Poland is the "hyena of Eastern Europe". Poland and the Munich Agreement What Churchill said about Poland

Polonophobia, or anti-Polonism, is a manifestation of a hostile attitude towards the Polish people and Polish history. Judging by the fact that books by Polonophobes are readily published in Russia, and on the Internet there are a lot of Russian-language articles and statements imbued with hatred of Poles, anti-Polonism in Russia has become the norm for many people...
Can this phenomenon be considered “normal”?
Every nation, like every person, has its own negative traits. The history of most countries contains shameful facts and crimes. And there are people who pay attention mainly to flaws and vices and do not notice the good either in the historical past or in the present. I am not one of those people, but in the end, everyone has their own shortcomings...
But the majority of Russian literary Polonophobes are not seriously interested in history. They call themselves “Russian patriots,” and draw their knowledge mainly from books translated from English. For example, they annoyingly repeat the words of Sir Winston Churchill about how Poland in 1938 “with the greed of a hyena took part in the robbery and destruction of the Czechoslovak state,” but they do not say a word about how the future law-abiding citizens of democratic Czechoslovakia in 1918-1920 years they looted on a large scale in Russia.
Lieutenant General of the White Army Grigory Semenov recalled it this way:
“According to the commander of the Czech troops, General Syrov, the discipline in the Czech regiments was so shaken that the command had difficulty restraining the units. The robbery of civilians and government institutions along the route of the Czechs reached absolutely incredible levels. The looted property was delivered in military trains to Harbin, where it was sold completely openly by the Czechs, who rented the local circus building for this purpose and set up a store out of it, which sold household items taken from Siberia, such as: samovars, sewing machines, icons, silverware , crews, agricultural tools, even copper ingots and cars taken from the factories of the Urals.
In addition to open robbery, organized, as can be seen from the previous presentation, on a broad, purely commercial basis, the Czechs, taking advantage of impunity, released counterfeit Siberian money onto the market in huge quantities, printing them in their echelons. The Czech command could not or did not want to fight this evil, and such connivance had a most corrupting effect on the discipline in the regiments of the Czech troops.”
Semenov also claimed that for the extradition of Kolchak to the Bolsheviks, “in Chita, Russian officers handed General Syrov 30 silver two-kopeck pieces on receipt - a symbolic payment for betrayal.” Most likely, this is a story, but the story is very eloquent.
But the fact that this same General Jan Syrovoy, during the occupation of the Cieszyn region by Poland, served as Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense in Czechoslovakia and did nothing to protect Czechoslovakia is the honest truth...
Sir Winston Churchill writes about this with sorrow: “Immediately after the conclusion of the Munich Agreement on September 30, the Polish government sent an ultimatum to the Czech government, to which a response was to be given within 24 hours. The Polish government demanded the immediate transfer of the border region of Cieszyn to it. There was no way to resist this rude demand."
With all due respect to the opinion of Sir Winston, I allow myself to doubt that Czechoslovakia did not have the opportunity for military resistance. At the end of 1939, Finland - with a population four times smaller than Czechoslovakia - responded “No” to territorial claims from the USSR, fought for three months and defended its independence.
What prevented Czechoslovakia from saying “No” to the Poles?
Before answering this question, we need to understand why the so-called Munich Agreement of 1938 took place. In modern Russia there are two main versions: “Soviet” and “Hitler”.
According to the “Soviet” version, Great Britain and France betrayed Czechoslovakia in order to set Germany against the USSR. The main drawback of this version is that it is completely unclear why the British and French, less than a year later, provided guarantees to Poland and got involved in a war with Germany.
The 1938 "Hitler" version - promoted by contemporary Russian neo-Nazis without any public opposition - states that Western countries simply "made a mistake" in 1919 by incorporating the German Sudetenland into Czechoslovakia, and in 1938 "corrected the mistake and returned » Germany German states. Russian General Anton Denikin commented on this “deep thought” back in 1939:
“If we take into account the public mood of 1919, then only a madman could then make a gift from the Sudetenland to the defeated Reich, recognized by the whole world as the culprit of the World War - from regions that, moreover, never belonged to the Reich...”
All this is true. The Sudetenland was never part of Germany, and before it became “Czechoslovakian”, it was part of Austria-Hungary. The Sudeten Germans lived, in general, not so bad. The famous American historian William Shirer, who worked as a journalist in Germany in the 1930s and repeatedly visited neighboring countries, writes:
“Undoubtedly, compared with the situation of national minorities in Western countries, even in America, their situation in Czechoslovakia was not so bad. They had full democratic and civil rights, including the right to vote, they had their own schools, their own cultural institutions. The leaders of their political parties often held ministerial positions in the central government."
The Germans in Czechoslovakia had their own Sudeten-German party, which defended the rights of the German population. And those Germans who did not like the order in Czechoslovakia at all could freely leave the country and go to permanent residence in Germany...
The political leaders of Czechoslovakia had enough arguments to defend the rights to the territorial integrity of their country in the eyes of international public opinion. There was only one thing missing: the determination of the majority of the population to defend the borders with arms in hand.
William Shirer naively believed in the presence in 1938 of “35 Czechoslovak well-trained and armed divisions stationed behind impenetrable mountain fortifications.”
...The weapons were most likely good. As for training, this is a difficult question. It is not a fact that General Syrovoy and his comrades with their “Siberian military experience” could teach their subordinates a lot. And fortifications are made “impregnable” by persistent and courageous people who are ready to fight the enemy. There were too few such people in Czechoslovakia at that time. This was precisely the fundamental difference between Czechoslovakia and Finland.
The “appeasers” Chamberlain and Daladier were quite typical mediocrities and did not harbor any insidious plans towards Russia. They simply had nothing to answer to the words spoken by Hitler on September 27, 1938 to Chamberlain’s representative Horace Wilson: “If France and England want to attack us, let them attack!” I don't care at all! Today is Tuesday, next Monday we will be at war!” Great Britain and France did not want to fight, and Great Britain did not even have a decent ground army to fight on the continent. But the main thing is that Czechoslovakia itself was in no way going to fight. Sir President Edvard Benes would not have dared to say: “Let them attack...”
As a result, Hitler obtained the consent of England and France to revise the borders of Czechoslovakia in favor of Germany. The “appeasers,” according to Churchill, achieved the following: “The year of respite, which was supposedly won in Munich, put England and France, in comparison with Hitler’s Germany, in a much worse position than the one in which they were at the time of the Munich crisis.”
And Poland took advantage of the Munich agreement to obtain its own benefit. Of course, it was very ugly, one might even say “disgusting”...
The only question is, who can say this with a clear conscience?
Honestly, Churchill did not have the moral right to compare Poland with a “greedy hyena”... Now, if Sir Winston had also compared Great Britain and France with “stupid donkeys”, and Czechoslovakia with a “cowardly ferret” - then it would be a different matter...
But only Poland “earned” the “zoological epithet” from the great Briton.
Why?
Speaking on October 5, 1938 in the British House of Commons, Churchill was indignant:
“What happened in Warsaw? The British and French ambassadors visited the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Colonel Beck, or at least tried to meet with him in order to ask for some mitigation of the cruel measures that were being used against Czechoslovakia in connection with the problem of the Teshen region. The door was slammed in front of them. The French ambassador never received an audience, but the English ambassador received a very harsh response from one of the ministry officials. The whole matter is portrayed by the Polish press as a political tactlessness on the part of both powers...”
Churchill's indignation is not difficult to understand. The door slammed in the face of the British ambassador hurt the national pride of all respectable Britons. Here you will not only start calling him a “hyena”... Of course, if you are a British patriot.
But patriots of most other countries, including Russia, will never take offense at the Poles for this diplomatic incident. Because Britain fully deserves such an insult both for the “Munich policy” and for many other not-so-nice deeds... And those who clumsily imitate Churchill thoughtlessly repeat the words “Hyena of Europe” about Poland! Hyena of Europe! They look not like Russian patriots, but like Russian-speaking parrots.

