Moonsund defensive operation (1941). Travel to the island of Saaremaa Ezel Island 1941 the fate of captured soldiers

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Following the scouts, the temporary commander of the 2nd battalion of the 151st PP, Hauptmann Pankov, ordered his battalion on the morning of September 16 to cross the dam and seize a bridgehead on the eastern shore of the island of Saaremaa. Due to the fact that the bridgehead on the eastern shore of Saaremaa was captured, the operation to cross the Veike Vein Strait was canceled, and the German units took turns crossing the dam to Saaremaa. By 20:00, four German battalions were already operating on this island.

On this day, the story of the missing fifth boat of the German special forces continued. The pilots who attacked the battery on Kyubassar reported that they saw two people in German uniforms who gave them signs. A message was sent to them, and they confirmed with the signs specified in it that there were no Soviet units in this place. To evacuate them, two He-59 seaplanes from the 9th Naval Aviation Squadron of the search and rescue service were used. The operation to rescue his soldiers was led by Hauptmann Benes. After splashdown, rifle and machine-gun fire was opened on these aircraft. One plane burned down and the second flew away. Pilot Oberfeldwebel P. Todte and pilot observer Lieutenant H. Zepke were wounded 273
Strelbitsky K. B. Losses of the German air force during the struggle for the Moonsund Islands from September 9 to October 21, 1941. Tsushima Forum. http://tsushima.su/forums/viewtopic.php?id=1041&p=6

Hauptmann Benes found two of his soldiers in the reeds and, on two inflatable boats, took them and two wounded pilots out to sea, where they were picked up by a naval aircraft. Both rescued people said that while descending to the boat they were captured and shot in the back, pretending to be dead, they then hid in the reeds.

The Kriegsmarine, despite the significant waves, systematically carried out the movement of ships between Virtsu and Kuivastu along the corridor created by German minesweepers. The German command concentrated the main efforts of the minesweepers on creating a mine-safe corridor to conduct the landing flotilla to the north for a future landing operation on Hiiumaa. At the same time, the commander of the German minesweeper forces in the Gulf of Riga repeated diversionary operations as part of Operation Svedwind. These operations were now carried out without the towing caravans and coasters of the Ostsee IO, since they were already participating in the shuttle transport to Mukha.

During the day, Air Command "B" focused its main efforts on ensuring the crossing of its infantry across the dam and seizing a bridgehead on the eastern bank of Saaremaa. In addition, anti-aircraft batteries on the western edge of Triigi Bay and on Hiiumaa near Heltermaa were suppressed. The ships in Triigi Bay were bombed, as a result of which KTSh No. 1306, 1307, 1309, 1310, 1318 sank; the last boat MO-216, minesweeper No. 81, tug KP-11, transport "Volkhov" 274
CVMA RF. F. 161. Op. 43. D. 100. L. 13–14.

During this day, the Germans lost 1 Bf-109 and 1 He-59 naval aircraft.

Table 14

In the operational report of the General Staff of the Red Army, the progress of the battles on Muhu Island is reflected as follows: “No. 172 on 20.00 16.09.1941: “At 15.00 13.9 the enemy landed troops on the island. Moon, Kubusar Peninsula (northern - eastern part of Ezel Island), there are fierce battles in which both sides suffer heavy losses. The enemy tried to land troops in Lyu Bay on the western coast of the island. Ezel with 6 transports, 8 destroyers and 11 torpedo boats. The landing party was repulsed, while 1 destroyer and 4 transports with enemy troops were destroyed, of which 3 transports with a displacement of 8,000 tons and one with a displacement of 4,000 tons.”

No. 176 on 20.00 09.18.1941: “On September 15, the enemy, with the support of ships and aircraft, landed troops of up to two regiments. Our units, with heavy fighting, retreated to the Orissary dam. Enemy attempts to land an amphibious assault force on the Kyubasar Peninsula (Ezel Island) were repulsed, while transport, 80 boats and boats were sunk, transport and a destroyer were damaged, and an enemy aircraft was shot down. The enemy airborne landing force on 7 gliders was destroyed. During September 16, up to 90 enemy aircraft bombed ships and coastal defense units on the island. Ezel. Losses are being clarified" 275
Information provided by K. B. Strelbitsky.

Ezel (September 17–23)

By the beginning of the fighting on Saaremaa, German troops, taking advantage of the confusion in the Soviet troops retreating from Muhu, crossed to the eastern bank of Saaremaa along the dam. All possible reserves were thrown against the Germans: the 1st local Estonian rifle battalion, a cavalry detachment, a chemical company and the 10th sapper company. But attempts to dislodge the Germans from the bridgehead did not lead to success. Scattered attacks by Soviet troops were repulsed. German aviation took an active part in the battles.

After abandoning the Orissari positions, it was not possible to stop the Germans on the second line of defense. Commandant of Coastal Defense General Eliseev in his reports 276
The first report was made immediately upon arrival in Leningrad in October 1941 by the commandant of the BOBR, Lieutenant General of the Coastal Service, Eliseev, and the commissioner of the BOBR, divisional commissar Zaitsev. The second report was made at a meeting of the command staff of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in March 1942 by the commandant of the BOBR, Lieutenant General of the Coastal Service Eliseev.

And the report 277
CVMA RF. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 528.

The main reason for this failure is the betrayal of the battalion created from mobilized Estonians. In the second report, he states: “The Estonian reserve battalion located in Paide was thrown into battle under the half-house of Pumale - a dam, at the first contact with the enemy without a fight, completely in the amount of 1350 people went over to the side of the enemy, as a result of this the enemy broke through the Orissari position and began to spread alone group to the south, to Kyubassar, the second to the northwest towards Triga" 278
CVMA RF. F. 161 Op. 6. D. 26. L. 34.

However, this fact is not confirmed in German documents and memoirs.

The author has at his disposal the combat logs of the XXXXII AK and the 61st Infantry Division, books on the history of the 61st Infantry Division and the 151st Infantry Division, written by direct participants in the battles, including the commander of the 151st Infantry Division, Oberst Melzer. None of the sources mention the mass surrender of Red Army soldiers in the period from September 14 to October 4, 1941, much less the transfer of a full Soviet battalion to their side. The version about the transition of the Estonian battalion to the side of the Germans is not confirmed in Estonian sources either. Estonian historian Maelis Maripuu describes these events as follows: “After the German troops quickly crossed the Väike-Väin Strait, the Red Army’s defenses collapsed and a rapid retreat began. Local mobilized military personnel, when sent into battle, gradually, at the first opportunity, left Soviet units and surrendered to the Germans. One part managed to receive civilian clothes from local residents and quietly cross the front line. In the German rear they began to move towards their homelands. By this time, patrols from the formed Omakaitse were already patrolling the roads. Their task was to detain those who came from the Red Army. It was especially difficult for those who lived on the island of Muhu to go home, because the dam across the Väike-Väin Strait was guarded by Omakaitse. They turned a blind eye to fellow villagers who returned home and let them go in peace.” 279
Maripuu M. Esimene nõukogude aasta Saaremaal // Saaremaa. 2. Ajalugu. Majandus. Kultuur. Tallinn, 2007 (translation from Estonian by E. Kubi).

Veteran of this battalion A. Klaas also does not confirm the version of the transition in full force to the side of the Germans 280
Klaas A. In those days... / Kadakaste saarte kaitsel. – Tallinn, 1966 (Fortress at Sea, collection). P. 37.

