Zemsky Sobors of the 17th century Changes in the composition and significance of Zemsky Sobors are one of the most important consequences of the Time of Troubles. To the cathedrals of the 16th century. officials, central and local government bodies were called up. But already at the councils of 1598 and 1605. the presence of elected representatives is noticeable

In the fall of 1650, a campaign was undertaken in Moldavia. This campaign thwarted the raid of the Turkish-Tatar invaders on Russia. The hetman sought from the Sultan an order for the Crimean Khan to support Khmelnitsky in his new campaign against the Polish king. Knowing that King Jan Casimir was gathering large forces, the hetman was actively preparing to repel the enemy.

At the request of Khmelnitsky, the Russian government allowed the passage of Cossack troops through Russian territory to strike Polish troops in the Lithuanian-Belarusian lands. The arrival of the Cossacks in Belarus caused a new upsurge of the liberation movement there.

At the beginning of 1651, the Russian government convened a Zemsky Sobor in Moscow specifically to consider the issue of admitting Ukraine to Russia.

The war with Poland resumed in 1651. This time the Khan and his horde joined Khmelnitsky’s army. In June 1651, near the town of Berestechko, in Volyn, a meeting of the people’s army with the army of King John Casimir took place.

At the beginning of the battle, success was on the side of the people's army. However, on the third day of the battle, the khan changed again; he withdrew from his horde and moved east, began to destroy defenseless Ukrainian cities and villages. The Khan detained the hetman as his prisoner. The people's army found itself in a very difficult situation. Nevertheless, a significant part of the army, led by Ivan Bohun, avoided defeat and retreated.

Meanwhile, Khmelnitsky was freed from the Khan's captivity. A new people's army soon gathered near Bila Tserkva. Khmelnitsky could not quickly and completely restore the forces lost at Berestechko. However, the position of Jan-Cazimir’s army worsened as it moved towards the Dnieper region, whose population rose up against the enemy. Under such conditions, in September 1651, a new Treaty of Belotserkov was concluded.

By concluding the Belotserkov Treaty, the hetman, like the rest of the people, did not intend to abandon the continuation of the war, the struggle for the unification of Ukraine with Russia.

5. Zemsky Sobor 1653

On May 22, 1652, the battle of Batog (on Podolia) ended in the complete defeat of the noble army. It became increasingly clear that Poland was powerless to restore its power in Ukraine and prevent its unification with Russia. Turkey’s aggressive aspirations have intensified, and the possibilities for bringing it and Crimea closer to Poland have expanded. At the same time, the victory at Batog convinced the tsarist government of the weakening of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

In 1653, the Russian government decisively took the path of annexing Ukraine to Russia.

The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth government resumed the war in Ukraine. The Polish army began to devastate Ukraine in order to force the Ukrainian people to submit. The masses of the people in Ukraine were in an exceptionally difficult situation.

At the end of April 1653, a Russian embassy headed by Prince Repnin was sent to Poland. The embassy demanded that the Polish king renew the Treaty of Zboriv and stop the oppression of the Ukrainian people. The Polish government refused to comply with these demands, insisting on the full restoration of the power of the Polish gentry in Ukraine.

In May 1653, the Russian government convened the Zemsky Sobor to consider the issue of unifying Ukraine with Russia and the war against Poland. The Council was held in Moscow, in the Garnet Chamber of the Kremlin. In addition to the Tsar, the Patriarch and the highest clergy, the work of the Zemsky Council was attended by “boyars, okolnichy, Duma people, stewards and solicitors. and Moscow nobles, and residents, and nobles from cities, and boyar children. guests and living rooms and cloth hundreds and black hundreds, and palace settlements, merchants and other ranks, people and archers.

Considering Ukraine's repeated requests. and also taking into account the danger that threatened the existence of the Ukrainian people from the Polish and Turkish-Tatar invaders, the Zemsky Sobor in Moscow on October 1, 1653 agreed to the admission of Ukraine into Russia and the declaration of war against gentry Poland for the liberation of Ukraine, Belarus and Smolensk .

The decision of the Zemsky Sobor on October 1, 1653 also reflected the patriotic sentiments of the Russian people, their desire to reunite with the fraternal Ukrainian people, and their willingness to make sacrifices to implement this decision.

In October 1653, the Russian government sent the Great Embassy to Ukraine, headed by the boyar V. Buturlin. The Kremlin soon solemnly announced the beginning of the war for Ukraine.

Khmelnitsky and his army took part at this time in a new campaign against the Polish army. The meeting with the royal army took place at Zhvanets (near Kamenets-Podolsk). The hetman this time was forced to enter into an alliance with the khan. By the end of November, the troops led by him had completely wrested the initiative from the hands of the enemy, exhausted and surrounded the royal army and were ready to deal the final blow to it. However, this time the Khan demanded that Khmelnytsky conclude peace with the king, and then participate in a joint attack on Russia. Bogdan Khmelnytsky resolutely refused to comply with these demands.

This day in history:

On October 1, 1653, the Zemsky Sobor met in Moscow, whose task was to consider the issue of reunifying the lands of the previously unified ancient Russian state - Kievan Rus. And although at that time the satisfaction of the request of the Cossacks, who spoke on behalf of the entire people of South-Western Rus' (even then called Little Russia), considered by the Council, to be accepted “under the high hand of the Moscow sovereign”, which was considered by the Council, meant a war with Poland, the Council’s opinion on the formation of a single state was unanimous.

The reunification of Little Russia with Muscovite Russia corresponded to the vital interests and aspirations of the forcibly separated population of the ancient Russian state and was conditioned by the entire previous course of history.

The ancestors of both Little Russians and Great Russians were East Slavic tribes, which since ancient times inhabited the territory from the Carpathians to the Volga and from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The Eastern Slavs moved from a primitive communal system to a feudal one, having a common territory, religion, culture, a common language and way of life. In the VI-VIII centuries. AD they formed the largest single ancient Russian nation in Europe.

The interests of socio-economic, political and cultural development, as well as the need for defense against external enemies, led to the creation of one of the largest and most powerful states in Europe - Kievan Rus. However, due to the laws of development of feudal society, the ancient Russian state was divided into a number of separate principalities. In the 13th century The Mongol-Tatar invasion from the east, German and Swedish aggression from the west, hostile relations with the Poles and Hungarians put Rus' in extremely difficult conditions. She was able to repel German and Swedish attacks, but could not resist the Mongol-Tatar hordes.