NOTES:

Churchill W., World War II. (In 3 books). - M.: Alpina non-fiction, 2013. - Book. 1. P. 159e
Semenov G.M., About myself: Memories, thoughts and conclusions - M.: AST, 2002. - P. 234-235.
Right there. P. 233.
Churchill W., Decree. Op. - Book 1. P. 149.
Denikin A.I., World events and the Russian question // Denikin A.I., The path of the Russian officer. Articles and essays on historical and geopolitical topics - M.: Iris-press, 2006. - P. 470.
Shearer. U., The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich - M: Astrel, 2012. - P. 404.
Right there. P. 509.
Right there. P. 441.
Churchill W., Decree. Op. - Book 1. P. 155.
Churchill W., Muscles of the world. - M.: Eksmo, 2009. - P. 81.

The Soviet Union, along with Germany, "significantly contributed" to the outbreak of World War II. This was stated by Polish Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski. “It must be remembered that the Soviet Union contributed significantly to the outbreak of World War II and invaded Poland along with Germany. Thus, he is also responsible for the beginning of World War II,” Waszczykowski said. According to him, the USSR participated in World War II “in its own interests,” since it itself was a victim of German aggression.

Who would have thought - the Soviet Union fought in its own interests. And in whose other interests did he need to fight? It just so happened that at the same time the Red Army deprived the Poles of the German governorship general and the “high” rank of subhumans. Moreover, Stalin cut off a fair chunk of Germany to Poland. Now the “grateful” Poles are fighting with our monuments with gusto.

The immortal lines immediately come to mind: “...The Germans were not the only predators who tormented the corpse of Czechoslovakia. Immediately after the conclusion of the Munich Agreement on September 30, the Polish government sent an ultimatum to the Czech government, which was to be responded to within 24 hours. The Polish government demanded the immediate transfer of the border region of Cieszyn to it. There was no way to resist this brutal demand.

The heroic character traits of the Polish people should not force us to close our eyes to their recklessness and ingratitude, which over the course of several centuries caused them immeasurable suffering. In 1919, this was a country that the Allied victory, after generations of partition and slavery, had transformed into an independent republic and one of the major European powers.

Now, in 1938, because of such an insignificant issue as Teshin, the Poles broke with all their friends in France, in England and in the USA, who brought them back to a united national life and whose help they were soon to be in such great need. We saw how now, while the reflection of the power of Germany was falling on them, they hastened to seize their share in the plunder and ruin of Czechoslovakia. At the moment of crisis, all doors were closed to the English and French ambassadors. They were not even allowed to see the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs. It must be considered a mystery and tragedy of European history that a people capable of any heroism, some of whose representatives are talented, valiant, and charming, constantly displays such huge shortcomings in almost all aspects of their public life. Glory in times of rebellion and sorrow; infamy and shame during periods of triumph. The bravest of the brave have too often been led by the foulest of the foul! And yet there have always been two Polands: one of them fought for the truth, and the other grovelled in meanness..."

You can, of course, as is now customary among supporters of total repentance on behalf of the USSR and the Red Army, call the author of these lines a “communist falsifier”, a “Stalinist”, “convict” that he is a “scoop” with imperial thinking, etc. If it were... not Winston Churchill. It’s hard to suspect this political figure of sympathizing with the USSR.

The question may arise: why did Hitler even need to give Poland the Cieszyn region? The fact is that when Germany presented Czechoslovakia with a demand to transfer to it the Sudetenland inhabited by the Germans, Poland played along with it. At the height of the Sudetenland crisis, on September 21, 1938, Poland presented Czechoslovakia with an ultimatum to “return” the Cieszyn region to it. On September 27, a repeated demand followed. A committee was created to recruit volunteers for the invasion corps. Armed provocations were organized: a Polish detachment crossed the border and fought a two-hour battle on Czechoslovak territory. On the night of September 26, the Poles raided the Frishtat station. Polish planes violated the Czechoslovak border every day.

This is what the Germans had to reward Poland for. Allies in the partition of Czechoslovakia, after all. A few months later, the turn came: “that same Poland, which just six months ago, with the greed of a hyena, took part in the robbery and destruction of the Czechoslovak state.”

After this, the Poles, with inimitable sincerity, are outraged that the USSR dared in 1939 to encroach on the territory that Poland captured in 1919–1920. At the same time, the “greedy hyena”, she is also one of the “predators who tormented the corpse of Czechoslovakia” (all complaints about the rough accuracy of this definition should be addressed to the terribly intolerant and politically incorrect Winston Churchill) came up with the idea of ​​​​being indignant at the role of its benefactor the USSR in World War II.

You can send them the memoirs of the British Prime Minister in response, let the Polish diplomats read it and prepare an indignant statement for the British.

Maxim Kustov

The article often raised the idea that Poland itself was to blame for its troubles. I don’t presume to assess Poland’s guilt, but the fact that it was far from an angelic country is confirmed by this article. Its original is on the author Olga Tonina.

"...the same Poland that just six months ago, with the greed of a hyena, took part in the robbery and destruction of the Czechoslovak state."
(W. Churchill, "The Second World War")
In the history of every state, there are heroic pages of which this state is proud. There are such heroic pages in the history of Poland. One of these glorious pages of Polish history is Operation Zaluzhye - the armed occupation by Polish troops of part of the territory of Czechoslovakia, which occurred 11 months before the start of World War II.

A brief chronology of events from such a glorious page in the history of the Polish state:

February 23, 1938. Beck, in negotiations with Goering, declares Poland’s readiness to take into account German interests in Austria and emphasized Poland’s interest “in the Czech problem”

March 17, 1938. Poland presents an ultimatum to Lithuania demanding the conclusion of a convention guaranteeing the rights of the Polish minority in Lithuania, as well as the abolition of the paragraph of the Lithuanian constitution proclaiming Vilna as the capital of Lithuania. (Vilna was illegally captured by the Poles several years ago and incorporated into Poland). Polish troops are concentrated on the Polish-Lithuanian border. Lithuania agreed to receive the Polish representative. If the ultimatum was rejected within 24 hours, the Poles threatened to march to Kaunas and occupy Lithuania. The Soviet government, through the Polish ambassador in Moscow, recommended not to infringe on the freedom and independence of Lithuania. Otherwise, it will denounce without warning the Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact and, in the event of an armed attack on Lithuania, will reserve freedom of action. Thanks to this intervention, the danger of an armed conflict between Poland and Lithuania was averted. The Poles limited their demands on Lithuania to one point - the establishment of diplomatic relations - and refused an armed invasion of Lithuania.

May 1938. The Polish government concentrates several formations in the Teszyn area (three divisions and one brigade of border troops).

