Map from the airfield to the village of Seshcha. Map from the airfield to the village of Seshcha Military airfield of Seshcha
Story
Construction of an airfield for heavy aviation began in 1931 (the construction manager was August Dussier, a Latvian Bolshevik with pre-revolutionary experience).
Since 1932, the 9th heavy bomber brigade was based here (commander Tsiemgal (Tsemgal) Albert Yanovich, commissar Losev Mendel Abramovich (since 1935), chief of staff Shkurin Yakov Stepanovich), by 1936 equipped with the largest pre-war bombers TB-3 R. The entire brigade was called the “9th Brigade named after the 10th All-Union Congress of the Lenin Komsomol”, the five squadrons included in it were named after Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Kirov, Postyshev and Kosarev.
The airfield has a unique shape: the taxiways are built in a circle with a diameter of about 2000 m. As of the summer of 1943, the airfield had two concrete runways with a length of 1670 and 820 m.
During the years of fascist occupation during the Great Patriotic War, an international underground operated at the Seshchinsky airfield, about whose heroes a four-part feature film “Calling Fire on Ourselves” was shot in 1964. Thanks to the activities of the underground, the airfield was destroyed by a bomb attack Soviet aviation in the fall of 1943.
The 566th Solnechnogorsk Red Banner Order of Kutuzov III degree military transport aviation regiment is based at the airfield. The regiment is armed with Il-76 and An-124 aircraft. Also based at the airfield is the OJSC State Airlines “224 Flight Detachment”, which belongs to the Ministry of Defense.
An-124-100 aircraft from Seshcha airfield take part in the aerial part of the Parade on Red Square on May 9 of each year.
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An excerpt characterizing Seshcha (airfield)
It seemed to me that something was simply preventing us from finding her on this “floor” and I suggested that Stella look “higher”. We slipped mentally onto Mental... and immediately saw her... She really was amazingly beautiful - light and pure, like a stream. And long golden hair scattered over her shoulders like a golden cloak... I have never seen such long and such beautiful hair! The girl was deeply thoughtful and sad, like many on the “floors”, who had lost their love, their relatives, or simply because they were alone...- Hello, Michelle! – without wasting time, Stella immediately said. - And we have prepared a gift for you!
The woman smiled in surprise and asked tenderly:
-Who are you, girls?
But without answering her, Stella mentally called Arno...
I won’t be able to tell them what this meeting brought them... And there’s no need for that. Such happiness cannot be put into words - they will fade... It just wasn’t there, probably, at that moment happier people all over the world, and on all “floors”!.. And we sincerely rejoiced with them, not forgetting those to whom they owed their happiness... I think both little Maria and our kind Luminary would be very happy , seeing them now, and knowing that it was not in vain that they gave their lives for them...
Stella suddenly became alarmed and disappeared somewhere. I followed her too, since we had nothing else to do here...
-Where did you all disappear to? – Maya greeted us with a question, surprised, but very calmly. “We already thought you had left us for good.” And where is our new friend?.. Has he really disappeared too?.. We thought he would take us with him...
A problem arose... Where to put these unfortunate kids now - I didn’t have the slightest idea. Stella looked at me, thinking the same thing, and desperately trying to find some way out.
- I came up with it! – already just like the “old” Stella, she happily clapped her hands. “We will make them a joyful world in which they will exist.” And then, lo and behold, they will meet someone... Or someone good will take them.
“Don’t you think we should introduce them to someone here?” – I asked, trying to “more reliably” accommodate lonely kids.
“No, I don’t think so,” the friend answered very seriously. – Think for yourself, not all dead babies receive this... And not all of them here probably have time to take care of them. So it's fair to the others if we just make them a really nice home here while they find someone. After all, it’s easier for the three of them. And others are alone... I was alone too, I remember...
And suddenly, apparently remembering that terrible time, she became confused and sad... and somehow unprotected. Wanting to immediately bring her back, I mentally brought down a waterfall of incredible fantastic flowers on her...
- Oh! – Stella laughed like a bell. - Well, what are you talking about!.. Stop it!
: UHVD– Int. code: УВД
airfield on the map of Bryansk region
| Number | Dimensions (m) | Coating |
|---|---|---|
| 08/26 | 3100×56 | concrete |
Story
Construction of an airfield for heavy aviation began in 1931 (the construction manager was August Dussier, a Latvian Bolshevik with pre-revolutionary experience).
Since 1932, the 9th Heavy Bomber Brigade was based here (commander Tsiemgal (Tsemgal) Albert Yanovich, Commissioner Losev Mendel Abramovich (since 1935), chief of staff Shkurin Yakov Stepanovich), as well as the 130th Bomber Aviation Regiment, by 1936 staffed by the largest pre-war bombers TB-3 R. The entire brigade was called the “9th Brigade named after the 10th All-Union Congress of the Lenin Komsomol”, the five squadrons included in it bore the names of Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Kirov, Postyshev and Kosarev.