After the Mongol-Tatar invasion, the ancient Russian state found itself significantly weakened, which its neighbors were quick to take advantage of. Already in the 14th century. Western Rus' (now Belarus), Volyn, Eastern Podolia, Kiev region, Chernigovo-Severshchina, as well as the Smolensk lands were captured by the Lithuanians. At the same time, the Poles captured the southwestern Russian lands - Galicia and Western Volyn (and in the 15th century, Western Podolia). Bukovina was included in the Principality of Moldova, and Transcarpathian Rus' back in the 11th century. fell into the hands of the Hungarians. In the 15th century, Türkiye captured Moldova and southern Russian lands north coast Black and Azov seas- New Russia (now part of Ukraine) and made the Crimean Khanate, which by that time had separated from the Golden Horde, into vassal dependence. In the 16th century, already from the Principality of Lithuania, Poland essentially tore away Eastern Volyn, Bratslav and Kiev regions with part of the left bank of the Dnieper. As a result of all these seizures, Kievan Rus was torn into territories that fell under the authority of various countries.

However, even in these difficult conditions, the ancient Russian people did not succumb to assimilation: the previously achieved high level of economic and cultural development and its internal strength had an impact. Ethnic, economic, cultural and political ties were preserved and continued to develop. The ideas of unity and independence, as evidenced, in particular, by the Kievan and Galician-Volyn Chronicles, * were firmly rooted in the consciousness of the entire Russian people even during the period of feudal fragmentation of Kievan Rus. Therefore, having strengthened themselves internally, the people waged a liberation struggle against their enslavers, trying to restore their unity.

This desire for unity manifested itself, first of all, in the form of the resettlement of the inhabitants of Little Russia to the Moscow state. Starting from the end of the 13th century, all classes moved: from peasants to boyars and princes. Moreover, the latter, as a rule, moved with their lands and peasants.

A wave of popular uprisings swept across the territory of the occupied lands. At the end of the 14th century, the Kiev region rebelled against foreign rule. At the beginning of the 15th century, uprisings swept Galicia, Volyn, Podolia and again the Kiev region. The struggle of the Little Russians against their enslavers reached particular strength in the second half of the 15th century.

At this time, the apotheosis of Russian resistance was the deliverance from the hated Mongol-Tatar yoke of North-Eastern Rus', which united into the Moscow state. Subsequently, it was it that played a decisive role in the liberation and unification of all occupied Russian territories. As it rose, Moscow became more and more the center of gravity for the Russian people, who found themselves under the yoke of foreign enslavers.

After the great “stand on the Ugra”, the tsarist government almost immediately took an active position on the issue of returning the seized lands. In 1492, Grand Duke Ivan III demanded from the Grand Duke of Lithuania: “... and you would surrender our cities and our volosts, the lands and waters that you hold behind you to us.” **. He declared to the Poles that “The United Great Russia will not lay down its arms until it returns all the other parts of the Russian land, torn off by its neighbors, until it gathers all the people” ***. All Russian lands were called “fatherland” based on the ethnicity of the population and their historical past. “It’s not just our fatherland, whose cities and volosts are now behind us: and the whole Russian land, Kyiv and Smolensk and other cities... from ancient times... our fatherland...” ****,” Russian diplomats explained.

Ivan the Terrible also demanded the return of Russian lands. So, in 1563, he presented King Sigismund II Augustus with a list in which a number of Russian lands and cities captured by the Poles were named. Among them were Przemysl, Lvov, Galich and others. Justifying the rights of Rus' to them, Russian diplomats declared: “... and those cities were the ancient Russian sovereigns... and that patrimony fell for your sovereign... due to some hardships after Batu’s captivity, how the godless Batu captured many Russian cities, and after that because of our sovereigns... those cities withdrew” *****. Since the invaders did not even think about returning the seized territories, the Russian people more than once had to fight liberation wars for their liberation.

The Little Russians, for their part, also fought for unification with Muscovite Russia. In the 16th century on the territory of Southwestern Rus' they launched a broad people's liberation movement. A prominent place in it was occupied by the Cossacks who appeared in Zaporozhye (as earlier on the Don and in other places on the southern borders of the then Rus'), who were destined to play an important role in the future. historical fate Little Russia, in its struggle for liberation from the oppression of the Polish-Lithuanian invaders and reunification with Russia.

In order to suppress the liberation struggle and strengthen their dominance, the Polish and Lithuanian lords united Poland and Lithuania into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Union of Lublin) in 1569. In Southwestern Rus', the Poles captured vast estates, numbering in some cases up to hundreds of settlements. The Polish gentry intensified feudal-serfdom, religious and national-colonial oppression. Serfdom in Poland in the 16th century reached the highest level in Europe. “The gentry even arrogated to themselves the right of life and death over their peasants: killing a slave for a gentry was the same as killing a dog” ******. The situation of local townspeople in Little Russia also deteriorated significantly. They were restricted in everything, even in the right of residence: in Lviv, for example, they were allowed to settle only on one street (“Russkaya Street”). The Poles waged a tough fight against Orthodoxy. In 1596, a union was formalized in Brest, proclaiming the subordination of the Orthodox Church to the Catholic Church, the recognition of the Pope as the head of the Uniates and the adoption of the basic dogma of Catholicism. The Orthodox clergy were subjected to repression.

The inculcation of Catholicism, Polonization, national discrimination - everything was aimed at the Vatican-inspired denationalization of the Little Russians, weakening their ties with the Moscow state, and strengthening the dominant position of the Poles and Lithuanians. The population was required to have compulsory knowledge of Polish as the only state language of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It was forbidden to use the national language in business correspondence, schools teaching in Russian were closed. This policy of the ruling circles of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth put the bulk of the local peasantry and philistines in an exceptionally difficult and powerless situation.

The strengthening of Polish oppression after the Union of Lublin and Brest caused a new rise in the liberation movement of the Little Russians. The main forces of this movement were the peasantry and Cossacks. In the early 90s of the 16th century, protests against Polish dominance became widespread.