The death of the “Estonian” battalion, as well as other reserve units, was probably due to bombing attacks by German aircraft. The reasons for the death of the cavalry detachment are visible in the dialogue between Vasily Riis and the commandant of Kuressaare, Major Fedorov, given in the memoirs of the former. He writes: “...I met the city commandant. “You know, our cavalry detachment...” he began, but I couldn’t listen to him to the end. His face and tone already said it all. "I know!" – I interrupted. “Two planes and ten minutes were enough... The times of the cavalry are over,” the commandant continued stubbornly. And with amazing clarity, the morning-fresh faces of the horsemen stood before my eyes.” 281
Riis V. On the line of fire / Kadakaste saarte kaitsel. – Tallinn, 1966 (Fortress at Sea, collection). P. 37.

The gap between Soviet units was struck by the 161st reconnaissance battalion of the 61st Infantry Division, which launched an attack on Kihelkona.

During September 17, the Germans continued to expand the bridgehead on Saaremaa and reached the line east of Triigi - Kardja - Mustla, cutting off Soviet units on the Kybassar Peninsula. On the same day, Muhu was finally captured. To clean it up and create Estonian self-defense (under German control), the 3rd Battalion of the 311th Infantry Division of the 217th Infantry Division was transferred from Virtsu to the island. The personnel of the 85th local rifle company of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, the 43rd coastal battery and a detachment from the rifle battalion of Captain Ogorodnikov continued to defend on the Kyubassar peninsula, cut off from their troops.

On the night of September 17-18, the infantry regiments of the 61st Infantry Division repelled numerous counterattacks by Soviet troops. In the north of the island, a column of Soviet units defending the northeastern part of the island broke through the positions of the 176th infantry regiment. The basis of this group was the 1st Battalion of the 46th Regiment and, probably, the sailors of the Kuivastu OHR. The losses of the 176th brigade when repelling the attack amounted to 14 people. In the south, large units of Soviet troops, on trucks, with three tanks, attacked the positions of the 3rd battalion of the 162nd infantry regiment. The battle went on all night, the attack was repulsed. It was likely that a cavalry detachment was operating, which included three flamethrower tanks. The losses of the 162nd brigade were 53 people. Because of the night fighting, the Germans rested until lunchtime. Then they replenished supplies of ammunition, food and carried out deep reconnaissance. The units of the 151st infantry regiment and 161st rb were advancing mainly. 282
NARA. T-315. R-1013. F-000332-34 (document provided by A. Perestoronin, translated from German by V. Lobanov).

On September 17, the Kriegsmarine continued diversionary operations against the Soviet garrison of the islands - “Svedwind”. Again, landings were demonstrated and the Soviet coast was shelled in the areas of Abruka Island, the city of Kuressaare and the Keiguste Peninsula. During one of them (“Stimmung”), off the southern coast of the island of Saaremaa, the minesweeper of the 17th flotilla M-1707 was blown up by a mine; it came under fire from our 3rd coastal battery and was abandoned by the crew, who lost only 14 people killed. A few hours later, it was discovered by a detachment of TKA captain-lieutenant Osipov, consisting of TKA No. 83, 154, 111 and 67. The personnel of the latter removed weapons (20-mm cannon and 5 rifles) and ammunition from the minesweeper and sank it with a torpedo 283
CVMA RF. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 531. L. 209.

German aircraft bombed Keighuste Bay. Two TKAs No. 17 and 93 came under German attack. They were here after damage received on September 9. They could not be towed, since the tug "Riga" was laying out mine banks, and the remaining TKAs were on combat duty. At 10:38 a.m., a torpedo on the TKA-93 exploded as a result of a shrapnel hit. Both boats were destroyed 284
CVMA RF. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 531. L. 205.

Two German floating batteries were used to combat the coastal battery on Kuressaare. Sweeping work continued on the minefield in the Greater Sound in order to create a fairway from north to south, for subsequent passage of ships to the north of Saaremaa for the purpose of carrying out an amphibious operation on Hiiumaa. The crossing of artillery and watercraft continued through the Viirs-Kurk Strait under fire from the Soviet 43rd battery.

The breakthrough of German troops on Saaremaa forced Kudryavtsev’s air group to relocate to the take-off site of the Sõrve Peninsula. At the Kogul airfield, fighters that were unable to take off due to malfunctions were destroyed: two I-153s and one Yak-1 and I-16 each. Aircraft of new designs could not take off from a small site on Syrve and were sent to Leningrad on September 17. Junior Lieutenant Naumov flew to the Bychye Pole airfield in a MiG-3. The plane was destroyed during landing, but the pilot remained unharmed. The Yak-1 landed at the Komendantsky airfield. Two Che-2s sent to Saaremaa were met by German fighters in the area of ​​Nargen Island and returned to Leningrad 285
CVMA RF. F. 586. Op. 40. D. 35. L. 275, 276.

Early in the morning of this day, I./KG 77 and II./ZG 26 were again returned to the command of the I Air Corps and began flying to Leningrad. The remaining aircraft attacked coastal batteries in Keigust and Kybassaare, as well as anti-aircraft gun positions at Kogul airfield. Ships in the bays of Keiguste, Triigi and the Gulf of Riga were also successfully attacked by the Germans. In the afternoon, General von Wülisch, due to the start of the assault on Leningrad, was recalled to the headquarters of the 1st VF and handed over command of the air units to the commander of the Ostsee air command, Oberst von Wild.

In the operational report of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, the battles on this day are described as follows: “At 20.00 on September 19, 1941: “At 05.00 on 17.09, the enemy again tried to land troops in Keigust Bay (Ezel Island) with 5 minesweepers, 5 transports and torpedo boats. The enemy's attempt was repulsed by the actions of our coastal batteries. Under the cover of a smoke screen, the enemy retreated. 1 enemy transport was sunk. Battle at the Orisar Dam on the island. Ezel continues."

During September 18, the Germans continued their offensive on three fronts. In the north, along the coast, the 176th brigade was advancing. He had to take the hardest battle on the shore of Triigi Bay. Here the withdrawal of the 1st Sat of the 46th Regiment was covered by a detachment of communists and Komsomol members of the battalion and sailors of the OVR. German 88-mm anti-aircraft guns from the 111th Anti-Aircraft Regiment fired at the ships in the bay. The following ships were sunk: Helga, Triton and the ferry Kuivasto. 286
CVMA RF. D. 670. L. 27.

The OVR commander, Captain 3rd Rank Egorov, who remained in Triigi, and his team destroyed faulty boats and blew up the remaining stock of fuel and lubricants and a warehouse with aerial bombs. After that we went to Hiiumaa 287
The third separate rifle... forgotten. Collection of memoirs of participants in the defense of the Moonsund Islands in 1941 / Compiled by M. L. Kondratova, V. N. Lukin. – St. Petersburg, 2010. P. 273.

In the center, on Kuressaare, the 151st regiment was advancing. Between them the 161st rb was advancing. In the south, along the coast, the 162nd brigade was advancing. They were opposed by the remnants of the 85th local regiment and the 43rd BB. In the forest north of the battery, there was an attempt to use aerial bombs with weakened fuses suspended from trees, like tension mines. But this obstacle was destroyed by enemy aircraft 288
CVMA RF. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 528. L. 152.

After a fierce battle, the Germans captured the guns of the 43rd battery on Kybassaare. They were blown up by battery personnel. Now nothing threatened the crossing of the Germans from Virts to Kuivast except the storm that had begun. With the help of the 777th airborne engineer company, the German command launched a second ferry crossing from Virtsu to Kuivasta. The German floating batteries began to fight the Soviet battery on Keygusta. During the attack on Kuressaare, German reconnaissance captured a Soviet howitzer battery of 122 mm guns on the march, and approximately 100 people surrendered. To comb the south-eastern part of Saaremaa through Mukha in the afternoon, the 2nd battalion of the 311th infantry regiment of the 217th infantry division is transferred to this area. German aviation continued to fight Soviet coastal batteries, tried to prevent the withdrawal of Soviet troops and attacked Soviet ships in Triigi.