The airfield has a unique shape: the taxiways are built in a circle with a diameter of about 2000 m. As of the summer of 1943, the airfield had two concrete runways with a length of 1670 and 820 m.
During the years of fascist occupation during the Great Patriotic War, an international underground operated at the Seshchinsky airfield, about whose heroes a four-part feature film “Calling Fire on Ourselves” was shot in 1964. Thanks to the activities of the underground, the airfield was destroyed by a bomb attack by Soviet aviation in the fall of 1943.
An-124-100 aircraft from Seshcha airfield take part in the aerial part of the Parade on Red Square on May 9 of each year.
Incidents
- December 21, 1976 An-22 plane crash, Seshcha airfield, KK Major V. A. Efremov. While performing a test flight to measure the forces in the control wiring elements with maximum deflection of the rudders, the plane entered a deep slide. Trying not to lose altitude, the commander took the helm. This led to the aircraft reaching critical angles of attack and flipping over. The plane fell from a height of approximately 6000 m on its “back”, breaking up in the air. The crew died. This was the next stage of military testing without the involvement of test pilots. The crew was selected as a team. No one could have predicted how the plane would behave. Subsequently, the angle of deflection of the rudders was limited and pilots were advised not to use rudders at all during turns; the Antey had enough ailerons.
The headquarters of the division with an aviation regiment was located here.
Now the military transport aviation Solnechnogorsk Red Banner Order of Kutuzov 3rd class regiment is stationed in the village of Seshcha. Its formation took place in September 1941 in Voronezh on the basis of Il-2 aircraft. On November 27, 1941, the assault aviation regiment began its first combat missions, striking the enemy near Moscow, and went through a glorious battle path, participating in operations near Kursk, Orel, in the Bryansk region, near Leningrad and in East Prussia.
For the valor and courage shown in battles, the regiment was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and Kutuzov, 3rd degree. The regiment's aviators showed massive heroism in defeating the fascist invaders near Moscow, for which the 566th Assault Regiment was given its own name "Solnechnogorsk".
During the war years, 12 pilots were awarded the high title of “Hero of the Soviet Union”, pilot V. I. Mykhlik - twice.
In the post-war period, the aviation regiment underwent reformation changes and adopted transport aircraft.
The regiment's personnel mastered such types of aircraft as Li-2, Tu-4, An-12, An-22 and An-124 "Ruslan".
During peacetime, the regiment carried out government tasks to provide assistance to the population after the consequences of earthquakes in Ashgabat /1948/, Armenia /1988/, and delivered humanitarian aid to countries in Africa, the Middle East and Indonesia.
In February 1987, the regiment received the first AN-124 “Ruslan” aircraft and began mastering this very big plane who is the pride Russian aviation. Its length is 69 meters, height -21 meters, wingspan -73.3 meters, load capacity - 120 tons. In 1991, for military valor demonstrated during the performance of tasks of the Soviet Government and the USSR Minister of Defense, the Solnechnogorsk Regiment was awarded the pennant of the Minister of Defense.
Until 1996, the regiment took part in providing assistance in military conflicts, including under the auspices of the UN. IN last years carries out tasks to eliminate hotbeds of international terrorism in the North Caucasus region and other “hot spots”. Currently, the personnel of the military transport regiment are improving and enhancing their flying skills, taking part in air parades and exercises conducted by the Ministry of Defense. Foreign companies and international organizations give preference to these aircraft.
Residents of the garrison sacredly honor the memory of the pilots who died in the performance of their military duty. At the Seshchinskoe cemetery there are monuments to four fallen crews / in 1956, 1972, 1976, 1997/
The names of the crew members and their commanders became a symbol of fearlessness and military valor for the officers of the regiment.
A small military town is an integral part of the village of Seshcha. The head of the garrison from 1998 to 2007 was Colonel Alexander Ivanovich Vinokurov. Currently, the head of the garrison is Colonel Nikolai Dmitrievich Belov. According to the map, the distance from the Aerodrome to the village of Seshcha is 2342 km. Our service allows you to work independently with the map above. Using this map, you can accurately build the route you need from the Aerodrome to the village of Seshcha, as well as find out the distance between these points. To decide how to get from the Aerodrome to the village of Seshcha, you should simply enter the point of departure and destination. After this, the system itself will find the shortest distance and present a possible travel plan (It is determined by constructing a route along roads). The road from the Aerodrome to the village of Sescha is shown on the plan with a thick line. The map will show settlements, which you will meet on your way when driving along the Aerodrom - Seshcha village highway. The route proposed on the schematic map from the Aerodrome to the village of Seshcha is only one of the possible ones. You can make your way through any transit point you choose. To get acquainted with detailed information about settlements, forks, bridges, railway tracks and other objects on your way, you can use various functions, such as zooming in/out, switching layers (satellite, diagram, hybrid, folk map). Using the "ruler" function, you can determine the straight line distance to any point on the map. Some motorists prefer to use maps printed on paper. To print the route map, click on the "Print route" button.