August 11, 1938 - in a conversation with Lipsky, the German side announced an understanding of Poland’s interest in the territory of Soviet Ukraine

September 8-11, 1938. In response to the readiness expressed by the Soviet Union to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia, both against Germany and against Poland, the largest military maneuvers in the history of the revived Polish state were organized on the Polish-Soviet border, in which 5 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions, 1 motorized brigade, as well as aviation. The “reds” advancing from the east were completely defeated by the “blues”. The maneuvers ended with a grandiose 7-hour parade in Lutsk, which was personally received by the “supreme leader” Marshal Rydz-Smigly.

September 19, 1938 - Lipsky brings to the attention of Hitler the opinion of the Polish government that Czechoslovakia is an artificial entity and supports Hungarian claims to the territory of Carpathian Ruthenia

September 20, 1938 - Hitler declares to Lipsky that in the event of a military conflict between Poland and Czechoslovakia over the Cieszyn region, the Reich will side with Poland, that beyond the line of German interests Poland has completely free hands, that he sees a solution to the Jewish problem through emigration to the colonies in agreement with Poland, Hungary and Romania.

September 21, 1938 - Poland sent a note to Czechoslovakia demanding a solution to the problem of the Polish national minority in Cieszyn Silesia.

September 22, 1938 - the Polish government urgently announces the denunciation of the Polish-Czechoslovak Treaty on National Minorities, and a few hours later announces an ultimatum to Czechoslovakia on the annexation of lands with a Polish population to Poland. On behalf of the so-called “Union of Silesian Insurgents” in Warsaw, recruitment into the “Cieszyn Volunteer Corps” was launched completely openly. The formed detachments of “volunteers” are sent to the Czechoslovak border, where they organize armed provocations and sabotage.

September 23, 1938. The Soviet government warned the Polish government that if Polish troops concentrated on the border with Czechoslovakia invaded its borders, the USSR would consider this an act of unprovoked aggression and would denounce the non-aggression pact with Poland. The Polish government responded in the evening of the same day. His tone was, as usual, arrogant. It explained that it was carrying out some military activities only for defensive purposes.

September 24, 1938. Newspaper "Pravda" 1938. September 24. N264 (7589). on S.5. publishes the article “Polish fascists are preparing a putsch in Cieszyn Silesia.” Later, on the night of September 25, in the town of Konské near Třinec, the Poles threw hand grenades and fired at houses in which Czechoslovak border guards were located, as a result of which two buildings burned down. After a two-hour battle, the attackers retreated into Polish territory. Similar clashes occurred that night in a number of other places in the Teshin region.

September 25, 1938. The Poles raided railway station Frishtat, fired at her and threw grenades at her.

September 27, 1938. The Polish government is putting forward a repeated demand for the “return” of the Cieszyn region to it. Throughout the night, rifle and machine gun fire, grenade explosions, etc. were heard in almost all areas of the Teshin region. The bloodiest clashes, as reported by the Polish Telegraph Agency, were observed in the vicinity of Bohumin, Cieszyn and Jablunkov, in the towns of Bystrice, Konska and Skrzechen. Armed groups of “rebels” repeatedly attacked Czechoslovakian weapons depots, and Polish planes violated the Czechoslovakian border every day. In the newspaper "Pravda" 1938. September 27. N267 (7592) on page 1 the article “The unbridled impudence of the Polish fascists” is published

September 28, 1938. Armed provocations continue. In the newspaper "Pravda" 1938. September 28. N268 (7593) On S.5. The article “Provocations of Polish Fascists” is published.

September 29, 1938. Polish diplomats in London and Paris insist on an equal approach to solving the Sudeten and Cieszyn problems, Polish and German military officers agree on the line of demarcation of troops in the event of an invasion of Czechoslovakia. Czech newspapers describe touching scenes of “combat brotherhood” between German fascists and Polish nationalists. A Czechoslovakian border post near Grgava was attacked by a gang of 20 people armed with automatic weapons. The attack was repulsed, the attackers fled to Poland, and one of them, being wounded, was captured. During interrogation, the captured bandit said that in their detachment there were many Germans living in Poland. On the night of September 29-30, 1938, the infamous Munich Agreement was concluded.

September 30, 1938. Warsaw presented Prague with a new ultimatum, which was to be answered within 24 hours, demanding immediate satisfaction of its claims, where it demanded the immediate transfer of the border region of Cieszyn to it. Newspaper "Pravda" 1938. September 30. N270 (7595) on S.5. publishes an article: “The provocations of the aggressors do not stop. “Incidents” at the borders.”

October 1, 1938. Czechoslovakia cedes to Poland an area where 80 thousand Poles and 120 thousand Czechs lived. However, the main gain is the industrial potential of the captured territory. At the end of 1938, the enterprises located there produced almost 41% of the pig iron produced in Poland and almost 47% of the steel.

October 2, 1938. Operation "Zaluzhye". Poland occupies Cieszyn Silesia (Teschen - Frištát - Bohumin region) and some settlements on the territory of modern Slovakia.

How did the world react to these actions of the Poles?

From W. Churchill's book "The Second World War", volume 1, "The Gathering Storm"
"Chapter Eighteen"
"MUNICH WINTER"

“On September 30, Czechoslovakia bowed to the Munich decisions. “We want,” said the Czechs, “to declare before the whole world our protest against decisions in which we did not participate.” President Benes resigned because “he might end up an obstacle to the development of events to which our new state must adapt." Beneš left Czechoslovakia and found refuge in England. The dismemberment of the Czechoslovak state proceeded in accordance with the agreement. However, the Germans were not the only predators tormenting the corpse of Czechoslovakia. Immediately after the conclusion of the Munich Agreement on September 30 The Polish government sent an ultimatum to the Czech government, which was to be responded to within 24 hours. The Polish government demanded the immediate transfer of the border region of Cieszyn to it. There was no way to resist this brutal demand.
The heroic character traits of the Polish people should not force us to close our eyes to their recklessness and ingratitude, which over the course of several centuries caused them immeasurable suffering. In 1919, this was a country that the Allied victory, after generations of partition and slavery, had transformed into an independent republic and one of the major European powers. Now, in 1938, because of such an insignificant issue as Teshin, the Poles broke with all their friends in France, in England and in the USA, which had brought them back to a united national life and whose help they were soon to need so badly. We saw how now, while the reflection of the power of Germany was falling on them, they hastened to seize their share in the plunder and ruin of Czechoslovakia. At the moment of crisis, all doors were closed to the English and French ambassadors. They were not even allowed to see the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs. It must be considered a mystery and tragedy of European history that a people capable of any heroism, some of whose representatives are talented, valiant, and charming, constantly displays such huge shortcomings in almost all aspects of their public life. Glory in times of rebellion and sorrow; infamy and shame during periods of triumph. The bravest of the brave have too often been led by the foulest of the foul! And yet, there have always been two Polands: one of them fought for truth, and the other grovelled in meanness.

We have yet to tell of the failure of their military preparations and plans; about the arrogance and mistakes of their policies; about the terrible massacres and deprivations to which they doomed themselves with their madness."