At the end of the 16th century, the resettlement of Little Russians, primarily Cossacks, to the borders of Moscow Rus' intensified. Cossacks settled, as a rule, on its southern borders, protecting them. At the same time, they not only moved to the lands of the Russian state, but sometimes also became the subject of the tsar, along with the territories they cleared from the Polish lords. In this regard, the example of such a transition of the Cossack army led by Kr. Kosinsky is widely known, in correspondence with whom in 1593 the Russian Tsar already calls himself the sovereign of “Zaporozhye, Cherkasy and Nizovsky.”

The Polish lords responded to the liberation struggle of the people by strengthening national-colonial oppression. “To exterminate Rus' in Rus'” - this is how the goals and policy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth regarding South-Western Rus' were defined in one of the appeals to the Sejm in 1623. The uprisings were suppressed with particular cruelty. The Poles continued to use force and coercion as the main means of maintaining their dominance. Individual attempts to somehow soften this policy led nowhere. For example, the so-called “Articles to calm the Russian people” of King Vladislav IV (1633) in fact did not provide any rights and freedoms to the oppressed.

Resistance to the Polish lords, the fight against common enemies - the Turks and Crimean Tatars - contributed to the expansion and strengthening of the military-political ties of the Little Russians and Great Russians, especially the Cossacks of the Zaporozhye Sich and the Don. Russian-Little Russian economic ties have also undergone significant development. After 1612, there was an increase in the liberation struggle and an increase in the desire of the population of the lands of Southwestern Rus' captured by the Poles to reunite with Eastern Russia, with Moscow.

In the 17th century, representatives of Little Russia repeatedly turned to the Russian sovereigns with requests to accept the Little Russians “under their high hand.” Such plans often arose among the Cossacks *******, especially since the Cossacks had been actively enlisting in the service of Moscow since the time of Ivan the Terrible. This service to the Russian Tsar with the entire Zaporozhye army ******** was sought even by such hetmans as Sagaidachny, a nobleman by birth who got along well with Warsaw (1620).

However, not only the Cossacks wanted to unite with Moscow Russia. Representatives of the Orthodox clergy, Archbishop Isaiah Kopinsky (later Metropolitan of Lithuania) in 1622 and Metropolitan Job Boretsky in 1625 turned to the Moscow Tsar with a request for patronage and the reunification of Little Russia with Russia.

After suppressing a number of uprisings in the 30s of the 17th century, the Polish lords further strengthened serfdom, national and religious oppression. Along with peasants and burghers, small Ukrainian gentry and the Orthodox clergy were subjected to oppression.

General discontent and protest resulted in the Liberation War of the Ukrainian people against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of 1648-1654. The fight against the oppression of lordly Poland was led by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. At the initial stage of the war, he tried to win over the Turkish Sultan, the Crimean Khan, and the Swedish king to his side. At first, B. Khmelnitsky was lucky. The rebels won a series of victories: at Zheltye Vody, near Korsun and near Pilyavtsy. However, then, due to the betrayal of the Crimean Khan, the hetman suffered a number of serious defeats: in 1649 near Zborov, in 1651 near Berestechko and in 1652 in the vicinity of Zhvanets. The famous historian S.M. Soloviev wrote that “the defeat at Berestechko clearly showed B. Khmelnitsky and the Cossacks that they alone could not cope with Poland..., and one cannot rely on the khan either, when it comes to fighting with a large army, and not to rob..." *********.

For six years the Little Russians waged a difficult struggle with the Poles. The war required enormous sacrifices and enormous effort. The situation in Little Russia was extremely difficult. Under these conditions, the hetman became even more active in offering Moscow reunification. They sent about 20 embassies to the king with such a request. B. Khmelnitsky even suggested that Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, with the support of the rebels, take the vacant Polish throne at that time and thus unite Little Russia and Russia **********.

However, the Russian government, fearing a new war with Poland, took a restrained position. Muscovite Rus' has not yet fully recovered from the Troubles. In addition, such a war could have pushed (and later pushed) Sweden to seize Primorye (which was at that time in the hands of the Poles), which would have made it difficult for Moscow to return the Russian lands adjacent to the Baltic Sea.

At the same time, Rus' could not remain completely aloof from the struggle of the Little Russians and provided assistance to the rebels with “bread and guns,” as well as through diplomatic methods. In 1653, the tsar demanded that Warsaw not violate the rights of the Orthodox population in Little Russia and stop persecuting Orthodox Church. However, the embassy sent in this regard returned with nothing.

Taking into account the numerous requests from representatives of Little Russia for its acceptance into Russia and the danger that threatened the Little Russians from the Poles, as well as the Turks and Tatars ***********. (who increasingly asserted their claims to Southwestern Rus'), the tsarist government decided to convene a Zemsky Sobor in order to enlist the support of the entire people when deciding the issue of reunification.

On October 1 (11), 1653, almost all segments of the population of the then Russian state gathered in Moscow: the clergy, boyars, representatives of Russian cities, merchants, peasants and archers.

When considering the issue of “petitioning the sovereign for citizenship of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhian Army,” the serious danger looming over Little Russia was emphasized: “in 161 (1652) at the Sejm in Brest-Litovsk it was indeed sentenced that they, Orthodox Christians... who live in Koruna Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, to beat..." *************. The intentions of the Poles to “eradicate the Orthodox Christian faith and completely destroy the holy churches of God...” ************** were also noted.

The Council was informed that the Turkish Sultan had called upon the Little Russians to become his subjects, but the hetman “denied him this”; that the Cossacks called the Crimean Khan and his horde to be their allies against the Poles “involuntarily”; that the Cossacks sent their embassies with a request to accept them as citizenship and help in the war with Poland “many times.”

Despite the fact that the report was discussed separately at meetings of each estate, the decision was unanimous. The Council “sentenced”: “that the Great Sovereign Tsar and Grand Duke Alexei Mikhailovich of all Rus' would deign that Hetman Bogdan Khmelnitsky and the entire Zaporozhye Army with their cities and lands to accept under his sovereign high hand for the Orthodox Christian faith and the holy churches of God...” ** ************* Here we were talking not only about the hetman’s army, which a year ago it was proposed to resettle on the lands of Muscovite Rus', but also about “cities” and “lands”, i.e. about all of Little Russia.The liberation of the Little Russians from the citizenship of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was legally justified not only by their desire, but also by the failure of the king himself to fulfill the oath in terms of non-oppression of his subjects of non-Catholic faith.