For the 639th Attack Aviation Regiment, September 13, 1942 became one of the decisive dates in its history. After the raid on the fascist Seshcha airfield, the regiment practically ceased to exist as a combat unit.
In November 1943, the 639th Shap transferred the remaining pilots and equipment to other regiments and began forming anew.
In a unique study by Alexander Sadkov, it is given detailed description this flight and an analysis of the reasons that led to such a tragic result.
Operational reports from the headquarters of the 224th Attack Air Division:611 Shap - 6 sorties, in the period from 16.58 to 19.15, destroyed aircraft on Seshche. Did not return: Oleinichenko (plane No. 201), Denezhkin (plane No. 3021) - on an emergency landing, Ivanov (plane No. 4021), Kalyunin (plane No. 9005).
639 Shap - 8 sorties, in the period from 16.58 to 19.15, destroyed aircraft on Seshche. Did not return: Major Krasotkin (plane No. 5306), senior lieutenant Gustov (plane No. 30765), sergeants Yurchenko (plane No. 2613), Filippov (plane No. 9108), Belov (plane No. 30704) and Rappoport (plane No. 3203).
The combat mission to attack the Seshcha airfield was not completed.
Oleinichenko returned (he was on emergency duty), Kalyunin, Denezhkin (he was on emergency duty at the Mukovnino airfield, Medyn), Krasotkin (he was on emergency duty at the Mukovnino airfield, landed due to lack of fuel). Gustov was on forced duty in Spas-Zagorye.
According to the reports of the returning pilots, the task was completed. On September 13, on the return route, the attack aircraft were attacked by 2 groups of Me-109s (4 and 7 aircraft).
Yurchenko and Belov returned and were forced to stay at the Slyadnevo airfield.
Report No. 81 dated September 16, 1942On September 13, Yurchenko, upon returning from a combat mission, was attacked by 2 Me-109s. I went out to the Yukhnov area, where I regained my bearings, and flew along the Warsaw Highway, looking for my airfield. Having used up the fuel, I sat down near the village of Pavlovo (12 km northeast of Slyadnevo).
Belov, upon returning, was attacked by 2 Me-109s, shot down one in the area 30-40 kilometers east of Seshcha and followed the pair with Comrade Yurchenko to his territory. In the Yukhnov area, I regained my orientation and flew until the fuel ran out. Village in the Pavlovo area.
Historical reference. The fight of the Red Army Air Force with German airfields.
1942 was a very difficult year for our Air Force. German aviation dominated the air, its fighters were the masters of the sky. Our planes had a hard time in air battles. The reason for this was the heavy losses of 1941, when a large number of pilots with pre-war training were put out of action and the continued lag of our aircraft in terms of determining flight and combat qualities. Therefore, the Red Army Air Force Command considered air strikes on airfields as a very effective form of struggle for air supremacy. It was believed that in this way it was possible to quickly weaken the enemy’s air force.
One of the fundamental postulates of the art of war is the desire to beat the enemy where he is weak and, if possible, to avoid combat in cases where the enemy is strong. But German airfields in no way fit the definition of a weak enemy. The Luftwaffe had its own air defense forces, and defended its installations with vigor, aggression and ingenuity. In general, the air defense forces of the Third Reich were one of the strongest in the world, and airfields in particular were one of the most protected facilities.
Typically, the air defense of a German airfield consisted of 2-4 batteries of medium-caliber artillery (each battery had 4x88-mm and 2x20-mm anti-aircraft guns), 6-8 batteries of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery (9-12 20-mm or 37-mm machine guns each), up to 10 large-caliber anti-aircraft machine gun installations. That is, from 70 to 130 anti-aircraft guns per airfield. It can be assumed that the leadership of our Air Force was impressed by the successful actions of German aviation against our airfields, especially in the summer of 1941. But the defense of our airfields could not be compared with the enemy’s handling of this matter. There are memoirs of veterans describing the air defense of the airfield, which consisted of one ShKAS machine gun taken from an attack aircraft, and in another case - of one homemade RS installation. And even that one was soon taken over by the higher command. It is no wonder that with such security, German aviation felt extremely at ease.
Second possible reason The management’s “love” for attacking airfields was the complex control of the efficiency of a flight to such a “biting” object. Forced to act under time pressure, usually in one pass (and any subsequent one, under these conditions, would most likely be a high-tech form of suicide), pilots, as a rule, overestimated the results of their activities. And this supported the management’s illusion of efficiency.
On August 21, 1942, the commander of the 565th Shap, combat pilot, Major Volodin, died. Trying to determine the effectiveness of the departure, he went alone for the second approach. His plane was the only loss during the flight on August 21, when, on the eve of our offensive near Ulyanovo, another attempt was made to weaken the enemy’s air force.
After the war, many years later, it was established by the testimony of eyewitnesses, peasants of the village of Seshcha, that our commander decided to make a second approach over the enemy airfield in order to see with his own eyes the results of the work of his “chicks.” And this repeated approach turned out to be fatal. Hit by a direct hit from an anti-aircraft shell, the plane of the commander of 565 ShAP fell one kilometer from the enemy airfield, near the house of residents of Seshchi named Enkin. This family buried the heroic pilot and looked after the grave until it was discovered by relatives and friends in battle.