Operational report of the General Staff of the spacecraft No. 183 at 8.00 09.21.1941 reported: “Garrison o. Ezel, under enemy pressure, withdrew from the Orisar dam and by 01.00 19.9 occupied the line of the Kakhta-Laht Peninsula, Palo Kurdla, Koigi-Jarv, Karedi Manor, Kuhiguste, Kaaba, Triigi. A repeated attempt by the enemy to land troops in the Keygust area was repulsed, with one enemy transport sunk and two damaged. The stationary battery on the Kybossaar peninsula was blown up by personnel after all the ammunition had been shot. Enemy forces on Ezel Island are up to one and a half regiments with armored vehicles.”

The next day, September 19, the Germans continued their advance to the west. On the southeastern coast, German troops continued to resist in the area of ​​Keiguste Bay by personnel of the 1st BB, 515th Ozenbat and one of the companies of the sailor detachment. As a result of the aerial bombardment, the commander of the anti-aircraft battery, Lieutenant Danilkin, was seriously wounded; his further fate is unknown. The commander of the coastal battery, Lieutenant Budaev, was seriously wounded in the legs. Not wanting to surrender, he shot himself 289
Chernov Yu. Meridians of Baltic Glory (Following the footsteps of the defense of the Moonsund Archipelago). – M., 1968. P. 71–72.

On this day, the Germans captured the 1st coastal battery on the Keiguste Peninsula. The guns were blown up by battery personnel. The Kriegsmarine continued to create a 300 m wide passage from south to north into Triigi Bay to concentrate the landing flotilla against Hiiumaa. The next day the Germans made their main efforts to capture Kuressaare. To do this, they concentrated the forces of the 151st and 162nd regiments against the Soviet group defending the city.

The greatest advance of German troops occurred on September 20. Soviet troops began to retreat to the Sõrve Peninsula. From the report of General Eliseev it is clear that he chose from two withdrawal options: to the island of Hiiumaa and the Sõrve peninsula of the island of Saaremaa. Due to the operational situation prevailing at that time of the battle, the second course of action was adopted. General Eliseev wrote: “By this time, the main floating assets had been destroyed by enemy aircraft, there were a few small minesweepers left on which no more than a battalion could be lifted without equipment, but this was also doubtful, because (as in the text. - Auto.) enemy aircraft constantly destroyed boats and small boats. It took at least ten nights to retreat, but only at night... They couldn’t hold out for that many days, so the decision was made to retreat in battle to the Svorbe Peninsula, for which to organize a number of lines... After the decision was made, all the ammunition, food, gasoline and warm uniforms transferred to Svorbe, organizing all economic organizations there. An airfield for our aviation was also prepared and built there.” 290
CVMA RF. F. 161. Op. 6. D. 28. L. 39.

However, the logic of events does not allow us to agree that there was an option to retreat to Hiiumaa. It is unlikely that in the turmoil of the retreat it would have been possible to withdraw all material supplies from Syrve in an organized manner within three days, and even to build an airfield on it. In addition, part of the forces of the Saaremaa garrison had not yet entered into battle at all and were located precisely on Syrve, these were the 69th Infantry Brigade and the 34th Infantry Infantry. Let’s get acquainted with the opinion of General Kabanov: “The error of the decision taken is obvious. The Gulf of Riga and the entire coast are in German hands. One battery of A. M. Stebel, even though it fought heroically, and four torpedo boats of V. P. Gumanenko with a dozen torpedoes still cannot protect the Irben Strait. So wouldn’t it be better to save at least part of the garrison and go to Hiiumaa, three times smaller than Saaremaa, so that together and with the help of the Hanko garrison, they could stubbornly defend both the island itself and the mouth of the Gulf of Finland? That’s what I thought and expressed it at the Hanko checkpoint then. I still think so now.” 291
Kabanov S. I. On distant approaches. – M., 1971. P. 240.

After the decision was made to redeploy the main forces and supplies to Sõrve and leave Kuressaare, local authorities also moved there. Their general headquarters was located in the village of Yameyala, in the farm of local teacher Eduard Punab 292
Puüa, Endel. Punane terror Saaremaal 1941. aastal. (Saaremaa Muuseumi toimetised. 3.) Kuressaare, 2006. P.40 (translation from Estonian by E. Kubi).

On Syrva, soldiers of the 12th Destroyer Battalion rounded up requisitioned cattle from all over the island. 293
Right there. P. 43.

Due to the rapid advance of the German 161st reconnaissance battalion, the Soviet command was unable to carry out a systematic and organized retreat to Syrve. Because of this, a crisis in management arose. General A.B. Eliseev briefly mentions it in his report: “The maneuverable nature of modern ground operations requires the widespread development of radio communications between individual units up to and including the company, which was not done in 3-OSB, where control was based on electrical communication means exposed to aviation and acts of sabotage" 294
CVMA RF. F. 161. Op. 6. D. 28. L. 58.

In a political report sent by the head of the political department of the BOBR, regimental commissar L.E. Kopnov and intercepted by the Germans, this crisis is described more specifically: “Cases of cowardice and panic have been identified. Among other things, a number of soldiers and commanders left their positions without orders. A significant part of the units, especially the commanders of the 3rd separate rifle brigade, turned out to be unable to fight in difficult conditions and lead their subordinates. The enemy air force destroyed telephone lines. The commanders of the various units did nothing to re-establish the interrupted connection. Intelligence was often very insufficient" 295

The consequence of this crisis was the removal of the chief of staff of the 3rd special brigade, Colonel V. M. Pimenov, from his post and his transfer to the post of chief of staff of the 69th special brigade. True, according to veterans, he continued to remain at brigade headquarters. Instead of V. M. Pimenov, the head of the operational department of the headquarters, Captain Ya. F. Yatsuk, was appointed to the post of chief of staff of the brigade. According to the recollections of veterans who went to Syrva without their subordinates, the commander and commissar of the 317th coastal battery were ordered by General Eliseev to return to the German rear for their personnel. Probably, senior lieutenant Osmanov and senior political instructor Lomonosov considered this order impossible to implement. “They went into the forest and allegedly committed suicide there.” 296
The third separate rifle... forgotten. Collection of memoirs of participants in the defense of the Moonsund Islands in 1941 / Compiled by M. L. Kondratova, V. N. Lukin. – St. Petersburg, 2010.

The commander and military commissar of the OVR, because they left Triiga for Hiiumaa, and not for Sõrve, the commandant of BOBR ordered to be arrested 297
CVMA RF. F. 161. Op. 43. D. 111. L. 24.

The defense of the isthmus was personally organized by General Eliseev. According to the memoirs of veteran A.P. Uvarov: “While driving through the isthmus of the Svorbe Peninsula, I personally saw General Eliseev, in a worn leather raglan. He was pale, with red eyes from sleepless nights. It was towards evening. The general personally organized the defense in this place, stopped trucks on the road and sent them back to the rear for shells if the trucks were empty.” 298
Right there. P. 254.

Despite the resistance of the vanguards of the Soviet troops, the Germans continued their offensive. The reconnaissance battalion of the 61st Infantry Division broke through to the Aste airfield area and turned north. The main battle took place in the Mustjala area, after which a Soviet battery of 180 mm guns was captured. The guns were blown up. The reconnaissance battalion had difficulties in supplying troops. This happened because the water level in the Suur-Väin Strait dropped by 0.5 m; transports delivering cargo for the division had to be unloaded far from the shore. The command of the training detachment “Ostsee” described this situation as follows: “For many days the water level was so low that every time they tried to unload on the Moon, the ships sat on the rocks and then had to be pulled off by tugboats.” 299
NARA. T-311. R-51. P-2. F-063400 (translation from German by I. Borisenko).