It was obvious that in connection with the reunification of Russian lands, war with the Poles could not be avoided. Taking this into account, the Council decided: “the message of war is against the Polish king.” **************** On October 23 (November 2), 1653, in the Assumption Cathedral of the Kremlin, the king, referring to this decision, announced about the beginning of the war with Poland.

The resolutions of the Council were announced to the Russian people and met with unanimous support.

The Hetman's embassy headed by L. Kapusta was also present at the Council, which immediately after its end went to B. Khmelnytsky and informed him about the decisions made. To complete the process of reunification, a special royal embassy was also sent to the hetman, headed by a close boyar, V.V. Buturlin. Having received Moscow's consent to the unification, B. Khmelnitsky on January 8, 1654 in the city of Pereyaslavl convened a national assembly - the Rada, which, according to Cossack traditions, alone was competent to resolve the most important political issues. The Rada was “explicit,” that is, open to the entire people. It represented both all the Little Russian lands and all classes (Cossacks, clergy, townspeople, merchants, peasants). Thus, the issue of reunification with Russia and in Little Russia was resolved with the widest possible representation. After the polls, the people unanimously “cryed out: We are willing under the Eastern Tsar, the Orthodox... God confirm, God strengthen, that we may all be one forever!” *****************.

After the Rada, first the residents of Pereyaslavl, and then the Cossack regiments (military administrative units of Little Russia) and the population of the cities of Little Russia swore allegiance to the Russian sovereign.

The March Articles of 1654 formalized the position of Little Russia within Russia, and also defined the rights and privileges of the Cossacks, Ukrainian gentry and clergy.

The decisions of the Zemsky Sobor and the Pereyaslav Rada clearly demonstrated the will of a single people, divided even during the years of the Mongol-Tatar invasion, to live in a single state. Then, in accordance with the clearly expressed desire of all segments of the population of Little and Great Rus', their reunification in a single state began.

There were still centuries ahead of the struggle for the return of all the lands seized from Kievan Rus. Only after the bloody wars with the Polish lords in 1667, according to the Truce of Andrusovo, Left Bank Little Russia was transferred to the Moscow state, and in 1686, according to the “Eternal Peace”, Kyiv and its surroundings were returned. The Northern Black Sea region or Novorossiya was conquered from Turkey in the wars of 1768-1774. and 1787-1791 Right Bank Little Russia became part of Russia as a result of the divisions of Poland in 1793 and 1795. Galicia and Northern Bukovina were returned in 1939-1940, and Transcarpathian Rus' in 1945. Russian Crimea, recaptured from the Turks in 1783, was transferred to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954. The modern independent state of Ukraine appeared on political map world in 1991.

___________________________________________________________

* Great Soviet Encyclopedia, third edition, M., “Soviet Encyclopedia”, 1977, T.26, p.539.

** Collection of the Russian Historical Society, St. Petersburg, 1882, volume XXXV, pp. 61-66.

*** V.O. Klyuchevsky, Course of Russian history. Works in 9 volumes, M. Mysl, 1988, T.III, p. 85.

**** Collection of the Russian Historical Society, St. Petersburg, 1882, volume XXXV, pp. 457-460.

***** Ibid., pp. 265-270

****** V.O.Klyuchevsky, T.III, p.97.

******* Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts (RGADA), f. 210, Discharge order, Moscow table, stb. 79, pp. 370-372.

******** Reunification of Ukraine with Russia. Documents and materials in three volumes, M., publishing house of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 1953. T.1, No. 1.

********* S.M. Soloviev. Works in 18 volumes. History of Russia from ancient times. M., Mysl, 1990, T.T. 9-10, pp. 559.

********** Reunification of Ukraine with Russia Vol. II, pp. 32-33.

*********** V.O. Klyuchevsky, T III, p. 111.

************* Reunification of Ukraine with Russia, Vol. III, p. 411.

*************** Ibid.

*************** Ibid., p. 413.

**************** Right there.

***************** Ibid., page 461.

Historical and Documentary Department

Zemsky Sobor 1653

The next zemstvo council on the Ukrainian issue took place in 1653. On October 1, it decided to reunite Ukraine with Russia. But this act was preceded by a long history.

The “Palace Discharges” states that on March 19 of this year “the sovereign ordered the sovereign’s letters to be sent to all cities to the governors and clerks” with a summons to the stewards, solicitors, Moscow nobles, and residents to Moscow by May 20 “with all the service.” It was planned that “at that time their sovereign will deign to look at Moscow on horseback” 1322. On May 2, this order was repeated, but in addition to it, the governors of a number of Zamoskovny and Ukrainian cities were ordered to “exile from each city, from a choice of two nobles, good and reasonable people.” The arrival date is the same - May 20, 1323. It is clear that two events were being prepared: the royal review of those serving on the “Moscow list” and the Zemsky Sobor - both of them were related to the struggle for Ukraine.

In the Sevsky table of the Discharge, a large column has been preserved containing materials on the elections of deputies to the council from among the nobles and children of boyars in a number of cities: Aleksin, Arzamas, Belgorod, Belev, Volkhov, Borovsk, Bryansk, Vladimir, Volok, Voronezh, Vorotynsk, Gorokhovets, Yelets , Kaluga, Karachev, Kashira, Kozelsk, Kolomna, Krapivna, Kursk, Livny, Lukh, Maly Yaroslavets, Medyn, Meshchera, Meshchovsk, Mikhailov, Mozhaisk, Murom, Mtsensk, Nizhny Novgorod, Novgorod Seversky, Novosil, Odoev, Orel, Oskol, Pereyaslavl Zalessky, Pochep, Putivl, Roslavl, Ruza, Rylsk, Ryazhsk, Ryazan, Sevsk, Serisysk, Serpukhov, Starodub, Suzdal, Tarusa, Tikhvin, Tula, Chernigov, Shatsk, Yuryev Polish 1324. The given list of cities is approximately the same as that mentioned above when describing the elections to the Zemsky Sobor of 1651. Some discrepancies between the two lists, very minor, can be explained both by the degree of preservation of documents and by random circumstances or conditions of local development.

Documents relating to the elections of 1653 concern only service people; they do not mention “elected” townspeople. The materials of 1651 contain data on elections from among both the nobles and the townspeople. But we know that the townspeople were also present at the council of 1653. This means that either the circle of sources is not complete, or only the Moscow population was called up.