Combat operations at airfields were accompanied by heavy losses of our aviation. At the same time, in battles over airfields, not only aircraft, but also flight crews were lost. Unlike enemy losses. And damage that was fatal to a flying aircraft could be easily repaired when received at the airport parking lot. In 1944-1945, the Red Army Air Force largely abandoned the practice of air operations to destroy German aircraft at airfields. This was due both to the general improvement in the air situation and to the fact that the enemy’s air defense system was strengthened year after year, and significantly moreover.
The success of the attack on the airfield lay in the competent combination of all methods of countering enemy anti-aircraft artillery: ensuring the surprise of the attack, choosing the direction of sunset from the direction of the sun or from behind natural shelters that prevented anti-aircraft gunners from conducting targeted fire, as well as building an effective anti-aircraft maneuver and fire suppression of the air defense of the airfield. The key to a successful fight between attack aircraft and an air enemy was a compact combat formation and strict adherence to it by all crews. It was necessary to maintain in flight such speeds, intervals and distances that provided all wingmen with maneuver in air combat. Of no small importance was the timely detection of enemy aircraft and notification of their appearance, as well as the organization of a circular defensive fire system based on the interaction between the crews in the group. Constantly maintaining one's place in the battle formation was the primary responsibility of all flight personnel. , since a plane flying out of combat formation became easy prey for Luftwaffe pilots. Separation from the group was dangerous not only for the detached crew, but also for other crews from the group who were counting on its support in battle. Particularly dangerous were the moments when the aircraft were rearranging into battle formation when approaching a target and when assembling a group at the exit from an attack. " A group that breaks its order of battle usually suffers heavy losses. " - was emphasized in the manual on combat operations of attack aircraft in 1944. That is why the departure of the crew from the general combat formation without good reason was considered in the manual as a crime.
Seshcha airfield
The Seshcha airfield was built in 1931 as a base for our long-range bomber aircraft and, after being captured by the Wehrmacht, it was actively used for raids on Moscow and other cities of the Soviet Union. 224 Shad in 1942 - 43 was based in the Kaluga area, and its pilots probably flew the most attacks on this object. As already mentioned, German airfields had the strongest anti-aircraft cover, but even among them Sescha stood apart. In 1942, the 224th shad regiments flew to Seshcha on July 9, August 21 and 28, and September 13. And after the first raid, the following phrase was heard in the operational report: "The anti-aircraft defense of the facility surpasses everything seen before".
German aerial photograph of Seshcha airfield from August 19, 1943. Noteworthy is the unusual round shape of the taxiway. At the top of the photo you can see the highway and Railway Roslavl - Bryansk.
German aerial photograph of Seshcha airfield from August 19, 1943. The unusual round shape of the taxiway is noteworthy. At the top of the picture you can see the highway and railway Roslavl - Bryansk.
The Seshchinsky airfield was also equipped with extensive concrete shelters for personnel, airfield equipment, ammunition, as well as concrete caponiers for aircraft. Not far from Seshcha, the Olsufyevo airfield was located, from which cover fighters could be called in if necessary.
Seshchinsky airfield today. Attack aircraft of the 611th and 639th regiments were supposed to attack directly on us, in the direction of the long runway.
Seshchinsky airfield today. The attack aircraft of the 611th and 639th regiments were supposed to attack directly on us, in the direction of the long runway.
From the book “Broken Sky” by O.V. Rastrenin: “On the approach to the airfield, the attack aircraft received strong anti-aircraft fire from the areas of Kholmovka, Petlevka, Krasnopolye, Dmitrievka, the Trekhbratsky storage farm, Seshchinskaya and Seshcha stations. Only medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery, not counting the MZA, within 1-1.5 km of the zone from airfield, the crews counted up to 6-8 batteries. Directly in the area of the airfield, the attack aircraft were “worked” mainly by anti-aircraft machine guns and heavy machine guns, which were located “on the borders of the airfield and parking areas.” It was not possible to count how many of them were stuck. The crews noted that: "...in the Seshcha area there was continuous anti-aircraft machine-gun fire", "...when approaching the target, anti-aircraft fire was carried out in three tiers, at the Seshcha airfield the fire was carried out in a circular manner in two tiers, ...especially strong from the north side." In the area "There were up to 15 Fw190 and Bf109 fighters in the air at the airfield, which were trying to attack the attack aircraft."
Report from headquarters 611 Shap on the flight to attack the Seshcha airfield.
On September 13, 1942, at 11.00, a combat order was received from the headquarters of 224 shad, in which 611 shap, the task was set, together with 639 shad, in an assault raid to destroy enemy aircraft at the Seshcha airfield. At the same time, the division commander arrived at the airfield, who directly supervised the preparation of the flight personnel for the mission.