Therefore, the Kriegsmarine command decided to use heavy gliders to support the troops. They landed directly at the location of Soviet units and were destroyed. The last serviceable Soviet MBR-2 seaplanes left the Kihelkonna hydroairfield on September 20, 1941, after which the remaining ground personnel of the 15th squadron took part in the defense of the island of Saaremaa on land. During the flight to Oranienbaum from September 16 to 18, three MBR-2s went missing. They carried ten commanders and a cryptographer. Their fate is unknown 300
CVMA RF. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 122. L. 475.

Minesweepers No. 82 and 89 were sent from Hiiumaa to pick up the ground personnel of the 15th Uae. However, they did not come to Kihelkona. Their search began on the morning of September 23, but was unsuccessful. Only some time later it became known that these minesweepers were interned in Swedish waters. And it was no coincidence that they got into them. Probably, out of fear of death, under the impression of losses in Triigi Bay, the acting commander of the 8th minesweeper division, Lieutenant Commander I. P. Teplitsky, commander of minesweeper No. 82, senior lieutenant G. V. Ivanov and commander of minesweeper No. 89 , Lieutenant P.N. Krivolapov hatched a conspiracy to desert. They attracted part of the crew personnel to him. Having gone out to carry out a combat mission in Kihelkona, they, having killed political instructors Akulov and Yakovlev, headed to the shores of Sweden. In total, Sweden received from these ships: 13 medium commanders, 17 junior commanders and 30 Red Navy men. Some of them will then refuse to return to their homeland. These were the first defenders of the Moonsund Islands interned in Sweden.

On the night of September 19–20, five ICBMs-2 44th Airborne Division were sent to Saaremaa. Of these, three seaplanes were unable to land and flew back. Two landed, one of them flew back that same night, one remained 301
CVMA RF. F. 586. Op. 40. D. 35. L. 280.

The battle of Leningrad required more and more troops. Therefore, from the subordination of the commander of the 61st Infantry Division, the 2nd Battalion of the 311th Infantry Division of the 217th Infantry Division and the 637th Heavy Motorized Artillery Division were withdrawn and sent to the east. On September 20, the command of the 61st Infantry Division began preparations for a landing operation against Soviet troops on the island of Hiiumaa. German intelligence suggested that the island's garrison was approximately 3-5 thousand people, 8 artillery batteries (including 5-6 coastal), 10 anti-aircraft batteries, defensive lines, mainly in the south, northwest and north of the island. At the same time, the eastern and southeastern coast of Hiiumaa was considered to be less fortified. It was there that the main attack of the amphibious assault was planned by the forces of the 172nd infantry regiment 302
Melzer. Kampf um die Baltischen Inseln 1917–1941-1944. – 1960. S. 234 (translation from German – Central Scientific Translation Bureau of the Navy, Leningrad, 1962). pp. 67–68.

By 12 noon on September 21, the 151st and 162nd infantry regiments captured Kuressaare. The combing of the city began. Before leaving, the BOBR headquarters building was blown up. The Romassare pier, prepared for destruction, could not be blown up, since the infantry covering the pier withdrew and the demolition men died 303

The German 2nd battalion of the 162nd infantry regiment, passing through the city, captured the bridge across the Nasva River unexploded. The demolition charges on the bridge were neutralized. In the west, the 161st RB from the Mustjala area broke through to Kihelkone, where they captured two faulty ICBM-2s, after which reconnaissance patrols were sent to the northwest to comb the Hundsort Peninsula, to the south to capture Lümand and to the east to capture the Kogul airfield. During the withdrawal, construction forces No. 05 destroyed all valuable property at airfields, warehouses and piers: burned, blown up, flooded with water (cement). The iron remained undestroyed. The 3rd Special Brigade organized the destruction of cement stored in the north (6000 tons) 304
CVMA RF. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 528. L. 153.

Soviet batteries on the Hundsort Peninsula, structures and an ammunition depot at the airfield were blown up. According to German intelligence data and the testimony of prisoners, the main forces of the Soviet garrison were retreating to the Syrve Peninsula. To verify this data, the commander of the 61st Infantry ordered the next day to attack in the direction of the peninsula with the forces of the 161st RB and the forward detachment of the 162nd Infantry Division. The remaining infantry regiments, the 176th and 151st, carried out combing operations in the northwest and central parts of Saaremaa, respectively.

The commandant of the BOBR, following the results of the battles until September 22, reported: “The enemy in three columns is pushing our units towards Arensburg. There is no strength to hold on to a broad front. I’m leaving for Tserel, preparing for the final battle. There were many losses of personnel and equipment from enemy aircraft. The Red Navy withstands the fighting, the 3rd brigade is holding out weakly. The Estonian battalions went over to the enemy's side. We will fight to the last" 305
CVMA RF. F. 161. Op. 43. D. 111. L. 16.

On September 22, Kudryavtsev’s air group was reinforced with three I-16s and three I-153s from the Hanko air group (13th ap) 306
CVMA RF. F. 586. Op. 40. D. 35. L. 292.

The senior lieutenant of the group was G. D. Tsokolaev 307
Kabanov S. I. On distant approaches. – M., 1971. P. 242.

The appearance of this group caused an escalation of air combat. Senior lieutenants Krainov, Semenov, Tsokolaev and junior lieutenant Krainov shot down a German bomber over Cape Tserel. In turn, German fighters, Lieutenant W. Kretschmer and non-commissioned officer G. Normann, shot down two I-153 308
Prien J. Die Jagdflied erverbände der Deutschen Luftwffe 1934 bis 1945. Teil 6/II. S. 294–295. P. 292 (translation from German by V. Lobanov).

13th ap lieutenant K.L. Andreev (wounded) and junior lieutenant N.L. Shabanov (killed). On the same day, there was an air battle between a German seaplane and Soviet fighters over the island of Abruka. The Germans describe it as follows: “The Ostsee Air Command, Oberst von Wild, personally attacked the Abruk battery on this day with bombs and cannon fire and was able to fight in two battles with 1 I-16 and 2 I-153 in his seaplane (He-114 ) escape from the enemy without significant damage to your vehicle" 309
NARA. T-311. R-51. P-2. F-063361 (translation from German by I. Borisenko).

One victory over a German seaplane on September 22 was credited to Major Leonovich, as well as a group victory to Lieutenant Khromov and Junior Lieutenant Shevtsov. On the same day, junior lieutenants Khromov and Shevtsov shot down a German Hs-126 short-range reconnaissance aircraft. Air battles continued the next day. Lieutenant Colonel Kudryavtsev chalked up two victories over fighters 310
CVMA. F. 226. Op. 27. D. 28656. L. 54.

However, these fighters do not appear on the lists of German losses. On September 23, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet Air Force command again tried to organize an air bridge to Saaremaa. Three MBR-2 44th ae at 22:45. flew to the island, but were forced to return due to bad weather conditions.

According to preliminary data from the Germans, by the evening of September 23, 3,305 people were captured on the islands. prisoners. In addition, up to and including September 22, the following weapons were captured: “5 tanks, 37 guns, 11 anti-aircraft guns, 20 anti-tank guns, 2 infantry guns, 44 mortars, 98 machine guns, about 400 hand weapons.” 311
NARA. T-311. R-51 (translation from German by I. Borisenko).

The Germans assessed the mood in the Soviet troops as follows: “The desire to fight itself is less than on the mainland, since the hopelessness of the situation is generally known. However, the commissars (there are now 40 of them on the Svorbe Peninsula alone) constantly forced the troops to resist. Means of influence: 1) the Germans shoot prisoners; 2) repressions against family members of defectors and prisoners by the government (exile and confiscation of property). There are few defectors" 312
Right there.

The alleged intentions of the Soviet troops were assessed as follows: “The troops must continue to offer stubborn resistance on Svorbe and Dago. The order to withdraw to Svorbe was given on September 20. The troops were told that they would be taken out by military and merchant ships." 313
Right there.