The Sevsky Table column consists of a number of cases related to individual cities. The full form for each case is as follows: 1) the royal letter to the governor on the conduct of elections; 2) a statement from the voivode regarding the implementation of this order; 3) “choice”, i.e. the act of electing representatives to the Zemsky Sobor at the congress of the district nobility, signed by voters. In a number of cases, only certain parts of this form have been preserved.

Most of the letters were sent from Moscow and received by provincial governors throughout May. But this matter extended into June. On May 15, the state authorities officially postponed the arrival of “electors” from the provinces to Moscow to June 5, 1325.

As in 1651, elections did not take place calmly and without complications everywhere. On May 9, 1653, Mozhaisk servicemen (six people) presented the voivode with a “fairy tale” that the “old” nobles of Mozhaichi, suitable for the “royal business,” were “settled in Zamoskovny and in rozny towns,” and they were “people of low power.” and the weak-minded." The voivode sent these small-scale, placeless and empty-placed (far from being the best, as required) nobles and boyar children to Moscow in 1326. At the elections that took place on May 9 in Serpeisk, it turned out that many Serpeisk service people lived in “roznye in distant cities,” and nobles who lived in Belevsky district were elected 1327. Voivode Bogdan Ushakov reported to the Discharge that the Vorotyn people “disobeyed” the tsar’s decree and did not hold elections until May 16 1328. In Suzdal, not all the nobles and boyar children who were supposed to showed up for the elections on May 20, and the elected delegates to the Zemsky Council did not show up at the governor’s office 1329. The Tula governor Osip Sukhotin received an order from the center to imprison three of the “best” nobles “for disobedience”: “that they, according to the previous ... sovereign decree, did not choose two people according to three letters” 1330. The voivode replied that he had imprisoned two nobles, and sent for the third “to the district,” but since no one was going from the “district” to Tula, there was no one to imprison 1331.

In addition to the Sevsky column, which contains documents about the elections to the Zemsky Sobor, which took place in May-June 1653, there is a Belgorod column with lists of nobles elected and who arrived in Moscow in 1332. The materials of the Belgorod Table were published by A.K. Kabanov 1333 and A.I. Kozachenko 1334 (to the latter, Kabanov’s publication apparently remained unknown).

Kozachenko called the document of the Belgorod table a “registration list” (compiled in the Rank) of the nobles who participated in the Zemsky Sobor. The name is not entirely accurate, since what we have before us is not just a sequential registration of persons in the order of their arrival in Moscow, but a well-known grouping of material. The document consists of several sections. First, a personal list of nobles who “by the sovereign’s decree were sent to Moscow for the sovereign’s and zemstvo’s affairs,” indicating from which city and when who came. The information forms, as it were, two chronological layers: May 15 - June 4 and May 21 - 24. Next comes the heading “The nobles showed up from the cities after the council,” and then the information for May 25 - June 19, 1335 follows in chronological order of the arrival of the belated nobles. In addition to the list of “elected” nobles, in the Belgorod column the cities where the elections took place are distributed into three groups. First, the cities from which the nobles were present at the council of 1336 are indicated, then the cities from which “the nobles came after the council” of 1337. The last section is entitled “The sovereign’s letters about the nobles were sent to the cities, but the Mayans had not visited Moscow until the 29th” 1338.

So, some city nobles got to the cathedral, others were late, but they were still registered, and the recording went on for more than a month, from May 15 to June 19. Why? Obviously, there was not one, but several conciliar meetings. The chronological layers identified in the Belgorod column (May 15-June 4, May 21-24, May 25-June 19) are guidelines for dating these meetings. Initially, the government deadline for the nobles to appear in Moscow was, as is known, set for May 20. Between May 20 and 25, one must think, the Zemsky Sobor met for the first time (by no means in full strength), as can now be concluded based on the analysis of this source. But even earlier, on May 15, taking into account the possibility of further meetings, the government postponed the date of arrival in Moscow for provincial servicemen until June 5. It is possible that a second meeting took place then. It is possible that the council met for the third time somewhere at the beginning of the third decade of June.

There is information about several convocations of the council in 1653 in some later acts. In the draft, which formed the basis of the conciliar act on October 1 on the reunification of Ukraine with Russia, it is written: “Last year, in the year 161, by decree of the Great Sovereign Tsar and Grand Duke Alexei Mikhailovich of All Russia, the autocrat spoke at the council about the Lithuanian and Cherkasy affairs.” 1339. In the columns of the Order of Secret Affairs, the speech of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich Prince is retold. To A. N. Trubetskoy on April 23, 1654, before his campaign in Poland: “Last year there were councils more than once, at which two people were elected from you, from all cities of nobles; At these councils we spoke about the lies of the Polish kings, you heard this from your elected representatives...” 1340.

However, there is a source that allows us to determine the exact time of the council meeting in May. To judge the May Council of 1653 and its date, a document opened by A.I. Kozachenko is important - a letter (undated) from Alexei Mikhailovich to the Russian ambassadors sent to Poland in April - Prince. B. A. Repnin, okolnichy B. M. Khitrovo and clerk Almaz Ivanov. In it we read: “...let you know, there was a council on the seventh week on Mayan Wednesday on (the numbers of the day are not clearly readable - L. Ch.) day, and we, the great sovereign, with our father and the pilgrim Nikon, the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, at that council they spent a lot of time talking and interrogating all the people - whether to accept Cherkassy. And all sorts of ranks and public people unanimously spoke about this in order to accept Cherkassy. And we, the great sovereign, praised them with our merciful words for the fact that they want to serve with generous and self-willing hearts. And they, hearing our sovereign’s merciful words, were especially happy, and sent... And we have postponed until you arrive from the embassy...” 1341.

From the above text it is clear that in May 1653 a Zemstvo Council was held, at which the issue of admitting Ukraine to Russian citizenship was discussed. This already confirms the preliminary conclusion made above about the conciliar meeting in the first half of the 20th of May. The discussion was long, people of “all ranks” were interviewed. They also took into account the opinion of the “square people” (obviously, not the participants of the cathedral, but those who were on the square while the meeting was going on and somehow expressed their attitude towards it). As a result, a unanimously positive opinion was expressed about the accession of Ukraine to Russia. The letter expressed satisfaction with its voluntary nature on the part of the Ukrainians, but indicated that the final decision on the issue of their accession and the execution of this act were postponed until the return of the embassy from Poland to Moscow.