Appetite, as you know, comes with eating. Before the Poles had time to celebrate the capture of the Cieszyn region, they had new plans:

December 28, 1938 In a conversation between the counselor of the German embassy in Poland, Rudolf von Schelia, and the newly appointed Polish envoy to Iran, J. Karsho-Sedlevsky, the latter states: “The political perspective for the European East is clear. In a few years, Germany will be at war with the Soviet Union, and Poland will support Germany, voluntarily or forcedly, in this war. For Poland, it is better to definitely take the side of Germany before the conflict, since Poland’s territorial interests are in the west and the political goals of Poland in the East, especially in the Ukraine, can only be secured through a previously reached Polish-German agreement.He, Karszo-Sedlewski, will subordinate his activities as the Polish envoy in Tehran to the implementation of this great Eastern concept, since it is necessary in the end finally convince and induce also the Persians and Afghans to play an active role in the future war against the Soviets."
December 1938. From the report of the 2nd department (intelligence department) of the main headquarters of the Polish Army: “The dismemberment of Russia lies at the core of Polish policy in the East... Therefore, our possible position will boil down to the following formula: who will take part in the division. Poland must not remain passive at this remarkable historical moment. The task is to prepare well in advance physically and spiritually... The main goal is the weakening and defeat of Russia."(see Z dziejow stosunkow polsko-radzieckich. Studia i materialy. T. III. Warszawa, 1968, str. 262, 287.)

January 26, 1939. In a conversation with German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, Polish Foreign Minister Jozef Beck, held in Warsaw, states: "Poland lays claim to Soviet Ukraine and access to the Black Sea."
March 4, 1939. The Polish command, after lengthy economic, political and operational studies, completed the development of a plan for the war against the USSR. "East" ("Vshud").(see Centralne Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnetrznych, R-16/1).

However, here the Poles were faced with another opportunity to once again act as a hyena and rob for free, hiding behind the back of a stronger neighbor, because she, Poland, was lured by the opportunity to rob a neighbor richer than the USSR:

March 17, 1939. Chamberlain made a sharp speech in Birmingham against Germany, in which he declared that England would make contact with other like-minded powers. This speech marked the beginning of a policy of encircling Germany with alliances with other states. Financial negotiations between England and Poland have begun; military negotiations with Poland in London; General Ironside pays a visit to Warsaw.

March 20, 1939. Hitler put forward a proposal to Poland: to agree to the inclusion of the city of Danzig in Germany and to the creation of an extraterritorial corridor that would connect Germany with East Prussia.

March 21, 1939. Ribbentrop, in a conversation with the Polish ambassador, again presented demands for Danzig (Gdansk), as well as the right to build an extraterritorial railway and highway that would connect Germany with East Prussia.

March 22, 1939. In Poland, the beginning of the first partial and hidden mobilization (five formations) was announced in order to provide cover for the mobilization and concentration of the main forces of the Polish army.

March 24, 1939. The Polish government submitted a proposal for an Anglo-Polish pact to the British government.

March 26, 1939. The Polish government issues a memorandum in which, according to Ribbentrop, "the German proposals for the return of Danzig and extraterritorial transport routes through the corridor were unceremoniously rejected." Ambassador Lipsky stated: “Any further pursuit of the goals of these German plans, and especially those related to the return of Danzig to the Reich, means war with Poland.” Ribbentrop again verbally repeated the German demands: the unambiguous return of Danzig, an extraterritorial connection with East Prussia, a 25-year non-aggression pact with a guarantee of borders, as well as cooperation on the Slovak question in the form of the neighboring states accepting the defense of this area.

March 31, 1939. British Prime Minister H. Chamberlain announced Anglo-French military guarantees for Poland in connection with the threat of aggression from Germany. As Churchill wrote on this occasion in his memoirs: “And now, when all these advantages and all this help have been lost and discarded, England, leading France, offers to guarantee the integrity of Poland - the same Poland that just six months ago With the greed of a hyena, she took part in the robbery and destruction of the Czechoslovak state."

And how did the Poles react to the desire of England and France to protect them from German aggression and the guarantees they received? They began to transform into a greedy hyena again! And now they were sharpening their teeth to snatch a piece from Germany. As the American researcher Henson Baldwin, who worked as the military editor of the New York Times during the war, noted in his book:
“They were proud and overconfident, living in the past. Many Polish soldiers, imbued with the military spirit of their people and their traditional hatred of the Germans, talked and dreamed of a “march on Berlin.” Their hopes are well reflected in the words of one of the songs:

...clad in steel and armor,
Led by Rydz-Smigly,
We will march to the Rhine..."

How did this madness end? On September 1, 1939, “Clad in steel and armor” and led by Rydz-Smigly began to march in the opposite direction, towards the border with Romania. And less than a month later, Poland disappeared from the geographical map for seven years, along with its ambitions and habits of a hyena. In 1945, she reappeared, paying for her madness with six million Poles' lives. The blood of six million Polish lives cooled the madness of the Polish government for almost 50 years. But nothing lasts forever, and again the cries about Greater Poland “from mozh to mozh” begin to be heard louder and louder, and the already familiar greedy grin of a hyena begins to appear in Polish politics.

Now is the time to remember what Poland was like at that time, for the sake of saving which from Hitler we had to join forces with England and France.

As soon as it was born, the revived Polish state started armed conflicts with all its neighbors, trying to expand its borders as much as possible.

Czechoslovakia was no exception, a territorial dispute with which flared up over the former Principality of Cieszyn.

That time nothing worked out for the Poles. On July 28, 1920, during the Red Army's attack on Warsaw, an agreement was signed in Paris according to which Poland ceded the Cieszyn region to Czechoslovakia in exchange for the latter's neutrality in the Polish-Soviet war.

Nevertheless, the Poles, in the words of the famous satirical writer Mikhail Zoshchenko, “harboured rudeness” and, when the Germans demanded the Sudetenland from Prague, they decided that the right opportunity had come to get their way. On January 14, 1938, Hitler received Polish Foreign Minister Jozef Beck.

“The Czech state in its current form cannot be preserved, because as a result of the disastrous policy of the Czechs in Central Europe, it represents an unsafe place - a communist hotbed”, - said the leader of the Third Reich. Of course, as stated in the official Polish report on the meeting, "Mr. Beck warmly supported the Fuhrer". This audience marked the beginning of Polish-German consultations regarding Czechoslovakia.

At the height of the Sudeten crisis, on September 21, 1938, Poland presented Czechoslovakia with an ultimatum to “return” the Cieszyn region to it. On September 27, a repeated demand followed. Anti-Czech hysteria was whipped up in the country. On behalf of the so-called “Union of Silesian Insurgents” in Warsaw, recruitment into the “Cieszyn Volunteer Corps” was launched completely openly. The formed detachments of “volunteers” were sent to the Czechoslovak border, where they staged armed provocations and sabotage.

So, on the night of September 25, in the town of Konské near Třinec, the Poles threw hand grenades and fired at houses in which Czechoslovak border guards were located, as a result of which two buildings burned down. After a two-hour battle, the attackers retreated into Polish territory. Similar clashes took place that night in a number of other places in the Cieszyn region. The next night, the Poles raided the Frištát railway station, fired at it and threw grenades at it.

On September 27, throughout the night, rifle and machine gun fire, grenade explosions, etc. were heard in almost all areas of the Cieszyn region. The bloodiest clashes, as reported by the Polish Telegraph Agency, were observed in the vicinity of Bohumin, Cieszyn and Jablunkov, in the towns of Bystrice, Konska and Skrzechen. Armed groups of “rebels” repeatedly attacked Czechoslovakian weapons depots, and Polish planes violated the Czechoslovakian border every day.

The Poles closely coordinated their actions with the Germans. Polish diplomats in London and Paris insisted on an equal approach to solving the Sudeten and Cieszyn problems, while the Polish and German military agreed on the line of demarcation of troops in the event of an invasion of Czechoslovakia.