From September 21, the commander of the Ostsee air command was subordinated to the 506th Bomber Group under the command of Oberstleutnant V. Schwartz, which consisted of 9 Ju-88 A-4s and was based in Riga 314
NARA. T-311. R-51. P-2. F-063359 (translation from German by I. Borisenko).

Number 9 includes only aircraft from the 1st and 3rd squadrons. In addition to the two headquarters aircraft, the commander of the 506th group was subordinate to the 2nd squadron of the 906th air group (4 Ju-88 A-4).

The German command tried on September 22 to break through to the Syrve Peninsula on the move with the help of the 162nd infantry regiment and the 161st reconnaissance battalion. However, all attempts to break through to the isthmus met with fierce resistance. In the combat log of the 61st Infantry Division, the situation was assessed as follows: “The fighting of the day confirmed that the enemy had withdrawn the main forces to Svorbe and would defend the peninsula with all his might. The division command asked itself the question: why did the enemy leave the entire island to offer resistance only on this peninsula, but a look at the map completely explains this. The thin isthmus at the entrance makes it possible to defend it with small forces, while at the same time the length of the peninsula does not make it possible to completely cover it with artillery fire. Finally, the armored battery on Tserele, already known since the First World War, blocks the Gulf of Riga at the southern tip of the peninsula. The strategic importance of Ezel lies precisely in the Svorbe Peninsula." 315
NARA. T-315. R-1013. F-000344-47 (document provided by A. Perestoronin, translated from German by V. Lobanov).

The higher command continued to remove the commander of the 61st Infantry Reinforcement Unit from subordination. According to the German higher command, the main task was completed, and on this day an order was issued to send the 254th construction battalion and a company of the 683rd construction battalion to Leningrad.

The BOBR command tried to create a powerful artillery group of coastal artillery on Syrva. However, time for this was also lost, and during the general retreat it was not possible to carry out the plan. During the evacuation of guns to the Sõrve Peninsula from the Hundsort Peninsula, only one gun from the 24th battery was delivered; the gun from the 25th battery and the personnel accompanying it were missing. Perhaps this is what is mentioned in the report of the German Air Command "B". True, it mentions two guns: “At Laadyala (the base of the Hundsort Peninsula. - Auto.) two heavy enemy guns being transported along the road were attacked by bombs and cannon and machine-gun fire, and the servants of the guns hid for so long that the advanced German units were able to capture both guns.” 316
NARA. T-311. R-51. P-2. F-063357 (translation from German by I. Borisenko).

An attempt was also made to transfer two guns from Pamman (167th BB) to Syrve; the guns were removed and transported, but the road was cut off and both guns were apparently captured disassembled by the enemy 317
CVMA RF. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 528. L. 153.

Khiuma was defended by a small force - only about 4,000 people. The garrison was commanded by Colonel A. S. Konstantinov, the military commissar was regimental commissar M. S. Bilenko, and the chief of staff was Colonel P. V. Savelyev.
When the enemy began landing simultaneously on three directions, the commandant found it difficult to decide where to throw his small forces. The landing began at dawn on October 12, seven days after the end of the fighting at Sarema; it took the enemy a whole week to concentrate sufficient forces here. Large units of the 217th Infantry Division were prepared for the landing on Hiuma, concentrated on Sarema, Vormsi and on the coast of the mainland. The landing was supported by aircraft, destroyers and light cruisers. During the battles for Hiuma, a group of enemy ships "Westfallen" consisting of the cruiser "Cologne", destroyers "T-2", "T-5", "T-7", "T-8", seven base minesweepers were located at Cape Ristna . Another group, "Ostpreisen", as part of the 2nd minesweeper flotilla, was located off the eastern coast of the island.
On the night of October 12, observers on the southern coast of Khium noticed an unusual activity on Sarema and the light of many car headlights. At dawn, almost in darkness, the enemy, covering himself with hurricane fire from his artillery, began to cross the bay. Six landing detachments went to the area occupied by the 33rd engineer battalion and the 44th battery. The battery immediately, at maximum rate of fire, opened fire. Precisely fired shells swept boats and boats from the water surface. Field guns, machine guns, and machine guns also entered the battle. Four landing detachments were defeated.
The enemy directed efforts to the left flank of the Terkma sector, where our troops were not present and where the battery fire did not reach. Soon the Nazis landed on the right flank of the site, near the village of Nurste. The battalion commander A.P. Morozov threw his reserve into battle. At dawn, enemy planes appeared. Communication with the companies was broken; Company and platoon commanders now acted independently. A detachment of Captain Goryunov numbering 150 people was advanced to the village of Valga. The heroes fought at this line for two days, inflicting significant losses on the enemy. Being wounded, Goryunov continued to command the detachment. A brave and courageous man, a communist, he died heroically in battle.
The fascists were prevented from developing their success by the battery of captain F.N. Volkov. The enemy cruiser and destroyers opened fire on her, while guns from Sarem were firing, and aircraft were bombing. The enemy threw part of the landing force against Kataev's battery, directly in the area of ​​the firing position. Machine gunners and searchlight men defended the battery with machine-gun fire and grenades, while artillerymen shot at the infantry at point-blank range. All day long the soldiers held back the enemy's onslaught. The enemy group captured the battery barracks; a few volleys - and the barracks, along with the Nazis, flew into the air. The same thing happened with the barn where the Nazis broke into. Fierce fighting raged for about a day. Up to three hundred enemy soldiers were destroyed on the approaches to the battery.

“I’m surrounded,” Kataev reported, “I’m fighting. The enemy is at the wire fence. I am under fire, being bombed by aircraft, and burning codes. Let's be open."

As darkness fell, the surviving artillerymen blew up their guns and cleared the way with bayonets and grenades to retreat north to Tahkun's battery.
In conditions of almost complete encirclement, the company of Captain M.I. Golovan from the 36th Engineering Construction Battalion made its way to the north. Colonel Konstantinov reported:

“For two days the soldiers of Captain Golovan held back the enemy’s onslaught. On October 15, having destroyed over three hundred Nazis, several anti-tank guns and five tankettes, they went on the offensive. The next day, when the Germans sent a battalion to the rear of the detachment, Golovan was ordered to retreat to Takhkuna. On the night of October 17, the brave commander with 120 soldiers and a 76-mm cannon fought his way through the enemy ring. In the battles for Kayina and Nymba, the enemy lost over seven hundred people killed.”

Until October 20, there were fierce, bloody battles. General Kabanov was ordered to begin the evacuation from Khium. The chief of staff of the Hanko naval base, Captain 1st Rank P.G. Maksimov, was also here, who flew in to draw up a preliminary evacuation plan together with the commandant of the island. For three nights, starting on October 19, boats and motorboats approached the island under shelling and bombing.
For three days the Khankovites carried out the defenders of Khium. In the last days of the fighting, they took people who stood chest-deep in water, but continued to fight the fascists. More than six hundred people were evacuated to Hanko and Osmussar.
The last battle at Tahkuna was fought by only a few sailors who managed to retreat along the rocky ridge to the sea. They fought to the death. The last survivor climbed the forty-meter lighthouse. In front of the Nazis, he threw himself down from the lighthouse platform. The name of the hero is still unknown.

On Search Engine Forum Anna Akhmedovna Zeil names the name of this sailor - Nikolay Chizh.