The task and decision of the group commander were worked out in detail with the flight crew on large-scale maps. The target was studied from photographs and photographic diagrams. Anti-aircraft points in the area of the enemy airfield were plotted by all crews on maps at a scale of 100,000.
2 hours before departure, the group commander, Senior Lieutenant Lyalenko, staged a flight on a box of sand, on which the target was accurately and in detail recreated. Careful and detailed preparation was to ensure excellent execution of the combat mission.
The group took off at 17.00, formed an organized battle formation, and covered the route in a tight, clear formation. But when approaching the target, the group commander, Senior Lieutenant Lyalenko, completely unexpectedly changed his mind and decided to approach the target from the north-west. Coming out north of the airfield, he began first a left and then a right turn. At the same time, the formation was disrupted since the group was moving with a right bearing and all turns were supposed to be made to the left. The enemy discovered the group, the surprise of the attack was lost and the planes were met with heavy anti-aircraft artillery fire. However, some of the planes reached the target and stormed it. At the same time, according to crew reports, 8-10 enemy aircraft were destroyed.
The departure from the target and the flight to their territory was carried out unorganized, in 2 groups. Halfway from the target, in the Bashevo area, both groups were attacked by Me-109s, which pushed them back to the Zanoznaya station. In the Zanoznaya area, the groups came under intense fire from ZA and some dispersed. Course evasion, anti-aircraft maneuver and the fight against enemy fighters led to the fact that out of a group of 6 aircraft 611, 2 arrived at their airfield that day. 3 aircraft landed at foreign airfields, and the flight commander, Lieutenant Nikolai Vasilievich Ivanov, did not return at all.
Thus, the raid on Seshcha was unsuccessful. However, as a result of the raid, it turned out that with proper operation of the IL-2 aircraft, the flight duration could be more than 2 hours. Thus, experienced pilots, senior lieutenants Lyalenko and Vykhor, had 50 and 100 kg of fuel left after 2 hours and 20 minutes of flight.
Report from headquarters 639 Shap on the flight to attack the Seshcha airfield.
On September 13, 1942, the regiment received an order for a combat mission with the task of destroying enemy aircraft at Seshcha airfield as part of 8 IL-2s. The combat sortie was carried out jointly with 611 units. The commander of the 611th squadron, senior lieutenant Lyalenko, was appointed commander of the group. The entire flight there and back and the attack on the target were carefully worked out with the entire flight crew. The flight on the sand box was lost. Each pilot was given a specific task during the flight and work on the target.
When approaching, the group came out to the right of the target. The group commander decided to go to the areas of Tananykino and Pobeda and from there, turning to the left, attack the target from the direction of the sun. Having made a turn to the left by 50-60 degrees, immediately in front of the target he began to turn to the right with a large roll. But, since the entire column was in the right bearing and was pulled into a tight formation for the attack, without warning from the leader of his intentions, from surprise and as a result of the loss of speed during the turn, it began to crumble and individual planes began to jump forward.
Thus, the task of destroying aircraft at the Seshcha airfield was not completely completed, and when moving away from the target, the group essentially had no commander and split into 2 groups, completely isolated from each other and moving on parallel courses. In the area of Patsin and Snopot, both groups were attacked by enemy fighters and, lacking a formation that provided protection from the enemy, were shot with impunity. Avoiding pursuit of fighters, both groups reached the area of Zanoznaya station and, instead of crossing the front line north of Kirov, due to loss of orientation, they became attached to the Warsaw Highway, and walked 70 km along the front line, being subjected to continuous shelling from the enemy’s defense and defense zones.
Only after reaching Yukhnov did both groups regain their orientation. The group carried out the task without fighter cover. All pilots who took part in a combat sortie, on the basis of the order of units 224 Shad No. 077, are not counted for a combat sortie. According to observations by the crews: 1 ME 109 was shot down by Sergeant Belov (confirmed by Sergeant Yurchenko); the fire of 14 anti-aircraft points on the northern and northwestern outskirts of the Seshcha airfield and on the return route (Betlitsa station, Zanoznaya station) was suppressed; set on fire by cannon fire and fire from the RS 1st echelon at the station. Betlitsa and 1 at the station. Splinter; broken up to 4 vehicles; The fire of 1 mortar battery was suppressed; Up to 40 servants and infantry were destroyed.
Headquarters report 224 shad.
On the evening of September 12, 1942. The division was given the task of destroying enemy aircraft at the Seshcha airport with a strike from 2 IL-2 groups. By combat order from the commander of air division No. 17, the task of striking was assigned to 2 regiments, detailed navigational instructions were given, the strike was to be carried out without fighter cover. A second strike on the Seshcha airfield, on the morning of September 14, was to be carried out by a group of attack aircraft from two other regiments. The task for these regiments was assigned by a private combat order from the commander of division No. 18.