At the same time, one could observe touching scenes of “combat brotherhood” between German fascists and Polish nationalists. Thus, according to a report from Prague on September 29, a gang of 20 people armed with automatic weapons attacked the Czechoslovak border post near Grgava. The attack was repulsed, the attackers fled to Poland, and one of them, being wounded, was captured. During interrogation, the captured bandit said that in their detachment there were many Germans living in Poland.

As you know, the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia, both against Germany and against Poland. In response, on September 8-11, the largest military maneuvers in the history of the revived Polish state were organized on the Polish-Soviet border, in which 5 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions, 1 motorized brigade, as well as aviation took part. As one would expect, the “reds” advancing from the east were completely defeated by the “blues”. The maneuvers ended with a grandiose 7-hour parade in Lutsk, which was personally received by the “supreme leader” Marshal Rydz-Smigly.

In turn, the Soviet side announced on September 23 that if Polish troops entered Czechoslovakia, the USSR would denounce the non-aggression pact it had concluded with Poland in 1932.

As mentioned above, on the night of September 29-30, 1938, the infamous Munich Agreement was concluded. In an effort to “pacify” Hitler at any cost, England and France cynically surrendered their ally Czechoslovakia to him. On the same day, September 30, Warsaw presented Prague with a new ultimatum, demanding immediate satisfaction of its claims. As a result, on October 1, Czechoslovakia ceded to Poland an area where 80 thousand Poles and 120 thousand Czechs lived. However, the main acquisition was the industrial potential of the captured territory. At the end of 1938, the enterprises located there produced almost 41% of the pig iron produced in Poland and almost 47% of the steel.

As Churchill wrote about this in his memoirs, Poland “with the greed of a hyena she took part in the robbery and destruction of the Czechoslovak state”. An equally flattering zoological comparison is given in his book by the previously quoted American researcher Baldwin: “Poland and Hungary, like vultures, tore off pieces of a dying divided state.”.

Today in Poland they are trying to forget this page of their history. Thus, the authors of the book “History of Poland from Ancient Times to the Present Day,” published in Warsaw in 1995, Alicja Dybkowska, Malgorzata Zaryn and Jan Zharyn managed not to mention their country’s participation in the partition of Czechoslovakia at all:

“The interests of Poland were indirectly jeopardized by the policy of concessions Western states Hitler. So, in 1935, he introduced universal conscription in Germany, thereby violating the Versailles agreements; in 1936, Hitler's troops occupied the Rhineland demilitarized zone, and in 1938 his army entered Austria. The next target of German expansion was Czechoslovakia.

Despite the protests of its government, in September 1938 in Munich, France, Great Britain and Italy signed a treaty with Germany giving the Third Reich the right to occupy the Czech Sudetenland, inhabited by a German minority. In the face of what was happening, it became clear to Polish diplomats that now it was the turn to violate the Versailles regulations on the Polish issue.”.

Of course, is it possible to be indignant at the participation of the USSR in the “fourth partition of Poland” if it becomes known that they themselves are in the dust? And Molotov’s phrase about Poland as an ugly child of the Treaty of Versailles, so shocking to the progressive public, turns out to be just a copy of Pilsudski’s earlier statement about "the artificially and monstrously created Czechoslovak Republic".

Well, then, in 1938, no one was going to be ashamed. On the contrary, the capture of the Cieszyn region was considered a national triumph. Józef Beck was awarded the Order of the White Eagle, although for such a “feat”, say, the Order of the Spotted Hyena would have been more suitable. In addition, the grateful Polish intelligentsia presented him with the titles of honorary doctor of the Warsaw and Lviv universities. Polish propaganda was choking with delight. Thus, on October 9, 1938, Gazeta Polska wrote: “...the road open to us to a sovereign, leading role in our part of Europe requires in the near future enormous efforts and the resolution of incredibly difficult tasks”.

The triumph was somewhat overshadowed only by the fact that Poland was not invited to join the four great powers that signed the Munich Agreement, although it very much counted on it.

This was the Poland of that time, which we, in the opinion of home-grown liberals, were obliged to save at any cost.

Give us room to fight!

As you know, the main stumbling block, because of which the negotiations in Moscow finally reached a dead end, was the issue of allowing Soviet troops through the territory of Poland and Romania. The fact is that at that time the USSR did not have a common border with Germany. Therefore, it was not clear how, in the event of the outbreak of war, we would be able to enter into combat contact with the German army.

At a meeting of military delegations on August 14, 1939, Voroshilov asked a specific question about this: “In general, the outline is clear, but the position of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union is not entirely clear. It is not clear where they are located geographically and how they physically take part in the common struggle.".

To which General Dumenk, unfolding a map of the USSR and showing the area of ​​the western border, said: “This is a front that the Germans must not cross under any circumstances. And this is the front on which the Soviet Armed Forces should be based.".

This answer did not suit the Soviet side at all. As Voroshilov rightly noted, we were going to defend our borders in any case, regardless of any agreements.

In order for the Red Army to take part in hostilities from the very first days of the war, and not passively wait for Germany to crush Poland and reach the borders of the Soviet Union, our troops had to pass through Polish territory. At the same time, the zones of their passage were strictly limited: the Vilna region (the so-called Vilna corridor) and Galicia.

As the head of the French delegation, General Doumenc, emphasized in a telegram to the French War Ministry dated August 15, 1939: “I note the great importance, from the point of view of eliminating the fears of the Poles, of the fact that the Russians very strictly limit the entry zones[Soviet troops], taking an exclusively strategic point of view".

However, the arrogant Poles did not want to hear about it. As the German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain, Theodor Cordt, reported in a telegram to the German Foreign Ministry dated April 18, 1939:

“The Polish Embassy Counselor, whom I met today at a public event, said that both Poland and Romania have consistently refused to accept any offer of assistance from Soviet Russia. Germany, the adviser said, can be sure that Poland will never allow a single soldier of Soviet Russia, be it a member of the ground forces or the air force, to enter its territory.

This puts an end to all speculation in which it was claimed that airfields would be provided as a base for Soviet Russia's air operations against Germany. The same applies to Romania. According to Mr. Yazhdrzewski, it is well known that the aviation of Soviet Russia does not have a sufficient range to attack Germany from bases located on the territory of Soviet Russia. Poland thereby again proves that it is a European barrier against Bolshevism.”

Attempts by England and France to achieve a change in Poland's position led nowhere. As Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly stated on the evening of August 19: “Regardless of the consequences, not a single inch of Polish territory will ever be allowed to be occupied by Russian troops.”.

That same evening, Polish Foreign Minister Jozef Beck informed the French Ambassador in Warsaw, Léon Noel:

“For us this is a fundamental issue: we do not have a military treaty with the USSR; we don't want to have it; I, however, told this to Potemkin. We will not allow the use of part of our territory by foreign troops to be discussed in any form.”.

But perhaps, by setting the passage of our troops through Polish territory as a mandatory condition, we simply wanted to disrupt the agreement? And in fact this requirement was unimportant?

Let’s imagine that the Moscow negotiations ended in success and an agreement on mutual assistance between England, France and the USSR was nevertheless concluded. In this case, after the outbreak of World War 2, three scenarios were possible:

1. Germany delivers the main blow on the Western Front to England and France.

2. The main blow is directed against Poland and, possibly, Romania.

3. The main blow is delivered directly to the territory of the USSR through Finland, Estonia and Latvia.

These three options were outlined in the speech of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, B. M. Shaposhnikov, at a meeting of three delegations on August 15.