In August '41. Travel to the island of Saaremaa

The island of Saaremaa in modern Russia is not known to many. Meanwhile, historically, he played a very important role for our country in both world wars of the 20th century. A role, alas, unreasonably forgotten in the chronicles and historical textbooks of a great power... On the eve of the 76th anniversary of the first bombing of Berlin, we drove the new Skoda Kodiaq to Saaremaa to find the very place from where in August 1941 Soviet pilots carried out the most daring and desperate operation of the first year of the great war

text: Vladimir Makkaveev / photo: the author and Skoda / 08/04/2017

How to get to Saaremaa island

To get from Russia by car to the island of Saaremaa (or the island of Ezel, as it was called before), you need to overcome the Russian-Estonian border and cross almost the entire Baltic country. It is the border that in most cases serves as the determining factor when planning a route to Estonia. There are not many crossings, but the approaches to them make you think... If you travel from St. Petersburg, then the shortest route lies through Ivangorod and Narva and further along the Baltic coast to Tallinn. However, the Narva crossing is very busy today, you can stand here for many hours, so some St. Petersburg residents prefer to make a detour and enter Estonia through one of the Pskov checkpoints that are free on weekdays. When starting from Moscow, the Pskov option is all the more optimal, but here another question arises: what is the best way to get to Pskov - along the “Leningradka” or “new Riga”. This question was not raised before: the high-speed Novorizhskoye Highway definitely made the southern route faster than the northern one. However, this year, the global redevelopment of roads in the vicinity of Velikie Luki, endless repairs along the border with Latvia and new high-speed sections of the M11 toll highway have practically equalized these two routes in terms of time and labor costs.

From the Pskov checkpoint “Shumil Kino” to Virtsu, from where the ferry departs to the islands of the Moonsund archipelago, there is only 300 km left to travel, but taking into account provincial Estonian roads and speed limits, this journey will take at least four hours, or even more, since it is several kilometers away Another large-scale road repair with reverse traffic awaits you from Virtsu. You can use this forced stop to buy an electronic ferry ticket to Kuivastu from your phone or tablet (www.praamid.ee). The operation is simple, but it will significantly save time on standing in lines at the cash register and on loading. Happy e-ticket holders travel without a queue and in separate lanes. There is no need to print the ticket; the system itself reads the car number. In case of delay, the electronic ticket is automatically extended to the next ferry, which operate at intervals on average of 40 minutes to an hour.

The ferry ride to Muhu Island takes about 25 minutes. During this time, you can have a hearty snack in a very decent cafe on the middle deck or admire the views of the Moonsund Strait - the same one where the Russian Imperial Fleet took its last battle in the fall of 1917.

MOONSUND

Between Russia and Germany in the First World War there were fierce battles in the Baltic. To the credit of the Russian fleet, which survived the shame of Tsushima, from 1914 to 1917 the Kaiser’s battleships never managed to fully establish themselves in the Baltic. This became possible thanks to the wise actions of the commander of the Baltic Fleet, Vice-Admiral von Essen, and the batteries of Cape Tserel on the island of Ezel. The dramatic events that unfolded in these places were later described in Valentin Pikul’s novel “Moonzund” and filmed in the Soviet film of the same name starring Oleg Menshikov, Evgeny Evstigneev, Nikolai Karachentsov and Valery Gostyukhin. The Svorbe Peninsula, with Cape Tserel jutting deep into the Irbe Strait, became a key Russian position in the defense of the Gulf of Riga. Here, among the sand dunes overgrown with grass, the concrete bases of the guns of the famous 43rd battery, commanded by Senior Lieutenant Bartenev, who became the prototype of the Pikulevsky starley Artenev, still stand today.

The battles for the archipelago reached their climax in October 1917.

The denouement came on October 16 in the Moonsund Strait: the Germans broke through into the coveted Gulf of Riga, but, despite the defeat, the Moonsund Battle did not become the second Tsushima for Russia, rather the opposite.

As a result of the operation, the German fleet occupied the Gulf of Riga and the Moonsund archipelago, but this cost it nine ships sunk and the actual loss of combat capabilities for a whole year, while the Russian fleet lost only two ships. One of them, however, turned out to be the squadron battleship “Slava”, sunk in the Moonsund fairway, just one and a half kilometers south of the ferry route that carries our Kodiaq to Muhu Island.

The battleship Slava was sunk in Moonsund just 1.5 km from where the ferry passes. In the 1930s Estonians dismantled Slava for scrap metal

Muhu, the third largest of the Moonsund archipelago islands, can be crossed by car in 15–20 minutes. But if you want to be curious and plunge into the life and history of the island, you can look into the open-air museum on the way - the ancient Estonian village of Koguva.

Loading and unloading the ferry takes just minutes

A 2.5-kilometer causeway connects Muhu to Saaremaa, Moonsund's largest island. It will take at least several days to go around and examine only the main attractions of Ezel - the Kaali meteorite crater, the ancient Angla mill complex, the high cliffs of the Panga Peninsula and, of course, the Russian batteries at Cape Tserel. Not to mention the capital of the island itself - the amazingly cute town of Kuressaare, as if straight out of the pages of American novels of the 19th century, with its medieval castle, in the donjon of which there is a museum of the Soviet occupation. But today we are more interested not in the tourist attractions of Saaremaa, but in the forgotten field airfield 10 km northwest of Kuressaare...

“MY PLACE IS BERLIN...”

After the fall of Tserel's batteries, Russian, or rather now Soviet, troops returned to Saaremaa only shortly before the start of World War II, on the eve of Estonia's annexation to the USSR. The construction of new batteries began on Tserele, and on the outskirts of the village of Kogula the field airfield “Kagul” (as it was called in Soviet military documents) was built, which at the end of the summer of 1941 was destined to write one of the most glorious pages in the bleak history of the first year of the Great Patriotic War. Patriotic War...

Saaremaa Island - attractions

The majestic Kuressaare Castle

At the end of fiery July 1941, the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral Kuznetsov, unexpectedly reported to Stalin about the possibility of bombing Berlin from the island of Ezel. From Saaremaa (which by that time was already deep in the rear of the Wehrmacht, but was still not occupied by the Germans) to the German capital in a straight line across the Baltic was only 850 km, which theoretically allowed DB-3 bombers to fly to Berlin and return back. Against the backdrop of the collapse of the Red Army, the idea of ​​bombing Berlin in August 1941 looked fantastic and delighted Stalin. The 1st mine and torpedo air regiment of the Baltic Fleet Air Force, Colonel Preobrazhensky, was urgently transferred to Saaremaa: they were in a hurry, since the Germans could any day remember about the island they had recklessly forgotten in their rear.

The wooden houses of the capital of Saaremaa seem to have stepped out of the pages of a 19th century novel.

On the evening of August 7, 11 DB-3, straining to accelerate along the Cahula dirt strip, rose into the Baltic sky and rushed west - towards the setting sun. Some of them went off course, eventually bombing Königsberg and Kolberg: navigation in the pitch-dark Baltic sky was too difficult. But four DB-3 groups of Colonel Preobrazhensky (led by captains Grechishnikov, Plotkin and Lieutenant Dashkovsky) by 1:30 a.m. reached the outskirts of Berlin and from a height of 5500 meters brought down the first weapon of retaliation in the history of the Patriotic War on the carefreely illuminated capital of the Wehrmacht. “My place is Berlin! Completed the task. I'm coming back! - a few minutes later, Vladimir Krotenko, gunner-radio operator of Preobrazhensky, transmitted to the base. All 11 aircraft did return safely. And in the morning, the stunned Germans announced on the radio that “up to 150 British planes tried to bomb Berlin at night.” But this was only the beginning... In a month, from August 7 to September 5, 1941, while Wehrmacht units were rushing to Moscow, Red Banner Baltic Fleet pilots made nine raids on Berlin from Saaremaa. Having carried out a total of 88 combat missions, they dropped 620 (21 tons) bombs on the capital of the Reich. Five pilots of the regiment led by Preobrazhensky and five long-range aviation pilots of the Leningrad Front were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union...