On the morning of September 13, the air division commander was personally present at the flight crew’s work on the mission. Senior Lieutenant Lyalenko was appointed commander of the group 611 Shap. According to the decision made by Senior Lieutenant Lyalenko, the attack on the airfield was to be carried out by 10 aircraft, 4 aircraft were allocated to suppress enemy anti-aircraft weapons. The flight crew laid out and studied the routes and made the necessary calculations. A “miniature of the airfield” was made on the box with sand, on which the flight was lost in the presence of the AD commander. The attack, by decision of the group commander, had to be carried out on the move. The first approach is from the northeast, from the side of the village of Seshcha, from a height of 100-150 meters, then in the Tananykino, Pobeda area, make a turn to the left and repeat the attack on the target.
At 17.00 all 14 aircraft took off and at 17.10 they were on course from their original location. The group followed the route correctly, reaching the target with a slight deviation to the right (2-3 km to the north). The group commander, Senior Lieutenant Lyalenko, seeing that he had gone to the right of the target, decided to go to the area of the village of Pobeda-Tananykino and from there, turning to the left, carry out an attack from sunset. Having made a turn of 50-60 degrees, he immediately began to turn sharply to the right in front of the target. Since the group was moving on the right bearing, in tight formation, ready to attack, this unexpected turn upset the order of the group. As a result of the turn, the formation began to crumble, individual planes began to jump forward. Senior Lieutenant Oleinichenko's unit launched an attack on the airfield. Two pairs allocated to suppress the ZA attacked anti-aircraft points. The rest of the group passed north of the airfield and took the opposite course.
When moving away from the target, the group split into two, walking a parallel course. In the Patcin area, Snopot was attacked by 2 groups of enemy fighters (4 and 7 ME-109). Enemy fighters, with their attacks, pushed back groups of attack aircraft to the area of Zanoznaya station, where IL-2 aircraft were fired upon by ZA. This further disrupted the battle formation and the planes then moved in small groups of 2-3 aircraft. Due to loss of orientation, instead of heading towards their territory, the pilots became attached to the Varshavskoe highway and from Zanoznaya station to Yukhnov walked approximately 70 kilometers along the front line, all the time being subjected to shelling FOR the enemy. The task of destroying the enemy's materiel at the Seshcha aerodrome was not actually completed. The division commander did not count this flight as an effective combat sortie.
The reason for the failure of the mission is the incorrect actions of the group commander, Senior Lieutenant Lyalenko, who changed the decision he had previously made to attack the target over the target. Aircraft attacks by enemy fighters and shelling of the ZA forced the pilots to change course, which led to loss of orientation. Only 4 aircraft returned from a combat mission that day to the airfields. 7 aircraft made emergency landings outside their airfields, 3 aircraft did not return at all. According to crew reports, 7 twin-engine aircraft, 4 ZA guns were destroyed at the airfield, and up to 20 vehicles were destroyed in the airfield area. On the return route, a railway train with tanks was attacked at the station. Betlitsa and railway train at the station. Zanoznaya, 7 wagons with cargo and up to 65 infantry were destroyed.
Debriefing. Modern analysis of the 224th shad raid on Seshcha airfield
It is quite difficult to restore a detailed picture of what happened decades later. And most often the reason for this was the position of the report writers - staff officers, who did not bother themselves to explain some points, considering them insignificant or self-evident.
For example, the composition of the combat outfit for departure was almost never deciphered. It seems, why would it be easier to include 4-6-8, even 14 names, in the summary? But, no... Even in the much calmer years of 44-45, everything was extremely laconic: “...six aircraft, leading so-and-so.” That's all. And in 1942 for the most part not even the presenter was mentioned.
Further. What is a link? According to the 1942 regulations, a flight seems to have 4 aircraft (flight commander, senior pilot and two pilots). But in the documents of 639 shap, literally bit by bit, we manage to collect the composition of squadrons and units. And we get: 2 squadron commanders (Krasotkin and Zelentsov), one deputy in the 2nd squadron - senior lieutenant Kornienko. And there are 2 more senior lieutenants - Gustov and Kardava, both deputies, one in the first and Kardava in the second (there are already 2 deputies there). There are, so to speak, official flight commanders - Galkin, Ulanov and Sorokin, that's already 3.
And there are also Belov and Panchenko appointed commanders (on July 11, when the regiment had not yet suffered losses). In total there are 5 known flight commanders. And four of them are in the first squadron. And lonely Belov in the second. And a little further: “The best link in the unit is the communist, senior lieutenant Kornienko...”. This is the one who seems to be the deputy commander. Maybe he was demoted on August 14th? Yes, no problem, after a couple of months - he is already a squadron commander, and his unit is mentioned as the best in the unit. So, most likely, the flight consisted of three aircraft.
Based on this, we presumably get the composition of the 611th regiment for the flight to Sescha. Oleinichenko’s link is himself, and, most likely, Kalyunin, Denezhkin (since the three of them landed in Mukovnino). Then we get the second link - Lyalenko, Ivanov, Vykhor. Otherwise, if Oleinichenko has 4 aircraft in a flight, the group commander will have simply indecently little left for direct command - one subordinate.