Let's assume that Germany's first blow is delivered on the Western Front. With Poland's permission to use its territory, the Soviet Union would be ready to immediately enter the war. Otherwise, we will not be able to help. All that remains is to watch as Hitler crushes France. Let us remember the events of 1914. If, immediately after the outbreak of World War I, the Russian army had not launched an offensive in East Prussia, forcing the German command to transfer two corps and a cavalry division from the Western Front,
the Germans would have had a very good chance of defeating the French army and thereby winning the war.

Let us now consider the second option - a German attack on Poland. With permission, our troops enter Polish territory and, together with the Polish army, repel the German attack. Otherwise, we will have to wait until Germany defeats Poland and comes directly to our borders. At the same time, as Voroshilov rightly noted:

“I do not dispute the very opinion that Poland and Romania, if they do not ask for help from the USSR, could very quickly become provinces of aggressive Germany.

I must, however, note here [that] our meeting is a meeting of the military missions of three great states and the people representing the Armed Forces of these states should know the following: it is not in our interests, nor in the interests of the Armed Forces of Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union, that additional Armed Forces the forces of Poland and Romania would have been destroyed.

But if they, Poland and Romania, do not promptly ask for help from the Soviet Union, then, according to the admiral’s concept, the Armed Forces of Poland and Romania will be destroyed.”

But besides the use of the Polish Armed Forces, there is another important argument that is not spoken out loud. It is better to fight on foreign territory. If we are not given such an opportunity, we will have to take the battle on our own borders, and on the borders of 1939.

Finally, the third option, the least likely, but at the same time the most unpleasant for the USSR, is if the Germans approach us through the Baltic states and Finland. However, such a development of events cannot be called completely impossible. Both in the Baltic states, and even more so in Finland, pro-German sentiments were very strong. So these countries could well not only let German troops pass through their territory, but also take part in the campaign against the Soviet Union themselves.

In this case, the Poles will definitely not fight, since they do not have any obligations to the USSR. You are also unlikely to get help from England and France. Thus, we are left alone with Germany. If, in response to a German attack, the Red Army strikes Germany through Polish territory, there is no way for Warsaw to avoid participating in the war.

And one can only agree with the opinion of Winston Churchill: “Marshal Voroshilov’s demand, according to which the Russian armies, if they were allies of Poland, would have to occupy Vilnius and Lvov, was a completely expedient military demand.”.

To the above, it should be added that Poland not only did not want Soviet help, but until the last moment continued to plot dirty tricks against our country.

Thus, in the report of the 2nd (intelligence) department of the General Staff of the Polish Army, dated December 1938, it was emphasized: “The dismemberment of Russia lies at the heart of Polish policy in the East... Therefore, our possible position will be reduced to the following formula: who will take part in the division. Poland must not remain passive at this remarkable historical moment. The task is to prepare well in advance physically and spiritually... The main goal is to weaken and defeat Russia.”.

And here is an excerpt from a conversation between the adviser of the German embassy in Poland, Rudolf von Schelia, and the newly appointed Polish envoy to Iran, J. Karsho-Sedlevsky, that took place on December 28, 1938:

“The political outlook for the European East is clear. In a few years, Germany will be at war with the Soviet Union, and Poland will support Germany, voluntarily or forcedly, in this war. For Poland, it is better to definitely take the side of Germany before the conflict, since the territorial interests of Poland in the West and the political goals of Poland in the East, especially in Ukraine, can only be ensured through a previously reached Polish-German agreement.

He, Karsho-Sedlewski, would subordinate his activities as the Polish envoy in Tehran to the implementation of this great Eastern concept, since it was necessary in the end to convince and encourage also the Persians and Afghans to play an active role in the future war against the Soviets. He will devote his activities to this task in the coming years in Tehran."

From a recording of a conversation between German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and Polish Foreign Minister Jozef Beck, which took place on January 26, 1939 in Warsaw: “Mr. Beck did not hide the fact that Poland lays claim to Soviet Ukraine and access to the Black Sea”.

From books by I. Pykhalov “The Great Slandered War”. Links are there too.

"Hyena of Eastern Europe -

This is exactly how British Prime Minister Winston Churchill described Poland.

"Great powers always
behaved like bandits
and the little ones are like prostitutes.”
Stanley Kubrick, American film director

The Ukrainian political and cultural elite is increasingly becoming infected with the “menshovartosti” virus, so recently it has begun to choose friends and strategic partners with the same sick “national callus.” And for some reason all with long-standing historical territorial and other claims to Ukraine - Poland, Romania.

The Munich agreement and the appetites of Poland

Today, nationalists in Poland are trying to reconstruct the history of World War II in the subjunctive mood. Thus, on September 28, 2005, an interview with Professor Pawel Wieczorkiewicz appeared in the official newspaper Rzeczpospolita, which shocked many. In it, the professor regretted the missed opportunities for European civilization, which, in his opinion, would have happened in the event of a joint campaign against Moscow by the German and Polish armies. " We could find a place on the Reich side almost the same as Italy, and certainly better than Hungary or Romania. As a result, we would be in Moscow, where Adolf Hitler, together with Rydz-Smigly, would host the parade of the victorious Polish-German troops. A sad association, of course, is the Holocaust. However, if you think about it carefully, you can come to the conclusion that a quick German victory could mean that it would not have happened at all, since the Holocaust was largely a consequence of German military defeats " That is, the Soviet Union is to blame for the Holocaust! Instead of handing over the keys to Moscow to Germany, “where Adolf Hitler, together with Rydz-Smigly, would have hosted a parade of victorious Polish-German troops,” the Red Army defeated the Germans, which caused a natural reaction, in the opinion of the Polish “Young Europeans,” - the Holocaust.

Forgetting about their own national interests, some Ukrainian historians echo them. Thus, Stanislav Kulchytsky believes that “the petition of the People’s Assembly for the reunification of Western Ukraine with the Ukrainian SSR, which was referred to as an “expression of the people’s will,” cannot justify the conquest of half the territory of the Polish state by the Soviet Union... The only thing that matters is what the USSR did in in collusion with the German Nazis, an unprovoked armed attack on a country with which it maintained normal diplomatic relations,” and therefore “it is impossible to associate reunification with the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact” (ZN, No. 2 (377), 19 - 25.01.02). I would just like to remind you that such a position could cost Ukraine dearly if Poland, guided by such statements, makes claims to Galicia and Western Volyn.

It is worth reminding such researchers that a correct assessment of the past is impossible without a historical context, without taking into account the events that occurred. Therefore, it is worth remembering the causes of the Second World War - the Munich Agreement. And at the same time, understand the role of Poland.

In the official publication of the US State Department “War and Peace. Foreign Policy of the United States" it was noted that "the entire decade (1931-1941) passed under the sign of the steady development of the policy of striving for world domination on the part of Japan, Germany and Italy." Western democracies, under the pretext of saving the world from the communist threat, pursued a policy of “pacification” of Germany. Its apotheosis was the Munich Agreement.

