Jabhat al-Nusra. In three days, the colonel managed to prepare the commanders, who had about one thousand fighters under his command, and secretly notify them of the time of the release of the statement on the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra.

The day before the announcement, the colonel notified all other leaders of Jabhat al-Nusra about the presence of Emir Al-Baghdadi in Syria, so that they were ready to accept the dissolution and submit to him, swearing allegiance to him during this period as part of the declaration of the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra and formation of the state of Iraq and Syria. The hour “zero” (the hour of declaration) has arrived. It was greeted with approval by the leaders, with whom an agreement had been reached in advance. They expressed their pleasure at solving problems. Leaders and Shariah judges were elected from among the members of Jabhat al-Nusra, who were supposed to meet with Al-Baghdadi to confirm them in office, so that, upon returning to their subordinates, they could tell them about their meeting and conversation with Al -Baghdadi.

Colonel Haji Bakr warned Al-Baghdadi that the current period is very decisive and security measures should be relaxed when organizing personal meetings with Jabhat al-Nusra supporters to take the oath, so that people feel freer, especially after the entire previous period, Al-Jolani violated the oath given to them. So that senior leaders and Shariah judges can feel the difference when they see a person more prominent than them, namely Al-Baghdadi. This will be a great psychological factor and must be carried out.

After the release of the Statement, Jabhat al-Nusra split into three parts. Part of it, and this is almost half of the composition, joined Al-Baghdadi. The other part, which is a quarter of the composition, remained neutral, and the last quarter remained with Al-Jolani. Al-Baghdadi felt the threat posed by the neutral or hostile half that did not align with him. The colonel sent an angry message to Al-Jolani, in which he suggested that he either join Al-Baghdadi or accept death, since his actions, according to Khariji, constitute open disobedience, and, according to Islamic Sharia law, deserve death. Al-Jolani did not receive the message, because he changed his place of residence and his headquarters.

Members of his staff were informed of the nature of this message. The colonel, on behalf of Al-Baghdadi, began sending his representatives to all the governing bodies of units that were not aligned with Al-Baghdadi with threats, calling them fugitives and declaring that everything they have belongs to the state, and they must swear allegiance to it, or disarm , it is safe to leave the country. They don't have a third choice.

Colonel Haji Bakr demanded that defectors from Jabhat al-Nusra give up the names of influential individuals from the forces not aligned with al-Baghdadi in order to bribe or intimidate them. At this time, the name of the former Saudi officer Bender Al-Shaalian, who had been on good terms with the state of Al-Baghdadi since the time of the first Al-Baghdadi, began to appear. Bandar Al-Shaalian played an important role during two periods: the first - the state of Iraq before Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, and the second - the period of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. Bender Al-Shaalian was among the influential persons of the state of Iraq before Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi.

He was one of the commanders of a military unit in Iraq. Then he returned to Saudi Arabia, and a new state was formed under the leadership of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, with whom Bender maintained good ties. However, only for this period did he turn away from the path destined for him. He was constantly in contact with the state of Iraq and supported it in every possible way both before and after the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra. He accomplished his task of establishing acquaintances and connections between influential figures of Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Baghdadi.

Al-Shaalian's first act was to introduce Al-Baghdadi to Abu Bakr Omar Al-Qahtani. He believed that the Saudi Arabian flag would influence the Mujahideen. It was a rare chance for Saudi Arabian Abu Bakr Omar Al-Qahtani to transform himself from an inmate of Al-Jolani prisons into a visitor of Al-Baghdadi. Al-Qahtani was summoned to meet with Al-Baghdadi and Colonel Haji Bakr, where he immediately pledged allegiance to them, expressing his readiness to influence and lure Jabhat al-Nusra supporters, especially the Saudis.