In the 639th regiment it is even more difficult. 2 pairs were assigned to suppress anti-aircraft guns, most likely the youth of Belov-Yurchenko and Rappoport-Filippov. And the strike four, which included Krasotkin, Gustov and 2 more pilots. Who?
There were still 4 pilots left in the regiment. The commander of the 1st squadron Zelentsov flew little, Kornishin was mentioned only once - on the day of his death on October 22, 1942. Therefore, we can assume that at that time he was not yet in the regiment and he arrived later with reinforcements. So that leaves Panchenko, Kornienko and Golovkin. Most likely, Kornienko was flying (in 1943, he flew group 565 Shap to Seshcha, and they tried to appoint a pilot who had flown to the “object” at least once as the leader. This despite the fact that there were still enough pilots with similar experience in 565 Shap). This means - Kornienko, he should have already recovered from the minor wounds received on August 22, and Panchenko or Golovkin. They are all in Krasotkin's four.
The flight route to the target is not indicated in the reports, but by analogy with subsequent raids on Sescha, this option can be assumed. Kozhukhovo - Sukhinichi district - intersection of the front line between Kirov and Lyudinovo, at an angle of 30-60 degrees, and then course 225, bypassing large settlements, leads directly to the airfield.
The group commander, thirty-year-old senior lieutenant Vladimir Ilyich Lyalenko, was certainly worthy of his position. Apparently he previously served on Seshcha, which is why he flew as the leader. Vladimir Ilyich was an experienced pilot, having flown more than three thousand hours.
“On May 5, 1942, while supporting Belov’s horse guards group from the air, he was shot down, landed the plane and fought alongside the partisans for three weeks. ... In the battle near the village of Nekrasy, Senior Lieutenant Lyalenko led a group of pilots, mechanics, wounded and sick horse guards and a swift attack knocked the Germans out of there..."
He distinguished himself as the leader of the group in the July-August battles for 42 years. The report on the hostilities mentions the "Lyalenko carousel", who managed to build a defensive circle of four aircraft.
“...During the battles, several times he drove a group of aircraft to a depth of 80-100 km, into enemy territory, without fighter escort. Being attacked by seven fighters, he lost only one of the 4 attack aircraft, and the crew then returned to their unit. In this battle, The group not only maneuvered skillfully, but also, while actively defending itself, shot down one ME-109 (shot down by Vykhor). Attacks by enemy fighters did not interfere with the execution of the combat mission..."
Having fought in the winter of 41-42 on a night bomber, from May 25, 1942 he made 17 combat missions on an IL-2 and in August was presented with the Order of the Red Banner of Battle. So what happened during the takeoff?
Airfield attack plan. The shock ten not only attacks targets, but also has the ability to suppress anti-aircraft guns located along the attack course. Two dedicated pairs of attack aircraft suppress the guns to the side of the approach. After the group turns around in the Pobeda-Tananykino area, a second approach is planned.
Airfield attack plan. The shock ten not only attacks targets, but also has the ability to suppress anti-aircraft guns located along the attack course. Two dedicated pairs of attack aircraft suppress the guns to the side of the approach. After the group turns around in the Pobeda-Tananykino area, a second approach is planned.
The group walked without fighter cover, so it had to try to maintain maximum secrecy. In 1942, attack aircraft tried to reach the target at low level, jumping to a height of 100-150 meters immediately before the attack. But when flying at ultra-low altitude, along with increased stealth, orientation becomes difficult. Apparently, this is why, despite his experience, Lyalenko was unable to accurately reach the airfield. One can only guess about the motives for further actions, since there is no clear explanation in the reports.
It is unclear from which direction the group approached the airfield. It was supposed to be from the northeast, then either the leader changed his decision or mistakenly led the group out from the northwest. Entry from the northeast, exit 2-3 kilometers to the right of the target, that is, to the north. In this case, turning 50-60 degrees to the left immediately brings the attack aircraft directly to the airfield. Why did Lyalenko then make a sharp turn to the right, confusing the group? Unknown. But at the same time, it is unclear how the “anti-aircraft gunners” and Oleinichenko’s group were able to attack the target.
After all, they, who had already lost speed, would have to make another sharp turn. And one more thing: the course when approaching from the northeast, with an exit north of the target, practically leads to the Pobeda-Tananykino area and no sharp turns are required here. The option with an approach from the northwest puts more more questions. A miss 2-3 kilometers to the right of the target leads directly to Pobeda, a turn 50 degrees to the left either leads to the airfield immediately, or allows you to make a wide circle and then attack the target.
In any case, the situation was completely ruined by the last action: "...immediately in front of the target he began to turn to the right with a large roll...". The group mixed up. Lyalenko had to lead the first link, then Oleinichenko's link (this is more logical, if possible - formation along the regiments), then Krasotkin's four. Two "anti-aircraft" pairs - in conditions of relative freedom, at the edges. After sharp maneuvers of the leader, more "Oleinichenko was the one who suffered the most, as the closest one, and he had to jump forward. Having no radio contact, he went to attack the airfield. They also went there." anti-aircraft gunners", either to ensure his actions, or simply by working according to a previously adopted plan. Krasotkin, being at the very end of the group, had a little more room for maneuver and did not lose the leader.