The church where the Preobrazhensky Communist Party was located in August 1941

So why was the heroic epic of the bombing of Berlin from the island of Ezel in August-September 1941 so unfairly forgotten by Soviet historians? There is still no official answer to this question. But I think two tragic facts played a key role in this. The first of them is entirely on the conscience of the “father of nations”: having felt the taste of the first victory, Stalin began to demand that bombers fly to Berlin with at least a ton of bombs under the fuselage instead of 750 kg. DB-3s with worn-out engines, and even from the dirt strips of Cahul and the neighboring Aste airfield, were not able to lift such a weight. But Stalin, as we know, who understood aviation better than anyone else, sent the chief tester of the Air Force, Vladimir Kokkinaki, to Saaremaa with a categorical order to “force the sailors to take off with a ton under their belly.” Result: two planes crashed during an attempt to take off and a burned-out crew - Preobrazhensky’s regiment did not suffer such losses in one day even in the skies over Berlin. It is not surprising that the USSR preferred not to remember the heroic epic of Saaremaa after the war. Moreover, part of the flight and technical personnel of the airfield could not even be removed from the island: by mid-September there were no aircraft or fuel left on Ezel. The fate of those remaining on Saaremaa is still unknown. On October 4, 1941, the last radiogram came from Ezel: “I’m closing the radio watch, I’m going into battle, the last battle... Farewell, farewell.” At 16:10, communication with the heroic garrison of the island ceased forever.

Colonel Preobrazhensky and his navigator Captain Khokhlov

The regiment's flagship navigator, Captain Khokhlov, in his DB-3

EPILOGUE

Contrary to expectations, finding that very field airfield “Cahul” turned out to be not so difficult. The concrete post-war runway of Soviet jet aircraft, preserved on the edge of the forest, helped. But of course, nothing remains of the 1941 field airfield itself, the runway of which was located on the same field a little to the left. Except perhaps the old church that stood on the edge of the “take-off”, which housed the Preobrazhensky command post in August 1941. It was then that the dome was removed from the temple so that bombers would not touch it during takeoff and landing. Before the collapse of the USSR, in memory of the heroic events of 1941, there was at least a memorial concrete slab on this field. But after gaining independence, the Estonians broke it and dragged it somewhere into the forest. Local residents admitted that they came across it a couple of times, but could not remember where exactly... We managed to find the only monument to the heroic pilots who flew from Saaremaa to bomb Berlin in August 1941 at the Kogula cemetery, where in a mass grave Several crews who crashed during takeoffs and landings are buried. Among others, the name of Lieutenant Nikolai Dashkovsky, the commander of one of the four crews that dropped the first bombs on Berlin on the night of August 8, 1941, will be written on the gray stone. Returning from another flight, his DB-3 was just a little short of reaching the Cahul runway: it ran out of fuel...

The Moonsund Archipelago is a group of islands in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea, separating it from the waters of the Gulf of Riga. In total, the archipelago includes over 500 islands, including 4 large ones: Saaremaa (Ezel), Hiuma (Dago), Muhu (Moon) and Vormsi. The geographical position of the Moonsund Islands, separated from the mainland by the rather narrow Soela-Väin and Muhu-Väin straits, made them extremely important in the matter of military control, both over the Gulf of Riga and over the eastern Baltic in general.

Before the First World War, the Moonsund archipelago belonged to the Russian Empire. In September-October 1917, as a result of the Moonsund operation, Kaiser Germany was able to capture the archipelago. But German control over the archipelago was short-lived. As a result of the Treaty of Versailles in 1920, the islands came under the jurisdiction of newly independent Estonia.

In 1940, after the Baltic republics joined the USSR, the Moonsund archipelago again returned to the control of the Russian state represented by the Soviet Union.

The Second World War, which had begun by that time, again aggravated the importance of the archipelago in a military-geographical sense. In the same 1940, the formation of units of the coastal defensive Baltic region (BOBR) began. The construction of coastal fortifications, the equipment of positions for coastal batteries, as well as the equipment of bases for the Baltic Fleet began on the islands. Unfortunately, our country did not have time to fully implement all the planned work by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. It was possible to equip a significant defense system only in the western and northwestern directions. On the mainland side, the islands were virtually unprotected. But even in its unfinished state, the defensive area on the Moonsund archipelago had a significant influence on the course of events in the first months of the War.

The German command was also well aware of the exceptional military significance of the archipelago. Attempts to destroy the infrastructure on the islands began from the very first days of the War. German aviation repeatedly tried to crush the defenses of the archipelago, but the Reich command did not dare to undertake large-scale landing operations.

Beginning in July 1941, all military units, including the fleet and aviation, were reassigned to the commandant of the archipelago, General Eliseev.

Also, the BOBr troops were entrusted with the following tasks:

1. Defend the Moonsund Islands.
2. By periodic actions, disrupt enemy sea communications in the Gulf of Riga and the Irben Strait.
3. Provide trawling, anti-submarine defense and other types of defense in your area.
4. Ensure access to the Baltic Sea and the return of submarines, which could enter the Baltic Sea and return to their bases only through Moonsund and Soela-Vain.

The first months of the War were extremely difficult for our country. A series of defeats and retreat on all fronts affected the morale of the army. Germany was already rejoicing in anticipation of an imminent victory. On July 22, 1941, the first massive raid on Moscow was carried out. Goebbels' department trumpeted the imminent victory of the Reich and the complete defeat of Soviet aviation.

The fallacy of such statements was soon refuted by Soviet pilots. By the end of July 1941, the only territory not captured by the Germans from which our aircraft could attack Berlin remained the Moonsund Archipelago. Then the Headquarters decided to launch such a strike. The necessary logistical and technical means were secretly transferred to the islands, and the airfields of the archipelago were expanded to accommodate long-range aviation. On August 7, 1941, the 1st mine and torpedo aviation regiment of the Baltic Fleet, based on the island of Ezel, launched the first bomb attack on Berlin. In total, in August, Baltic pilots carried out about 10 massive raids. The actions of our aviation dealt a serious blow to the reputation of Goebbels’ department and infuriated Hitler, while simultaneously dispelling the myth of the invincibility and invulnerability of the Reich.

Despite the fact that Riga was abandoned by Soviet troops on July 1, 1941, the German command was able to begin the operation to capture the Moonsund Islands only in September 1941. All this time, BOBR aviation and naval forces largely constrained the actions of the German fleet in the eastern Baltic, thereby gaining invaluable time to prepare the defense of Leningrad.

The position of the defenders of the archipelago became seriously complicated when Tallinn fell. The Soviet command, under the threat of a complete blockade of the Baltic Fleet in the waters of the Gulf of Riga, was forced to withdraw ships based on the Moonsund Islands to Kronstadt and Leningrad. Thus, the garrison defending Moonsund was virtually isolated from supplies from the mainland.

On September 14, 1941, enemy troops landed on Muhu Island in two places - Kuivaste and Kalaste. The island's garrison, consisting of two battalions of the 79th Infantry Regiment and a pair of incomplete engineering and construction companies, put up stubborn resistance, almost completely destroying the landing force at Calaste. The Germans gained a foothold at Kuivaste and, having transferred more than four battalions there in one day, went on the offensive.

On the morning of the same day, the enemy made another attempt to land on the south-eastern coast of the island of Saaremaa with more than 40 ships. Having attacked from two directions, the Germans were repulsed everywhere. 12 boats and 2 trawlers were sunk by well-aimed fire from coastal batteries, up to 20 other ships were damaged, and the survivors hastened to retreat.

At the same time, the Nazis twice carried out an airborne assault on the Kybassare peninsula, but they were all destroyed by the personnel of coastal battery No. 43. Later, when the enemy invaded the island of Saaremaa, the battery soldiers again showed examples of courage and heroism. Finding themselves completely surrounded, they fought until the last shell, and then fought their way out of the encirclement..