Al-Qahtani was not previously known among the leadership of the state of Iraq, and Saudi Arabia duly directed his actions to influence the remaining members of Jabhat al-Nusra. Al-Qahtani began a new stage with his transformation from an illegal military prisoner of Jabhat al-Nusra into a close associate of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Part 3

It became known to Haji Bakr and Al-Baghdadi that Al-Jolani was not going to follow their call for the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra and that he was likely to make a public statement about his refusal to comply. Colonel Haji Bakr suggested that Al-Baghdadi immediately form a security group with two tasks: the first is to seize all the weapons depots of Jabhat al-Nusra, and immediately liquidate everyone who opposes this so that Jabhat al-Nusra does not have any weapons left, no ammunition for people to leave Jabhat al-Nusra, scatter and join the state of Iraq.

The first task was solved with great success. A group of Mujahideen Jabhat al-Nusra - warehouse guards who refused to hand over the warehouses they were guarding - was eliminated. The second task was even more decisive: the formation of a security group designed to eliminate the leadership of Jabhat al-Nusra, starting with Al-Jolani himself, the most influential Sharia lawyers, including Al-Muhajir Al-Qahtani.

Colonel Haji Bakr formed a group with the task of carrying out liquidations and murders consisting of fifty people under the command of a former Iraqi officer, which was supposed to, firstly: determine the location of the leadership of Jabhat al-Nusra, and, secondly: organize surveillance of all of them movements and eliminate them using cars with explosives attached under their bottoms, the detonation of which is carried out using a clock mechanism.

A search was carried out for Al-Jolani, his movements were investigated, and some of his former associates were arrested to ascertain his movements. However, the place where he was hiding could not be found. Then the group of Colonel Haji Bakr established surveillance of the main Sharia lawyer of Jabhat al-Nusra Al-Muhajer Al-Qahtani.

Colonel Haji Bakr was informed of his whereabouts and all his movements. However, it was also reported that Al-Muhajer Al-Qahtani does not go anywhere without being accompanied by two guards and has never been seen alone. Then an order was given to liquidate him along with those accompanying him.

Al-Muhajera Al-Qahtani is used to being accompanied in his car by two people, the first of whom is Abu Haws An-Najdi Omar Al-Muhaysani and the second is Abu Omar Al-Jazrawi, called Abdul Aziz Al-Othman. The liquidation team of Colonel Haji Bakr planted an explosive device in the car of Al-Muhajer and his companions. The car went in the direction of one of the positions occupied by Jabhat al-Nusra. On the way, the target of the liquidation, Al-Qahtani, got out of the car to meet with one of the members of Jabhat al-Nusra at one of his command posts, and asked his entourage to wait for him in the car.

At this time, the car with those accompanying it was blown up. Allah protected Al-Qahtani. He realized that he was the target of the action. After making sure that both of his companions were killed, he disappeared, fearing the presence of a safety ambush. Colonel Haji Baku was informed of the death of Al-Qahtani and his entourage, Al-Baghdadi was also informed that the second person in Jabhat al-Nusra had been secretly eliminated.

The news of the death of Al-Qahtani circulated among the state of Iraq for the whole day, until, from conversations among supporters of Jabhat al-Nusra, it became known that he was alive and well and that the action was a failure. Colonel Haji Bakr demanded an urgent convening of an emergency meeting of the leadership of the liquidation group, during which he sharply criticized them, saying that this unsuccessful operation would make it impossible to conduct similar operations for many months.

Al-Jolani's refusal to disband Jabhat al-Nusra has remained the main threat to Al-Baghdadi and Colonel Haji Bakr since they took charge of the state of Iraq. The colonel demanded that Al-Baghdadi provide a solution to the problem within his competence. Al-Baghdadi expressed to him his fears that Al-Jolani might resort to the help of Al-Zawahiri to escalate the conflict situation. This actually happened. Al-Jolani managed to strengthen his position with the help of three people, one of whom was a Saudi commander, and the other two were Syrians (we have their names).

Al-Zawahiri asked not to rush and to search for a fundamental solution to the problem. Al-Zawahiri sent a message to Al-Qaeda's Yemen chief Nasser Al-Wahishi asking for mediation before he made a final statement embarrassing Al-Qaeda. Al-Wahishi sent a written message to Al-Jolani and Al-Baghdadi, to which Al-Baghdadi did not respond. Al-Jolani's response to Al-Wahishi's message was word for word his justifications given to Al-Baghdadi himself and, subsequently, Az-Zawahiri that Al-Baghdadi's participation was the worst mistake of the Syrian revolution.