But this is how it actually happened. There are large areas that cannot be shot by attack aircraft's on-board weapons. The work of German anti-aircraft gunners is greatly facilitated.
But this is how it actually happened. There are large areas that cannot be shot by attack aircraft's on-board weapons. The work of German anti-aircraft gunners is greatly facilitated.
Why Lyalenko did not attack the target is unknown, but 7 aircraft (exactly half of the group) under his command turned around and took the opposite course. This course also turned out to be strange - in the direction of Bashevo, strictly north, parallel to the front line (maybe in order to pass away from Olsufyevo?). " Oleinichenko Group"Having assaulted the targets, it was supposed to go east of the airfield and also went north, trying to catch up with the leader. Most likely, some of their planes were damaged by anti-aircraft fire and became the first target of German fighters flying up from the same Olsufyevo.
Departure from the target and attack of the Betlitsa station. Me-109 fighter, shot down by Belov "... 30-40 kilometers east of Seshcha
Departure from the target and attack of the Betlitsa station. Me-109 fighter, shot down by Belov "... 30-40 kilometers east of Seshcha".
The Messers attacked the attack aircraft over a distance of 80 kilometers, from Bashevo to Zanoznaya station. Most likely, Oleinichenko’s group suffered more at first and the second seven managed to unload from the bombs at the Betlitsa station. Somewhere near the village of Snopot, Belov managed to shoot down a German fighter, which was confirmed by Sergeant Yurchenko. Despite the exhausting air battle, our pilots still found the strength to storm the train at Zanoznaya station, although it is not clear with what kind of ammunition.
With a high degree of probability, we can guess the time and place of the death of our guys. First, let us remember the line from the Manual: " A group that breaks its order of battle usually suffers heavy losses. ". And then - part of a paragraph from the report of the headquarters of 224 Shad: " ...Enemy fighters, with their attacks, pushed back groups of attack aircraft to the area of the Zanoznaya station, where the IL-2 aircraft were fired upon by ZA. This further upset the battle formation, and then the planes moved in small groups of 2-3 aircraft..."It was after this that our attack aircraft suffered all their losses.
According to the reports of the pilots of the Mölders fighter group (JG 51), the first plane was shot down at 17-24 (Berlin time) - in the area of the village of Naumovo, 8 km northwest of the Zanoznaya station, in the area of the already mentioned Warsaw highway. The German pilots continued their attacks to push our attack aircraft westward, away from the front line. The next Il-2 fell much further, 50-60 kilometers west of Yukhnov, in the area of the village of Ugra, Smolensk region. Two pilots claim to destroy it at once, they indicate the same time (17-30), only the square is slightly different. Apparently, they both shot and both hit, which was confirmed by photo control and, according to German rules, both had the right to " victory"(there were cases when the enemy did not even fall, but flew to his airfield, but" victory" was still recorded for both shooters).
The last Il-2 was shot down at 17:35, also west of the Warsaw highway (about 10 km), halfway between Spas-Demensk and Yukhnov. All the attack aircraft tried to escape at low level, but those who lost their orientation and were cut off from their comrades, of course, had no chance of success.
Considering the overall severity of the current situation, there should have been significantly more casualties. After all, our attack aircraft had neither fighter cover nor air gunners in the crew; they flew over foreign territory and constantly suffered from anti-aircraft fire, and were attacked by a large group for more than a hundred kilometers." Messers". There is only one explanation - all the pilots of the 224 shad were experienced, proven fighters, not spoiled by fighter cover and repeatedly participated in air battles. In addition to Belov, Vykhor shot down the plane, Rappoport shot down. Most managed to break through the fighter screen and fly further to the northeast, tied to the Warsaw highway (the pilots confused it with the Kyiv highway, which passes through our territory and leads directly to Kaluga and Kozhukhovo.) After regaining their orientation near Yukhnov, they scattered and landed as best they could.
Conclusion.
One of the tragic episodes of 1942 - the unsuccessful raid on Sescha, undoubtedly contributed to the final victory of our country. Pilots and air commanders" on blood"gained invaluable combat experience. Despite the obvious guilt of Senior Lieutenant Lyalenko, he did not suffer any significant punishment. And he died in another combat mission in the February battles of 1943.
And the flight on September 13, 1942 was not counted towards anyone - neither Oleinichenko and his comrades, who, despite the situation, attacked the airfield, nor Belov, who shot down an enemy fighter in an air battle, nor the pilots who gave their lives in this flight. The punishment in the form of a disallowed flight is more like an attempt to remove Senior Lieutenant Lyalenko from being hit. And perhaps the division commander had reasons for this, we just don’t know much. Not yet known.
Literature:
- Operational reports from the headquarters of 224 Shad for 1942.