It was a heroic battery. Its commander, Senior Lieutenant V.G. Bukotkin, being wounded (he received eleven shrapnel wounds), continued to command the battery until he lost consciousness. After the battery soldiers retreated to the Syrve Peninsula, Bukotkin, not yet recovering from his wounds, continued to direct the actions of the coastal battery.

When repelling enemy landings, the Muhu garrison defended literally every inch of land. A detachment of volunteers came to his aid from the island of Saaremaa. The fighting on the island lasted three days, the defending units suffered heavy losses and on September 17, by order of the command, they retreated to Saaremaa along the Orissara dam, after which they blew it up.

Even after blocking units of the Red Army, the Germans were unable to achieve a quick victory here. By the end of September, about 1,500 people remained in the ranks of the defenders of the archipelago with weak weapons and an insignificant supply of ammunition. There were no longer equipped defense lines on the peninsula, so the command of the Baltic defensive region decided to leave the Sõrve peninsula. Its defenders retreated to Cape Tserel and from there began to evacuate to the island of Hiiumaa on torpedo boats and motorboats. But it was not possible to transport most of the soldiers. The boats sent to rescue them were unable to reach the Sõrve Peninsula due to the storm and incessant shelling from the enemy. On October 4, the last telegram from the archipelago was received in Moscow, after which communication with the defenders of the island of Saaremaa was interrupted. The Moonsund defensive operation lasted more than a month and a half and was completed on October 22, 1941, when the remnants of the units defending the archipelago were evacuated to the Hanko Peninsula and Kronstadt.

And although it was not possible to hold the islands, their heroic defense seriously influenced the course of events in the Leningrad direction. The defenders of Moonsund managed to pin down significant forces of Army Group North, as well as limit the actions of the German fleet in the Baltic. All this, in turn, made it possible to better prepare Leningrad for defense and maintain the combat effectiveness of significant forces of the Baltic Fleet.

During the offensive of 1941, German troops significantly advanced east in the Leningrad direction and almost completely blocked the “northern capital”, but they still failed to achieve their main goals. Leningrad survived, and with it the Baltic Fleet survived. Although the Baltic suffered serious losses, the fleet remained a serious force capable of radically changing the balance of power in the Baltic Sea. By mid-1942, the front had finally stabilized. Relative calm continued until the beginning of 1944.

Baltic people in an internment camp in Sweden

In the list of losses of the Baltic Fleet at the beginning of the war, attention is drawn to a group of our auxiliary minesweepers, former tugs of the Izhorets type, with the same, but unusual fate:
TSCH No. 82 (used tug No. 23) on September. 1941 interned in Sweden, returned to the USSR in 1945
TSCH No. 85 (used tug No. 29) on September. 1941 interned in Sweden, returned to the USSR in 1945
TSCH No. 87 (used tug No. 34) on September. 1941 interned in Sweden, returned to the USSR in 1945
TSCH No. 89 (used tug No. 83) on September. 1941 interned in Sweden, returned to the USSR in 1945

The case is, in general, unique for the Soviet fleet. The tracks led to the legendary Moonsund, dating back to the First World War. They were interested in the circumstances of the internment: whether the exodus to Sweden was the only possible step in that situation or whether there was an unauthorized fact of surrender of a military unit with weapons. Here's what we found:

MOONSUND-41

A map that gives an idea of ​​where the Soviet units closest to Moonsund were located. Hanko is the closest. And he held out until the winter of 1941.

In September 1941, the Moonsund defensive operation unfolded, during which ours held the islands of the archipelago of the same name on the western coast of Estonia: Saaremaa (Ezel), Hiiumaa (Dago), Muhu (Moon) and Vormsi. The Germans, in addition to their strategic interest in this section of the Baltic Sea, had the task of stopping Soviet bomber raids on Berlin, which caused significant propaganda damage to Germany. Our planes then took off from the island of Ezel.
By September 1941, the operational situation in the North-West had become critical. The Germans captured Tallinn, forcing the Baltic Fleet to make a difficult transition to Kronstadt, and were already approaching Leningrad. The entire southern coast of the Gulf of Finland was occupied. On the northern shore of the bay, he fired back from the Finns of the Hanko Peninsula. There, ultimately, the defenders of Moonsund were partially evacuated.
October 13 An order was received from the command to evacuate the personnel of the Hiuma garrison to Hanko and Osmussar Island. The next day in the evening the evacuation began. By October 22, 570 people had been evacuated. The rest could not be evacuated for a number of reasons.

Minesweeper (former tug) "Izhorets"

PART 1. ESCAPE

There is not much information about the flight of the Moonsund defenders from the islands. There is an article in "Top Secret", but it is impossible to take it completely seriously, since it is written in the howling perestroika style. It mentions two former minesweepers No. 82 and No. 89 (initially minesweepers No. 62 and No. 69 appeared in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs documents), which, in the evening September 21 1941 (this was before the order for a general evacuation came) having left Ezel (the Germans established control on the island in early October), after a short journey we found ourselves in Sweden with the intention of interning, i.e. surrender to the authorities of a non-belligerent country. Did all the officers, civilians and enlisted personnel on deck know about the destination? Hardly.
Sweden at that time, although it was neutral, was definitely not a country friendly to the USSR after the Winter War, and it, like other European “neutrals” such as Portugal, can be called a “non-combatant sympathizer” of the Reich.

The map shows that the fighting on Ösel and Dago continued until October, while the ships that reached Sweden left on September 21. Why on this day? September 20 was the date when the Germans made the most progress in their offensive on the island. The Soviet command partially lost control of the situation. The Germans, having complete air supremacy, pinned the defenders of Ezel to the ground and made it impossible to receive outside help. The situation was becoming critical.
By this time, on the island, in addition to its defenders, a large number of military personnel, members of their families, administrative workers, builders of defense structures, sappers, sailors from faulty ships and vessels had accumulated on the island. There was even a district ensemble, the artist from which was later picked up from the water by the Germans, having shot down a seaplane that had taken off from Ezel.
There were cases of panic. The Germans took many prisoners.

And at this moment, minesweepers sent to a neighboring island of the archipelago to evacuate the personnel of the aviation unit suddenly unexpectedly find themselves in Sweden. It is probably worth paying attention to the fact that among the passengers there were a decent number of officers and junior commanders.
One more detail: from the Hanko Peninsula, the distance from which to Sweden is much shorter, there were no mass cases of internment. True, then, at the end of 1941, the situation on the fronts had already changed: the triumphal march of the Wehrmacht was slowly fading away and the evacuation from Hanko was organized.

Why did you decide to go to Sweden? The defenders of the islands had few options: try to reach Hanko on the remaining auxiliary ships, cross over to partisans in Estonia and Latvia, or go on foot to their own, surrender.
Of the entire list of Moonsund auxiliary minesweepers, one (No. 88) subsequently ended up in Leningrad. That is, a sea crossing for this type of vessel was, in principle, possible. Defense commander Hanko Kabanov recalls that on October 21, small boats and boats came to them from Hiuma. Those who wanted and were able got there, despite the opposition of the Germans and Finns.

It was difficult to get from the archipelago to territories not occupied by the enemy. The options that were chosen: Gotland Island (Sweden) and the Swedish coast itself. Although they were physically further than the Soviet base on Hanko. Without taking into account wind, currents and the activity of the enemy's air force and navy.

TWO CAMPS

Apparently, after landing on the Swedish coast

Internees follow armed escort into the camp

From the moment our sailors landed on the Swedish coast, the history of internment camp No. III (Swedish: III Interneringslägret) near Büringe (Södermanland, Sweden) begins. It held 164 Soviet citizens. In addition to those who came on minesweepers, our military personnel were kept here, who later got out by boat from the Moonsund Islands to the Swedish island. Gotland.
There were several more camps in Sweden where Russians who had escaped from German captivity from Norwegian territory were kept.