From the text of the letter in question, it is not entirely clear paleographically to the Russian ambassadors to which date of May the Zemsky Council on the issue of Ukraine should be attributed. A.I. Kozachenko read: “May 20,” without expressing any doubts about this. Meanwhile, familiarity with the original document causes fluctuations between two dates: May 20 and May 25, 1342. These hesitations are resolved in favor of the last date, since the council took place on Wednesday, and in 1653 Wednesday fell not on May 20, but on May 25. Thus, the exact time of the May Council is established.

This dating is confirmed by the data of a draft corrected copy of the report at the meeting of the May Zemsky Sobor, on the basis of which the text of the conciliar verdict on October 1 was subsequently compiled. This draft report has reached us as part of the archives of the Ambassadorial Prikaz. V.N. Latkin identified it as the “second copy” of the act of the October conciliar meeting, printed it “in a form corrected by the hand of a contemporary” 1343 and thereby significantly devalued it as a source, because he deprived researchers of the opportunity to carry out textual criticism based on the printed publication. And a comparison of the texts of this draft report with the materials of the Zemstvo Councils of 1651 and October 1653. leads to important results.

At the beginning of the document there is an amendment to its date. The number “May 25” is crossed out and above the crossed out is written: “October 1”. Consequently, the revised text refers to the May Council of 1653 1344

The May 1653 document is based on a “letter” reported at the council of 1651. Both documents are “letters” (or reports) “announced” to the participants of the councils, the composition of which is determined in the same way in both cases. To a large extent, these materials coincide not only in content, but also textually. However, there are also differences. At the council of 1651, they talked about “the Lithuanian affairs”, now - “about the Lithuanian and Cherkassy affairs” 1345. The importance of the Ukrainian issue is emphasized. The emphasis on the “non-corrections” of the king and the lords of 1346 was increased. The indictment of the Polish government has been given a more general character, therefore some specific examples distortion of royal names and titles by the lords or failure to fulfill obligations given to Russian envoys, but special emphasis was placed on the “constitution” of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which should punish for the “diminution” or “abolition” of the title 1347. As incriminating material, we used data from the embassies of Afanasy Pronchishchev, Almaz Ivanov, Prince. Boris Repnin, under which the question of the royal “honor” was called by the lords a “small matter” 1348.

When characterizing international relations, references to Poland's hostile actions against Russia in relation to Sweden and Crimea (pass to the Swedish queen of the Crimean ambassador) 1349 are omitted. Attention is focused on Ukrainian-Polish relations. This topic was almost absent from the “letter” of 1651. She was overwhelmed by the exposure of the royal “untruths” in relation to the Russian state. Now, in the May “letter” of 1653, a fairly vivid picture of the difficult situation of the Ukrainian people under the yoke of lordly Poland, the religious and national persecutions to which they were subjected in 1350 was developed.

The last part of the “letter” says that Bogdan Khmelnitsky and the entire Zaporozhye army sent “many of their envoys” to the Russian government asking for help. The Zaporozhye Cossacks do not want to “put up” with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, because the lords “cannot be trusted in anything”; they have already violated the treaties concluded near Zborov and Bila Tserkva. The Cossacks don’t want to be a “gibberish” to “the Turk Saltan or the Crimean Khan.” They ask to be accepted into Russian citizenship and to send Russian troops to their aid 1351.

According to the concept of the May “letter,” the question of war or peace with Poland was common to Russia and Ukraine. If Bogdan Khmelnitsky and the Zaporozhye army do not see a path to reconciliation with the Polish state, then Russia’s position is also clearly formulated: the inevitability of breaking off peaceful relations with Poland and giving this act international importance. “And he will not send his ambassadors and envoys to them (the Polish government. - L. Ch.) ahead (the sovereign. - L. Ch.), and orders them to write about those untruths and the violation of eternal consummation to all surrounding states to the great Christian and Busurman sovereigns" 1352.

At the end of the “letter”, in a handwriting different from the entire text, it is written: “And those days (i.e., obviously, May 25) according to this letter were announced, and the Sovereign Tsar and Grand Duke Alexei Mikhailovich of All Russia and the Sovereign, His Holiness the Patriarch, and authorities, and boyars, priests, and Duma people, and elected people of all ranks were in the Faceted Chamber at that time" 1353.

Above, arguments were given in favor of the possibility of a meeting of the Zemsky Sobor on June 5. The “Palace Classes” says that on this day the sovereign had a dinner in the Dining Hut, which was attended by Patriarch Nikon, boyars, and stewards, and at which “the sovereign ordered city nobles to be elected doubles” 1354. Of course, the connection between the Zemsky Sobor and the royal dinner can only be speculative, but if we compare the dates extracted above from the documents with the information of the “Palace Classes”, then this proposal hardly seems implausible. Indeed, by June 5, nobles from a number of cities were called to Moscow for “sovereign and zemstvo affairs.”

June 1653 is the month when a review of the combat readiness of part of the military forces was carried out in Moscow: on the Maiden Field “the sovereign looked at the captains, and solicitors, and nobles, and tenants with all their service in June from the 13th of June to the 28th” 1355. Registration in the category of “elected” continued until June 19 inclusive (which means the cathedral had not yet been dissolved). On June 22, a royal letter was sent to Bogdan Khmelnitsky with a notice of the Russian government’s decision to reunite Ukraine with Russia and preparations for war with Poland: “and our military people, by our royal majesty’s decree, are recruiting a soldier and building a militia” 1356. Around June 20, a situation had developed that made it very likely that a third meeting of the Zemsky Sobor would take place at this time. Of course, it is unlikely that the text on May 25 was revised at the two June meetings (June 5 and at the beginning of the last ten days). If it had been so, it would not have formed the basis of the verdict on October 1. Rather, it was about familiarization with the May “letter” of the “elected” nobles who arrived at different times from the provinces and its editing (it was subject to significant editing).

The last, decisive meeting of the Zemsky Sobor in 1653, when a resolution was adopted on the reunification of Ukraine with Russia, took place on October 1 in Moscow in the Faceted Chamber. The act of this council of 1357 has reached us. It contains three parts: 1) the royal decree on convening the council; 2) report from the government; 3) the verdict of the boyars and Duma people and the speeches of other class groups.