Al-Wahishi informed Al-Zawahiri of the failure of his mediation and that a solution must be reached by Al-Zawahiri himself in his personal statement. Al-Baghdadi, after receiving a message from Al-Wahishi, felt that the problem was becoming more complicated. Al-Baghdadi was in a difficult psychological state at that time, and Colonel Haji Bakr advised him on how to maintain commitment, strength and perseverance.

Kuwaiti Hamid Hamd al-Ali met with Al-Jolani to offer him his mediation role in defusing the conflict. Al-Jolani expressed to him his thoughts and commitment to thoughts regarding the danger of Al-Baghdadi's presence in Syria. Kuwaiti Al-Ali found Al-Jolani's arguments in favor of his commitment to Al-Nusra convincing, and also agreed that the existence of a state called the State of the Levant led by Al-Baghdadi was a gross political and legal mistake.

Kuwaiti Al-Ali, through one of the sharia leaders close to Al-Baghdadi, Abu Ali Al-Anbari, demanded a meeting with Al-Baghdadi. Such a meeting took place. The meeting was recorded. During the meeting, Al-Baghdadi and the colonel expressed their commitment to the state of Iraq and the Levant, and the Kuwaiti stated the importance of unity and resolution of the conflict situation. In short, an agreement was reached between them on the following: wait to see what Az-Zawahiri says in his speech to the media.

Colonel Haji Bakr expressed uncertainty about Az-Zawahiri's removal. Al-Baghdadi asked him to calm down. After the departure of the Kuwaiti Al-Ali, the colonel reproached Al-Baghdadi for linking the fate of their state with Az-Zawahiri, who sent Nasser Al-Wahishi on a mediation mission. Colonel Haji Bakr demanded that Al-Baghdadi withdraw from Az-Zawahiri in order to put an end to Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Jolani, their leadership and to dissolve Al-Nusra even from a legal point of view. The colonel began to take steps in many directions at once:

• firstly, to intensify the role of the liquidation unit;
• secondly, to act among Sharia lawyers, recruiting them from among influential muftis with the obligatory oath to Al-Baghdadi;
• thirdly, increased recruitment through the media on the Internet with the glorification of Al-Baghdadi and his state, posting reports on operations carried out and their confirmations, and publishing calls directed against Al-Nusra and his leadership.

The liquidation group continued to operate. However, she changed her tactics, moving from using plastid to using highly trained snipers. She again returned to the search for iconic figures and leaders, and began to carry out recruitment among the Sharia lawyers of Jabhat al-Nusra with the involvement of the Iraqis Abu Al-Anbari and Abu Yahya and the Saudi Abu Bakr Omar Al-Qahtani. The two Iraqis were tasked with recruiting supporters from the Maghreb and Levant countries, while the Saudi Al-Qahtani was tasked with recruiting Saudis and people from the Gulf countries.

Al-Qahtani worked day and night to issue fatwas about the need to swear allegiance to Al-Baghdadi, and even established connections with influential circles in Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf and the Maghreb. But all this did not bring results. He then went to meet with Sharia jihadist lawyers to persuade them to pledge allegiance to Al-Baghdadi. He had a meeting with the Saudi Othman Al-Nazih and convinced him to side with the state of Iraq, which was victoriously announced by Abu Ali Al-Ansari.

Al-Anbari was the most prominent sharia authority in the state of Al-Baghdadi, however, he was an Iraqi. Al-Anbari asked to meet with the Saudi Othman in order to find out the extent of his influence, but discovered exactly the opposite of what Al-Qahtani told him about him. Al-Anbari reported to Al-Baghdadi that Osman Al-Nazih was not suitable to be nominated for the role of Sharia leader because he had weak personal qualities and is unable to conduct a conversation and engage in theological confrontation.

Colonel Haji Bakr and Abu Ali Al-Anbari asked Saudi Arabian Abu Bakr Omar Al-Qahtani to have the fatwas issued on his behalf, telling him that Saudi Sharia authorities would support his commitment to Al-Baghdadi's state.

• ISIS, prohibited V Russia terrorist organization