What was Poland like at that time? After the Treaty of Versailles, Piłsudski's Poland started armed conflicts with all its neighbors, trying to expand its borders as much as possible. Czechoslovakia was no exception, a territorial dispute with which flared up over the former Principality of Cieszyn. Then nothing worked out for the Poles. On July 28, 1920, during the Red Army's attack on Warsaw, an agreement was signed in Paris according to which Poland ceded the Cieszyn region to Czechoslovakia in exchange for the latter's neutrality in the Polish-Soviet war. But the Poles did not forget about it, and when the Germans demanded the Sudetenland from Prague, they decided that the time had come to achieve their goal. On January 14, 1938, Hitler received Polish Foreign Minister Jozef Beck. The audience marked the beginning of Polish-German consultations regarding Czechoslovakia. At the height of the Sudeten crisis, on September 21, 1938, Poland presented Czechoslovakia with an ultimatum to “return” the Cieszyn region to it. On September 27, a repeated demand followed. Anti-Czech hysteria was whipped up in the country. On behalf of the so-called “Union of Silesian Insurgents”, recruitment into the “Cieszyn Volunteer Corps” began in Warsaw. Detachments of “volunteers” were formed and headed to the Czechoslovak border, where they carried out armed provocations and sabotage. The Poles coordinated their actions with the Germans. Polish diplomats in London and Paris insisted on an equal approach to solving the Sudeten and Cieszyn problems, while the Polish and German military agreed on the line of demarcation of troops in the event of an invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet Union then expressed its readiness to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia. In response, on September 8-11, the largest military maneuvers in the history of the revived Polish state were organized on the Polish-Soviet border, in which 5 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions, 1 motorized brigade, as well as aviation took part. According to the “legend,” as one would expect, the “reds” advancing from the east were completely defeated by the “blues.” The maneuvers ended with a grandiose seven-hour parade in Lutsk, which was personally hosted by the “supreme leader” Marshal Rydz-Smigly. In turn, the Soviet Union announced on September 23 that if Polish troops entered Czechoslovakia, the USSR would denounce the non-aggression pact it concluded with Poland in 1932.

On the night of September 29-30, 1938, the infamous Munich Agreement was concluded. In an effort to “pacify” Hitler at any cost, England and France surrendered their ally, Czechoslovakia, to him. On the same day, September 30, Warsaw presented Prague with a new ultimatum, demanding immediate satisfaction of its demands. As a result, on October 1, Czechoslovakia ceded to Poland an area where 80 thousand Poles and 120 thousand Czechs lived. However, the main acquisition of the Poles was the industrial potential of the captured territory. At the end of 1938, the enterprises located there produced almost 41% of the pig iron produced in Poland and almost 47% of the steel. As Churchill wrote about this in his memoirs, Poland “with the greed of a hyena took part in the plunder and destruction of the Czechoslovak state.” The capture of the Cieszyn region was considered a national triumph for Poland. Józef Beck was awarded the Order of the White Eagle, the grateful Polish intelligentsia presented him with the title of honorary doctor of the Warsaw and Lviv universities, and the propaganda editorials of Polish newspapers were very reminiscent of the articles of today's Polish pro-government publications about the role of modern Poland in Eastern Europe in general and in the fate of Ukraine in particular. Thus, on October 9, 1938, Gazeta Polska wrote: “... the road open to us to a sovereign, leading role in our part of Europe requires in the near future enormous efforts and the resolution of incredibly difficult tasks.”

On the eve of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

The Munich Agreement left the USSR without allies. The Franco-Soviet Pact, the cornerstone of collective security in Europe, was buried. The Czech Sudetes became part of Nazi Germany. And on March 15, 1939, Czechoslovakia ceased to exist as an independent state.

When Hitler's troops marched on Czechoslovakia, Stalin warned the British and French "appeasers" that anti-Soviet policies would bring misfortune upon themselves. On March 10, 1939, at the XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, he said that the undeclared war that the Axis powers are waging in Europe and Asia under the guise of the Anti-Comintern Pact is directed not only against Soviet Russia, but also against England, France and the United States: “ The war is waged by aggressor states, in every possible way infringing on the interests of non-aggressive states, primarily England, France, and the United States, and the latter retreat back and retreat, giving concession after concession to the aggressors.

Despite the duplicitous policies of Western countries, the Soviet Union continued negotiations to create a coalition against the Axis powers. Thus, on August 14-15, 1939, a meeting of the delegations of the USSR, France and Great Britain was held in Moscow. The stumbling block, as always, was the position of Poland, which did not want help from the Soviet Union. Moreover, she expected to “grow” more lands in the upcoming German-Soviet conflict. Here is an excerpt from what took place on December 28, 1938. conversations between the counselor of the German Embassy in Poland, Rudolf von Schelia, and the newly appointed Polish envoy to Iran, J. Karsho-Sedlevsky: “The political perspective for the European East is clear.

In a few years, Germany will be at war with the Soviet Union, and Poland will support Germany (voluntarily or forced) in this war. It is better for Poland before the conflict to definitely take the side of Germany, since the territorial interests of Poland in the West and the political goals of Poland in the East, especially in Ukraine, can only be ensured through a previously reached Polish-German agreement.”

As a result, the Soviet Union had no choice but to conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany. Joseph Davis former ambassador in the USSR, described the dilemma facing the Soviet Union in his letter written on July 18, 1941 to Harry Hopkins, adviser to President Roosevelt: “All my connections and observations since 1936 allow me to say that, except for the President of the United States, no one The government, more clearly than the Soviet government, did not see a threat from Hitler to the cause of peace, did not see the need for collective security and alliances between non-aggressive states.

The Soviet government was ready to stand up for Czechoslovakia; even before Munich, it annulled the non-aggression pact with Poland in order to open the way for its troops through Polish territory if it was necessary to help Czechoslovakia in fulfillment of its obligations under the treaty. Even after Munich in the spring of 1939, the Soviet government agreed to unite with England and France if Germany attacked Poland and Romania, but demanded that an international conference of non-aggressive states be convened in order to objectively determine the capabilities of each of them and notify Hitler of the organization of a united response...

This proposal was rejected by Chamberlain due to the fact that Poland and Romania objected to Russian participation... Throughout the spring of 1939, the Soviets sought a clear and definite agreement that would provide unity of action and coordination of military plans designed to stop Hitler. England... refused to give Russia in relation to the Baltic states the same guarantees of protecting their neutrality that Russia gave to France and England in the event of an attack on Belgium or Holland.

The Soviets were finally and with good reason convinced that a direct, effective and practicable agreement with France and England was impossible. They had only one thing left: to conclude a non-aggression pact with Hitler.”

The West's reaction to the non-aggression pact between Germany and the USSR

On August 23, 1939, a non-aggression pact was signed between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. September 1, 1939 Mechanized units of the Nazi army invaded Poland. Two days later, England and France declared war on Germany. Less than two weeks had passed since the Polish state, which was blockaded with Nazism, refused Soviet help, opposed the policy of collective security, collapsed, and the Nazis scattered the pathetic remnants of their former ally on their way. On September 17, as the Polish government fled the country in panic, the Red Army crossed Poland's pre-war eastern border and occupied the territory that Poland had annexed from the USSR in 1920.

Commenting on this event, Winston Churchill, in a radio speech on October 1, 1939, stated: “It is absolutely obvious that the Russian armies must stand on this line in order to ensure Russia’s security from the Nazi threat. An Eastern Front has been created, on which Nazi Germany will not dare to attack. When Herr von Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow last week by special invitation, he had to face and come to terms with the fact that the Nazi plans in the Baltics and Ukraine were not destined to come true.”

And the American journalist William Shirer wrote: “If Chamberlain acted honestly and nobly, appeasing Hitler and giving him Czechoslovakia in 1938, then why did Stalin behave dishonestly and ignoblely, appeasing Hitler a year later with Poland, which still refused Soviet help?”