The following names were named as participants in the cathedral: the Tsar, Patriarch Nikon, Metropolitan Selivester of Krutitsa, Metropolitan Mikhail of Serbia, archimandrites, abbots, “with the entire consecrated cathedral”, boyars, okolnichy, Duma nobles, stewards, solicitors, Moscow nobles, residents, nobles from cities, boyar children, guests, trading people of the living room, cloth hundreds, tax people of the black hundreds and palace settlements, streltsy (streltsy heads). The stereotypical formula also appears: “people of all ranks.” This is approximately the same composition that was named in the “letter” of May 25, only residents, archers were added and more details were said about “trading people”. It is noteworthy that in the words “nobles and boyar children elected from the cities” the definition “elected” is crossed out 1358. Obviously, the government no longer addressed the “elected” provincial service people at the last stage of the Zemsky Sobor. It dealt with them in May-June, when they were summoned to Moscow in 1359.

October 1 was a holiday, and the cathedral was of a solemn character. The Emperor came straight from the church with a procession of the cross. At the cathedral, a “letter” (a report in a new edition) was “read out loud to everyone” about the “untruths” of the Polish king and lords and about the “petition to the sovereign for citizenship” of Bogdan Khmelnitsky and the Zaporozhye army in 1360. This edition of the report is sometimes literally similar to the May one, sometimes represents its literary adaptation, and in some cases develops the thoughts contained in it, deepens its ideological content, supplements the text with new facts (the embassy to Warsaw of V. A. Repnin, who returned to Moscow on September 25, embassy to Moscow of the representative of Hetman L. Kapusta).

If, when characterizing Russian-Polish relations, the emphasis was previously placed on causing “dishonor” to the royal name, now there are also cases of direct violation “from the royal side” of the Russian-Polish border, causing damage to the population. “...They learned to be in great spirits in border areas: when they come to the sovereign’s side, their Polish and Lithuanian people of the sovereign’s border cities and nobles and children of the boyars’ estates and estates are ruined, and their people and peasants are robbed and tortured with pink torments, and taken abroad strongly and inflict all sorts of evil on them” 1361. This emphasizes the common national interests of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples in the fight against lordly Poland, which is pursuing a policy of land seizures and religious oppression. The idea is substantiated that the blame for starting the war lies with the Polish government. “And King Jan Casimir and the lords ... refused peace with the Cherkassy, ​​and, although they eradicated the Orthodox Christian faith and the Church of God, they went to war against them under their great successors” 1362 (B. A. Repnine and others).

Under the petition of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Zaporozhye army to accept them “under... the sovereign’s high hand,” the conciliar act lays down the legal foundations: King Jan Casimir violated the oath of toleration given at the coronation and thereby freed his subjects “from all loyalty and obedience... » 1363.

After the “reading” of the government report, a discussion followed. First, the conciliar act contains the opinion of the boyars, which is regarded as a “sentence” (“and after listening to the boyars they sentenced”, “and according to this they sentenced”) 1364. This is followed by statements from other “ranks” listed at the beginning of the document. Here we are no longer talking about a “sentence”, but about an “interrogation” (“interrogated according to rank, separately”) 1365. Obviously, representatives of each “rank” conferred with each other and then announced their opinion. There are no statements from the clergy, although they were present at the council. Perhaps it simply confirmed what was said at the council of 1651?

The “sentence” of the boyars was: “there is a war against the Polish king,” and Bogdan Khmelnitsky with the Zaporozhye army “to accept their cities and lands.” Both proposals stemmed directly from the government report. The argumentation also coincides completely: the Polish side belittles the state dignity of Russia, the persecution of Orthodoxy, the threat of the Orthodox Ukrainian population transferring “to citizenship” to the Turkish Sultan or to the Crimean Khan, since the violation of the oath by the Polish king made his subjects “free people” 1366.

The conciliar act does not reproduce in detail the speeches of other “ranks”, it gives them concisely, summarily, noting their closeness to the statements of the boyars and combining them into two declarations - servicemen and merchants. The first said: “And they, the service people, will fight with the Lithuanian king for their state honor, not sparing their heads, and die for their state honor.” Traders of all ranks said: “Let us help and for their sovereign honor, we will die with our own heads for the sake of it” 1367. In short, it was about readiness to support the decision to go to war. It must be said that such declarations are not the original statement of the participants in the council on October 1, 1653. They have long been repeated from council to council in response to government requests for cash and military strength. But one should not consider statements of this kind by service and trade “rankers” as mere etiquette. These were commitments made in a public political forum, which was supposed to serve as a guarantee of their implementation.

At the council in the Chamber of Facets, the composition of the embassy was approved to swear in the residents of Ukraine (boyar V.V. Buturlin, steward I.V. Alferyev, Duma clerk L. Lopukhin) 1368.

In “Palace Discharges” the news of the Zemsky Sobor on October 1, 1653 is presented from a certain angle. Of the two closely related issues discussed at it - the relationship between Russia and Poland and Bogdan Khmelnitsky’s appeal to the Russian government about the reunification of Ukraine with Russia - the second issue was chosen. For the Russian government and for the classes of the Russian state, this was the main thing. But above all, the question of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia was the main one for the broad masses of the people, both Russian and Ukrainian. They did not take part in zemstvo councils and did not make decisions on Ukraine’s entry into Russia. However, objectively, this decision met the people's interests and met the needs of national development. Three major popular movements of the mid-17th century. - urban uprisings in Moscow and Pskov, the liberation struggle in Ukraine - gave rise to several zemstvo councils. They were close in social composition. But their historical significance is different. Councils 1648-1650 were busy strengthening the internal, class foundations of the feudal state. And although some progressive measures were taken, their main complex was aimed at strengthening serfdom. The war of liberation in Ukraine and its subsequent reunification with Russia did not and could not lead to the elimination of the feudal system, and the reunification itself took place in feudal forms. But the decision of the October Zemsky Sobor of 1653 provided the Ukrainian people with a more favorable path of historical development.