Polish émigré government and Anders' army

The Polish emigrant government was created on September 30, 1939 in Angers (France). It consisted mainly of political figures who, in the pre-war years, actively colluded with Hitler, intending with his help to create “Greater Poland” at the expense of the territories of neighboring states. In June 1940 it moved to England. On July 30, 1941, the USSR concluded a mutual assistance agreement with the emigrant Polish government, according to which Polish military units were created on the territory of the Soviet Union. In connection with the anti-Soviet activities of the Polish government, on April 25, 1943, the USSR government broke off relations with it.

From the Cambridge Five, the Soviet leadership received information about the British plans to bring to power in post-war Poland political figures opposed to the Soviet Union and to recreate the pre-war cordon sanitaire on the USSR border.

On December 23, 1943, intelligence provided the country's leadership with a secret report from the Minister of the Polish Exile Government in London and the Chairman of the Polish Commission for Post-War Reconstruction Seyda, sent to the President of Czechoslovakia Benes as an official document of the Polish government on post-war settlement issues. It was entitled “Poland and Germany and the Post-War Reconstruction of Europe.” Its meaning boiled down to the following: Germany should be occupied in the west by England and the USA, in the east by Poland and Czechoslovakia. Poland should receive land along the Oder and Neisse. The border with the Soviet Union should be restored according to the 1921 treaty. Two federations should be created in the east of Germany - in Central and South-Eastern Europe, consisting of Poland, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania, and in the Balkans - within Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and possibly Turkey. The main goal of uniting in a federation is to exclude any influence of the Soviet Union on them.

It was important for the Soviet leadership to know the attitude of the allies to the plans of the Polish émigré government. Although Churchill agreed with him, he understood the unreality of the Poles’ plans. Roosevelt called them “harmful and stupid.” He spoke in favor of establishing the Polish-Soviet border along the “Curzon Line”. He also condemned plans to create blocs and federations in Europe.

At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin discussed the question of the fate of Poland and agreed that the Warsaw government should be "reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic figures from Poland and Poles from abroad" and that it will then be recognized as the country's legitimate interim government.

Polish emigrants in London greeted the Yalta decision with hostility, declaring that the Allies had “betrayed Poland.” They defended their claims to power in Poland not so much by political as by forceful methods. On the basis of the Home Army (AK), after the liberation of Poland by Soviet troops, the sabotage and terrorist organization “Liberty and Freedom” was organized, which operated in Poland until 1947.

Another structure that the Polish exile government relied on was the army of General Anders. It was formed on Soviet soil by agreement between the Soviet and Polish authorities in 1941 in order to fight against the Germans together with the Red Army. To train and equip it in preparation for war with Germany, the Soviet government provided Poland with an interest-free loan of 300 million rubles and created all the conditions for conducting recruitment and camp exercises.

But the Poles were in no hurry to fight. From the report of Lieutenant Colonel Berling, later the head of the armed forces of the Warsaw government, it turned out that in 1941, shortly after the first Polish units were formed on Soviet territory, General Anders told his officers: “As soon as the Red Army yields under the onslaught of the Germans, happens in a few months, we will be able to break through the Caspian Sea to Iran. Since we will be the only armed force in this territory, we will be free to do whatever we please.”

According to Lieutenant Colonel Berling, Anders and his officers “did everything to delay the period of training and arming their divisions” so that they would not have to act against Germany, terrorized Polish officers and soldiers who wanted to accept the help of the Soviet government and take up arms go against the invaders of your homeland. Their names were entered in a special index called “card file B” as Soviet sympathizers.

The so-called “Two”, the intelligence department of Anders’ army, collected information about Soviet military factories, state farms, railways, field warehouses, and the location of Red Army troops. Therefore, in August 1942, Anders' army and family members of military personnel were evacuated to Iran, under the auspices of the British.

On March 13, 1944, Australian journalist James Aldridge, bypassing military censorship, sent correspondence to the New York Times regarding the methods of the leaders of the Polish emigrant army in Iran. Aldridge reported that he had been trying for more than a year to make public the facts about the behavior of Polish emigrants, but Union censorship prevented him from doing so. One of the censors told Aldridge: “I know this is all true, but what can I do? After all, we recognized the Polish government.”

Here are some of the facts that Aldridge cited: “In the Polish camp there was a division into castes. The lower a person's position, the worse the conditions in which he had to live. Jews were separated into a special ghetto. The management of the camp was carried out on a totalitarian basis... Reactionary groups waged a ceaseless campaign against Soviet Russia... When more than three hundred Jewish children were to be taken to Palestine, the Polish elite, among whom anti-Semitism flourished, put pressure on the Iranian authorities so that the Jewish children were denied transit... I heard from many Americans that they would willingly tell the whole truth about the Poles, but that this would lead to nothing, since the Poles have a strong “hand” in Washington behind the scenes...”

When the war was nearing its end, and the territory of Poland was largely liberated by Soviet troops, the Polish government in exile began to build up the capacity of its security forces, as well as develop a spy network in the Soviet rear. Throughout the autumn-winter of 1944 and the spring months of 1945, while the Red Army launched its offensive, striving for the final defeat of the German military machine on the Eastern Front, the Home Army, under the leadership of General Okulicki, the former chief of staff of the Anders army, was intensively engaged in terrorist acts, sabotage, espionage and armed raids behind Soviet lines.

Here are excerpts from the London Polish government directive No. 7201-1-777 dated November 11, 1944, addressed to General Okulitsky: “Since knowledge of the military intentions and capabilities ... of the Soviets in the east is of fundamental importance for anticipating and planning further developments, To Poland you must... transmit intelligence reports, according to the instructions of the intelligence department of the headquarters.” Further, the directive requested detailed information about Soviet military units, transport, fortifications, airfields, weapons, data on the military industry, etc.

On March 22, 1945, General Okulicki expressed the cherished aspirations of his London superiors in a secret directive to Colonel “Slavbor”, commander of the western district of the Home Army. Okulitsky’s emergency directive read: “If the USSR wins over Germany, this will threaten not only the interests of England in Europe, but all of Europe will be in fear... Taking into account their interests in Europe, the British will have to begin mobilizing the forces of Europe against the USSR. It is clear that we will be in the forefront of this European anti-Soviet bloc; and it is also impossible to imagine this bloc without the participation of Germany, which will be controlled by the British.”

These plans and hopes of the Polish emigrants turned out to be short-lived. At the beginning of 1945, Soviet military intelligence arrested Polish spies operating behind Soviet lines. By the summer of 1945, sixteen of them, including General Okulitsky, appeared before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR and received various prison terms.

Based on the above, I would like to remind our powers that be, who go out of their way to seem like “podpunks” next to the Polish gentry, the characteristic given to the Poles by the wise Churchill: “The heroic character traits of the Polish people should not force us to turn a blind eye to their recklessness and ingratitude, which over the course of a number of centuries caused him immeasurable suffering... It must be considered a mystery and tragedy of European history that a people capable of any heroism, some of whose representatives are talented, valiant, charming, constantly displays such shortcomings in almost all aspects of their public life. Glory in times of rebellion and sorrow; infamy and shame during periods of triumph. The bravest of the brave have too often been led by the foulest of the foul! And yet there have always been two Polands: one fought for the truth, and the other grovelled in meanness” (Winston Churchill. The Second World War. Book 1. M., 1991).

And if, according to the plans of the American Pole Zbigniew Brzezinski, it is impossible to recreate the Soviet Union without Ukraine, we should not forget the lessons of history and remember that in the same way, without the western lands of Ukraine, the construction of the IV Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is impossible."