1322 Palace ranks, vol. III. SPb., 1852, stb. 343.
1323 Ibid., stb. 350.
1324 TsGADA, f. 210, Sevsky Stol, no. 148, pp. 1-192; No. 145, pp. 349-356 (several documents accidentally ended up in number 145 from a previously single column - number 148). As far as I know, this column has not yet been used as a source, although Kozachenko refers to it. See also: ibid., Belgorod Table, 360, l. 174; Kabanov A.K. Organization of elections to zemstvo councils of the 17th century. - ZhMNP, 1910, No. 9, p. 126, no. 8-9.
1325 Palace ranks, vol. III, stb. 351: “On the 15th day of May, the sovereign’s letters were sent to Zamoskovnye and Ukrainian cities to the governors and to the administrative people, it was ordered, according to the previous sovereign decree, elected people, good nobles, two people from the city, to be sent to Moscow by the previous indicated date, June by the 5th.” See also the royal letter to the Voronezh governor F.Yu. Arsenev dated June 7, 1653: “It was written from us to you in advance of this May on the 15th day with the boyar’s son Ivashk Cherlenikov, and it was ordered that two of the Voronezh residents from the boyar’s children should come to us to Moscow and the choice for them for elected people will be sent by hand in June at 5 days. And you didn’t send the Voronazh men to us in this place, so you put our case in jeopardy” (Kabanov A.K. Decree. cit., p. 126, No. 9).
1326 TsGADA, f. 210, Sevsky table, d. 148, pp. 31-32.
1327 Ibid., pp. 135-136.
1328 Ibid., pp. 36-38.
1329 Ibid., pp. 107-108.
1330 Ibid., pp. 189-187.
1331 Ibid., pp. 188-190.
1332 Ibid., Belgorod table, no. 351, pp. 346-352.
1333 Kabanov L.K. Decree. cit., p. 127-130, No. 10.
1334 Kozachenko A.I. On the history of the Zemsky Sobor of 1653. Historical archive", 1957, No. 4, p. 223-227.
1335 Ibid., p. 224-226.
1336 Kozachenko A, Ya. On the history of the Zemsky Sobor of 1653, p. 227. The cities named: Zamoskovnye - Bezhetsky Verkh, Vyazma, Dmitrov, Zubtsov, Kashin, Pereyaslavl Zalessky, Rzheva, Rostov, Ruza, Staritsa, Tver, Uglich, Yuryev Polsky; Ukrainian - Aleksin, Volkhov, Vorotynsk, Kaluga, Kashira, Kozelsk, Kolomna, Likhvin, Medyn, Odoev, Ryazan, Sevsk, Serpukhov, Solova, Tarusa.
1337 Ibid., p. 227. The cities named: Zamoskovnye - Borovsk, Vereya, Vladimir, Gorokhovets, Lukh, Murom, Nizhny; Ukrainian and Polish - Bolev, Bryansk, Voronezh, Yelets, Karachev, Livny, Medyn, Meshchera, Mtsensk, Novgorod Seversky, Novosil, Pochep, Putivl, Rylsk, Yaroslavets Maly.
1338 Kozachenko A.I. On the history of the Zemsky Sobor of 1653, p. 227.
1339 TsGADA, f. 79, op. 1, 1653, d. 6, l. 1.
1340 Soloviev S. M. Decree. op., book. V (vol. 9-10), p. 624. They talk about several cathedrals: Platonov S.F. Notes on the history of zemstvo cathedrals. - Articles on Russian history (1883-1912), ed. 2. St. Petersburg, 1912, p. 22-25; Latkin V.N. Decree. cit., p. 236-237, approx. 1; Kozachenko A.I. Zemsky Sobor 1653, p. 152-155.
1341 TsGADA, f. 27, d. 79, l. 4; Kozachenko A.I. Zemsky Sobor 1653, p. 153-154.
1342 V.D. Nazarov drew my attention to this.
1343 TsGADA, f. 79, op. 1, 1653, no. 6; Latkin V.N. Decree. cit., p. 434-440.
1344 TsGADA, f. 79, op. 1, 1653, d. 6, l. 1; Kozachenko A.I. Zemsky Sobor 1653, p. 153.
1345 TsGADA, f. 79, op. 1, 1653, no. 6; l. 1; Reunion, vol. III, p. 7, no. 1.
1346 TsGADA, f. 79, op. 1, 1653, d. 6, l. 2.
1347 Ibid., l. 15; Reunion, vol. III, p. 9, no. 1.
1348 TsGADA, f. 79, op. 1, 1653, no. 6, pp. 16-17.
1349 Reunion, vol. III, p. 10, No. 1. The verdict on October 1, 1653 returned to this issue again.
1350 A large literary and editorial edit was made on the draft “letter”. Here is one example. The phrase “Jan Casimir and the lords of the Rada said that they can’t bear peace with Cherkasy now, because they have many troops gathered and they are going against their enemies, Cherkasy is going to war against them, but they don’t even want to hear the Treaty of Zborovsky, and they don’t want to give up churches from them it is impossible for them” is crossed out, except for the first five words. Instead of what was crossed out, it is written: “...and that matter was treated as nothing, and they refused peace with the Cherkasy people, and although they eradicated the Orthodox Christian faith and destroyed the churches of God, they went to war against them” (TsGADA, f. 79, op. 1 1653, d. 6, l. 19).
1351 Ibid., l. 21, 25, 27-28.
1352 Ibid., l. 20.
1353 Ibid., l. 29.
1354 Palace ranks, vol. III, stb. 354.
1355 Palace ranks, vol. III, stb. 355-356.
1356 Reunion, vol. III, p. 322-323, No. 169.
1357 Ibid., p. 406-414, No. 197; SGGD, vol. 3. M., 1822, p. 481-489, No. 157; AUZR, vol. X. St. Petersburg, 1878, p. 3-18, No. 2; Acts relating to the history of zemstvo councils, p. 68-76, No. XX.
1358 Reunion, vol. III, p. 406-414, No. 197.
1359 “Palace ranks,” naming the members of the council on October 1, 1653, say: “and from the captains, and from the solicitors, and from the nobles, and from the tenants, and from the townspeople, there were elected people” (Palace ranks, vol. III, Art. 369). There is no talk about “elected” city nobles and boyar children.
1360 Reunion, vol. III, p. 407.
1361 Ibid., p. 410.
1362 Ibid., p. 411.
1363 Ibid., p. 411-412.
1364 Reunion, vol. III, p. 413-414.
1365 Ibid., p. 414.
1366 Ibid.
1367 Ibid.
1368 Palace ranks, vol. III, stb. 372.